Southwest oopsie - ‘woman partially sucked out of window’

[PaulS]

Mischaracterization.

At no time did I make this personal other than to say I'm comfortable with the process, and YMMV. That's it.

Fact: Until this week the FAA had not issued any AD or order to inspect the fan blades. ADs had been issued in 2010 and 2012 for different CFM engines. The airline was under no obligation to conduct other than routine/regular inspections absent an AD. That's fact. If you want to verify it, here's the link to the FAA AD database list of CFM ADs: https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/search/?q=CFM

Having dealt with both the FAA and other federal regulatory agencies (and having worked for one such agency in the past), the normal process - absent an "emergency order" - is to propose an AD and ask for comments. I have not read the actual comments (perhaps you have), but my understanding is that Southwest requested a longer compliance period. In either case - the proposed period or Southwest's request - this event occurred before that period would have ended IF the AD had been issued. It hadn't, so there was no mandatory compliance.

I can also state that most entities - commercial airlines all the way down to the bug smashers - take a view that doing work before an order (or AD) is final may well be counterproductive. Why? Because the specific requirements of the inspection may change, resulting in the need to redo (or cost more) for the inspection.

I'll make it personal to me - this does not apply to you: I owned a Commander 112TC for quite a while. The FAA came out with an AD that would have required major work on the tail feathers just to inspect the elevator spar for cracks. By major work, I mean removing the elevator from the plane, removing elevator ribs, removing the end caps, cleaning, inspection with certain gear, reassembling the elevator and ribs using new hardware, and reinstalling/rebalancing. A short time after the AD came out, an AMOC was released to permit the use of a borescope without removing the elevator from the plane (and without the potential damage from removing/reriviting the rib). Huge cost difference. I liken it to the difference between a full colonoscopy and the use of the new Cologard testing. I'll point out that such has nothing to do with you.

While this doesn't apply directly to the situation at hand, it does point out the risk/reward before an AD becomes final and the potential for a much better solution through an AMOC process. I'll also point to the Samsung Note 7 matter: Samsung issued a recall and warning without involving the CPSC - they got in trouble because it was not "official" and they were supposed to notify the CPSC, who was supposed to issue the recall, which Samsung was supposed to comply with. In other words, they got their hands slapped for taking their own action without government agency officialdom. From my experience in industry, I know that other companies wouldn't want to be similarly raked over the coals for doing things in the absence of an official order. Companies will deny that, but it does happen.

Am I comfortable that a woman died? No. Not in the least.

Did the process work? It worked as it was designed to work. There was no AD or order, Southwest had no mandate to comply, and frankly any inspection they did may not have complied with the final AD. Serious question: if you were running techops/QA for Southwest, what standard would you have inspected to absent an FAA order?

Should the process be changed? Good question. First we need to define the goal. The design the best process we can to achieve that goal. As an engineer who qualified for 6-sigma, I can tell you that it's a lot harder taking a system to eliminating the risk of even a single death in 9 years than it is to go from 1-2 major accidents/deaths a year to where we are now. Can it be done? Probably. Do we have the current process in place to do it? Probably not.

Yes, there will be lawsuits. Yes, Southwest will be held to account for what happened. And yes, the airline will point to the lack of a final FAA AD. The NTSB will also weigh in with recommendations.

Regulations cut both ways: they can help make things safer or consumer friendly, but at the same time they impose rigid requirements that discourage some voluntary actions that might improve things even more.

Ok Bill, long post, I have read it now. I get that there was no AD, it was proposed, apparently CFM wanted it done, but SW balked and was successful in getting the AD cancelled. We'll never know as to whether the AD would have prevented this, my guess is that what would have been learned by the AD probably would have been beneficial.

You asked if I was running Techops at SW would I have inspected the engines? My answer is, that depends. I think CFM knows pretty much exactly what happened here (with the first issue) and I think they probably have a solution, at least on paper. That failure last year would have had me leaning toward yes I would have wanted the inspections. The only thing that would have swayed me toward no would have been if the fracture last year was caused by a one off failure mechanism, such as a mechanic tool left in the intake, or some type of traceable accident. This problem isn't a bearing spalling, or a seal failure or gears wearing out prematurely, things that could have dozens of causes or failure mechanisms. This was the fracture of a blade, apparently due to micro fractures caused by fatigue. That narrows the problem scope in my opinion and short term anyway, an inspection would quickly buy time by removing any other damaged blades from service. Examination of these blades hopefully would have shed more light on what's going on and reflect whether the inspections needed to be broadened to other engines in this family by answering questions like are there material issues, is the part not designed well or other things. Now we have the shot gun approach, where most if not all of these engines will be inspected.


Sorry about the mischaracterization quip, you've actually been pretty reasonable in discussing this.

Here's a story from the Tribune, this is my favorite quote: ""Engine failures like this should not occur," Robert Sumwalt, chairman of the NTSB, said Wednesday."

http://www.chicagotribune.com/busin...ade-inspections-southwest-20180419-story.html

 

[PaulS]

I'm confused again. Is perfection the minimum acceptable standard, or not? If not, then people will die. If you're ok with less than perfection, as you say, then you must ok with that.

Lindberg, your confusion is because you make assumptions about my position you really shouldn't make. I've never asked for perfection, I suppose if you need to classify what I am asking for, it's reasonable diligence. Not doing the inspections was a mistake that probably cost this woman her life. There is no perfect or not perfect in that. There is just a part, that failed a year ago in one jet, due to micro fractures caused by fatigue, this is what we have gleaned from news reports. The inspections as I understand them, were an ultrasonic test of the blades, which one news report said would take about 10 hours per engine, I'm assuming that is the actual checking of the parts after they are removed.

So to answer your question, I'm ok with the risk involved in commercial aviation as long as the operators are using reasonable care to make sure the public is safe. I think allowing those planes to fly with fan blades in which an unexpected failure mechanism already caused catastrophic engine failure was not reasonable. I think the FAA learned a lesson here, one that may not bode well for other problems that arise that may not require immediate inspections, and that part is unfortunate. I have less sympathy for SW as I feel this was an economic decision over common sense, their lesson is on its way.

