Addison is a 7200 foot runway. That seems like that gives a lot of extra margin for a King Air, even a fully loaded one on a warm day. Granted, I did not look at the performance charts. So, if someone has data to the contrary, please share.
That makes three Beeches, then, that even I can remember recently: The Tuscon King Air, the Van Nuys(?) Duke and now this KA. Wondering if seat and seat tracks are common parts...I heard (2nd hand) that it went near vertical into the hangar, not horizontally. Meaning it was well airborne before it rolled over left.
This is not the first 200/300/350 LOC incident after liftoff. The most recent that comes to mind is the 300 in Tuscon in 2017.
It was not a wheels up aircraft, and not sure what the point is that you are trying to make.
I have been told the KA autofeather system is deactivated if a throttle is pulled back to idle. Claim made was that the POH says to leave the throttles forward and let the automation sort it out.
Anyone know if this is accurate?
My pull it out of my ass guess is that the plane was climbing below Vmc, left engine went kaput, and that was that.
I'm pretty certain Vmc is well below Vr for this aircraft. In the B200 POH I have, Vmc is 86 KIAS, and Vr (with approach flaps) is 94. Assuming a similar spread on the 350, if they were climbing below Vmc, then they allowed their airspeed to decay from when they left the ground.I have no turbine experience, single or twin, but I would think it would be unusual to climb a twin at or below Vmc.
I have no turbine experience, single or twin, but I would think it would be unusual to climb a twin at or below Vmc. Normally one wants at or above blue line (best single engine rate of climb speed). Even on one engine I would expect a King Air 350 should be able to accelerate in a shallow climb?
Heavy plane, engine failure in first couple of hundred feet: requires proper briefing and execution of those decisions if anything deviates from that script. I am suggesting that some part of that did not happen: looks to me from the description that this is a Vmc roll following engine failure. That's all. Speculative, sure. What evidence excludes this hypothesis? Sure, it would be great to wait for a final report (you'll be long-gone), but if it looks like a duck.... If it was briefed (properly), it wasn't flown in accoerdance with that briefing; this airplane could perform an accelerate-go in competent hands.
I presume that the "go" decision was made near or after V1 (or red-line plus some margin). In any case, the pilot's responsibility is to pitch to blue-line or above. I don't know what was briefed or not; I am suggesting that the takeoff was not performed in accordance with a rigorous briefing. I suspect that the pilot pitched to a normal (two-engine, take-off thrust) attitude: which will always lead to a Vmc loss of control in the event of an engine failure; the pilot must maintain blue-line or V2 to establish a climb (under control). I offered a speculative hypothesis based on the limited information available, and I appreciate your comment, but I enthusiastically invite any alternative hypothesis along with requisite evidence which will sway may thinking and (temporary) conclusions. Thanks for your engagement.
You seem to be under the impression that a proper and thorough briefing is going to guarantee that the pilot/crew will be able to carry out their plan as discussed and disaster will be totally avoided.Heavy plane, engine failure in first couple of hundred feet: requires proper briefing and execution of those decisions if anything deviates from that script. I am suggesting that some part of that did not happen: looks to me from the description that this is a Vmc roll following engine failure. That's all. Speculative, sure. What evidence excludes this hypothesis? Sure, it would be great to wait for a final report (you'll be long-gone), but if it looks like a duck.... If it was briefed (properly), it wasn't flown in accoerdance with that briefing; this airplane could perform an accelerate-go in competent hands.
Relatively new to them. Two years + since AW date.
Assuming they were dealing with an engine failure. At this point we have enough direct knowledge about this event to say two things with confidence: the plane crashed & they died.I have absolutely no evidence that the takeoff wasn't briefed. If someone is rated in the aircraft and responsible for his or her passengers they are reasonably expected to be able to deal with any emergency. My posited thesis is not excluding the performance of "their takeoff briefing", but that the take-off was not executed according to procedure (based solely on witness testimony of the accident sequence). No speculation: a properly-flown King Air "should" have been able to effect the take-off and return without difficulty; but to flip it over and dive it into a hangar tells me someone was behind the airplane. That's all.
It’s not. Just making an observation.Sure. Exactly. Speculation was freely acknowledged. What's the big deal?
The Tuscon one, the pilot made the main character from Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas seem like a patron saint. Not sure I'd include that one.That makes three Beeches, then, that even I can remember recently: The Tuscon King Air, the Van Nuys(?) Duke and now this KA. Wondering if seat and seat tracks are common parts...
You think he was doped up and thought to try a barrel roll on liftoff? It's my experience that after every crash those with an agenda seize the moment to push it.The Tuscon one, the pilot made the main character from Fear and Loathing in Las Vegas seem like a patron saint. Not sure I'd include that one.
