Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

Seeing now it wasn't a Goldtop and was a training flight for a low-time pilot, I'm shocked someone authorized this in a congested airspace at night. I'm putting this on the 60 crew and their command. Granted that ATC had a hand in this, so the short-staffing levels should never be an excuse. This was another normalization of deviance where the holes lined up.

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Why wasn't this an option? It's a military helicopter after all so it must be capable.

"PAT hover where you are for landing traffic"
CRJ passes
"PAT, continue"
This was discussed by the retired Army helicopter pilot on the Opposing Bases podcast. To paraphrase, his response was that civilians aren't so keen on helicopters coming to a hover at < 200 over their house, business, boat, etc. I'm sure there's some helicopter pilots here that can confirm, but he also said in the military they're trained to avoid coming to a hover over civilian areas for those reasons. Civilian complaints seem to be true, based on our old neighborhood Facebook cluster**** group where many were keen on complaining about any "scary" helicopter. :rolleyes:

They did say that if the controller had detected earlier that something was amiss they could've had them slow down considerably or do left 360 away from DCA.

One thing they said that really stood out to me is, because of these helicopter routes and the regularity of how they were used, the controllers probably didn't think anything was wrong until too late. Since they're accustomed to running these routes close to approaching airliner traffic and seeing that proximity on their scope, it looked in the realm of "normal" to them. Just one more hole in the Swiss cheese.
 
They already built an airport to replace DCA, it's called IAD. However our privileged politicians didn't want to be driven an extra 30 minutes from their office at the Capital.

Well, I know that. And that was before the SFRA too. But if traffic at DCA is still growing, perhaps another is warranted between RIC and DCA. This is like schools: when one fills up, build another. When they are both too full again, build another. BWI is there too. But people drive from all over to go to DCA. And it sounds like many of these victims were not from the DC area or going to DC. AA has been using it like a hub. Perhaps they need a hub somewhere south of DCA out of the SFRA
 
Well, I know that. And that was before the SFRA too. But if traffic at DCA is still growing, perhaps another is warranted between RIC and DCA. This is like schools: when one fills up, build another. When they are both too full again, build another. BWI is there too. But people drive from all over to go to DCA. And it sounds like many of these victims were not from the DC area or going to DC. AA has been using it like a hub. Perhaps they need a hub somewhere south of DCA out of the SFRA
The privileged won't do that. ;)

There are plenty of alternatives....we don't need any new airports. BWI and IAD are but a few minutes away and then there are a half dozen or so regional airports in the area for private rides.
 
This was discussed by the retired Army helicopter pilot on the Opposing Bases podcast. To paraphrase, his response was that civilians aren't so keen on helicopters coming to a hover at < 200 over their house, business, boat, etc. I'm sure there's some helicopter pilots here that can confirm, but he also said in the military they're trained to avoid coming to a hover over civilian areas for those reasons. Civilian complaints seem to be true, based on our old neighborhood Facebook cluster**** group where many were keen on complaining about any "scary" helicopter. :rolleyes:

They did say that if the controller had detected earlier that something was amiss they could've had them slow down considerably or do left 360 away from DCA.

One thing they said that really stood out to me is, because of these helicopter routes and the regularity of how they were used, the controllers probably didn't think anything was wrong until too late. Since they're accustomed to running these routes close to approaching airliner traffic and seeing that proximity on their scope, it looked in the realm of "normal" to them. Just one more hole in the Swiss cheese.

Not that ATC can’t issue it because I’ve never encountered anything restricting that phraseology. But, as a general rule they treat helicopters during enroute operations the same as fixed wing. The noise issue really isn’t a factor here because they’re over the river. But, as brought up earlier, they are in an avoidance range here. While they could easily bring it to an hover with two engines, an engine failure at hover would get pretty sporty trying to fly out of it. Also, trying to maintain a precise OGE hover at night over water in an aircraft without hover mode would be a sporty as well. Especially if you start kicking up water spray. But, all that’s necessary to ensure separation would be “PAT25 hold north of Hains Point for landing traffic.” Done.
 