 

[RyanB]

So to answer your question, I'm ok with the risk involved in commercial aviation as long as the operators are using reasonable care to make sure the public is safe. I think allowing those planes to fly with fan blades in which an unexpected failure mechanism already caused catastrophic engine failure was not reasonable. I think the FAA learned a lesson here, one that may not bode well for other problems that arise that may not require immediate inspections, and that part is unfortunate. I have less sympathy for SW as I feel this was an economic decision over common sense, their lesson is on its way.

Easy to say that now, but before, the evidence wasn’t as well known and clear cut as it is now.

I think the 121 record speaks for itself by showing that operators are using reasonable care to ensure the safety of the public both mechanically and physically by way of human factors (crew training etc.)

 

[X3 Skier]

This whole rotor vs blade episode was the result of an assertion about rotor containment. I believe I know what rotor and blade containment mean in that context and I was attempting to explain the accepted definition and application of that requirement.

In my experience and as well as every one of the hundred or so design engineers I knew or know at GE, PWA, Rolls Royce and other manufacturers as will as the USAF, USN, NASA and the FAA, there’s a difference in Part 33 of the FAR between rotor failure, re containment, which in the business has always meant to be the discs and shaft and blade failure which is meant the blade above the attachment. The containment of the first isn’t and never has been required while the second has been. Apparently we are all wrong and all commercial engines do not meet the certification requirements.

Since the FAA has certified the CFM56-7B has met all requirements, whatever the requirement is, either the industry and government view or some other view that believes an exploding disc(s) operating at between 100 and 1400 degrees at several thousand RPM and weighing over a couple hundred pounds must be contained within the engine case, it really doesn’t matter. The FAA said the design was adequate.

Anyone who might question the FAA’s decision is free to petition the FAA to adhere to the higher containment level or better yet, ask them which containment view is their standard. I would caution when asking the FAA to carefully define the terms.

Edit: I believe, as do others, that the process dealing with the recent blade failures is adequate. Some do not. No sense in discussing that and I haven’t lately since nothing will convince those who believe it is inadequate. That’s not the purpose of the blade vs rotor containment posts by me. It is to try and explain what containment means in certification.


Cheers

 

[X3 Skier]

I’m surprised that no one has mentioned the fan blade failures in earlier versions of the CFM56, the CFM56-3C. A high cycle fatigue problem caused by flutter. One failure led to a fatal crash when the crew shut down the wrong engine. http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=2&LLID=62&LLTypeID=2 “British Midland Airways Flight 92 experienced a failure condition which should not have resulted in a catastrophic outcome. The fan blade failure, while resulting in substantial engine damage, did not pose a structural or controllability threat to the airplane.“ I believe two others were uneventful. IIRC, after the third failure, max thrust was limited to avoid the HCF and an AD for inspection was issued.

Cheers

 

[Hank S]

It seems that one assertion here is, "engines aren't supposed to fail like this. But this one did. Ergo the design and certification are inadequate." Which is unfortunately not true, thus the people supporting this idea are arguing themselves into a hole, and can't let themselves stop digging until they dig their way out . . .

It stopped being informative several pages back, and now even the entertainment value of watching the bickering has gone away.

 

[PaulS]

Easy to say that now, but before, the evidence wasn’t as well known and clear cut as it is now.

I think the 121 record speaks for itself by showing that operators are using reasonable care to ensure the safety of the public both mechanically and physically by way of human factors (crew training etc.)

It seems that one assertion here is, "engines aren't supposed to fail like this. But this one did. Ergo the design and certification are inadequate." Which is unfortunately not true, thus the people supporting this idea are arguing themselves into a hole, and can't let themselves stop digging until they dig their way out . . .

It stopped being informative several pages back, and now even the entertainment value of watching the bickering has gone away.

Ryan, I think on the whole, the 121 record is great, commercial aviation is pretty safe. I disagree about the evidence in this matter, the blade failed due to fatigue, I don't think anyone is arguing that, and that is pretty strong evidence something was wrong.

Hank, I never said nor implied the design and certification process are inadequate, that is you carrying my statement beyond its meaning to the absurd.

I have faith in the design and certification of these machines, and the record of the this process is excellent. It's not perfect however, hence the need to responsibly address problems like blades failing when they crop up. I've stated over and over again now where I think SW went wrong so no sense repeating it again.

 

[RyanB]

Ryan, I think on the whole, the 121 record is great, commercial aviation is pretty safe. I disagree about the evidence in this matter, the blade failed due to fatigue, I don't think anyone is arguing that, and that is pretty strong evidence something was wrong.

Well obviously something was wrong. An uncontained turbine failure isn’t a normal occurrence. As I said before, it’s easy to say all of this now, after it happened, as there wasn’t much data available on this problem pre-accident. Sometimes it takes accidents like this to discover these problems.

I have faith in the design and certification of these machines, and the record of the this process is excellent. It's not perfect however, hence the need to responsibly address problems like blades failing when they crop up. I've stated over and over again now where I think SW went wrong so no sense repeating it again.

I’m just not sure what you’re continuing to argue. We’ve seen actions taken by the FAA for an emergency AD on this engine model, so I think they’re responsibly addressing the issue the best they can at this point. Not sure what else there is to do at this point in the investigation.

 

[PaulS]

Well obviously something was wrong. An uncontained turbine failure isn’t a normal occurrence. As I said before, it’s easy to say all of this now, after it happened, as there wasn’t much data available on this problem pre-accident. Sometimes it takes accidents like this to discover these problems.

I’m just not sure what you’re continuing to argue. We’ve seen actions taken by the FAA for an emergency AD on this engine model, so I think they’re responsibly addressing the issue the best they can at this point. Not sure what else there is to do at this point in the investigation.

