Southwest oopsie - ‘woman partially sucked out of window’
- Thread starter RyanB
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From Fortune Magazine.
“Airlines were ordered to inspect CFM56-7B engines with more than 30,000 total cycles. The FAA said the inspection must be complete within 20 days.
CFM went a step further and also recommended inspections by the end of August for fan blades with 20,000 cycles, and inspections to all other fan blades when they reach 20,000 cycles. CFM said Friday operators should repeat the inspection every 3,000 cycles, the equivalent of about two years in airline service.
CFM noted that more than 150 of these engines have already been inspected. Inspections recommended by the end of August for fan blades with 20,000 cycles will impact an additional 2,500 engines, CFM said.”
Sounds reasonable to me but I have no idea if this a low cycle fatigue (highly likely) or extremely unlikely, a high cycle fatigue problem brought on by some weird combination of inlet distortion, variable geometry misrigging, machining defect, inclusion or the phase of the moon.
Cheers
“Airlines were ordered to inspect CFM56-7B engines with more than 30,000 total cycles. The FAA said the inspection must be complete within 20 days.
CFM went a step further and also recommended inspections by the end of August for fan blades with 20,000 cycles, and inspections to all other fan blades when they reach 20,000 cycles. CFM said Friday operators should repeat the inspection every 3,000 cycles, the equivalent of about two years in airline service.
CFM noted that more than 150 of these engines have already been inspected. Inspections recommended by the end of August for fan blades with 20,000 cycles will impact an additional 2,500 engines, CFM said.”
Sounds reasonable to me but I have no idea if this a low cycle fatigue (highly likely) or extremely unlikely, a high cycle fatigue problem brought on by some weird combination of inlet distortion, variable geometry misrigging, machining defect, inclusion or the phase of the moon.
Cheers
Knowing what I know about Southwest's operations and culture, I can reassure you: it is not a Southwest issue. There is a reason they have the best safety record among majors. Reliability and safety are irretrievably linked.
hindsight2020
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hindsight2020
well since you called.....
nice false equivalence. The jury is still out on the ERAU revenue-operated wing spar failure leading to an overreaching AD; so unless you happen to own CFMs engines you operate recreationally, I suggest you keep our objections as recreational participants out of your straw man.
Tarheelpilot
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PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
It always amazes me when pilots personalize and rationalize things like this, justifying additional risk based on some warped perception that a catastrophic failure is some one off "fluke" and everything will be alright. Part of the basis of ETOPS, allowing only two engines on an airliner for flight over water further than a couple hours of from a landing spot is that these engines are reliable and things like this will not happen. Further more, these engines are specifically designed and tested to contain a rotor failure with out damage to the fuselage, these SW engines failed both requirements miserably the first time. The FAA ordered inspections per an aggressive timetable last time, SW balked and complained, I'm guessing one of the arguments is that accident was a "fluke" and these engines have millions of hours of safe operation. The FAA acquiesced and now we have a second disaster. Now the FAA is demanding the suspect engines be inspected within 30 days. I doubt there will be any objection now, there shouldn't have been the first time. And willing to bet that the savings from stretching out the first inspection will be lost when the inevitable lawsuits happen..... or maybe not, maybe that's how the "brain trust" that justified delaying the inspections rationalized that even should the unthinkable fluke happen a second time, it still would be cheaper to delay. We'll never know.
The only thing that will be more disturbing about this incident is if the second failed engine is one that underwent the previously mandated inspection.
Tarheelpilot
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Tarheelpilot
It’s not personal and I’m not rationalizing anything. You are the one getting ****ed of about “southwests engines” and how you “guess” they bitched to get the FAA to back down. Southwest didn’t design and certify the engine. They operate and maintain the engine. When you look at the failure rate they do both very well and the attitude of profit above all else you are assigning to southwest is contrary to their corporate culture and policies.
Frankly you don’t know what you’re talking about in my opinion. You’re just ****ed off because you think you “know” what’s going on and really don’t know anything.
PaulS
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Read your posts then read mine and tell me again who comes across as ****ed.