I said this earlier, but I think I want to expand in it.

The big lesson I’m taking away from this is the limits of procedures as airspace control measures.

Those limits are exacerbated as airspace congestion increases, which nicks away at safety of flight.

When you look at our Class B airports, some are sleepy, others are booming; each one is its own unique and uniquely complex operation; this could have happened just as easily at any of the eight Class Bs with charted heli routes or really any airport with a very congested terminal area.

NTSB’s probable cause finding will not fix the problem of too many users in too small a space operating too close together going too many different directions. That’s a legislative and FAA problem and, so far, it doesn’t appear neither is interested in solving it.
 
The whole training flight vs actual mission isn’t an issue here either. A training flight is just as important and if this was indeed an eval, the evaluator could be testing the CPT on her knowledge of the route structure.

Helicopter routes to / from bases and around cities, are very similar to routes around restricted areas. When a pilot first checks into a unit, outside of their Commanders Eval, they do an LAO flight. Part of that is an introduction to route structure. That’s just a fire hose though and the new pilot isn’t really getting anything out of it. But, during readiness level (RL) progression, they’re gonna run though routes all the time so they know them like the back of their hand. My old unit I had to run the routes on R3005 day/night without the aid of a map and know procedures for IIMC on the route. Same thing here. You can’t fly VIP missions around DC if you don’t know the structure by heart.

Here’s the other thing and is going to surprise the general public when it comes out. Every Army flight requires a mission briefing form with the attached risk assessment. I’ll be willing to bet this flight was listed as a “low risk” on the RA. Every single flight I did outside of combat was low risk. I know, how can that be? These routes seem so dangerous but in reality, there are far more riskier operations in Army Aviation than this. This is actually kind of a yawn. But, like in the TNNG crash during IMC, even in a relatively benign mode of flight, disaster can strike. Does the RA process need to change? Yep, I’ve said that for years. IMO, it’s become a penciled whipped, cookie cuter form that doesn’t accurately reflect the level of risk.
 
The problem is that these VIRGINIA airports were turned over ostensively to an independent agency formed by the local government. Of course, Congress roundly forgot they did that and have been incessantly micromanaging IAD and DCA ever since.
 
The 60% landing requirement is a Dispatch requirement not a performance requirement. The Dispatch requirement is done for the longest runway, in DCA this is Runway 1. The CRJ would need to land in 4302 ft in order to be dispatched. While this is still shorter than Runway 33 it is only 902 feet shorter. Anything to remember is that most 121 and 135 Companies require that on a Visual Approach that the aircraft be stabilized and aligned with the runway at 500 ft AGL. This can't be done if over the Potomac going to Runway 33.
I'm aware of the last three sentences but I interpret the first three differently. Maybe the accident investigation ought to visit that too.

Under 121.195(b) the dispatch requirement "...would allow a full stop landing at the intended destination airport within 60 percent of the effective length of each runway described below..." It says "each" runway described in (b)(1) and (b)(2). Paragraph (e) allows for dispatch if you have an alternate that meets the requirement instead. Seems clear to me they expect you to go to the alternate if, upon arrival, you can't fit the planned landing distance. As you point out, there's less than 1000 feet of buffer if the crew accepts a landing on 33 after planning one on runway 1. That's not enough. So, I ask you, is the landing distance chart in the cockpit (I know things are digitized these days) including the 60% FAR requirement in addition to balked landing climb gradient, brake energy, weight altitude and temperature limitations? Serious question, IDK.
 
IMO, it’s become a penciled whipped, cookie cuter form that doesn’t accurately reflect the level of risk.
Become? It started out that way. I was filling them out 30 years ago. When someone got one through the approval process, it got passed around the battalion so everyone else could copy it ... regardless of the actual conditions of their event.
 
With proper training and familiarity running that route at less then 200 ft AGL should be a low risk routine operation day or night…agree the risk assessment is probably a joke.
 
