Austin International Airport: near disaster

Does Pt 121 have an equivalent of the Air Force Aircraft Save Award?
Or the ATCA Andy Pitas Save Award?

if so, I'm giving it to the crew of Fedex1432 this year.
 
Not sure what Juan is getting at with the SW being in the ILS critical area. Nothing in his diagram suggests that they penetrated the ILS critical area. They were holding short on the right side of 18L. They’re good.

Controller should’ve been immediately relieved by the sup. A bust all the way. He can clear Fed for landing at 3.1 but that’s based on SW rolling by Fed hits 2 miles. If he didn’t get a rolling call (should’ve) before Fed at 2 miles, then he should’ve issued an immediate go around with a turn to avoid. He doesn’t even have basic runway separation in that the SW has to be airborne off the end of the runway by the time Fed crosses threshold. Can’t use 6,000 ft because tower can’t see the runway.

3.1 miles can be done safely but with those conditions, I just would’ve either held the SW or issue a clearance with no delay and listen for the rolling call vs Fed’s position. Don’t know how many times I heard in approach training, “gotta protect for a go around.”
 
Fdx knew something was amiss when he asked to verify he was clear to land. They knew what SWA and AUS was oblivious to.

Fdx should send AUS the dry cleaning bill because they had to have crapped themselves seeing SWA.
 
Velocity173 said:
Not sure what Juan is getting at with the SW being in the ILS critical area. Nothing in his diagram suggests that they penetrated the ILS critical area. They were holding short on the right side of 18L. They’re good.
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Wouldn't crossing the hold short line constitute entering the ILS critical area in the absence of a critical-area marking?

At what point would an aircraft on a cat III approach be required to go around with an aircraft inside the critical area?
 
3-7-5. PRECISION APPROACH CRITICAL AREA
  1. ILS critical area dimensions are described in FAA Order 6750.16, Siting Criteria for Instrument Landing Systems. Aircraft and vehicle access to the ILS critical area must be controlled to ensure the integrity of ILS course signals whenever the official weather observation is a ceiling of less than 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles. Do not authorize vehicles/aircraft to operate in or over the critical area, except as specified in subparagraph a1, whenever an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS outer marker (OM) or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway.
    • PHRASEOLOGY
    • HOLD SHORT OF (runway) ILS CRITICAL AREA.
    NOTE: All available weather sources METARs/SPECI/PIREPS/ Controller observations are reported ceilings and/or visibilities and must be disseminated as described in 7110.65 and 7210.3
    1. LOCALIZER CRITICAL AREA
      1. (a) Do not authorize vehicle or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM when the official weather observation is a ceiling of less than 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles, except:
        1. (1) A preceding arriving aircraft on the same or another runway that passes over or through the area while landing or exiting the runway.
        2. (2) A preceding departing aircraft or missed approach on the same or another runway that passes through or over the area.
      2. (b) In addition to subparagraph a1(a), when the official weather observation indicates a ceiling of less than 200 feet or RVR 2,000 feet, do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the middle marker, 1/2 final mile.
    2. GLIDESLOPE CRITICAL AREA. Do not authorize vehicles or aircraft operations in or over the area when an arriving aircraft is inside the ILS OM or the fix used in lieu of the OM unless the arriving aircraft has reported the runway in sight or is circling to land on another runway when the official weather observation indicates a ceiling of less than 800 feet or visibility less than 2 miles.
  2. Operators commonly conduct “coupled” or “autoland” approaches to satisfy maintenance, training, or reliability program requirements. Promptly issue an advisory if the critical area will not be protected when an arriving aircraft advises that a “coupled,” “CATIII,” “autoland,” or similar type approach will be conducted and the official weather observation indicates a ceiling of 800 feet or more, or the visibility is 2 miles or more.
    • PHRASEOLOGY
    • ILS CRITICAL AREA NOT PROTECTED.
 
strangebird said:
Tha'ts because SWA was clueless about what was happening
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SWA was most likely on Ground Control frequency when Tower cleared FedEx to land so of course they wouldn't know a plane landing on the runway that thye were cleared to takeoff from.
 
jayhawk74 said:
SWA was most likely on Ground Control frequency when Tower cleared FedEx to land so of course they wouldn't know a plane landing on the runway that thye were cleared to takeoff from.
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Listen to the tape. Tower told them FedEx was at 3 miles as part of the TO clearance.
 
