Airplane down at Addison (KADS)

PIC appears to be experienced.

HOWARD HALE CASSADY

County: TARRANT
Country: USA
Medical Information:
Medical Class: First Medical Date: 12/2018
MUST WEAR CORR LENSES & POSSESS GLASSES FOR NEAR & INTRM VISION.
BasicMed Course Date: None BasicMed CMEC Date: None
Certificates
AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT, FLIGHT INSTRUCTOR, MECHANIC
Certificates Description
Certificate: AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT
Date of Issue: 3/3/2015

Ratings:
AIRLINE TRANSPORT PILOT
AIRPLANE MULTIENGINE LAND
COMMERCIAL PRIVILEGES
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE LAND
AIRPLANE SINGLE ENGINE SEA

Type Ratings:
A/BE-300 A/CE-500 A/CE-650 A/CE-750 A/G-1159, A/G-IV A/HS-125 A/IA-JET A /LR-6 A/LR-JET

Limits:
ENGLISH PROFICIENT.
 
The plane was sold earlier this year by an affluent owner of a financial company located in Chicago suburbs - the plane was being used a lot for conducting his business and he ended up replacing it with a jet - nothing really fishy here, just people doing everyday business.

The NTSB said during the press conference that the use of the old tail number instead of the new one for the fatal flight would be part of the accident investigation. Maybe something fishy, maybe not. We'll see.
 
The NTSB said during the press conference that the use of the old tail number instead of the new one for the fatal flight would be part of the accident investigation. Maybe something fishy, maybe not. We'll see.
The guy had ten type ratings, probably used to flying different airplanes day to day. Maybe the little call sign label on the instrument panel was never updated after the sale?
 
A cockpit recording from a St. Petersburg-bound plane that crashed in Texas on Sunday captured voices “consistent with confusion” and signaled there was a problem with the left engine seconds before it ended suddenly, according to the National Transportation Safety Board.

Twelve seconds before the flight recording ends, there was confusion inside the plane, indications of a problem with the left engine, then three alerts about the aircraft banking, said safety board vice chairman Bruce Landsberg at a Tuesday news conference in Texas.
 
One time, a King Air pilot told me that one King Air crash (I don't recall which one) involved one engine overspeeding on takeoff and the pilot misinterpreting the signs as being an engine failure on the other side, so he powered back his one good engine. I don't know enough about the PT6, King Air 350, multiengine flying in specific, or airplanes in general to say if there's any merit to that theory in any crash. But I can ask questions: Is that a plausible accident chain?
 
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Instances like this reinforce my feelings that a high time pilot isn't necessarily a better pilot. Yes I am sure there is a tipping point but let's just say you fly the same airplane over the same routes day after day after day. Do you really think you are getting better or getting more complacent? Do you think a pilot with a newly minted mutli rating would be apt to follow procedure or one with 10k hours and no engine failures? I'm sure there are things each experience level will do better than the other but automation in the cockpit is great until it stops working and that includes the pilot's behavior.
 
So within two weeks we have a low time single pilot roll a ratty old A90 on takeoff and now we have an experienced two person crew do the same thing in a new 350. I guess auto-feather, rudder-boost and two sets of experienced hands in the cockpit dont ensure a different outcome.
 
So within two weeks we have a low time single pilot roll a ratty old A90 on takeoff and now we have an experienced two person crew do the same thing in a new 350. I guess auto-feather, rudder-boost and two sets of experienced hands in the cockpit dont ensure a different outcome.
All roads lead to Rome.
 
Maybe it's time we drop the twin and require everything to have 1,3,or 4 engines..
 
So within two weeks we have a low time single pilot roll a ratty old A90 on takeoff and now we have an experienced two person crew do the same thing in a new 350. I guess auto-feather, rudder-boost and two sets of experienced hands in the cockpit dont ensure a different outcome.

True. But we also don't know the full story on this one yet.
 
The doctors here can explain this better than I, but Klonopin and Effexor aren't drugs that are taken casually. If you've been taking them for any length of time, you can't stop them cold turkey without withdrawal.

If there were even traces in the pilot's blood, its very likely they were taken regularly and the pilot may have been hiding this to protect the class 1 medical.

Klonopin is sometimes used BID and short term, but Effexor is an SNRI anti depressant intended for regular use. I can't remember if Effexor is on the approved list, but I'm pretty sure that all benzodiazepine meds (Klonopin, Valium, Ativan, et al) are a red flag.
 
Instances like this reinforce my feelings that a high time pilot isn't necessarily a better pilot. Yes I am sure there is a tipping point but let's just say you fly the same airplane over the same routes day after day after day. Do you really think you are getting better or getting more complacent? Do you think a pilot with a newly minted mutli rating would be apt to follow procedure or one with 10k hours and no engine failures? I'm sure there are things each experience level will do better than the other but automation in the cockpit is great until it stops working and that includes the pilot's behavior.