With proper training and familiarity running that route at less then 200 ft AGL should be a low risk routine operation day or night…agree the risk assessment is probably a joke.
So....what's up with the 1,000 hr instructor check dude sitting in the other seat? What was his job? There was not only one but two sets of eyeballs who missed it. In all fairness.....it was probably just him who missed it....cause he was making the radio calls. Not sure what the gal was doin?
 
So....what's up with the 1,000 hr instructor check dude sitting in the other seat? What was his job? There was not only one but two sets of eyeballs who missed it. In all fairness.....it was probably just him who missed it....cause he was making the radio calls. Not sure what the gal was doin?
If she hadn't been flying while she was at the White House gig he might have really had his hands full trying to get her up to speed.
 
If they were equipped... Well, I'm sorry, but squawking ADS-B on a training flight is not going to "compromise the operations security of the mission".
Unconfirmed if it is real, but someone forwarded me a post (X maybe?) from Sen. Cruz stating that this particular helo did have ADS-B, but the norm for the military is not to turn it on.
His comment was basically the same as yours. A training flight is not a National Security issue and the ADS-B should have been on.

From what I've read, the Mode C was on, which is how "an" altitude was showing up on the Radar. It would be interesting if they find that the Altimeter was showing 200ft, the Mode C was putting out 200ft, but regretfully they were not actually at 200ft (and did not actually have a visual on the CRJ).

I'm also wondering about the protocols for their night training. Why are they using the very limiting NVG in that very busy airspace. Get out into a training area (aka not right in around DCA or any other Apt) and then put them on.
 
Seeing now it wasn't a Goldtop and was a training flight for a low-time pilot
Is 500 hrs consider "low time" for the military? Sure, it's not the hours the airlines rack up, but I thought for the typical length of the flights, that would equate to a fair amount of flying.
 
Unconfirmed if it is real, but someone forwarded me a post (X maybe?) from Sen. Cruz stating that this particular helo did have ADS-B, but the norm for the military is not to turn it on.
I read it here this morning:

https://wtop.com/national/2025/02/t...m-for-deadly-plane-and-chopper-crash-near-dc/

...the norm for the military is not to turn [ADS-B] on...

Recently, I had some mil traffic fly at/over me with less separation than I cared for.
FWIW, said traffic had ADS-B on, two weeks ago. Good thing, too.
 
500 hrs is relatively low time in my opinion although by 500 hrs I was a Pilot in Command flying AH-1s both day and NVG as a 1LT. I had slightly more than 1000hrs when I made CPT in four years. My first four years were all flying assignments after my basic course and waiting for a couple of months to start flight school at Ft Rucker. I would estimate that 80 % of those hours were at 200 AGL or below….different times but many of those hours were flying ANVS-5s Full Face goggles as I was in a night Attack unit. It required a different level of proficiency.

Like wise my Son in Law recently passed a final FLUG ride and is now a flight lead, flying F-35s and has less then 500 hrs, so once again depends on proficiency and recency of training and maintaining perishable skills.
 
Unconfirmed if it is real, but someone forwarded me a post (X maybe?) from Sen. Cruz stating that this particular helo did have ADS-B, but the norm for the military is not to turn it on.
His comment was basically the same as yours. A training flight is not a National Security issue and the ADS-B should have been on.

From what I've read, the Mode C was on, which is how "an" altitude was showing up on the Radar. It would be interesting if they find that the Altimeter was showing 200ft, the Mode C was putting out 200ft, but regretfully they were not actually at 200ft (and did not actually have a visual on the CRJ).

I'm also wondering about the protocols for their night training. Why are they using the very limiting NVG in that very busy airspace. Get out into a training area (aka not right in around DCA or any other Apt) and then put them on.
What would ADSB have added over and above Mode C? Would it have made a difference?
 
500 hrs is relatively low time in my opinion although by 500 hrs I was a Pilot in Command flying AH-1s both day and NVG as a 1LT. I had slightly more than 1000hrs when I made CPT in four years. My first four years were all flying assignments after my basic course and waiting for a couple of months to start flight school at Ft Rucker. I would estimate that 80 % of those hours were at 200 AGL or below….different times but many of those hours were flying ANVS-5s Full Face goggles as I was in a night Attack unit. It required a different level of proficiency.