Tarheelpilot
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I did and I stand by my position. I’m not emotionally invested in the situation at all. I just think you’re wrong and not being objective and you have passed judgment on sw and pilots in general. You are entitled to your opinion just as I am. I don’t agree with you... just that simple.
PaulS
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Well, your analysis of my position smacks of someone cemented and invested in their position and upset that someone disagrees with them. When you try to assign "feelings" to things like this rather than just looking at the facts, at least facts as they appear now, then I can see you being ****ed at what I am saying. No where did I indict the SW pilots, they are just as much victims as the lady sucked out the window in my opinion. You are personalizing this, not me.
In industries other than aviation I've seen ivy educated bean counters smack down engineers on technical issues because they didn't like the cost implications, I've seen the engineers acquiesce, then when the inevitable happens, guess who bears the brunt of the blame for the issue? The engineer. It happens all the time. The smart engineer fires off an email to the bean counter saying that they understand the bean counter's prerogative to make the decision they've made, but the engineer doesn't agree with it and it will come back to haunt them.
The decision to slow down the inspections was a bean counter decision, by a company with a history (outsourcing maintenance to San Salvador) of pinching pennies on maintenance, that turned out to be the wrong decision. It's just THAT simple.
When you say the FAA “ordered Inspections” it sounds like they issued an AD and later retracted it after SWA “ balked and complained”. I didn’t know that. CFM issued a service bulletin but AFAIK, no AD was issued.
BTW, again AFAIK, the engine is not designed to contain a rotor failure nor cause no damage to the fuselage unless the rules have changed. The requirement is to stop a blade failed above the attachment from penetrating the case and from what I’ve seen in the photos, it didn’t penetrate the case. Containing a failed disc is a Herculean task, much less an entire rotor. At one time, fuselages were designed with additional protection in the plane of the Fan if the blade penetrated the case. I recall riding in that location and having no window whereas today, I can look out and wonder.
As far as missing the cracked blade during an inspection, that is well within the realm of possibility. Ultrasonic or eddy current inspections are difficult to preform in the field, having been thru several similar inspections on TF30’s and F100’s in the USAF and USN. That’s one reason USAF disc inspections at overhaul are scheduled at half the predicted crack growth life of a crack initiated by a defect below the smallest identifiable flaw so as to have two chances to catch it. I assume the intervals in the AD and SB use similar logic.
Cheers
wsuffa
Touchdown! Greaser!
"....union lawyer says..." Not exactly an unbiased source.
Much of what I read here bashing Southwest sounds like it might come from the union, who has a vested interest in a certain outcome.
Let me make it clear that I am *NOT* anti-Union, just that I am one who believes in identifying bias in reporting. We should make decisions based on an airing of ALL facts, which is (not surprisingly) what the FAA is supposed to do.
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
We are all reliant on press accounts of what happened here. I'm not a turbine engine engineer but I have met a few. Here is what I believe is the rule about uncontained rotor failures. http://flightsimaviation.com/data/FARS/part_25-1461.html
According to some reports I've read, the FAA or NTSB held much of the info about the first failure close to vest. I don't know if that is true or not, but if it is true, that practice should stop. The who, what and how of a failure like this should be part of the public domain. The only thing I can think of that might be allowed to be protected is proprietary manufacturing techniques. In that case, if the info is protected, the inspection should and timeframe should be unyielding.
I agree containing these parts is a Herculean task, which is why the impetus should be to make sure they never happen in the first place.
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
Yes, I get that, but somewhere between the bloviating sides the truth lies.
wsuffa
Touchdown! Greaser!
Containment is a certification issue, not a maintenance issue (excepting those cases where the containment system is modified or changed by the operator). Assuming Southwest was maintaining the engines using CFM and Boeing instructions, containment should have been assumed. This is not the same situation as e the AA 191 situation where maintenance shortcuts were taken that were not approved and cause cracks in the engine mount.