Ryan, you've lost me here, the issue was apparent the first time the blade failed, my argument is that the inspections ordered now should have been done then. "Sometimes it takes accidents like this to discover these problems", does this mean that someone needs to die before inspections are ordered? Sorry Ryan, there was plenty of evidence this was a problem a year ago, it should have been addressed then and this lady's death probably wouldn't have happened.

So I could ask the same of you, it should be clear to you that I thought the inspections ordered now should have been done for the last "event". You are telling me that there wasn't enough evidence then for the inspections, but there is now, what changed. Are you saying that the threshold is two catastrophic engine failures to inspect for an obvious defect or design issue in a part rather than one or does someone have to die to warrant inspections?

 

[SCCutler]

I guess the thing that is a little off-putting, Paul, is your fixation in Southwest; from where does that come? It is not as if they have the only CF56 engines (over 30,000 in service), and Southwest was not the only carrier to seek a modified schedule for the inspections.

A lot of swiss-cheese holes lined up to cause this tragedy, and valuable lessons will be learned from the investigation, but it is silly to single out the safest carrier in the sky like this; their safety and maintenance practices are and have been, from the carrier's inception, exemplary. "Safe" and "reliable" are inextricably intertwined, and they've always operated with this principle controlling.

Are you saying that the threshold is two catastrophic engine failures to inspect for an obvious defect or design issue in a part rather than one or does someone have to die to warrant inspections?

This is an example of an imprudent comment; it is statistical improbability that led to the second event occurring, and it could as easily have happened at any of the dozens of other carriers flying the CFM56-powered birds.

Please, try to tone it down a little - make it a productive conversation, more light and less heat.

 

[PaulS]

I guess the thing that is a little off-putting, Paul, is your fixation in Southwest; from where does that come? It is not as if they have the only CF56 engines (over 30,000 in service), and Southwest was not the only carrier to seek a modified schedule for the inspections.

A lot of swiss-cheese holes lined up to cause this tragedy, and valuable lessons will be learned from the investigation, but it is silly to single out the safest carrier in the sky like this; their safety and maintenance practices are and have been, from the carrier's inception, exemplary. "Safe" and "reliable" are inextricably intertwined, and they've always operated with this principle controlling.

I guess I don't understand your point, these two accidents happened to Southwest aircraft, yet I shouldn't talk about Southwest? I suppose I understand the brand loyalty/love fest some have here, but SW decisions are definitely part of the accident chain here, you are kidding yourself if you deny that.

Did the original proposed AD affect all "30,000" engines? My understanding is that it didn't, it was an engine model subset specific to Southwest and maybe one or two other carriers, I'm pretty sure there were under 750 aircraft that would have been affected at that point. If you know differently please share this information. You say there is a lot of "swiss cheese holes" lined up to cause this tragedy, and maybe there are, we can't know that, but we do know a fan blade fatigued and failed a year ago, now we have another fan blade fatigued and failed.... pretty powerful stuff.

This is an example of an imprudent comment; it is statistical improbability that led to the second event occurring, and it could as easily have happened at any of the dozens of other carriers flying the CFM56-powered birds.

Please, try to tone it down a little - make it a productive conversation, more light and less heat.

Sorry Spike, but the first accident could be considered a "statistical improbability", the second is a massive screw up because the failure mechanism was known after the first accident and it was serious enough for CFM to ask for inspections, that's pretty powerful stuff. That's the productive conversation that I am trying to have here and apparently it is very upsetting to SW fans.

Oh, and that was a question to RyanB, not a comment, I'm really trying to understand the threshold of what warrants emergency action for you guys.

 

[Salty]

No kidding. I didn't volunteer to have prostate cancer 10 years ago, but I fought it and survived to fly again. I'm not a hero, just a survivor.

But, you guys risked your lives to save .. uh yourself.

heh. I get your argument, but I think the idea is that you're hero's for coming through it emotionally intact.

 

[Bell206]

the first accident could be considered a "statistical improbability", the second is a massive screw up because the failure mechanism was known after the first accident... that's pretty powerful stuff.

Curious. The Rolls Royce Trent 1000 engine on 787s has had several serious events over the past 2 years. Serious enough for the FAA and EASA to require aircraft with 2 affected engines to be grounded or 1 engine replaced with a an non-affected engine and still remain in service. Last week another AD came out restricting ETOPS limits on aircraft with an affected engine from their 330 minute limit to 140 minute limit but still remain in service.

So would you hold these 787 operators to the same level as SWA if they have an inflight engine failure since they are operating aircraft for revenue with a known issue and at times 2 hours away from a suitable airport?

 

[PaulS]

Curious. The Rolls Royce Trent 1000 engine on 787s has had several serious events over the past 2 years. Serious enough for the FAA and EASA to require aircraft with 2 affected engines to be grounded or 1 engine replaced with a an non-affected engine and still remain in service. Last week another AD came out restricting ETOPS limits on aircraft with an affected engine from their 330 minute limit to 140 minute limit but still remain in service.

So would you hold these 787 operators to the same level as SWA if they have an inflight engine failure since they are operating aircraft for revenue with a known issue and at times 2 hours away from a suitable airport?

I was just reading about that in Aviation week this morning, seems they, the engine company and its customers, are right on top of it, addressing inspections in a timely fashion, shortening inspection periods out of concern about data collected as they watch the problem, a solution in the works for the problem although the physical fix is about a year away and a software fix in the works that may mitigate the problem in the short term. They are doing all in their power to address a problem they know about. I'd be comfortable getting on those planes knowing that. In what way is that situation similar to SW who decided the inspections requested were too burdensome?

 

[SCCutler]

I guess I don't understand your point, these two accidents happened to Southwest aircraft, yet I shouldn't talk about Southwest? I suppose I understand the brand loyalty/love fest some have here, but SW decisions are definitely part of the accident chain here, you are kidding yourself if you deny that.

Nice redirection, but sorry - fail.