Like wise my Son in Law recently passed a final FLUG ride and is now a flight lead, flying F-35s and has less then 500 hrs, so once again depends on proficiency and recency of training and maintaining perishable skills.
I met a Marine Corps Harrier pilot at an airshow about 15 years back. IIRC he had about 500 hours upon returning from a Middle East deployment, and went into Harriers with 250 hours.

I had about 500 hours as well, and figured that he’d by the time he soloed, he had a hundred times the experience and ability to handle situations that I had. Military aviation is levels above what we civilians do.
 
I'm aware of the last three sentences but I interpret the first three differently. Maybe the accident investigation ought to visit that too.

Under 121.195(b) the dispatch requirement "...would allow a full stop landing at the intended destination airport within 60 percent of the effective length of each runway described below..." It says "each" runway described in (b)(1) and (b)(2). Paragraph (e) allows for dispatch if you have an alternate that meets the requirement instead. Seems clear to me they expect you to go to the alternate if, upon arrival, you can't fit the planned landing distance. As you point out, there's less than 1000 feet of buffer if the crew accepts a landing on 33 after planning one on runway 1. That's not enough. So, I ask you, is the landing distance chart in the cockpit (I know things are digitized these days) including the 60% FAR requirement in addition to balked landing climb gradient, brake energy, weight altitude and temperature limitations? Serious question, IDK.
Speaking from the 135 perspective, not 121, FWIW, but the regs are pretty much the same. 135.385(b) is almost a word for word copy of 121.195(b). Per our flight manual, we treated it as both a dispatch requirement and an operational requirement; we would punch in the numbers for landing along with a safety distance factor (multiplier) of 1.67, and that number had to be less than the LDA for the intended runway. I would expect that's what the "short discussion" among the crew was before accepting 33. For us, doing the calculation for a second (or third) runway was pretty trivial, so I would usually do both the intended runway and the shortest runway that we might reasonably expect to be switched to so that I'd already have an answer ready, and I'd discuss that during the arrival briefing.

We did have the OpSpec that allowed us to use up to 80% of the runway (1.25 multiplier) if certain other requirements were met. 135.385(f) - There's no (f) in 121.195 so I don't think they have that option. And, it was still treated as an operational requirement here as well.
 
As you point out, there's less than 1000 feet of buffer if the crew accepts a landing on 33 after planning one on runway 1.
That's only if runway 1 was "just barely long enough" and there is no reason to assume that.

I located a CRJ-700 performance chart here and at the maximum landing weight of 67,000 pounds, the "landing field length" is about 5,100 feet at sea level (page 98) and this includes the safety margin, so actual landing distance is 60% of this number, or about 3,060 feet. Additionally there was a 12.9 knot headwind component on runway 33 further reducing the landing distance.

That's not enough.
Incorrect. Again, you would have to assume runway 1 was "just barely long enough" in order to draw that conclusion which is a silly assumption to make for too many reasons to list.
 
I just listened to the Opposing Bases episode today. I feel it necessary to say that almost everything that has been discussed in this thread (ATC ops, Army helo ops, CRJ performance, "normal" ops, etc) were all discussed by the two hosts who, between them have extensive experience on all 3 sides of this issue. Both are ATC, one flew Army helicopters on these exact routes, and the other flew CRJs into DCA regularly.
 
This was discussed by the retired Army helicopter pilot on the Opposing Bases podcast. To paraphrase, his response was that civilians aren't so keen on helicopters coming to a hover at < 200 over their house, business, boat, etc. I'm sure there's some helicopter pilots here that can confirm, but he also said in the military they're trained to avoid coming to a hover over civilian areas for those reasons. Civilian complaints seem to be true, based on our old neighborhood Facebook cluster**** group where many were keen on complaining about any "scary" helicopter. :rolleyes:

They did say that if the controller had detected earlier that something was amiss they could've had them slow down considerably or do left 360 away from DCA.

