It was also a much greater risk than most LSR streamliners present. I crewed on a AA/FS that held Southern California Timing Association and Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile world records at Bonneville in 2011, both whose speeds were over 400 MPH, and therefore have knowledge and experience applicable to the subject.
The media is reporting the vehicle's parachute system failed, and the car was destroyed when it ran off the dry lake bed into terrain.
One can easily imagine the forces involved in a crash at speeds near 400 MPH, and an aircraft fuselage is not built to absorb that damage. The remains of the vehicle were almost certainly nothing more than bits of fragmented aluminum and a battered J-79.
I believe the main reason the runs were conducted at the Alvord dry lake bed in Oregon was because the vehicle did not meet safety standards of the Southern California Timing Association, and therefore would not be allowed to run at Bonneville or El Mirage. The SCTA conducts scheduled racing events at both venues, and SCTA safety regulations govern what vehicles are allowed to participate.
The SCTA safety standards require robust construction around the cockpit, specifying roll bar material, thickness, and placement. Other rules dictate how the running gear, drivetrain, and safety systems are to be built. SCTA inspectors have positive safety bias in evaluating the vehicles, and if they don't approve the manner of construction, the vehicle doesn't run. The fuselage structure itself precluded the installation of a primary roll cage to protect the driver.
The Instagram post below shows a photo of the North American Eagle and several areas of deficiency.
One issue of particular interest is that the parachute main lanyard attachment points are in the airstream, susceptible to damage from achieved 400+ MPH and planned Mach 1 wind loads and race course debris. The inline front wheels throw material from the dry lakebed course directly at the parachute main lanyards, so you can easily imagine what I'm saying.
The primary lanyards of the parachutes are also anchored below the vehicle center of mass. This is another safety violation. Upon deployment, the parachutes will impart a strong lifting force, destabilizing the vehicle at close to its maximum speed.
From the attachment points on the fuselage, the main lanyards of the parachutes were routed between the lid and body of the parachute tubes. The lid was unlatched via a driver operated cable mechanism, and a large spring between the lid and parachute was propelled into the slipstream, pulling out the parachute.
The buffeting of air at the back of the car would have caused violent whipping of the exposed lanyards at speed. Did their routing under the lid provide a point for substantial fraying damage to occur, resulting in failure of the lanyards upon opening the parachutes?
Other issues with the modified F-104 fuselage of the North American Eagle would not have passed SCTA inspection, the biggest one being the overall vehicle itself. The driver protection provided by the fuselage is completely deficient because it does not have a rollover and crash structure. The cockpit retains the original configuration, including the ejection seat (which I assume was inoperative).
Was proper engineering scrutiny performed on the axle support struts and fuselage attachment point reinforcements? There aren't redundant load paths for the strut. Alternate load paths on critical vehicle structure are a SCTA safety requirement.
The air deflectors mounted on the axle for downforce place huge loads on it at speed, and based on the size of the axle system, I wonder if the air loads have been calculated and accounted for. I doubt the rear axle, and particularly its support strut arrangement, would pass an SCTA inspection.
I noticed the parachute system defects immediately when I saw this Instragram post and photo on Tuesday night. The danger of exposing the system's attachment points and primary lanyards to the airstream and their improper mounting points should have been obvious to the designers, engineers, and constructors of the vehicle.
From an overall perspective, the use of an airplane fuselage for a land speed record vehicle was, IMO, improper, because it could not be successfully modified to conform with cardinal safety requirements.
While the death of Jessi Combs is tragic, it also illustrates the burden of responsibility on designers, engineers, and constructors that build vehicles which operate at the knife edge. There is no margin for error.
https://mobile.twitter.com/TheJessiCombs/status/1165400181350776838
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This is the Flashpoint LSR streamliner, which crashed while traveling 427 MPH in September 2018. I included this photo to illustrate the strength of a conventional streamliner's construction, and that surviving a 400+ MPH crash is possible. The complete destruction of the North American Eagle in a lower speed crash shows that converting an aircraft for LSR attempts is significantly more dangerous than utilizing proven technology.
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