As I understand it, the delay was due to an inability to complete all the inspections in the 12 months the FAA allotted, instead asking for 18. We don't know whether that is due to staffing constraints, lack of available equipment, operational reasons (grounding the fleet), or the need for specialized resources that were available in limited quantities. Further, I note that a 12 month inspection period (rather than the 18 requested), would not have been likely to prevent this incident. This was less than 12 months from the last one, and less tha 12 months from the recommendation. To conclusively state that the delay caused this is misleading at best.
The emergency inspections within 20 days are limited to engines with a certain number of cycles - the rest are TBD on the timing. By my calculation, the number of engines worldwide that have been indicated to fall in that category times 4 hours per engine are about 1700 hours. That far different that the number of hours and resources needed to do the entire worldwide fleets.
We can better assess the rationale once all the facts are known rather than the hyperbola in the media and union material.
Since you say you are not a turbine engine engineer, and I was one for 40+ years among other specialties in aircraft development and maintenance, I believe I will refrain from further comments on your posts. The reference you noted specifically covers containment of blades.
One last thing though. The reason all NTSB, USAF, etc. accident investigations are close hold is to allow for the fullest discussion of the probable cause and potential solutions without fear of exploitation or misinterpretation by the uninvolved and uninformed, especially lawyers. If it was allowed to be used in suits by ambulance chasers, nobody would reveal anything to the total detriment of Aviation and other transportation safety.
Cheers
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Tarheelpilot
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I’m basing my statement on what you said. I think you should go try reading the posts again. I never said anything about you other than critiquing you’re level of judgment on the parties involved. Long wordy posts don’t change the fact that you are wrong.
Every time an airplane takes off someone somewhere has valuated the potential risk. There is a price on everyone’s head in the airplane. If you don’t like it don’t fly.
I’m done. Good day to you
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
Certification, maintenance, doesn't matter to me, all I have been saying is that this should never happen and when it did happen the suspect aircraft should have been inspected. I'll further that by saying they should have been inspected, but if it was physically impossible to do they should have been grounded. I suspect the inspections will now be done in the allocated times, funny how that works. The only thing I complained about was delaying the inspections, which should have been obvious then and is very obvious now should have been performed ASAP. I believe the initial inspections were limited in scope to a sub-group of aircraft, which make me suspect they think they understand the issue.
X3, yes, the reference I noted specifically referenced the containment of blades, it also references that the "Equipment containing high energy rotors must be located where rotor failure will neither endanger the occupants nor adversely affect continued safe flight. ", the engine failed that part. You claim to be a turbine engineer yet you were unaware of this certification rule, you'll have to excuse me if I don't accept your word as gospel. Have a nice day.
Tarheel, a lady died, and quite frankly a whole planeload of people could have easily died in this incident, you are upset that I am questioning the delay of inspections that most likely would have prevented this from happening, and I'm the one with a problem? Lol, well anyway, thanks for letting me have the last word.
PaulS. Since you accused me of ignorance, I will reply. I merely observed that I was unaware of any requirements to contain a rotor as you stated. You, in response, supplied a reference to blades, not rotors, a non sequitur. Anyone involved in aircraft design knows it is completely impractical to contain a rotor in a viable, even just a flying aircraft. The requirement you noted is containment of a blade, be it Fan, Compressor or Turbine. To be certified, the CFM56-7B engine and all other engines must be approved by the FAA as meeting any and all Requirements, including those you cited. It was and your continued fulminations will not change that fact. .
I will close by observing that your hyperbole was interesting for a while but has passed beyond rational discussion. If you don’t like what the FAA did I suggest you write them for a Change in the Certificaton Requirements, pointing out your perceived shortcomings and perhaps engage in short sales of SWA Stock. I believe their symbol is LUV.
Cheers
I will close by observing that your hyperbole was interesting for a while but has passed beyond rational discussion. If you don’t like what the FAA did I suggest you write them for a Change in the Certificaton Requirements, pointing out your perceived shortcomings and perhaps engage in short sales of SWA Stock. I believe their symbol is LUV.
Cheers
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wsuffa
Touchdown! Greaser!