Palmpilot said:
Wouldn't crossing the hold short line constitute entering the ILS critical area in the absence of a critical-area marking?

At what point would an aircraft on a cat III approach be required to go around with an aircraft inside the critical area?
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Two components two the ILS critical area. With less than 800/2 an aircraft can still depart into the localizer critical area but not the glide slope critical area. In this case, the glide slope critical area should look like this diagram. It’s serves all the way to the near edge of the runway but NOT the runway itself. Coming from the opposite side, SWA would be good.

As far as the go around, as I said, the controller has to have 2 miles increasing to 3 miles within 1 minute after departure. That’s a radar departure rule that tower has to work with the TRACON on. In this case, it wouldn’t matter what approach Fed was doing. They’re an IFR arrival vs another IFR departure. If the controller doesn’t have the SWA rolling once Fed is at 2 miles, minus visual sep (not happening here) he just busted that rule and better send him around and cancel SWAs take off clearance. The whole point of that rule is to protect for a possible go around. In this case, there was nothing ensuring that.

84520203-3A51-486F-8354-CCF0ECA86280.jpeg
 
AKiss20 said:
Was thinking the same thing. High SA, patience, and not blindly trusting ATC in low viz conditions saved a bunch of lives at PVD some 10 years ago

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That incident actually happened in 1999. About 10-11 years ago I was flying through PVD approach and I heard a controllers voice that sounded vaguely familiar for some reason. She then proceeded to chew out a pilot on the frequency for some reason or another and I immediately placed her as the controller working the tower during this incident that night. I guess her temperament never changed.

PVD has since de-designated a runway and redesigned the taxiways and low viz procedures after that near miss. Props to the crew that refused the take off clearance after being scolded by the controller.
 
Brad Z said:
That incident actually happened in 1999. About 10-11 years ago I was flying through PVD approach and I heard a controllers voice that sounded vaguely familiar for some reason. She then proceeded to chew out a pilot on the frequency for some reason or another and I immediately placed her as the controller working the tower during this incident that night. I guess her temperament never changed.

PVD has since de-designated a runway and redesigned the taxiways and low viz procedures after that near miss. Props to the crew that refused the take off clearance after being scolded by the controller.
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ah woops, I saw (2013) in the title and thought it referred to the date. I’d watched that video several times in the past so I didn’t re-watch it and get the exact details. Thanks for the correction
 
Hunter Handsfield said:
There's no way this incident is pilot error. It's all on ATC/tower, it seems to me. If Juan is right, the FedEx crew saved the day.
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How is this NOT pilot error?

SW calls holding short, ready to depart. Tower clears them for take off and tells there there is a inbound 767 Heavy 3 miles out. Also both planes had the RVR read to them.

And SW SITS. And sits. If I told cleared for take off with a plane on 3 mile final, I either ROLL NOW or tell the tower I will wait for the landing traffic. With the low RVR there was no way that the tower could see SW sitting.

Then once rolling, and abort is called. That the other aircraft is on the go, and SW continues the take off.

Then, once airborne, they refuse a turn that would have helped deconflict the two. OK, there may have been reasons to not accept the turn, but based on up to that point, it seems that SW was cluless as to the situation and did not understand how close they were to a mid air collision.

IMO, the only thing the tower might have done differently is to tell SW to expediate their take off when they gave the clearance.
 
Pinecone said:
Then once rolling, and abort is called. That the other aircraft is on the go, and SW continues the take off.
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One thing to note is that it was FedEx that told SWA to abort, not tower unless I missed a subsequent tower call. Furthermore we don’t really know where in the TO roll that was. Given that, I’m pretty understanding of SWA continuing the takeoff. I do agree they took their sweet time getting on the roll though.
 
