total electrical failure this morning

I am somewhat at a loss....(longer post shortened)
This is a ridiculous response. I hope to never be faced with the emergency situation described here, and I'm sure I would fail to do everything my CFI taught me, or everything in the POH. The "win" here is to land safely and tell everyone on POA about it. Great job to OP!
 
I'm sure I would fail to do everything my CFI taught me, or everything in the POH.
I think some people came down a little hard on the OP, I think it takes courage to post personal stories on a web forum. But hopefully you don't honestly mean though that during an inflight emergency you would literally "fail to do everything" you were taught :eek:

The "win" here is to land safely and tell everyone on POA about it
That's why we're taught the things we are taught by our CFIs and what's in the POH, to get back safely. The OP did a lot of things right, he turned back, he tried the xponder, relied on his friend for help, was vigilant of traffic, etc. Frankly until reading this thread I wouldn't have tried cycling the master either, or if I was close to home or an airport I wouldn't do *too* much troubleshooting either. Probably just load shed and entered the pattern normally for traffic reasons
 
Your statement is incorrect. Most older aircraft typically have fuel and oil pressure gauges that are not electrical. A line from the engine is routed to the gauge. That is not true of temperature gauges which normally consist of an electric gauge and a sending unit on the engine. Typically in newer aircraft, fuel and oil pressure gauges are electric.

Cessna's oil temp gauges were mechanical up until about 1978 or thereabouts. Then they went electric. Fuel pressure was mechanical up until more recently than that.
 
But hopefully you don't honestly mean though that during an inflight emergency you would literally "fail to do everything" you were taught :eek:
I would not fail to do _anything_, but I'm sure I would fail to do _everything_, yes. I feel sure that faced with a true emergency, I would struggle to do everything perfectly.
 
I would not fail to do _anything_, but I'm sure I would fail to do _everything_, yes. I feel sure that faced with a true emergency, I would struggle to do everything perfectly.

Then you just aren't a superior pilot and your instructor was incompetent and the Pilot Examiner who gave you your checkride failed by passing you. There is no place in the NAS for inferior pilots, I would say that I hope I don't share airspace with you, but then I remember that I too am an inferior pilot, so yeah, I agree with you, it would be hard to be perfect. We hope we can be adequate enough. There are fewer of these posts because of the way people are treated when they do post which is really sad because so much can be learned from them. ****THE BEGINNING OF THIS POST IS SARCASM****
 
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I would not fail to do _anything_, but I'm sure I would fail to do _everything_, yes. I feel sure that faced with a true emergency, I would struggle to do everything perfectly.
touche, good distinction there. and that's where good ADM comes into play.. I'm sure there are times when doing "everything" methodically is not appropriate either

There are fewer of these posts because of the way people are treated when they do post which is really sad because so much can be learned from them
Yeah the "Lessons Learned" is a favorite of mine to read, as are the "I learned about flying from that" in Flying Mag
 
****THE BEGINNING IF THIS POST IS SARCASM****

You fail miserably at sarcasm. Your sarcasm instructor must not have used a valid syllabus and he was in cahoots with your sarcasm examiner.

Don't despair, the remedial course of study at the sarcasm academy is available plus you can add courses in pointless interwebz argument and straw man construction.
 
You fail miserably at sarcasm. Your sarcasm instructor must not have used a valid syllabus and he was in cahoots with your sarcasm examiner.

Don't despair, the remedial course of study at the sarcasm academy is available plus you can add courses in pointless interwebz argument and straw man construction.

I can go back and correct a typo.........as for being an *******, well that is almost irreversible.
 
I can go back and correct a typo.........as for being an *******, well that is almost irreversible.
You will also need to add a course in sense of humor development.
 