Actually certification and maintenance are two different matters. The whole point of certification is to provide operators with reasonable assurance that the parts of their plane will meet the standards. If not, there is a whole process that can be followed to either mandate further inspections or decertify the parts (require modifications). The revocation of the type certificate for the DC-10 is a perfect example of how that works. Likewise, the design issues on the Comet caused it to be withdrawn from service.
No, it shouldn't have happened, but at the same time we can also say that there should be no injuries, deaths, or failures of anything in transportation - cars, trucks, planes, or railroads. Yet parts DO fail, and steps are taken to minimize the risk. I personally think that 9 years of commercial aviation without a fatality is a pretty damn good record. Can it be better? Sure. That's the whole point of six-sigma and other techniques to reduce failure rate. We have made great strides through the failure-feedback-improvement-implementation process. We can do better - and will do better - the former head of maintenance for Delta has remarked that it may be time for a different approach to achieve future gains.
The agency proposed a time table, and the airline counterproposed a different timetable. I don't know what other airlines proposed. The FAA could have simply ignored the counterproposal (and it has in the past), which tells me that this is not simply a matter of Southwest being cheap, but a process problem.
We still don't have all the facts in on this case - of particular interest would be the reason that the containment mechanism failed, and why the cowling came apart as it did. That will lead to the changes you seek.
As for inspections, that's easy to say, but is complicated by the shortage of qualified maintenance people (like the pilot shortage), the fact that the fan blade parts may be installed as "serviceable" on other engines (complicating the task of deciding which engines to inspect - if an old blade is put on a newer engine, what inspection requirement applies and how long will it take to determine the history of each part), the time required (I've seen reports ranging from 4 to 10 hours per engine), the need to determine what exactly to inspect, and how to do it. Both FAA and EASA had recommendations for an AD for some time - EASA's AD was issued this month and gave the airlines 9 months to inspect, the FAA's had yet to be issued. Clearly the agencies didn't consider the problem serious or urgent enough (until now) to issue a mandatory directive prior to the normal process. The manufacturer issued recommendations, but those were not mandatory. I note that Southwest had outsourced heavy engine maintenance to GE, who is not exactly a disinterested party to the manufacturer.
I'd argue against the contention that incidents require knee-jerk reaction or grounding of fleets. By that standard, the entire B767 fleet should be grounded because of the uncontained AA engine failure and fire on the runway at ORD (AA383). Instead, we determine the cause and take action based on that. DL had an inflight fire of one of their engines on an A330 this week - that didn't cause grounding of the entire fleet or immediate inspections.
There's a reason that we have a regulatory and certification process. It's to determine the root cause and take action based on that, and it's to impose a safety process and culture while at the same time avoiding knee-jerk reactions. You may not be comfortable with that process. I am. We can scuttle the process and make manufacturer recommendations mandatory (which will essentially ground the entire small GA fleet, possibly excepting the Cirrus and EAB fleets) and impose high costs on everyone else. We can make it like the medical industry, in which it is estimated that 30% of the tests are unnecessary, and industry insurers control things. Or we can work within a regulatory structure and make improvements based on science and facts.
The solution is never as simple. And we cannot achieve zero-risk. You clearly have a different view, and that's OK.
wsuffa
Touchdown! Greaser!
Or support the hearings that Rep. Norton wants in Congress.
Well said. I will make one observation. As far as I can tell from the pictures I have seen, the containment design did in fact work as designed. The blade didn’t penetrate the case. I suspect it bounced around the cowl and damaged it sufficiently to allow air loads to rip it to shreds. Wether it was cowl debris or the failed blade that destroyed the window leading to the fatality is TBD. Having seen more than a few Fan blade failures, where the blade goes after hitting the containment ring is beyond prediction.
Cheers
Indeed. Although IMNSHO, most Congressional hearings on high profile events are as Macbeth said “ It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing.”
Cheers
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azblackbird
Pattern Altitude
What's ironic is the damage to the fuselage area from the incident a couple years ago is almost exactly the same as the current damage. The window(s) from a couple years ago were only missed by a few inches by whatever type of shrapnel went flying from the engine from that incident.
Thanks. I had not seen that photo nor where the recent window breach was located. Not knowing the design layout of the cowl, I hestitate to guess if there’s sufficient mass of any given fragment of the cowl to cause such damage.