Well under stress you sink to your proficiency level. How proficient is a newly minted multi pilot vs an old salt? I’ll take the old salt, you can have the ATC kid ;-)
 
NB: the CVR data being released along with the numerous subsequent posts. It all says uncommanded Vmc roll and loss of aircraft control. Evidence to anything else?
And that proves they failed to brief beforehand?
 
Maybe it's time we drop the twin and require everything to have 1,3,or 4 engines..

If we insist on thinking outside the box, here is another option (and I am familiar with Addison and fully realize the implications of this in a field boxed in by concrete, cars and people)....
Once you realize a problem (major engine/prop problem and speed dipping towards vmc), pull them both back, set it down....and maybe (maybe) live.
Had it happen near me; twin Cessna just pulled them both back and slid along the grass. Alive, and no one could come up with a decent criticism of the choice.
 
One time, a King Air pilot told me that one King Air crash (I don't recall which one) involved one engine overspeeding on takeoff and the pilot misinterpreting the signs as being an engine failure on the other side, so he powered back his one good engine. I don't know enough about the PT6, King Air 350, multiengine flying in specific, or airplanes in general to say if there's any merit to that theory in any crash. But I can ask questions: Is that a plausible accident chain?

It isn't an overspeed, but a failure in the FCU(fuel control unit) that causes over torque. The plane yaws into the good engine and the old "dead leg, dead engine" drill fools the pilot into shutting down the functioning engine which exacerbates the yaw. Since you are past the certified power on the malfunctioning engine you're in test pilot land WRT Vmc. Very unpleasant failure mode and your only option is to recognize and shut down the engine.

There are some telltale signs from a PT-6 that is might be coming that you have to be mindful of.
 
So within two weeks we have a low time single pilot roll a ratty old A90 on takeoff and now we have an experienced two person crew do the same thing in a new 350. I guess auto-feather, rudder-boost and two sets of experienced hands in the cockpit dont ensure a different outcome.

When has more technology or more pilots ever ensured a specific outcome?

Instances like this reinforce my feelings that a high time pilot isn't necessarily a better pilot. Yes I am sure there is a tipping point but let's just say you fly the same airplane over the same routes day after day after day. Do you really think you are getting better or getting more complacent? Do you think a pilot with a newly minted mutli rating would be apt to follow procedure or one with 10k hours and no engine failures? I'm sure there are things each experience level will do better than the other but automation in the cockpit is great until it stops working and that includes the pilot's behavior.

The issue is recurrency training, not just total time. Like an athlete, where properly coached practice improves performance, the more a pilot practices/simulates them the more likely one will handle an abnormal or emergency situation competently and correctly. Although they don't yet have a perfect record, the commercial airlines statistically prove that point over and over.
 
Remember, real life malfunctions aren't always exactly the same as we're prepared for and we don't always have the time to go around the moon and back to figure it all out, like Apollo 13. This crew deserves the benefit of the doubt, imo.
 
Remember, real life malfunctions aren't always exactly the same as we're prepared for and we don't always have the time to go around the moon and back to figure it all out, like Apollo 13. This crew deserves the benefit of the doubt, imo.

I feel for the crew and all on board, but I also know that engine failures on take-off in a twin are just like engine failures in a helicopter.

When it happens, you don't have a couple seconds to figure it out. You have to respond immediately with the correct action or it's too late. A couple seconds of delay and it's gone too far and there's no recovering.
 
I feel for the crew and all on board, but I also know that engine failures on take-off in a twin are just like engine failures in a helicopter.
Hmm... props pull an airplane forward and a helicopter upward. If a prop suddenly goes to beta (ground fine?) I don't see any memory items or checklist here for it. If your helicopter blades do that have you got a checklist and memory items to fix it quick?
 
Well, it doesn't go into beta, it just provides no lift, and more lift.

On the ground the collective is full down and the blades are at flat pitch. You can sit there like that all day at 100% power and the helicopter will not go anywhere.

If an engine quits in a helicopter, the rotor rpm of the blades immediately begin decreasing. If allowed to decrease beyond a specified rpm limit, which only takes a few seconds, it will become irrecoverable. There will be nothing you can do, from any altitude to regain the rotor rpm.

Autorotation Procedures for helicopters must be memorized. There is literally no time to reference the checklist, and you'll be using both hands anyway on the collective and cyclic.

The bad news is, the rotor decay occurs in seconds, so your reaction has to be immediate and your memory flawless.

The good news is, you really only have to remember to do two things.

