Two things in the NTSB report that I don't believe were widely discussed in public are that flaps were found retracted at the scene, and the analysis showing that the "agglomerate stack" may not have been visible above the instrument panel.
No surprise the pilot was faulted for descending below the approach path.
The issues about the various stacks -- not being painted as required, and the one stack perhaps not having a red beacon (thanks, Gryder, for obscuring that) would be moot if the pilot would not have seen the stacks anyway.
Lots of discussion in the report about interaction between FAA and potato plant about the stacks.
Figure 3 in the report shows that the published descent angle from JAMID (3.75 deg) only clears the stack that was hit by 98 feet. Of course, you can't leave the MDA (4560) without proper visual references, and that's about 400 ft above the stack (4156).
Seems like th danger with this approach is that if you break out with runway environment in sight but stacks below line of sight, and then proceed below the published descent angle, you may never see the stack that kills you. The intracacies of instrument appraoch charts can be lethal.
Have I got this right?