Edit: I found a couple of photos showing the window breach that unfortunately I can’t link. It appears the window is about ten rows aft of the earlier plane’s damage. Again I won’t guess if it was the blade, a fragment of it or of the cowl. It does indicate the randomness of what happens after the blade failure.
Cheers
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PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
They found the blade?
wsuffa
Touchdown! Greaser!
Not sure about the blade, but they have found a lot of the cowling.
Ghery
Touchdown! Greaser!
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Ghery Pettit
No kidding. I didn't volunteer to have prostate cancer 10 years ago, but I fought it and survived to fly again. I'm not a hero, just a survivor.
Not sure what you're talking about. I am aware of the ERAU accident, but my comment has nothing to do with that particular event. Whether or not a flight is revenue-generating has no bearing on safety of flight; the airplane doesn't know whether it's working for hire or not. Decisions on these types of issues can only responsibly be made based on the evidence present at the time balanced with the probability of materially different evidence presenting itself in the future. Simply because there's a failure doesn't indicate negligence, a "process problem," or cut corners. Rather, it may be an acknowledgement that no one can foresee the future. However, as with many other tragic events which occur in the world, there is never a shortage of people after the fact who claim that they possessed such foreknowledge.
Like it or not, every one of us performs a cost/benefit analysis before we make an important decision. Corporations necessarily do the same, and ideally we hope that the FAA does as well with regard to regulatory mandates. There will never be a way to reduce the risk to zero.
hindsight2020
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My point is you brought up people's resistance to over-reaching ADs when it had to do with spam cans failing in single digits, and then proceeded to suggest the same population does not exhibit the same umbrage when it came to commercial operators with multi-million dollar pockets being slapped with wide-net ADs. And I told you that's a false equivalence, because most of the people you're referring to in the spam can example are recreational participants and private owners, and the airline accidents in question are common carriers. I'm not profiting from my endeavor, they are profiting from theirs.
The only reason I brought up the ERAU accident is to further illustrate my point, in that I do expect an airplane being used for revenue to have a higher standard of inspection as that of my personally owned non-revenue conveyance. I consider the different standards of safety congruent with the different uses and expectations. Again I'm not profiting from my private ownership, thus I should enjoy a lower standard of oversight. This isn't unique to aviation; people who make their own products understand the risk in liability of injury in its use, commercially available products are held to a higher standard. I find zero hypocrisy in that stance. It's clear from your post that you think everything should be held to the higher standard in order to be fair to the poor ol' for-profit airlines. I'm far more libertarian when it comes to my private behavior, and I eat the opportunity cost of those choices. It's called 'Murica. You'd probably find European Aviation more to your liking...if you can find it. <- Get it?
Commercial operators are already held to a higher standard, but that standard must still be reasonable. Expecting recreational pilots to drop thousands of dollars on immediate inspections because of a single failure in a very large sample is likely not reasonable; expecting commercial operators to drop millions of dollars on immediate inspections under similar conditions is likewise not reasonable. If the expectation is that regulators will mandate the elimination of risk, then the commercial operators will all go out of business. The financial impact of regulation must be considered regardless of whether it will apply to an individual or a for-profit corporation.
I was not party to the evaluation and decision process regarding the inspections which preceded this most recent incident, so I can't say whether the conclusion of that process was reasonable or not, only that it very well could have been given the evidence present at the time. By contrast, some on this forum appear to be suggesting that there was a process failure, or that Southwest or the FAA were somehow negligent with how the inspections were handled up to this point, but the most recent incident alone doesn't serve to prove any of those suggestions. The inspection process and timetable may have been perfectly reasonable and justified based on the evidence present at the time that it was established.
nrpetersen
Line Up and Wait
I would hope the FAA would consider the risk of alternate transportation means when the US airline system is accused of compliance foot dragging or other malfeasance. One fatality in nine years vs how many fatalities if these same passengers instead traveled the same routes by bus, automobile, or rail?