Lower the collective to increase rotor rpm, and almost as quickly gently brining it back up to keep the rotor rpm in the green.

-while simultaneously

adding aft cyclic to load the disk, helping to keep rotor rpm up, then smoothly apply forward cyclic to pitch for published autorotate speed.

Of course your feet will be dancing on the pedals as well while you're making all these changes.

Does that answer your question?
 
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What's that old saw about helicopters?

"A million parts rapidly rotating around an oil leak waiting for metal fatigue to set in." :p
 
What's that old saw about helicopters?

"A million parts rapidly rotating around an oil leak waiting for metal fatigue to set in." :p

That description sounds like the SA315B Lama, except for the metal fatigue. You fly it for an hour then spend two hours cleaning all the grease and oil off it.

Sure is a lot of fun to fly though.
 
That description sounds like the SA315B Lama, except for the metal fatigue. You fly it for an hour then spend two hours cleaning all the grease and oil off it.

Sure is a lot of fun to fly though.

Sounds like the helicopter version of a 1960s MGB.
You don't ever want to forget to renew the kitty litter on the garage floor. :D
 
Sounds like the helicopter version of a 1960s MGB.
You don't ever want to forget to renew the kitty litter on the garage floor. :D

You know, surprisingly, it's not so much the MGB. It's all those dang grease zerks on the rotor head and tail rotor drive shaft, and a few others. I forget exactly how many, but I think there's like 42 of them or something.
 
Sounds like the helicopter version of a 1960s MGB.
You don't ever want to forget to renew the kitty litter on the garage floor. :D

Oh wait... It just dawned on me... you were referring to the MGB sports car huh?

I thought you were talking about the Main Gear Box. LOL

My sister had a 1967 triumph. Similar to the MGB. That car was a blast to drive.
 
The folks at Kaboom Town had I think two moments of silence for this accident. It was definitely on folks’ mind.
 
Well, it doesn't go into beta, it just provides no lift, and more lift.

<snip>

Does that answer your question?
It was certainly fascinating, since I've never so much as sat in a helicopter. It sounds, though, that a helicopter never has a mode where airflow strikes the blades at a negative angle of attack in flight, such as a windmilling prop on an airplane. In an airplane, Vmc is defined with the prop on the low pitch stop and no engine power applied, so airflow rotates the engine by striking the "top" of the blade (curved side). If the propeller has a ground mode where the low pitch stop can be exceeded for the purpose of providing reverse thrust on landing a malfunction while airborne could result in an extremely high,unpublished, Vmc — especially so if the engine is producing power. It may be impossible to control. Howard Hughes, I think, had such a failure and crashed into a house in Beverly Hills. The analogy to a helicopter, to me, would be the blades changing angle of attack to negative, thrusting the helicopter toward the ground. For that, memory items, I would think, can't save you and the ensuing crash wouldn't be because you botched a published procedure. Agreed?
 
The analogy to a helicopter, to me, would be the blades changing angle of attack to negative, thrusting the helicopter toward the ground. For that, memory items, I would think, can't save you and the ensuing crash wouldn't be because you botched a published procedure. Agreed?

Well, that's not quite how it works. That would be pretty scary if it did.

This can get really technical really fast and it's beyond my knowledge since I'm not an A&P. Basically the blades are to be adjusted to the factory specifications, and those specs lay somewhere between 0 degrees, or possible a slight negative pitch of maybe .5 or 1, up to a positive of about 10. Of course there is some variation between helicopters, but these are pretty standard general settings. You never would really get the true beta that you can with a turbine fixed wing prop.

In training things always happen incredibly fast. However after you've done autos for awhile, it all seems to slow down incredibly slow. In the end, it's all about maintaining rotor RPM in the green and maintaining pitch for proper airspeed. Ball park around 65 to 75 kts depending on machine. . The higher the RPM, the more inertia in the rotor to cushion the landing. The trick is the transition from gliding to flaring to setting it down and not exceeding the top of the green, thus potentially causing more damage via an overspeed.
 
Oh wait... It just dawned on me... you were referring to the MGB sports car huh?

I thought you were talking about the Main Gear Box. LOL

My sister had a 1967 triumph. Similar to the MGB. That car was a blast to drive.

True. I loved the limey junk (MG, Triumph, Austin, Jag, etc.) in the 60's and 70's, but along came Mazda with their Miata which perfected the concept and retained every bit of the fun. No oil leaks. Happy Fourth!
 
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That doesn't eliminate a massive amount of yaw from the right engine if the left one grenaded, unless the autofeather also pulls power to the other engine.

Never heard of ANY auto feather feature also reducing power on the good engine. That's crazy!
 