@nj-pilot
The thing is thank God these planes were designed by really smart people who knew or anticipated that the requirement to do everything perfectly every time would result in a tremendous amount of planes falling from the sky. I did lots of things wrong in this situation( wrong in the sense of how a CFI would teach you to respond) but I fully maintain I did lots of things well enough that the outcome was really not in doubt. Here's the one thing I think we all need to remember when confronted with an emergency, "FLY THE PLANE." That's what kept going through my head thoughout the ordeal. If the plane has an engine working use the engine for what it is meant to do, keep the airplane in the air. Don't make the situation worse if the engine is working that's all that really matters!

The other thing was "how can I give myself the most outs if I need them." These two maxis were the guiding principles I used. They may not be textbook correct but I think they would work in nearly every situation minus catostrophic failures.

Thanks for the kind words.
 
Here is some good info from the AOPA web site. Click here.

Just some food for thought, if anyone here is hungry for it.

Here are some pertinent excerpts for those who want it easy.

"Emergency or Abnormal Situation?
In emergencies, context is everything. The location. The weather. The pilot. The aircraft. The circumstances in which a problem occurs can make it a virtual non-event—or turn it into a nightmare. For example, an engine failure at 5,000 agl, in perfect weather, with 20 suitable landing spots within gliding distance provides a lot more options than one at 300 agl during a night takeoff. Many “emergencies” that pilots face can be qualified as “abnormal”—not business as usual, but not a source of immediate or grave danger. That’s an important distinction."

"Troubleshooting
If the problem is mechanical or electrical, it may not be immediately obvious what’s wrong. Given time, attempt to determine the cause—both because it might be fixable and on the chance that you can keep it from getting worse, or causing other problems."

"
Electrical Failure
An electrical failure at night or in IMC is a serious emergency. Troubleshoot the obvious first. If the cockpit suddenly went dark, did you accidentally hit the master switch? If the ammeter is showing a discharge (or a zero reading on a load-type ammeter), the alternator may have tripped offline. Follow POH procedures for a reset. If the issue can’t be resolved, start reducing electrical load to the essentials: Drop back to one radio and minimal navigation gear, shut down unnecessary lights, and turn off anything else that’s drawing power. Stay in VMC if possible. If it’s IMC, declare an emergency and divert."

Of course, the POH and your emergency checklist take precedence over this article but I think the article adds value to the discussion.

But I'm certain that some on here will consider this post ridiculous, being a know it all, or something of that nature. I can only reply, bless your heart.

I do not claim to be the sharpest knife in the drawer but I am far from the dullest. However I am always reading and always listening to others to sharpen my edge a little more. Maybe others could stand to do the same.

I will close with one final thought. I attended a safety management course a couple years ago. One of the things the instructor said that really stuck with me is that you cannot always judge a system by its result. He added, just because you didn't kill anyone or crash doesn't mean you were operating safely.
 
Here is some good info from the AOPA web site. Click here.

Just some food for thought, if anyone here is hungry for it.

Here are some pertinent excerpts for those who want it easy.

"Emergency or Abnormal Situation?
In emergencies, context is everything. The location. The weather. The pilot. The aircraft. The circumstances in which a problem occurs can make it a virtual non-event—or turn it into a nightmare. For example, an engine failure at 5,000 agl, in perfect weather, with 20 suitable landing spots within gliding distance provides a lot more options than one at 300 agl during a night takeoff. Many “emergencies” that pilots face can be qualified as “abnormal”—not business as usual, but not a source of immediate or grave danger. That’s an important distinction."

"Troubleshooting
If the problem is mechanical or electrical, it may not be immediately obvious what’s wrong. Given time, attempt to determine the cause—both because it might be fixable and on the chance that you can keep it from getting worse, or causing other problems."

"
Electrical Failure
An electrical failure at night or in IMC is a serious emergency. Troubleshoot the obvious first. If the cockpit suddenly went dark, did you accidentally hit the master switch? If the ammeter is showing a discharge (or a zero reading on a load-type ammeter), the alternator may have tripped offline. Follow POH procedures for a reset. If the issue can’t be resolved, start reducing electrical load to the essentials: Drop back to one radio and minimal navigation gear, shut down unnecessary lights, and turn off anything else that’s drawing power. Stay in VMC if possible. If it’s IMC, declare an emergency and divert."