Aren't almost all FedEx aircraft now equipped with FLIR and heads-up display? Its possible the FedEx pilots COULD see the Southwest plane sitting on the runway.

My opinion, ATC cut it a little close clearing the SWA to depart ahead of FedEx, but it should have still worked out. SWA took their time getting rolling, obviously because of the very low visibility. Austin is a busy airport, but not so busy ATC needed to rush the SWA to depart during low-vis operations. Just bad judgement on both ATC and SWA.
 
AKiss20 said:
I do agree they took their sweet time getting on the roll though.
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That is a bit subjective. There is no standard for how long an airplane can take to being their takeoff roll and the normal amount of time varies by aircraft type and conditions.

Visibility was in the 1/8SM to 1/4SM. Under those conditions, airplanes move slower. Even SWA.

Temperature was M01 which, with the fog, makes that icing conditions. That requires a static runup just before brake release (to 70% N1) to ensure normal engine acceleration and operation. It is recommended that 70% be held for 30 seconds but that isn't required. (You'd tell ATC if you were going to hold that long, and they didn't)

Nothing the SWA crew did would indicate that they were aware of the proximity of the landing FDX 767, even though they were informed of it with their takeoff clearance.

What doesn't make sense to me is why the controller would give them a takeoff clearance, with FDX so close, under conditions that are known to result in slower aircraft movement. Then, he apparently didn't monitor it very well, even when queried by the FDX crew, so that a go-around could have been issued early enough to maintain separation.
 
I finally listened to the ATC tape on liveatc. Man, if a voice could ooze more DGAF energy after such a near miss, it's AUS tower.

I hate everything about this, except FedEx, who deserve medals and statues, paid for by a collection from the passengers on SWA. Eesh.
 
Larry in TN said:
Nothing the SWA crew did would indicate that they were aware of the proximity of the landing FDX 767, even though they were informed of it with their takeoff clearance.
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Yeah, I have to think they didn't process the proximity of FedEx.
 
Pinecone said:
How is this NOT pilot error?
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Everything is slower in low visbility. I don't work for Southwest, but less than 1200 RVR we would be required to stop and perform a checklist after being cleared onto the runway (for takeoff or LUAW). If the controller needed an immediate takeoff, he should have stated "cleared for immediate takeoff, no delay".
 
Pinecone said:
Then, once airborne, they refuse a turn that would have helped deconflict the two. OK, there may have been reasons to not accept the turn...
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Yeah, there was a GOOD reason. The controller thought he was issuing that turn to an airplane on the ground, not in the air.

Upon hearing "Southwest abort", the controller assumed the transmission was made by Southwest-- because that's exactly what the controller would expect to hear if Southwest had rejected the takeoff. Consequently, the controller thought Southwest was rolling out on the runway, and issued the turn to get him off of it.

It's several seconds later that he realizes that Southwest is actually airborne, after which he issues appropriate instructions.
 
hindsight2020 said:
...Hope things get shaken at AUS, changes need to be made anyways at that place. They're due for a major attitude adjustment, from where I sit at least as a local "customer".
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What is the attitude problem? Complacency?
 
schmookeeg said:
I finally listened to the ATC tape on liveatc. Man, if a voice could ooze more DGAF energy after such a near miss, it's AUS tower.
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And if a voice could give you confidence that even in a near miss, he was under control and everything was going to be fine, it was the FedEx pilot! He saved a lot of lives and didn't even sound like he broke a sweat!
 
Palmpilot said:
What is the attitude problem? Complacency?
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The problem is the attitude. A radio environment of rank self-importance and a lack of accountability, leading to and getting in the way of other people's jobs. This boo boo oughta knock them down a peg or two for a while, remind them they're not beyond reproach, and that we're participants, not subordinates.
 