There is no question that the decisions made by every air carrier can materially alter the events affecting that carrier - of course we talk about Southwest - but it is silly to pretend as if other carriers are not equally in the mix. In the lens through which your comments are projected, there is but one carrier in play. I have no overwhelming "brand loyalty" to Southwest, but I consider (based upon some pretty explicit and direct knowledge) that they may well represent the highest available standards in the industry.

The sad part is, getting to the truth is not so difficult, because the FAA publishes the docket with all comments made public.

https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=FAA-2017-0313

Did the original proposed AD affect all "30,000" engines? My understanding is that it didn't, it was an engine model subset specific to Southwest and maybe one or two other carriers, I'm pretty sure there were under 750 aircraft that would have been affected at that point. If you know differently please share this information.

The following affected carriers presented comments proposing essentially the same schedule modification:

Southwest
United
Alaska
Delta

And, AA asked for a longer period (20 months, rather than the 18 months proposed by the other carriers).

The essential nature of the relief requested wasn't really about "more time" at all, per se; it was to make the time of compliance be based upon months, eliminating an alternate "next lubrication" event, which was both ambiguous (what actually constituted "lubrication" for purposes of the proposed AD?), and potentially burdensome.

Other affected carriers offering comments included Qantas, Norwegian, Ryanair and Lufthansa.

According to the manufacturer:

Approximately 14,000 CFM56-7B engines are in operation. The fan-blade inspections recommended within the next 20 days for engines with more than 30,000 cycles will impact about 680 engines. However, more than 150 have already been inspected by operators. Inspections recommended by the end of August for fan blades with 20,000 cycles will impact an additional 2,500 engines.

And:

About 60 customers worldwide operate engines within the cyclic thresholds of the new service bulletin. CFM partners GE and Safran Aircraft Engines have about 500 technicians directly involved to support customers and minimize operational disruption.

(See: https://www.cfmaeroengines.com/pres...sues-new-service-bulletin-cfm56-7b-operators/)

This is hardly a "Southwest Airlines" problem; it is a problem potentially affecting the most prolific family of turbofan engines in the market; we'll know more, about how much, after inspections progress.

Southwest relies upon the manufacturer for major maintenance of the CF 56 engines.

You say there is a lot of "swiss cheese holes" lined up to cause this tragedy, and maybe there are, we can't know that, but we do know a fan blade fatigued and failed a year ago, now we have another fan blade fatigued and failed.... pretty powerful stuff.

Indeed it is, and essentially unprecedented, hence the now-accelerated pace of inspections.

---

Information is power.

 

[Bell206]

They are doing all in their power to address a problem they know about.

In what way is that situation similar to SW who decided the inspections requested were too burdensome?

The 787 situation and the SWA situation are very similar. SCC beat me to the details above so I wont repeat them. But I'll add this. Just about every airline echoed the same concerns as SWA on the blade inspections last year with AA actually leading the discussion. They had just over 300 aircraft affected, more than SWA at the time. United had 698 engines affected by the proposed schedule. All a far cry from the original 232 units calculated by CFM and FAA.

So SWA and the other airlines were all doing the same actions to address the blade problem. All of them were following the same CFM bulletin. So what do you see as the difference between these two situations?

And just as an FYI: as of yesterday the NTSB had not determined the failed blade would have been subject to the previous inspection requirement. There is also no determination the blade caused the event or was a result of the event. And unfortunately based on current discussion the window failed due impact damage at the fuselage area below and forward of the window not by direct impact of blade or cowling.

 

[PaulS]

Nice redirection, but sorry - fail.

There is no question that the decisions made by every air carrier can materially alter the events affecting that carrier - of course we talk about Southwest - but it is silly to pretend as if other carriers are not equally in the mix. In the lens through which your comments are projected, there is but one carrier in play. I have no overwhelming "brand loyalty" to Southwest, but I consider (based upon some pretty explicit and direct knowledge) that they may well represent the highest available standards in the industry.

The sad part is, getting to the truth is not so difficult, because the FAA publishes the docket with all comments made public.

https://www.regulations.gov/docketBrowser?rpp=50&so=DESC&sb=postedDate&po=0&dct=PS&D=FAA-2017-0313



The following affected carriers presented comments proposing essentially the same schedule modification:

Southwest
United
Alaska
Delta

And, AA asked for a longer period (20 months, rather than the 18 months proposed by the other carriers).

The essential nature of the relief requested wasn't really about "more time" at all, per se; it was to make the time of compliance be based upon months, eliminating an alternate "next lubrication" event, which was both ambiguous (what actually constituted "lubrication" for purposes of the proposed AD?), and potentially burdensome.

Other affected carriers offering comments included Qantas, Norwegian, Ryanair and Lufthansa.

According to the manufacturer:



And:

(See: https://www.cfmaeroengines.com/pres...sues-new-service-bulletin-cfm56-7b-operators/)

This is hardly a "Southwest Airlines" problem; it is a problem potentially affecting the most prolific family of turbofan engines in the market; we'll know more, about how much, after inspections progress.

Southwest relies upon the manufacturer for major maintenance of the CF 56 engines.



Indeed it is, and essentially unprecedented, hence the now-accelerated pace of inspections.

---

Information is power.

It was hardly misdirection, it was a fact, the airline who experienced the issue balked at the process, they are not balking now, the only difference, or differences is that the same failure has happened again, and this time it killed someone. If I'm in charge of SW, I don't really care about the other airline's problems in this case, I want my jets to be safe. CFM is in charge of maintenance specs for the engines and requested the inspections, they didn't get what they wanted, so it's tough to lay this on them in my opinion.