Of course, the POH and your emergency checklist take precedence over this article but I think the article adds value to the discussion.

But I'm certain that some on here will consider this post ridiculous, being a know it all, or something of that nature. I can only reply, bless your heart.

I do not claim to be the sharpest knife in the drawer but I am far from the dullest. However I am always reading and always listening to others to sharpen my edge a little more. Maybe others could stand to do the same.

I will close with one final thought. I attended a safety management course a couple years ago. One of the things the instructor said that really stuck with me is that you cannot always judge a system by its result. He added, just because you didn't kill anyone or crash doesn't mean you were operating safely.

To provide some context for this article based on my experiences I want to attempt to connect what went through my mind during the electrical failure.

The first line of the electrical failure section is exactly right. It reads to the effect that when an electrical failure occurs it may not be immediately clear what is happening. Whoever wrote that is 100% right and as I said numerous times this was my experience. I thought it was electrical but was not 100% certain. Some on here have acted all along like I should have immediately know what was going on and that within a short time pulled out the appropriate checklist and immediately within a few minutes had the entire situation troubleshooted correctly. Given the clues I had, no ammeter discharge, no low voltage light, radio and gas gauges not working I was not sure what was going on besides it had to be electrical because the engine still seemed fine! I'm attempting to share with people that it is not so simple to determine cause and appropriate responses when an actual event happens. All sorts of other thoughts keep coming into your head and it can take some serious priority setting to remain calm and have a successful outcome. It's easy to lose sight of the ultimate goal which is returning safely to the ground and become overwhelmed by tasks. What I'm most proud of is that I simplified my mission to getting back on the ground safely.

The troubleshooting section also further proves how my choices were in line with suggested guidelines. It says "given time attempt to figure out the cause of the problem." I figured I was having an electrical issue hence I attempted to determined the cause. It also says that troubleshooting may help fix the cause not will fix the cause. I've also suggested from the start that this is a key piece to the "in the moment thought process" I experienced. Could I have fixed the problem( no). I could have helped make myself safer by load shedding or recycling the master but fixing should be done on the ground.

Furthermore the first line says "in an emergency context is everything." This again has been a point I've made over and over again in that I still had a perfectly working engine. If I go messing around and try and fix a problem what's to say I don't create 4 more problems that could be potentially far worse. I was not in immediate or grave danger as the article hinted and as long as things remained that way, which I was confident they would given my knowledge that the engine would work without the electrical system and my anticipation that the flaps would not work on landing and thus my foresight to plan for a longer float on touchdown and to provide adequate spacing from the aircraft in front of me in the pattern, I should have a successful outcome.

What you shared with the community from the AOPA website is great and really seems to be insightful based on my experience.
 
You certainly achieved your main goal of returning home safely, and I never read one instance of where you labeled the electrical failure as an emergency. You sounded relatively calm and handled it well, overall. You have stated that you learned from it, and you've helped others learn, too. I'm sorry that you took such offense to my first post where I said that you were fixated on landing the plane immediately upon arrival to the runway. I think if this situation were to arise again, you would very likely fly a standard entry and pattern, especially after experiencing your straight in approach to a busy little field. Give 10 pilots the exact same live scenario and I'd bet there would be more than 4 different ways to handle it. Experience, knowledge, and skill all vary from one pilot to the next.
 
jspilot,

You've learned a lot since the flight and your thread on this forum. Outside looking in, this is how I see it. You posted your story. Some posted you should have ran the checklist. You got offended because you felt you did the right thing. Nothing wrong with what you did but you now know that you could have done it better and people who have more experience than you are pretty quick to point that out sometimes. You lived to fly another day and you learned from the experience. There's a saying that "experience is what you get just after you need it."

