Broward County Police Copter Down

So..and I realize it's early to posit... but they have firewalls but they don't work?
 
Let'sgoflying! said:
So..and I realize it's early to posit... but they have firewalls but they don't work?
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Expectation management. How the firewall is designed to work is not how some think they should work.
 
Skymac said:
Not special at all, just silly of folks to say well some people only think like a fixed wing pilot, etc.
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Never said he only thinks like a fixedwing pilot but that mentality of wanting to stretch it to an airport is fixedwing mentality. It’s a helicopter, you don’t need a runway.

Look, no one is saying this pilot was completely off the mark here. We’re not haters and as I said, I give him some latitude in his decision making due to the stress of the emergency. But, we’re critiquing this like the NTSB / FAA would. This isn’t a “Sully” where there’s a delay in engine start and looking for somewhere to land. Killing the engine and fighting the fire takes only a few seconds. Going into those fields isn’t convenient but at the worst you skid into the trees and shred some blades. Anyone who would question the pilot in that decision wouldn’t have a leg to stand on because the procedure requires it.

Couple months ago I had a trans chip on takeoff at night. I swung it back hard to the right and immediately had to decide on the field to my left, or the pad to my right. I didn’t choose the pad out of convenience, I chose it because I thought it was a dead tie as far as distance. In retrospect, the field was slightly closer. I chose wrong and you can bet If that transmission locked up on final, my actions would have been scrutinized by the powers that be. That’s the price you pay for flying for hire. If one can’t take that type of pressure, you find something else to do for a living.
 
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How TF did anyone walk away from that?!?
 
A comment not a conjecture - TR loss of control at a high power setting makes for a difficult autorotation.
 
Based on this video, there’s also fire coming from the right engine as it meets the tail boom. Starting to wonder if this pilot had any indications at all on what was going on behind him.

 
Maybe someone knows how the fire lights are wired up on that aircraft. Indicator systems have been known to fail. Another layer of cheese lines up.
 
The magnitude of the fire makes me think it was being fed from an active fuel source. I don't know anything about the plumbing on the engine or how the pressurized fuel lines are routed, so this is just conjecture.

@Velocity173 may be correct regarding the pilot's understanding of the situation. The severity of the fire as seen from the start of witness videos presents the possibility it was caused by an immediate and catastrophic event. It certainly could have compromised the fire warning system.

Mechanical failures that cause irretrievable damage followed by almost immediate loss of control are rare. We want to believe our piloting skills will allow us a fighting chance to overcome inflight emergencies, but sometimes fate decrees otherwise.

HEMS operations are demanding. Time pressures and environmental factors place added risk on those performing the missions. I live about three miles from a Level 1 trauma center, and CareFlite A109s inbound to the hospital often fly over my house.

Some of these are in the small hours of the morning, and I'm awakened by the engines' song and passing beat of the rotors. I think a short prayer for the safety of the crews, and consider their selfless dedication to others. The crews have my absolute respect.

I hope my thoughts and energy sent to the injured and families of BSO 9 and those on the ground provide them some small comfort.
 
Any fire in flight is bad and requires immediate landing. In a helicopter, you have the best possible chance to survive if you begin an immediate descent and commit to landing on whatever is below you, regardless of suitability. Anything is better than an uncontrolled descent into the Earth.

The primary objective in the emergency response to a fire is the safety of the occupants. Delaying any amount of time risks a successful outcome.

The only reason the pilot could have continued flight is that he was unaware of the fire and believed he only had a OEI engine failure, as he was trained.

Being the survivor of an inflight engine fire, I can say that I would not have hesitated to begin a descent and landed single engine on anything that provided a chance to survive the impact. This pilot did not do that, for whatever reason.

One other thing: a twin engine helicopter gives you the option to attempt to land after a single engine failure and that can be a very bad frame of mind in the case of a fire. In a single engine helicopter, things are much more simple- you are going to land whether you want to or not. There is no choice and no option to delay the inevitable. This is what I believe was influencing this pilot's decision making and ADM/SDM.