I appreciate the press release from the manufacturer on the current inspections, but the only relatable take away from that is they finally did the right thing they should have done last year. I also appreciate the comments on the AD from last year, I hadn't seen those. What a mess. As I suspected not all the blades and not all the engines are thought to have the issue, which apparently is linked to a series of part numbers of blades which is a subset of all the blades out there. The issue becomes locating these blades. Apparently they are field replaceable, if they get damaged from a foreign object or a bird strike, they are removed and replaced by another blade that is kept on hand. The damaged blade is reworked, brought back to spec, then used again. The issue is these blades are all interchangeable amongst the engines. So suspect blades may not, in fact, probably are not in their original engine. Further more, it sounds like some carriers don't keep track of which blade ends up where, so this AD turned into a fiasco.

In SW's case, it looks like they have 732 of these engines. It sounds to me like SW tracks what blade ends up where, a good thing in my opinion. It sounds like the issue was that the blades are interspersed throughout those 732 engines, so most, if not all would have to be inspected, plus it appears to me, the FAA wanted all the blades inspected in the suspect engines...... were I the king of the FAA at the time, I would have said too bad, do it or ground them. Apparently the FAA didn't say that then, they've said it now.

Here are my notes on most of the comments, to you nit pickers, there probably are mistakes and omissions in the notes below, if you want a full picture, read the originals yourselves.



1. Airline Pilots association Supports the AD, no surprise there IMHO, I wouldn't want to fly defective engines either.
2. Southwest Wants more time to inspect, wants to just inspect a certain part number blade (very telling in my opinion that they feel this is an isolated issue, wants to align inspections with routine maintenance schedule rather than special inspections. Main issues in my opinion.
3. United Wants more time, mainly because the affected blades from shipped with the 220 engines they have, may have been swapped throughout their fleet rather than just kept in the original engines. Yep, that's an issue, probably should keep track of that stuff, at least for blades.
4. Alaska airlines Seem to be asking that the most likely to fail blades be inspected within 6 months, and the other blades be inspected in 18 months. I don't know the details, but this actually sounds like it is reasonable.
5. Delta Seems mostly on board with the inspections, has some issue with the inspection required at blade lubrication, wants that removed and some clarification. Notes that not all blades are targeted for inspection, but only certain part numbers. Sounds like Delta tracks where it's blades go but Delta amicable to accommodating language to help out carriers who don't track the blades. Sounds like all the carriers should be required to track the blades.
6 AA Supports the intent of the AD, but also has a problem as the blades have been removed and reworked, apparently most carriers don't keep track of these blades and where they end up.
7 Quantas Agrees with the AD, concerned because blades are changed out for rework regularly.
8 Japan Airlines Seems on board, worried about timing
9Ryan Air Seems on board, worried about timing and some logistics of the AD, as is most of the respondents.
10 CFM Wants changes to reflect its SB, wants inspections done within 12 months.
11Norwegian Shuttle Wants to track blades rather than engines. Seems to make sense
12Lufthansa Seems fine with AD, just has some logistics questions.

 

[PaulS]

The 787 situation and the SWA situation are very similar. SCC beat me to the details above so I wont repeat them. But I'll add this. Just about every airline echoed the same concerns as SWA on the blade inspections last year with AA actually leading the discussion. They had just over 300 aircraft affected, more than SWA at the time. United had 698 engines affected by the proposed schedule. All a far cry from the original 232 units calculated by CFM and FAA.

So SWA and the other airlines were all doing the same actions to address the blade problem. All of them were following the same CFM bulletin. So what do you see as the difference between these two situations?

And just as an FYI: as of yesterday the NTSB had not determined the failed blade would have been subject to the previous inspection requirement. There is also no determination the blade caused the event or was a result of the event. And unfortunately based on current discussion the window failed due impact damage at the fuselage area below and forward of the window not by direct impact of blade or cowling.

You know, you guys keep asking me what I would do, I've stated that many times, including in the post above a few minutes ago, go read it there. The bottom line is the airlines made an economic decision to fly these blades because it was too expensive to find them and inspect them with in the times listed in the AD, they tried to fit it in and let the blades fly. I'm not ok with that, I won't put words in your mouth and say that you are, but damn, it sure does seem that way to me.

As far as the determination as to whether the blade that failed was even one of the suspected part numbers, that is a great question, I hope it is, but if it isn't that opens up a whole new can of worms that will need to be dealt with. I will note that it seems the AD asked for by the FAA would have required inspection of all blades in an engine even if only one or two was the affected part numbers, that would have been a great sanity check as to whether the problem existed beyond the designated blades.

 

[SoonerAviator]

So @PaulS . . . you implied that SWA was acting in some penny-pinching manner which was affecting their aircraft maintenance practices. Yet, they appear to be one of the few who were independently tracking where those reworked blades ended up, and were no different than the rest of the airlines in their concern for the time table to accomplish the inspections. I fail to see that penny-pinching was evident, and their operating practices were equal-to, or better than, any other air carrier involved.

It is unreasonable to expect that SWA (or any airline) ground the majority of its fleet in order to perform an inspection related to 2 failures out of tens of thousands of operating cycles annually.

 

[denverpilot]

1. Airline Pilots association Supports the AD, no surprise there IMHO, I wouldn't want to fly defective engines either.
2. Southwest Wants more time to inspect, wants to just inspect a certain part number blade (very telling in my opinion that they feel this is an isolated issue, wants to align inspections with routine maintenance schedule rather than special inspections. Main issues in my opinion.
3. United Wants more time, mainly because the affected blades from shipped with the 220 engines they have, may have been swapped throughout their fleet rather than just kept in the original engines. Yep, that's an issue, probably should keep track of that stuff, at least for blades.
4. Alaska airlines Seem to be asking that the most likely to fail blades be inspected within 6 months, and the other blades be inspected in 18 months. I don't know the details, but this actually sounds like it is reasonable.
5. Delta Seems mostly on board with the inspections, has some issue with the inspection required at blade lubrication, wants that removed and some clarification. Notes that not all blades are targeted for inspection, but only certain part numbers. Sounds like Delta tracks where it's blades go but Delta amicable to accommodating language to help out carriers who don't track the blades. Sounds like all the carriers should be required to track the blades.
6 AA Supports the intent of the AD, but also has a problem as the blades have been removed and reworked, apparently most carriers don't keep track of these blades and where they end up.
7 Quantas Agrees with the AD, concerned because blades are changed out for rework regularly.
8 Japan Airlines Seems on board, worried about timing
9Ryan Air Seems on board, worried about timing and some logistics of the AD, as is most of the respondents.
10 CFM Wants changes to reflect its SB, wants inspections done within 12 months.
11Norwegian Shuttle Wants to track blades rather than engines. Seems to make sense
12Lufthansa Seems fine with AD, just has some logistics questions.