Lindberg
Final Approach
Define "reliable." Now define "sufficiently reliable." The fleet has probably millions of hours on these engines with very few incidents. One fatality for all US airlines in almost a decade. Perfection is not obtainable. How many millions of $ should be spent to get us imperceptibly closer?
If there's a design defect or problem, it should be fixed. But we're never going to have engines that don't fail.
airdale
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airdale
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
You guys are killing me, learn to read. Better yet, learn to read to understand. I never said zero risk, I'm a pilot, I fly regularly so I regularly perform a risky vocation, fraught with risk. The people attributing this to me are intellectually lazy and actually pretty simple minded.
SW had a chance to inspect these planes in a compressed fashion and balked, the FAA allowed them to balk, and now the exact same thing that is never supposed to happen, happened. Now SW has been given 20 days to get the job done, no stupidity this time, the planes will be inspected or grounded. My money is says SW will comply in a timely fashion this time. My money is also on SW getting its pants sued off because of the same, dumbass, "it's always been safe ergo it's still safe now" attitude in the face of a major, and dangerous (uncontained engine failure) event that they chose to effectively ignore. The inspections should have been done the first time, chances are the problem in that blade would have been found and a lady wouldn't be dead.
SW had a chance to inspect these planes in a compressed fashion and balked, the FAA allowed them to balk, and now the exact same thing that is never supposed to happen, happened. Now SW has been given 20 days to get the job done, no stupidity this time, the planes will be inspected or grounded. My money is says SW will comply in a timely fashion this time. My money is also on SW getting its pants sued off because of the same, dumbass, "it's always been safe ergo it's still safe now" attitude in the face of a major, and dangerous (uncontained engine failure) event that they chose to effectively ignore. The inspections should have been done the first time, chances are the problem in that blade would have been found and a lady wouldn't be dead.
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
Airdale, this post is a special kind of stupid, I'm pretty comfortable I've forgotten more about statistics than you know. And your logical consistency interest is especially interesting to me since your first three statements are based on a strawman argument, apparently logic escapes you. Thanks for the entertainment.
nrpetersen
Line Up and Wait
"chances are the problem in that blade would have been found"
Any NDT specialist care to comment?
Any NDT specialist care to comment?
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
I define reliable as meeting the criteria of the FAR's to which the engines were designed. I define unreliable as a fan blade that departs a rotor and then penetrates the containment that is designed to contain it, causing damage to the fuselage, and nearly causing a catastrophe, the first time.
You apparently are fine with known defects with the potential for calamity flying as are some other pilots here, which quite frankly, explains the dismal GA safety record as compared to the airlines.
PaulS
Touchdown! Greaser!
And Bill, I find it interesting that each one of you arguing with me that you feel this event is perfectly acceptable in the grand scheme of things and that this lady died in the necessary advancement of science, or whatever warped justification you use in your heads. You and others keep personalizing this and trying to compare it to GA situations, each situation is different so your comparisons are meaningless.
I'm not a zero risk guy, I'm a don't take stupid risks guy. Flying those engines without inspecting them was a stupid risk, and it killed that lady, it could have killed many more. I'm all in for routing stupidity, apparently it's a momentous task judging from some of the comments here.
I can’t contain myself (pun intended).
According to the FAA, the engine met all of the criteria of the FAR’s otherwise the FAA would not have issued the certificate for commercial operation and thus is reliable by your definition. You may disagree with the FAA’s decision that it met all FAR Requirements but that doesn’t change the fact by your definition, as determined by the responsible agency, it is a reliable engine. If it’s reliable, it can’t be unreliable at the same time, or can it?
BTW, Since ETOPS, mentioned in one of your earlier posts (#286) as a good thing, in fact assumes there is a finite, if extremely small, both engines will fail on a twin engine aircraft over the ocean outside of gliding distance from a suitable airport, should ETOPS be allowed?
I understand you’re totally outraged about the implementation of inspections but all the other comments about certification, design, requirements, the FAA etc. and ad hominem attacks detract from any rational discussion of the facts other than a obvious disagreement about the pace of a known defect inspection.
I really need to go to my cave and retire again from this thread, but one never knows.
Cheers
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