Helicopters are obviously not like airplanes and only experience could have helped this pilot, in my opinion.
 
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@Bell206 I heard from a friend the old T1s have fire indication but no bottles?
 
Velocity173 said:
Starting to wonder if this pilot had any indications at all on what was going on behind him.
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This is becoming a consensus. Its my understanding the flames only became visible immediately before the t/boom failed. Prior he was trailing smoke for up to 60 seconds. With the pilot alive and not injured we should hopefully have these questions answered shortly.

If the smoke/fire originated outside the engine compartment then no fire light. Also quite possible whatever failed may have been ingested by one engine giving the impression of an engine failure. Oil can do this.

There is a “channel” between the inboard firewall for both engines. This serves as the engine intake duct and is open to the xsmn deck. Any fluid or other substance can easily flow down that channel and out the back and would be separated from the engine areas. However, each engine could easily suck in any substance in that area and has in the past. The newer T3 and P3s moved the intakes to the exterior cowlings due to excessive FOD issues. The pic in Post 40 shows this channel and one of the engine intake screens. Its also where the #1 TR shaft runs.
Velocity173 said:
I heard from a friend the old T1s have fire indication but no bottles?
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A lot of the older models T and P didn’t have bottles as it is an option. Most newer ones seem to have the bottle installed. I have an internet pic that shows the bottle mounted on the shelf below the #2 engine next to the battery. This is also the area where the smoke/fire came from.
Piperonca said:
how the fire lights are wired up on that aircraft.
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Each engine has 2 thermal detectors: one on the fwd side at the ST/GEN and one under the combustion can. Once one of them hits the trigger temp light in the cockpit Warning Unit. System is fairly bulletproof in my experience.
3393RP said:
The magnitude of the fire makes me think it was being fed from an active fuel source. I don't know anything about the plumbing on the engine or how the pressurized fuel lines are routed,
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My guess it was oil or something fed vs fuel. Smoke would have been different with fuel plus I believe if fuel was consumed outside the engine there would have been fire from the getgo vs 60 seconds later. Oil has a much higher flash temp and can be burnt without visible flame.

Also a 135 has a suction fuel system and not pressurized. If you look at the pic in Post 40 the engine fuel inlet hose is at the outboard side of engine deck with the red tape
 
Bell206 said:
My guess it was oil or something fed vs fuel. Smoke would have been different with fuel plus I believe if fuel was consumed outside the engine there would have been fire from the getgo vs 60 seconds later. Oil has a much higher flash temp and can be burnt without visible flame.

Also a 135 has a suction fuel system and not pressurized. If you look at the pic in Post 40 the engine fuel inlet hose is at the outboard side of engine deck with the red tape
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I didn't properly think before I made my comments. The smoke from a fuel fed fire would have been black, and in larger quantities. Oil seems the more likely source.

I do believe that as soon as the fire ignited, it had copious amounts of a combustible material feeding it. It did get progressively more intense as time elapsed, but was aggressive and intense from the beginning.
 
Bell206 said:
This is becoming a consensus. Its my understanding the flames only became visible immediately before the t/boom failed. Prior he was trailing smoke for up to 60 seconds. With the pilot alive and not injured we should hopefully have these questions answered shortly.

If the smoke/fire originated outside the engine compartment then no fire light. Also quite possible whatever failed may have been ingested by one engine giving the impression of an engine failure. Oil can do this.

There is a “channel” between the inboard firewall for both engines. This serves as the engine intake duct and is open to the xsmn deck. Any fluid or other substance can easily flow down that channel and out the back and would be separated from the engine areas. However, each engine could easily suck in any substance in that area and has in the past. The newer T3 and P3s moved the intakes to the exterior cowlings due to excessive FOD issues. The pic in Post 40 shows this channel and one of the engine intake screens. Its also where the #1 TR shaft runs.