You ever had a family member give you tough love? That's how I see the responses in this thread. Nobody was out to berate you as a pilot and nobody was chest thumping that they're better than you. I'm one of the least experienced pilots on this forum and I too have received some tough love as a result of some of my posts here. Did it make me mad? Sure, but I got over it and more importantly, I learned from it.

There is another benefit to running the checklist that hasn't been mentioned here. It will help the mechanic charged with finding out the problem a lot quicker which will save money in the long run to the owner of the plane which someday could be you. Your post here although painful for you has helped a LOT more pilots than you know. Not everyone who read this thread has responded but most have learned from it and for that, thank you for sharing. Don't beat yourself up over it, learn from it and go fly with the new knowledge that if this ever happens again, you'll be a better pilot from the experience.

Oh and what Sully did wrong? He never flipped the switch which closed the airtight doors for a water landing. I learned that from a friend of mine who is an Airbus 320 pilot.
 
Oh and what Sully did wrong? He never flipped the switch which closed the airtight doors for a water landing. I learned that from a friend of mine who is an Airbus 320 pilot.
That's because it was at the end of the ditching checklist that was meant to be started at cruise altitude. They didn't have time to make it to the end. It wouldn't have mattered anyway because the tail section partially separated from the rest of the fuselage and water was going to rush in no matter what.
 
Oh I understand why. It was just another example of Monday morning quarterbacking and what could be done after the fact which is what this thread has become.
 
jspilot,

You've learned a lot since the flight and your thread on this forum. Outside looking in, this is how I see it. You posted your story. Some posted you should have ran the checklist. You got offended because you felt you did the right thing. Nothing wrong with what you did but you now know that you could have done it better and people who have more experience than you are pretty quick to point that out sometimes. You lived to fly another day and you learned from the experience. There's a saying that "experience is what you get just after you need it."

You ever had a family member give you tough love? That's how I see the responses in this thread. Nobody was out to berate you as a pilot and nobody was chest thumping that they're better than you. I'm one of the least experienced pilots on this forum and I too have received some tough love as a result of some of my posts here. Did it make me mad? Sure, but I got over it and more importantly, I learned from it.

There is another benefit to running the checklist that hasn't been mentioned here. It will help the mechanic charged with finding out the problem a lot quicker which will save money in the long run to the owner of the plane which someday could be you. Your post here although painful for you has helped a LOT more pilots than you know. Not everyone who read this thread has responded but most have learned from it and for that, thank you for sharing. Don't beat yourself up over it, learn from it and go fly with the new knowledge that if this ever happens again, you'll be a better pilot from the experience.

Oh and what Sully did wrong? He never flipped the switch which closed the airtight doors for a water landing. I learned that from a friend of mine who is an Airbus 320 pilot.

I appreciate this. You hit on exactly why I posted this story and that was to help others who may find themselves in this situation in the future. It could just save someone's life or at the very least help make us all more knowledgable.

Just to clarify, I was not offended by those offering help and I knew I did not do everything right. The only thing that got me was when people became disrespectful and started calling me an unsafe pilot or a dangerous pilot and painted me with such wide strokes that I became a menace to all who fly. That was out of line but good old constructive criticism has to become part of any reflection based discussion.

I love your quote about experience and how it comes after you need it. What a true statement!
 
I guess I missed the part about anyone calling you unsafe or dangerous but I'm glad you took my reply in the manner that it was intended.
 
Just to update here- the head of the place I rent with saw me today before I took off and told me that what happened was 2 of the cells in the battery had run completely dry. It was a bad battery that caused this whole ordeal! They replaced the battery and all works well!
 
Just to update here- the head of the place I rent with saw me today before I took off and told me that what happened was 2 of the cells in the battery had run completely dry. It was a bad battery that caused this whole ordeal! They replaced the battery and all works well!