So a question to those of you who are commercial pilots. I'd heard a story many years ago from a commercial pilot. He said if you hear someone on the radio telling you to abort and you can do so safely, you have no choice, you have to comply. This was a hangar story, and it was something like he and his buddies were working for FedEx and would occasionally get on the radio and tell the other pilot to abort just to be a pain. One day, one of the pilots told him to abort his takeoff and he did even though he thought it was a prank, only to have another plane taking off in the opposite direction go right over his head. Maybe true, maybe hangar flying...

Is this really a rule? If so, I'm guessing they would determine if the SWA pilot violated the rule. Since he didn't abort, if he'd flown into the FedEx plane, we'd have a much different story today.
 
schmookeeg said:
Some remarks about the controller on reddit... eek if true. o_O

https://old.reddit.com/r/flying/comments/10ty412/aus_runway_incursion/j7brfzs/
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And this is what people don’t want to talk about but it’s exactly what Juan was referring to at the end of his vid. It’s also the primary reason why my brother retired out of ATC at 51 vs sticking it out til mandatory 56. Far too many controllers getting pushed through the system in the last 10 years that have no business controlling aircraft.
 
Larry in TN said:
There is no such rule.

How could there be? No person outside of the aircraft knows if a safe reject is even possible at any point in time.
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I guess, coming from a non-commercial pilot, I assumed it could be real... on the other hand, I questioned it!

Not knowing if it's possible and knowing there is an issue requiring you to abort are two different things. I see an elephant (or 737) on the runway at night and tell you to abort your landing. Better for you to do it than to question me.
 
Lowflynjack said:
I see an elephant (or 737) on the runway at night and tell you to abort your landing. Better for you to do it than to question me.
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But what if the elephant is actually on the parallel taxiway, presumably waiting for clearance to cross, and the departing flight no long has room to stop on the runway?

It's a decision that the Captain will have to make.
 
Outside of a rule, if I don't heed any rando on the radio telling me to abort, and I come into some sort of mischief, I will need to explain why I didn't listen. Stating that I was uncertain of the transmitter or that it was incorrect phraseology would sound pretty dumb in hindsight.
 
From what I see, & details coming out. It may be a ‘pilot save’, but the main ingredient is ‘controller error’.
 
AKiss20 said:
One thing to note is that it was FedEx that told SWA to abort, not tower unless I missed a subsequent tower call. Furthermore we don’t really know where in the TO roll that was. Given that, I’m pretty understanding of SWA continuing the takeoff. I do agree they took their sweet time getting on the roll though.
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Revised my opinion on this, and agree that maybe they were past the point of a safe abort. However, it doesn't matter who called the abort, if possible, they should have aborted versus trying to decide who called. It could be a different voice but a senior tower person.

Also, IMO, SW should have been more clear that they were not aborting. This was low viz, so nobody could see what what occuring.
 
dmspilot said:
Everything is slower in low visbility. I don't work for Southwest, but less than 1200 RVR we would be required to stop and perform a checklist after being cleared onto the runway (for takeoff or LUAW). If the controller needed an immediate takeoff, he should have stated "cleared for immediate takeoff, no delay".
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Agreed that the controller should have stated so. BUT, if I am waiting to depart and they clear me for takeoff stating an inbound on a 3 mile final, I would think, Hmm, I need to roll now or decline the TO clearance and wait.

A little SA please.
 
What? Two airplanes about collided
Where? Both had permission to be in the same place at the same time
How? One was late leaving or the other was early
Why? No one could see anything
Why? The weather was bad
Who? An arriving plane, a departing plane and a controller

The root cause becomes pretty clear. But this is STILL basically a mishap. LOTS of things had to go wrong. Fortunately, the chain was broke, which is likely.

Still, lots of little things. Lots of other links could have been broken but they weren’t, they are not root causes.
 
And this doesn’t THEN address:

Who? Controller
Why? Was he trained adequately?
Rested? The whole IMSAFE thing
How? Wasn’t backed up?
How? What were the procedures?

yada yada yada. It’s also an elephant, one bite at a time.
 
Anybody recognize this voice?

 
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