A lot of the older models T and P didn’t have bottles as it is an option. Most newer ones seem to have the bottle installed. I have an internet pic that shows the bottle mounted on the shelf below the #2 engine next to the battery. This is also the area where the smoke/fire came from.

Each engine has 2 thermal detectors: one on the fwd side at the ST/GEN and one under the combustion can. Once one of them hits the trigger temp light in the cockpit Warning Unit. System is fairly bulletproof in my experience.

My guess it was oil or something fed vs fuel. Smoke would have been different with fuel plus I believe if fuel was consumed outside the engine there would have been fire from the getgo vs 60 seconds later. Oil has a much higher flash temp and can be burnt without visible flame.

Also a 135 has a suction fuel system and not pressurized. If you look at the pic in Post 40 the engine fuel inlet hose is at the outboard side of engine deck with the red tape
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And that a heat probe correct? Not an IR sensor?
 
I've got a good bit of time in EC135's and am current in one part 135.293/297/299.

It's hard not to try to MMQB this one but I can see me doing the same thing. The fire warning on the EC135 is a little ding and a dull light (especially in an NVG cockpit) on the dash. Most if not all EC135's have a fire warning but no extinguisher.

If he got a fire warning less than 2 miles from the airport and shut down an engine then turning around and doing a run on would make the most sense. Nobody expects the tail boom to burn through.
 
k9medic said:
If he got a fire warning less than 2 miles from the airport and shut down an engine then turning around and doing a run on would make the most sense. Nobody expects the tail boom to burn through.
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They will now.
 
k9medic said:
This has been a HUGE discussion amongst EC135 pilots
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That it has. There is also an interesting question making the rounds and curious to see your response. IF you got a fire light in your 135, would you, one, check for trailing smoke... and two, if you saw a similar smoke trail as in the OP would you continue to the airport or land immediately?
k9medic said:
Nobody expects the tail boom to burn through.
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Agree. But you have to put it into context. Hot bond temperatures for a composite repair on a 135 tailboom are about 125 deg C. The fire detectors on a T1 trigger at 210-270 deg C. Non-heat resistant composite structures start to degrade at around 300 deg C. And any fuel or oil fire burn at higher temps. And for reference, aluminum alloy structures start to degrade at over 600 deg C.
 
Bell206 said:
That it has. There is also an interesting question making the rounds and curious to see your response. IF you got a fire light in your 135, would you, one, check for trailing smoke... and two, if you saw a similar smoke trail as in the OP would you continue to the airport or land immediately?

Agree. But you have to put it into context. Hot bond temperatures for a composite repair on a 135 tailboom are about 125 deg C. The fire detectors on a T1 trigger at 210-270 deg C. Non-heat resistant composite structures start to degrade at around 300 deg C. And any fuel or oil fire burn at higher temps. And for reference, aluminum alloy structures start to degrade at over 600 deg C.
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Looking at the terrain and the flight path he did not have too many options. A run on landing is what is required. Given the flight track and approach paths, it looks like he was set up correctly. At the airspeed he was at, he would have almost had to auto to get into a football field. That would not be a normal response to the event.
 
k9medic said:
Looking at the terrain and the flight path he did not have too many options. A run on landing is what is required. Given the flight track and approach paths, it looks like he was set up correctly. At the airspeed he was at, he would have almost had to auto to get into a football field. That would not be a normal response to the event.
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Auto into a football field is precisely what I would do if my helicopter was on fire. It gets me and my pax on the ground in the shortest time.
 
The EC135 emergency check list says that if there is a continued indication of an engine fire then you are to land immediately. They define land immediately as "the urgency of landing is paramount. Primary consideration is to assure survival of the occupants. Landing in water, trees or other unsafe areas should be considered only as a last resort."

The track shows he was doing just that. For reference, I95 is less than 1nm from the airport environment.