Sounds like their maintenance needs a big shakeup. Electrolyte level checks are basic to any scheduled inspection. It takes a long time to dry a cell out like that. I'd be wondering what else isn't being looked after.
 
Just to update here- the head of the place I rent with saw me today before I took off and told me that what happened was 2 of the cells in the battery had run completely dry. It was a bad battery that caused this whole ordeal! They replaced the battery and all works well!
I found this snippet in my POH, your mechanic probably knows, but overcharging might be another issue that could cause the battery to do that:

-snip-
However, after thirty minutes of cruising flight, the ammeter
should be indicating less than two needle widths of charging
current. If the charging rate were to remain above this value on a
long flight, the battery would overheat and evaporate the electrolyte
at an excessive rate.
-snip-
 
Sounds like their maintenance needs a big shakeup. Electrolyte level checks are basic to any scheduled inspection. It takes a long time to dry a cell out like that. I'd be wondering what else isn't being looked after.

Hmmmm.... You have me thinking here.

I appreciate your hoensty. If something else goes then maybe I need to make a change.
 
Sounds like their maintenance needs a big shakeup. Electrolyte level checks are basic to any scheduled inspection. It takes a long time to dry a cell out like that. I'd be wondering what else isn't being looked after.

One odd issue occuring one time does not "a big shakeup" make. :rolleyes:
 
One odd issue occuring one time does not "a big shakeup" make. :rolleyes:

In my experience, if I find something like that it's almost always a hint that I will find many other shortcomings. Unless the voltage regulator is misadjusted and boiling the electrolyte off, there is no excuse whatever for the battery to run dry.
 
Your statement is incorrect. Most older aircraft typically have fuel and oil pressure gauges that are not electrical.

Oil pressure for sure. Most older planes have capillary tube gauges. While some older planes have purely mechanical gauges like the Cub's cork with a wire sticking out the top or the 170 wing root gauges, pretty much the standard for decades was and still is the automotive resistive float gauge which requires electricity.
 
Oh and what Sully did wrong? He never flipped the switch which closed the airtight doors for a water landing. I learned that from a friend of mine who is an Airbus 320 pilot.

Rumor back then was the aft FA panicked and opened the door after splash down. Heard that back then but never have heard anything about it since, and probably no mention of it in the NTSB report. So, probably not true. :dunno:
 
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Oil pressure for sure. Most older planes have capillary tube gauges. While some older planes have purely mechanical gauges like the Cub's cork with a wire sticking out the top or the 170 wing root gauges, pretty much the standard for decades was and still is the automotive resistive float gauge which requires electricity.

Don't forget the purely mechanical gauges near the wing roots of the PA-32 Saratoga IIs.

These are visible from the cockpit, but are flooded out on fillup long before the tank is full.
Yes, they have conventional electric resistance gauges to measure the quantity near the top of the tank. This dual metering is required by the long wing and the dihedral angle.

-Skip
 
Rumor back then was the aft FA panicked and opened the door after splash down. Heard that back then but never have heard anything about it since, and probably no mention of it in the NTSB report. So, probably not true. :dunno:

Here's the passage from the report:

According to flight attendant B, after the impact, she went into the aft galley and assessed the conditions outside of door 2L, at which time, she realized the airplane was in the water. Door 2L was “cracked” open, but it was unclear by whom.

Flight attendant B reported that a passenger came into the aft galley and lifted the handle of door 2L, “cracking” the door open; however, several passengers reported that the door was “cracked” open before they arrived in the aft galley.
Seeing how FA B's seat on the plane was next to 2L, it's conceivable she did attempt to open it, but no conclusion was reached by the NTSB. THe NTSB does point out that the rear doors should have remained above the water line according to the Airbus certification information.

Timbeck2 said:
Oh and what Sully did wrong? He never flipped the switch which closed the airtight doors for a water landing. I learned that from a friend of mine who is an Airbus 320 pilot.
There is a ditch switch on the pressurization panel that closes the outflow, ram air, and pack inlet VALVES on that system. While the report mentions the presence of the button, there's no other mention of it.