One thing they said that really stood out to me is, because of these helicopter routes and the regularity of how they were used, the controllers probably didn't think anything was wrong until too late. Since they're accustomed to running these routes close to approaching airliner traffic and seeing that proximity on their scope, it looked in the realm of "normal" to them. Just one more hole in the Swiss cheese.

Except they would be hovering over the river.
Beats having a couple of massive fireballs raining down on houses, businesses, boats, etc.
 
Incorrect. Again, you would have to assume runway 1 was "just barely long enough" in order to draw that conclusion which is a silly assumption to make for too many reasons to list.
It wasn't my math. The purpose of 121.195(b)(1) and (b)(2) is to keep operators from gaming the system with respect to the 60% rule in order to carry more payload. I think you and @flyingcheesehead would agree with that?
 
Talking with a guy at work that was an instructor helo pilot for these missions, he says 70% helo crew, 20 % tower/atc, 10% fisdo.
 
Talking with a guy at work that was an instructor helo pilot for these missions, he says 70% helo crew, 20 % tower/atc, 10% fisdo.
Well then, should be pretty straightforward to pay off victim families … another 100 million or so is just a rounding error in that massive 700 billion DOD could not account for.
 
Given the height-velocity charts they wouldn't hover, but would start holding. Regardless, they wouldn't be crossing paths until it was clear.
Realize a lightly loaded Blackhawk could probably OGE hover on one engine…although slow to 10-20 knots is more practical…It’s sort of interesting we used to have as part of the task for Army aviation with single engine aircraft included OGE hovering autos…some of us even did them with goggles. Two engine redundancy basically takes away the height velocity problem as even loosing an engine you can fly away with minimal issue with a competent crew…although the gunships may be blowing wing-stores and lift guys may be dropping an external load.
 
If that were the case, PAT25 should have stayed even more to the left (west) of the final approach course. But instead, they deviated right (east) into the path the CRJ.
I was downwind once with a fellow on
straight in for the final. The tower had me turn base but I couldn’t see him so I cadged way to the right. The tower asked me what I was doing? I said, I can’t see this fellow! They waited a minute and then said, he’s over the numbers now, you can turn. My philosophy is, we can talk about it on the ground.
 
Is 500 hrs consider "low time" for the military? Sure, it's not the hours the airlines rack up, but I thought for the typical length of the flights, that would equate to a fair amount of flying.
The better measure of skill is how many night hours in past 6 months
 
It wasn't my math. The purpose of 121.195(b)(1) and (b)(2) is to keep operators from gaming the system with respect to the 60% rule in order to carry more payload. I think you and @flyingcheesehead would agree with that?
The purpose is to prevent dispatch to an airport where the runways are too short for the predicted landing weight. Don't know what you mean with the "gaming the system" part. If the reg did not exist there would be no system to game, I think.
 
The purpose is to prevent dispatch to an airport where the runways are too short for the predicted landing weight. Don't know what you mean with the "gaming the system" part. If the reg did not exist there would be no system to game, I think.
Par (b)(1) keeps 'em from using another available runway for permissible landing weight if a different runway is considered more favorable when there are no other factors, such as wind, etc. to consider. Let's say the longer option is too rough to be favorable. Got to use the more favorable one.

Par (b)(2) keeps 'em from using another available runway for permissible landing weight when there is a more suitable one, given expected wind and other conditions. Let's say the longest runway offers the highest landing weight, but due to a crosswind a shorter runway is more suitable. Got to use the shorter one. "Other conditions", I think, covers the common switch to runway 33 at DCA.
 
ADS-B is not the panacea people think it is.

So all of us “civilians” can turn ours off and fly around low level and ATC/FAA/et al is cool with it?

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I reckon even the slow kids in class are getting a little tired of the governments double standards
 
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The privileged won't do that. ;)

There are plenty of alternatives....we don't need any new airports. BWI and IAD are but a few minutes away and then there are a half dozen or so regional airports in the area for private rides.

I’m not talking about the government people. Just the normal working people that use DCA. DCA can’t all be politicians. Heck, many of them probably fly GA
 
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