All of those seem utterly reasonable, including Southwest's response, considering two events in the amount of flying these engines are doing isn't much of a statistic to go on.

You claim two events and "feeling it's an isolated problem" is the "main issue" at SWA when almost all the other airlines can't even find the silly blades? LOL... (Neither can SWA, I assume.)

There's all sorts of problems with that Paul. Mostly that sounds like you're way too focused on the SWA answer and thinking it's more negative than "We don't even know where the damn things even are..."?

 

[PaulS]

So @PaulS . . . you implied that SWA was acting in some penny-pinching manner which was affecting their aircraft maintenance practices. Yet, they appear to be one of the few who were independently tracking where those reworked blades ended up, and were no different than the rest of the airlines in their concern for the time table to accomplish the inspections. I fail to see that penny-pinching was evident, and their operating practices were equal-to, or better than, any other air carrier involved.

It is unreasonable to expect that SWA (or any airline) ground the majority of its fleet in order to perform an inspection related to 2 failures out of tens of thousands of operating cycles annually.

Ok boys, I'm done with "you implied", you feel, you have zero tolerance, do you even get out of bed in the morning, it's not relevant and I really don't care what you think about me.

I'll respond to your last sentence, those two failures endangered a cabin full of passengers and crew in the first case, and did the same as the first case plus killed a lady in the second case. You feel it's unreasonable to expect SWA address a known issue in a reasonable amount of time. The FAA agreed with you the first time, they don't agree with you the second time and in my opinion they got it wrong the first time. I get it you don't like it, I'm glad it wasn't one of your loved ones who died.

 

[PaulS]

All of those seem utterly reasonable, including Southwest's response, considering two events in the amount of flying these engines are doing isn't much of a statistic to go on.

You claim two events and "feeling it's an isolated problem" is the "main issue" at SWA when almost all the other airlines can't even find the silly blades? LOL... (Neither can SWA, I assume.)

There's all sorts of problems with that Paul. Mostly that sounds like you're way too focused on the SWA answer and thinking it's more negative than "We don't even know where the damn things even are..."?

Nate, a lady died, I don't care if you feel it was an utterly reasonable response, feelings don't mean anything. The response failed, it was a failure, the lady died. Let's hope this changes the way business is done in these carriers looking forward.

 

[SoonerAviator]

Ok boys, I'm done with "you implied", you feel, you have zero tolerance, do you even get out of bed in the morning, it's not relevant and I really don't care what you think about me.

I'll respond to your last sentence, those two failures endangered a cabin full of passengers and crew in the first case, and did the same as the first case plus killed a lady in the second case. You feel it's unreasonable to expect SWA address a known issue in a reasonable amount of time. The FAA agreed with you the first time, they don't agree with you the second time and in my opinion they got it wrong the first time. I get it you don't like it, I'm glad it wasn't one of your loved ones who died.

I'm glad for that, too, but I can't logically expect that it be asked of an air carrier, even if it had been a family member. It doesn't make anything better/worse for the family of the deceased that it was a possible known issue. If the aircraft turns out not to be on the list with the affected AD, or wouldn't have been inspected in the time frame between the CFM recommendation and now, what would your response be then? All aircraft grounded indefinitely until every last blade is inspected? Logistical nightmare, catastrophic blow to US air carrier operations, and a transportation/commerce halt for the better part of a year. The statistical risks are likely so small, that instigating such a disruption is in the realm of absurd.

 

[denverpilot]

Nate, a lady died, I don't care if you feel it was an utterly reasonable response, feelings don't mean anything. The response failed, it was a failure, the lady died. Let's hope this changes the way business is done in these carriers looking forward.

If that's the case, your emotional over-reaction also doesn't mean anything. Lots of people die every day. "Those carriers" went almost a decade without killing anyone, and there's no evidence they're any less committed to that than before this isolated incident.

There's also plenty of competition... the dumb general public can choose to fly someone other than SWA if they have a mistaken belief that the problem in a CFM engine would be isolated to SWA... and they'll be riding on a CFM from one of the carriers. They can make themselves feel better by flying some carrier with a "better response than SWA" in your opinion. Same engine, same problem if it's hiding there.

Your "a lady died" is about as convincing as the whiny "think of the children" argument for all sorts of dumb things not worth pursuing as real threats these days. Riding on any of those carriers on a CFM powered aircraft is so far down any "actual threat" list, it's silliness.

Sometimes bad chit happens when you're riding in a chair 35,000' above the earth inside an aluminum tube held aloft by a barely controlled fireball 15' away from your seat. My response is, "Yeah ONE lady died... out of millions who've flown on CFM engines... MILLIONS." At the personal level for her family, yeah... it sucks. At the mass transit planning and public safety level, it's a speck of fly poop in the pepper.

 

[PaulS]

I'm glad for that, too, but I can't logically expect that it be asked of an air carrier, even if it had been a family member. It doesn't make anything better/worse for the family of the deceased that it was a possible known issue. If the aircraft turns out not to be on the list with the affected AD, or wouldn't have been inspected in the time frame between the CFM recommendation and now, what would your response be then? All aircraft grounded indefinitely until every last blade is inspected? Logistical nightmare, catastrophic blow to US air carrier operations, and a transportation/commerce halt for the better part of a year. The statistical risks are likely so small, that instigating such a disruption is in the realm of absurd.