However, straight from Sully in an interview by Air & Space Magazine:
Yes, it’s called a ditching push button. And there was not time. We never got to the ditching push button on the checklist. It wouldn’t have mattered anyway. The vents that are normally open are small. And once the airplane touched the water, the contact opened holes in the bottom of the airplane much, much larger than all of the vents that this ditching push button was designed to close.

I cannot conceive of any ditching or water landing where it would help. Theoretically I understand why the engineers included it. It sounded like a good idea, but not in practice. We had a successful water landing, and even then, from seeing pictures of [the airplane] being removed from the river by a crane, there were much larger holes than the vents this button was designed to close.
 
Just wanted to add something I haven't seen mentioned regarding the flaps...

In a 172 with electric flaps, I'd think long and hard about whether to even try to extend the flaps with any sort of compromised electrical system, and I don't think I'd consider anything more than 10 degrees. It would be my luck that there might be just enough power left to get them down, but not enough to retract them in the event of the need for a go-around. Pilots do odd things at uncontrolled fields, and it would be horrible to be coming in with full flaps and no way to retract them, only to have someone suddenly turn out onto the runway directly in front of you.

By the way, I'd also second the idea to pickup a handheld and to keep it within easy reach. There are lots of things short of electrical failure that can disrupt radios, and a backup is a terrific idea, no matter which one you choose.
 
As a student, I ant to thank jspilot for sharing this story.

But critiquing (debriefing) is a hugely important thing to all pilots isn't it? That is how we ended up with checklists in the first place and refine them. I also learned from the critiques. I know I know nothing and this is definitely not s critique, I'm just trying to understand as much as possible so if it ever happens to me, I will make the best decisions. In reality of course, the fear and worry make one less focused than sitting safely at home imagining it. But it is important to first congratulate the OP for safely getting back, and then...I just feel like any pilot, all pilots, ought to critique (possibly less bombastic about it, but in a good natured "we're in this together" way) in order to help all of us be better in situations like this.

As I read the story, recent instruction went through my mind, I bet we all do that. As we read think "what would I do there?". One thing said in a recent intensive course I was in stuck with me. That the natural desire to land immediately can be dangerous. It was a scenario like this, and I had never thought about it in that way, where the instructor said basically (besides that we should fly the plane first and as soon as we can without impacting that, do the checklists) that "it is our first reaction to get safely on the ground, but as long as the motor is running you can gain some altitude, and fly in a circle or whatever to get calmed a little, to gather yourself, and prove to yourself that you aren't going to fall out of the sky....and then start working the checklists and think about options.

It made sense to me, knowing myself, that doing something like that, which means fighting th natural urge, could in fact help a lot. Obviously jspilot was successful, and that is the most important. But going through the story and comments and thinking about it definitely helped me.

So thanks again jspilot, and the folks that added ideas, or critique.

Edit to add: Just to be clear, this is in NO way a critique. I have the utmost respect for jspilot, and all the other pilots (pretty much any pilot) here and am just a punk kid (60 year old punk kid) and would not presume to critique an experienced pilot, specially when he was there and I wasn't. It's just me thinking out what I HOPE I might do in such a situation.

And we all have our skillsets. Personally I am a troubleshooter at my work. I love and am good at it, and electrical is up my alley as I am an electronics technician (or was..) so for me even though I may not want to, I'd see the value of gaining altitude for a comfort zone with more options for me, and when I feel ok..calmer hopefully, go through the list see if I can isolate the electrical problem.

But I can also picture myself kinda getting the feeling everything is closing in (will more things fail? Is this one part of a chain of failures?) and not following through on my "armchair plan".

Glad all are safe!
 
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As a student, I ant to thank jspilot for sharing this story.