F4oUgRnXcAA7OWG.jpg
 
Circled are apparently open areas free of trees or water where I would perform an autorotation:

Map edit.jpg
 
Piperonca said:
Auto into a football field is precisely what I would do if my helicopter was on fire. It gets me and my pax on the ground in the shortest time.
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If the tail rotor is still working; otherwise, it will be a disorienting ride.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
If the tail rotor is still working; otherwise, it will be a disorienting ride.
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Of course, the objective would be to get on the ground quickly, while the TR was still attached. I do have sympathy for the pilot. He made a justifiable decision according to his SOP, but it just turned out badly.
 
Piperonca said:
Auto into a football field is precisely what I would do if my helicopter was on fire. It gets me and my pax on the ground in the shortest time.
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Don't forget this happened Monday during school hours. Football field could have had a bunch of kids on it at that hour.

Tough decision to make in a split second. I'm glad it wasn't me making it.
 
We had a similar dynamic 5 years ago when we lost a 38 in Oklahoma during a low level. Bird ingestion at really high speed trashed one engine and severed a bunch of fuel lines. An open flame fire being fed by positive fuel pressure ensues. The flame eventually burns through both hydraulic system flexible braided lines (stuff is packed close back there, centerline thrust engines placement), causing loss of flight controls and prompting an (successful) ejection.

The AIB report outright ommitted any discussion about the timing of the emergency action responses, which goes directly to the loss of both systems.

The USAF absolved the pilot of any fault because the checklist for engine fire was merely accomplished, and the checklist does not provide a time limit or constraint in terms of how expeditious the actions have to be taken. It is not at all facts in evidence the aircraft was doomed to crash regardless of pilot action expediency or lack thereof.

I am of the opinion the delay in shutting off fuel to the engine was causal to the loss of both hydraulic flight control systems; the accident board opted to forego the topic entirely, and buried the timeline by omitting it from the public report. Let's just say the safety (privilege access) report paints a different picture. Which tells me all i needed to know about the issue at hand from the perspective of teaching my students going forward.

BL, it is a big gamble to let flames cook for any amount of time just because checklist lawyers want to keep the question of timing open, in order to cover the entire spectrum of inflight fire variances. And in fairness, it is true there are instances where not letting an engine cook (guaranteeing a loss of flight control) could mean the difference between getting the airspeed needed to zoom and boom, and ending up hitting a fence at 250knots. Damned if you do, damned if you don't. This goes even more so for folks without the ability to eject.

As @Velocity173 said, it's the reason they pay us. Too hot (pun intended) for a living? Get out of the kitchen.
 
donjohnston said:
Don't forget this happened Monday during school hours. Football field could have had a bunch of kids on it at that hour.

Tough decision to make in a split second. I'm glad it wasn't me making it.
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Maybe mistaken, but I continue to believe there were adequate open areas without people, trees, or water that helicopter could have made it into without delay. Aggressive maneuvering required? Sure. But remember it's a helicopter. With moderate skill, you can put it any place the blades will fit. Power off is another level of difficulty but not impossible, because you have some inertia in the rotor system to help you. And it beats burning to death. Disclaimer: my experience is mostly military including Vietnam, and several decades ago when training risks were more acceptable than in today's commercial operations.
 
hindsight2020 said:
We had a similar dynamic 5 years ago when we lost a 38 in Oklahoma during a low level. Bird ingestion at really high speed trashed one engine and severed a bunch of fuel lines. An open flame fire being fed by positive fuel pressure ensues. The flame eventually burns through both hydraulic system flexible braided lines (stuff is packed close back there, centerline thrust engines placement), causing loss of flight controls and prompting an (successful) ejection.

The AIB report outright ommitted any discussion about the timing of the emergency action responses, which goes directly to the loss of both systems.

The USAF absolved the pilot of any fault because the checklist for engine fire was merely accomplished, and the checklist does not provide a time limit or constraint in terms of how expeditious the actions have to be taken. It is not at all facts in evidence the aircraft was doomed to crash regardless of pilot action expediency or lack thereof.