Man, the drama, ground the whole fleet? Who is being absurd now? I suspect that CFM understands what is wrong and has figured out why this has happened, hence the limited scope of the inspections, at least limited in the sense of certain part number blades. If that turns out to not be the case, then it is back to the drawing board, but even in that case I don't think it will take long to figure out what's up.

I also didn't realize that the blades were switched as much as they are, it makes sense. I also suspect it will make sense to track where these blades end up, most likely via logs, part number and serial number, it just seems well with in the realm of something that can be tracked easily with a little forethought.

 

[PaulS]

If that's the case, your emotional over-reaction also doesn't mean anything. Lots of people die every day. "Those carriers" went almost a decade without killing anyone, and there's no evidence they're any less committed to that than before this isolated incident.

There's also plenty of competition... the dumb general public can choose to fly someone other than SWA if they have a mistaken belief that the problem in a CFM engine would be isolated to SWA... and they'll be riding on a CFM from one of the carriers. They can make themselves feel better by flying some carrier with a "better response than SWA" in your opinion. Same engine, same problem if it's hiding there.

Your "a lady died" is about as convincing as the whiny "think of the children" argument for all sorts of dumb things not worth pursuing as real threats these days. Riding on any of those carriers on a CFM powered aircraft is so far down any "actual threat" list, it's silliness.

Sometimes bad chit happens when you're riding in a chair 35,000' above the earth inside an aluminum tube held aloft by a barely controlled fireball 15' away from your seat. My response is, "Yeah ONE lady died... out of millions who've flown on CFM engines... MILLIONS." At the personal level for her family, yeah... it sucks. At the mass transit planning and public safety level, it's a speck of fly poop in the pepper.

What emotional overreaction is that Nate? What are you talking about? I'm not emotional about it, you are more emotional about than I. I guess it's ok to lose a few here or there with you, to each his own.

I have no problem with SWA and would fly them tomorrow, I just think they made stupid decision.

 

[denverpilot]

What emotional overreaction is that Nate? What are you talking about? I'm not emotional about it, you are more emotional about than I. I guess it's ok to lose a few here or there with you, to each his own.

I have no problem with SWA and would fly them tomorrow, I just think they made stupid decision.

You're just trolling now. YOU are the one who has used "but a woman died!" as an attempt at an emotional response trigger multiple times now.

It's definitely okay to "lose a few here or there" in our society... to all sorts of things. Being sucked out of an airliner is at least a novel way to go out, compared to being smashed into red goo by a driver who's never had a test any harder than parallel parking once twenty years ago.

And if you think I'm emotional, I'm not... Don't know the lady, and don't know anyone doing CFM maintenance at SWA. If airliner incidents and accidents weren't big news BECAUSE they're rare, I wouldn't even know about it.

You've been very unconvincing in describing what "stupid decision" SWA made, considering all of those other carriers literally made the same decision after the first event on an SWA aircraft. If you're arguing that they all made the same "stupid decision", okay... you could argue that... few would agree, but at least it would be consistent with the facts.

 

[TCABM]

Nate, a lady died, I don't care if you feel it was an utterly reasonable response, feelings don't mean anything. The response failed, it was a failure, the lady died. Let's hope this changes the way business is done in these carriers looking forward.

To put it in perspective, more people die in car crashes in an hour than have died in the last nine years on a US airline.

Why is this one lady’s death so impactful to you?

 

[PaulS]

You're just trolling now. YOU are the one who has used "but a woman died!" as an attempt at an emotional response trigger multiple times now.

It's definitely okay to "lose a few here or there" in our society... to all sorts of things. Being sucked out of an airliner is at least a novel way to go out, compared to being smashed into red goo by a driver who's never had a test any harder than parallel parking once twenty years ago.

And if you think I'm emotional, I'm not... Don't know the lady, and don't know anyone doing CFM maintenance at SWA. If airliner incidents and accidents weren't big news BECAUSE they're rare, I wouldn't even know about it.

You've been very unconvincing in describing what "stupid decision" SWA made, considering all of those other carriers literally made the same decision after the first event on an SWA aircraft. If you're arguing that they all made the same "stupid decision", okay... you could argue that... few would agree, but at least it would be consistent with the facts.

No Nate, I'm not trolling, I've been battered about in this thread though by others telling me I'm emotional, attributing things I didn't write to me, telling me I don't understand risk and other things that amount to ad hominem, including your post. On top of that, I don't care if you are emotional or not, it's not germane to the discussion and while it was entertaining for a while has become boring. I was just parroting you. It's definitely not ok to "lose a few here or there" in our society, that is one of the most........ never mind, doesn't matter, but that does make sense considering your position.

The lady dying is a fact Nate, not an emotional response, sorry it's upsetting to you, but she is dead because an engine that isn't supposed to fail in the manner it did, failed and wasn't contained another problem.

My review of the comments led me to believe that some of the carriers were fine with AD, in fact I would even go so far as to say they all thought it was a good idea, they just didn't want to get it done in the time laid out and some had some pretty big logistical issues, I'm surprised your reading is different, or did you even read it?

 

[Lindberg]

The bottom line is the airlines made an economic decision to fly these blades because it was too expensive to find them and inspect them with in the times listed in the AD, they tried to fit it in and let the blades fly. I'm not ok with that, I won't put words in your mouth and say that you are, but damn, it sure does seem that way to me.

Why is it not ok? Because a person died? Even with that hindsight, if the only way of preventing that was to ground the fleet and spend hundreds of millions of dollars inspecting and replacing fan blades, who that be the right solution? The manufacturers and the airlines DO account for the possibility thiswill happen. They engineer to reasonably minimize that possibility, and they trainand equip for when it happens anyway. You keep ignoring the fact that 150 people on that plane DIDN'T die. So something must have worked right. You keep saying you aren't a perfectionist, but I still don't see where you've said what an acceptable standard is. Obviously one death per decade is too many. What about one every two decades? You need to identify the target in order to know whether you've missed it.