But critiquing (debriefing) is a hugely important thing to all pilots isn't it? That is how we ended up with checklists in the first place and refine them. I also learned from the critiques. I know I know nothing and this is definitely not s critique, I'm just trying to understand as much as possible so if it ever happens to me, I will make the best decisions. In reality of course, the fear and worry make one less focused than sitting safely at home imagining it. But it is important to first congratulate the OP for safely getting back, and then...I just feel like any pilot, all pilots, ought to critique (possibly less bombastic about it, but in a good natured "we're in this together" way) in order to help all of us be better in situations like this.

As I read the story, recent instruction went through my mind, I bet we all do that. As we read think "what would I do there?". One thing said in a recent intensive course I was in stuck with me. That the natural desire to land immediately can be dangerous. It was a scenario like this, and I had never thought about it in that way, where the instructor said basically (besides that we should fly the plane first and as soon as we can without impacting that, do the checklists) that "it is our first reaction to get safely on the ground, but as long as the motor is running you can gain some altitude, and fly in a circle or whatever to get calmed a little, to gather yourself, and prove to yourself that you aren't going to fall out of the sky....and then start working the checklists and think about options.

It made sense to me, knowing myself, that doing something like that, which means fighting th natural urge, could in fact help a lot. Obviously jspilot was successful, and that is the most important. But going through the story and comments and thinking about it definitely helped me.

So thanks again jspilot, and the folks that added ideas, or critique.

Edit to add: Just to be clear, this is in NO way a critique. I have the utmost respect for jspilot, and all the other pilots (pretty much any pilot) here and am just a punk kid (60 year old punk kid) and would not presume to critique an experienced pilot, specially when he was there and I wasn't. It's just me thinking out what I HOPE I might do in such a situation.

And we all have our skillsets. Personally I am a troubleshooter at my work. I love and am good at it, and electrical is up my alley as I am an electronics technician (or was..) so for me even though I may not want to, I'd see the value of gaining altitude for a comfort zone with more options for me, and when I feel ok..calmer hopefully, go through the list see if I can isolate the electrical problem.

But I can also picture myself kinda getting the feeling everything is closing in (will more things fail? Is this one part of a chain of failures?) and not following through on my "armchair plan".

Glad all are safe!

I'm so glad you posted this. It makes my day really because this is the exact reason I posted in the first place-- to have other pilots think through the scenario for themselves and make themselves better for it! I'm really glad you are benefitting from my situation and that is great--especially as a student with so much flight time ahead of you! I don't take your post as a critique one bit.

Your post brought up a really interesting aspect of training that I wonder about having gone through this type of event. If this type of event happens we are taught to run a checklist( something I should have done) but I wonder how many pilots believe that this checklist will " fix" the problem and this could lead to a false sense of security in the sense that it is now safe to continue to fly the plane. In my case, the battery was burning fluid from the cells. It's entirely possible that if I would have run the checklist, gotten myself a "fix" continued to fly without urgently returning to the airport, that I could have possibly had a fire if the battery got too hot. That's far worse than just no radio, flaps and misreading fuel gauges. So while I agree their was no reason to panic in my situation( something I'm proud of myself for not doing) we can't, as pilots, take a false comfort in knowing the checklist might " fix" or "save" the flight.

An interestting note to this too is the checklist for this scenario( which I've now basically committed to memory) has as its final line "terminate flight". If the outcome of trying all the things above is still to "terminate flight" why waste anytime trying to see if items 1-7 work first. That's time, I'd argue, that you should be flying towards an airport anyway. If "terminate flight" was moved to number 1 on the checklist, and then once committed to landing, in this or similar scenario, you attempted to try and "fix" I'd be more inclined to agree with that flow. It seems like most flight instructors want you to run through the fixes first and then plan on how you will land. That seems backwards to me.
 
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John and Martha have a story they relate in their public presentations about deciding to press on after an alternator failure. It ends up with them setting down in a field. No need to panic over an electrical failure, but you don't want to go pressing on too long with one in most modern aircraft.
 
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