Also, I can understand how the right engine was POSSIBLY misidentified as being the bad engine and left rudder and aileron was applied. That would account for the airplane's radical left turn. No time to correct at that altitude and 105-110kias. Anybody's guess at this point. Condolences to the families and everyone involved.
 
Sure. This aircraft was being flown by Saints (pending canonization), and with all the automatic stuff, this plane should have been able to be driven out like a Chevy Kingswood Estate wagon; no airmanship necessary or required. Sympathy for those innocents lost as a result.

PS: What guesswork is needed to take us from an obvious Vmc roll and dive?

To be clear, it does appear that there was some type of un-commanded roll/uncoordinated spin. My issue is that we don't yet have enough detail to conclude that it was caused by a simple single engine failure and botched one engine out take off. Given the level of automation and capability of the airplane, that scenario alone seems unlikely. I would suspect something else was going on. But, of course, that is only a suspicion.
 
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A 2019 King Air 350 does not have any more capability and automation that helps with engine control than the first King Air 90 that rolled off the assembly line, except for auto feather and rudder boost. Rudder boost isn’t as awesome as it sounds, it helps a little but you still need to jam the rudder to the floor right NOW to keep the airplane going straight. Add in some odd failure like a run away FCU or a prop governor, and things can get really dicey. Not saying this crew were saints, sounds like the airplane may have been over MTOW with an aft CG, but its possible they got into a situation that demanded they do the exact right thing at the exact right time. All of us would be hard pressed to do that. I also heard a report that the person in the right seat was a low time pilot with just a multi commercial. That doesn’t help either.
 
There is lots of detailed info on Beechtalk, if you are a member.

It is blowing up subforum CrashTalk there; up to 21 pages this morning.....and these are guys with thousands of hours in type plus at least one guru-type instructor.
Head on over:

https://www.beechtalk.com/forums/viewtopic.php?f=41&t=169203
Up to 50 pages now. I read the first 8. The experts seem to blame throttle roll-back when reaching for the gear handle. That raises the question of why that should cause a loss of control.

My thoughts, having never flown a King Air, are: The existence of an autofeather system may indicate the plane NEEDS one, otherwise Vmc would be too high. Let's say the engines are also powerful enough that the prop governor coarsens pitch during takeoff to prevent overspeed. Upon rollback (due to a spring load in the linkage) when the pilot reaches for the gear handle, perhaps (I say "perhaps"), the reduction of power causes the prop blades to drive back toward the low pitch stop and temporarily windmill the engine at a speed below the Vmc for that condition. The autofeather system is also disabled by a micro switch in the throttle quadrant when that happens, so the prop does not feather. Although it's hard for me to imagine an engine that's still producing power would cause a loss of control with the prop on the low pitch stop, what about if the the low pitch stop were for some reason not doing it's job in that scenario, by design or by failure? In that case you have a similar situation to this accident at DTW where the left engine was intentionally (or accidentally) placed in reverse thrust on short final: http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR88-08.pdf
 
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Up to 50 pages now. I read the first 8. The experts seem to blame throttle roll-back when reaching for the gear handle. ...
I’ve been following that thread closely, and while there’s certainly enough anecdotal experience to suggest that theory as a contributing factor, there is also some other valid speculation, I believe.

It’s hard to believe that one shouldn’t be able to recover from a loss of power when you’ve got 1050 SHP per side, but that can also mean your game has to be on during an abnormal/non-normal event on takeoff, whatever that may be.

With the NTSBs comment on confusion in the cockpit prior immediately prior to the loss of control, it certainly suggests not only was the primary event abnormal, but how it presented in the cockpit may not have been immediately recognizable. And that little bit of confusion could have been enough for the holes to line up.
 
Sunny Sunday mornings aren't supposed to hide life threatening challenge, but sometimes they do.
 
Instances like this reinforce my feelings that a high time pilot isn't necessarily a better pilot. Yes I am sure there is a tipping point but let's just say you fly the same airplane over the same routes day after day after day. Do you really think you are getting better or getting more complacent? Do you think a pilot with a newly minted mutli rating would be apt to follow procedure or one with 10k hours and no engine failures? I'm sure there are things each experience level will do better than the other but automation in the cockpit is great until it stops working and that includes the pilot's behavior.
Like James Inhofe's son, who crashed his MU2 flying home from his MU2 checkride. It's hard to say. You can be diligent or complacent. It's hard to say if either was the case here.
 
Lower the collective to increase rotor rpm, and almost as quickly gently brining it back up to keep the rotor rpm in the green.
If there is no more power driving the rotor, what causes the increase in RPM? It seems like RPM could only be preserved, not increased. Is that an effect of simulating power loss for training that wouldn’t necessarily occur in a real engine failure?
 
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