 

[PaulS]

To put it in perspective, more people die in car crashes in an hour than have died in the last nine years on a US airline.

Why is this one lady’s death so impactful to you?

What makes you think it's impactful to me? I never said that, if you can't understand why I brought it up, I can't understand it for you. Although I'm wondering now, what if the blade had exited in a different direction causing something to pierce a fuel tank setting the wing on fire killing the 100+ people on board instead of just one? Would some here change their opinion? Probably not.

Anyway, it's not about the lady, she is just an unfortunate victim. It's about a design failure and a system wide failure that delayed the inevitable (inspections) about a year.

 

[Tarheelpilot]

Just because someone disagrees with you or points out a flaw in your information/reasoning doesn’t mean they love southwest. Personally I hate flying southwest. Haven’t been on one of their planes in over 8 years and haven’t paid for a ticket in over 15.

 

[PaulS]

Why is it not ok? Because a person died? Even with that hindsight, if the only way of preventing that was to ground the fleet and spend hundreds of millions of dollars inspecting and replacing fan blades, who that be the right solution? The manufacturers and the airlines DO account for the possibility thiswill happen. They engineer to reasonably minimize that possibility, and they trainand equip for when it happens anyway. You keep ignoring the fact that 150 people on that plane DIDN'T die. So something must have worked right. You keep saying you aren't a perfectionist, but I still don't see where you've said what an acceptable standard is. Obviously one death per decade is too many. What about one every two decades? You need to identify the target in order to know whether you've missed it.

Why do we have to keep discussing the absurd, grounding the fleet, rather than the pragmatic, doing the inspections that now mandatory?

An acceptable standard is to fix the problems as they arise, in an efficient and speedy manner.

 

[SoonerAviator]

Recent photo of this thread:

 

[PaulS]

Just because someone disagrees with you or points out a flaw in your information/reasoning doesn’t mean they love southwest. Personally I hate flying southwest. Haven’t been on one of their planes in over 8 years and haven’t paid for a ticket in over 15.

This has gotten so convoluted.... tell me the flaw in my information/ reasoning?

 

[denverpilot]

The lady dying is a fact Nate, not an emotional response, sorry it's upsetting to you, but she is dead because an engine that isn't supposed to fail in the manner it did, failed and wasn't contained another problem.

My review of the comments led me to believe that some of the carriers were fine with AD, in fact I would even go so far as to say they all thought it was a good idea, they just didn't want to get it done in the time laid out and some had some pretty big logistical issues, I'm surprised your reading is different, or did you even read it?

You haven't made the logical argument that "the engine isn't supposed to fail in the manner it did" yet... as numerous engineers in the biz have pointed out. That the standard is NOT what you THOUGHT it was. You've had ample material presented to know that now, so discuss it in terms of the actual standard, not your desires for the standard.

As far as the airline responses go, I read your summary... you apparently did a very poor job showing a significant difference between SWAs responses and the other airlines, because they all looked about the same to me... standard logistics problems of a big inspection that may or may not find anything. And not even having any records of where the stuff FAA wants inspected, even went over time... haha... "They're all here... somewhere..."

There's absolutely nothing "upsetting" to me about this entire thing. Like I said, the "news-media" made it "news"... but most of us don't fly, maintain, or are even passengers on these specific aircraft for the vast majority of the time we're here in our lives, so it's definitely "who cares?" for me... what's your personal interest?

Other than perhaps minor concern for friends who work aboard CFM powered stuff at another carrier in the same general type fleet. And if they're not concerned to go to work, I'm certainly not worried about it.

 

[SoonerAviator]

Man, the drama, ground the whole fleet? Who is being absurd now?

. . . In SW's case, it looks like they have 732 of these engines. It sounds to me like SW tracks what blade ends up where, a good thing in my opinion. It sounds like the issue was that the blades are interspersed throughout those 732 engines, so most, if not all would have to be inspected, plus it appears to me, the FAA wanted all the blades inspected in the suspect engines...... were I the king of the FAA at the time, I would have said too bad, do it or ground them . . .

 

[Palmpilot]

What makes you think it's impactful to me?

The number of posts.

 

[PaulS]

@SoonerAviator Oh, so by the whole fleet, you mean the aircraft with the suspected engines, yes, I said that, not what I thought you meant.

 

[PaulS]

You haven't made the logical argument that "the engine isn't supposed to fail in the manner it did" yet... as numerous engineers in the biz have pointed out. That the standard is NOT what you THOUGHT it was. You've had ample material presented to know that now, so discuss it in terms of the actual standard, not your desires for the standard.

As far as the airline responses go, I read your summary... you apparently did a very poor job showing a significant difference between SWAs responses and the other airlines, because they all looked about the same to me... standard logistics problems of a big inspection that may or may not find anything. And not even having any records of where the stuff FAA wants inspected, even went over time... haha... "They're all here... somewhere..."

There's absolutely nothing "upsetting" to me about this entire thing. Like I said, the "news-media" made it "news"... but most of us don't fly, maintain, or are even passengers on these specific aircraft for the vast majority of the time we're here in our lives, so it's definitely "who cares?" for me... what's your personal interest?

Other than perhaps minor concern for friends who work aboard CFM powered stuff at another carrier in the same general type fleet. And if they're not concerned to go to work, I'm certainly not worried about it.

Actually Nate, the standard is what I thought it was, but whatever. Post away, just make sure you are reading what I posted, not what others interpreted my posts as.

I was pretty clear in my summary that it probably had omissions and mistakes, and it definitely was not complete, you should probably read the original material before you take me to task.

I'll leave you with this, which is basically the same comment I made that started this **** show:

“This should not happen and we want to find out why it happened so we make sure the preventative measures are put in place,” said Robert Sumwalt, NTSB Chairman.

http://metrovoicenews.com/strong-faith-guides-pilot-who-safely-landed-southwest-jet/