I am of the opinion the delay in shutting off fuel to the engine was causal to the loss of both hydraulic flight control systems; the accident board opted to forego the topic entirely, and buried the timeline by omitting it from the public report. Let's just say the safety (privilege access) report paints a different picture. Which tells me all i needed to know about the issue at hand from the perspective of teaching my students going forward.

BL, it is a big gamble to let flames cook for any amount of time just because checklist lawyers want to keep the question of timing open, in order to cover the entire spectrum of inflight fire variances. And in fairness, it is true there are instances where not letting an engine cook (guaranteeing a loss of flight control) could mean the difference between getting the airspeed needed to zoom and boom, and ending up hitting a fence at 250knots. Damned if you do, damned if you don't. This goes even more so for folks without the ability to eject.

As @Velocity173 said, it's the reason they pay us. Too hot (pun intended) for a living? Get out of the kitchen.
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Like the Concorde Air France crash, fire tore thru that structure in a such a short period of time. Even if the engines survived, both the flight controls and left elevon were already severely damaged.

Personally I’ve have maybe a half dozen fire lights on the UH-60 and while none were valid (crappy IR sensors) I never treated it as a “cry wolf” scenario. I always grabbed the fire T handle, “confirm engine fire on one.” While awaiting confirmation I’m already looking out the window for possible LZs. Reply from CE “no fire! No smoke!” Continue to monitor and keep trucking on but you’re always on the alert. Like the chip lights. I’ve had 4 over the years and fortunately every one was within a 1/4 mile from a helipad. If it were enroute, good chance I’m landing in someone’s back yard. Helicopters in the past have had their transmissions seize in flight. Ya don’t play around with that stuff.
 
Piperonca said:
Maybe mistaken, but I continue to believe there were adequate open areas without people, trees, or water that helicopter could have made it into without delay. Aggressive maneuvering required? Sure. But remember it's a helicopter. With moderate skill, you can put it any place the blades will fit. Power off is another level of difficulty but not impossible, because you have some inertia in the rotor system to help you. And it beats burning to death. Disclaimer: my experience is mostly military including Vietnam, and several decades ago when training risks were more acceptable than in today's commercial operations.
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I haven't heard that the pilot knew there was a fire. Only that there was an engine failure. I'd like to think that if there were a fire indication that when the radio call was made they would have said they had a fire and not just an engine failure. Beyond that, I don't know. I suppose when the airport is so close there's a tendency to think that's your best choice.
 
donjohnston said:
I haven't heard that the pilot knew there was a fire. Only that there was an engine failure. I'd like to think that if there were a fire indication that when the radio call was made they would have said they had a fire and not just an engine failure. Beyond that, I don't know. I suppose when the airport is so close there's a tendency to think that's your best choice.
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My assumption was that there was a fire indication and the pilot was aware of it but you know how to spell assume.
 
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Piperonca said:
My assumption was that there was a fire indication and the pilot was aware of it but you know how to spell assume.
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Yep, speculation. And I know there are those who don’t like that but I disagree. My outlook has always been, as long as it’s respectful to the deceased (if the case), nothing wrong with speculation. Just don’t be a Gryder.

The thing that’s good with healthy speculation, is you can brainstorm the heck out of it. While doing that, you’re covering so many different options on what could have happened, that even if it’s not the actual cause, something can be learned from one of those options. Just like the Snort Snodgrass accident. Multiple reasons could have caused it and we probably had 3 or 4 possible scenarios. If we withhold an opinion until the official NTSB report based on some misplaced courtesy for the pilot, the only thing gained is knowing one scenario…the actual cause.
 
That’s the Spirit of PoA, right there.
 
Velocity173 said:
Yeah definitely not a shining example of good ADM on my part. When the dust settles, I’ll probably do a thread on it.
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Eh, we all could do better next time. From the pic you posted it appears you at least avoided a prop strike which Henning was able to do twice in one incident.
 
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