I am skeptical of the single engine failure/Vmc roll theory. With auto feather and rudder boost, and the length of the runway, it seems unlikely to me it is that simple. I guess I should add the caveat that a sun gear failure won’t activate the rudder boost, so I suppose that’s a possibility. But other than that, I suspect there is more to the story.Looks like a textbook Vmc roll following engine failure at rotation or immediately after. Flown properly, this airplane can hack it. What are you saying or arguing?
Sigh.Multi-engine pilots (two in this case) are supposed to be trained and experienced in preventing such things.
Seems to be a fair amount of mention of the ‘friction lock’ on the throttles. There have been cases where the throttle(s) came back when one was reaching for the gear? If one came back would it be enough to activate an ‘auto-feather’?
Just something I’ve seen mentioned by some ‘seemingly’ familiar.
What doesn't explain a roll-over followed by a lawn-dart maneuver into a hangar adjacent to the left side of the runway? Auto-feather via NTS may decrease the drag of a windmilling prop, but the "good" engine (the one that's going to kill you) is generating enormous asymmetrical thrust -- rudder boost will not substitute for skilled airmanship at the controls. You are correct about sufficient runway to totally abort the take-off. So why the hand-waving? This flurry of distractions (but, I'll allow for the possibility of a sun-gear failure) doesn't get us any closer to a probable cause. Occam's razor demands the simplest explanation of the facts, and thus far, I don't have any evidence to construct the "more to the story." Thanks for your comment.
The fact that at Vr, the plane is well above Vmca. So, loss of an engine wouldn’t cause a loss of control. That’s particularly true after positive rate of climb, as is evident from the reported facts. A single engine failure doesn’t explain it to me. You seem to confusing the performance of a twin trainer with this very capable twin turboprop.
...There has been friction lock speculation in just about every similar King Air crash, but just one has been cited as the cause IIRC.
It’s not. Just making an observation
as far as I know NTS is only a thing on garret engines.What doesn't explain a roll-over followed by a lawn-dart maneuver into a hangar adjacent to the left side of the runway? Auto-feather via NTS may decrease the drag of a windmilling prop, but the "good" engine (the one that's going to kill you) is generating enormous asymmetrical thrust -- rudder boost will not substitute for skilled airmanship at the controls. You are correct about sufficient runway to totally abort the take-off. So why the hand-waving? This flurry of distractions (but, I'll allow for the possibility of a sun-gear failure) doesn't get us any closer to a probable cause. Occam's razor demands the simplest explanation of the facts, and thus far, I don't have any evidence to construct the "more to the story." Thanks for your comment.
as far as I know NTS is only a thing on garret engines.
Seems to be a fair amount of mention of the ‘friction lock’ on the throttles. There have been cases where the throttle(s) came back when one was reaching for the gear? If one came back would it be enough to activate an ‘auto-feather’?
Dual crew. No need to take the hand off the power levers right after liftoff.
While I agree, not every operator follows that practice.
No. It's pretty clear from the report that he was doped up to a degree hitherto unknown to manned flight and stalled on takeoff.You think he was doped up and thought to try a barrel roll on liftoff? It's my experience that after every crash those with an agenda seize the moment to push it.
That is only evidence that blood testing is sensitive to those substances not that enough of them were in the blood to impair the pilot. Now, I'm not saying there wasn't enough, just that the quote from the report isn't enough to conclude that caused or contributed to the accident. But it affords an opportunity to lecture pilots on the use of drugs while flying. I'd say it's more likely that the cavalier attitude the pilot had toward drugs he also had toward good operating practices, the lack of one which probably killed him. For all we know the seat slid back on rotation.No. It's pretty clear from the report that he was doped up to a degree hitherto unknown to manned flight and stalled on takeoff.
"Toxicology testing revealed the pilot's use of multiple psychoactive substances including marijuana, venlafaxine, amphetamine, pseudoephedrine, clonazepam, and pheniramine. The wide variety of psychoactive effects of these medications precludes predicting the specific effects of their use in combination."
I don't think you need an agenda to determine the cause of the accident.
This morning's San Francisco Chronicle has an article stating that the plane was sold earlier this year by Planemasters based in Chicago to an Addison company, EE Operations. The tail number was changed to N511EF in April, but on the fatal flight the crew was using the previous tail number for communications and for filing the flight plan to St. Petersburg, FL.
Something smells fishy.
This morning's San Francisco Chronicle has an article stating that the plane was sold earlier this year by Planemasters based in Chicago to an Addison company, EE Operations. The tail number was changed to N511EF in April, but on the fatal flight the crew was using the previous tail number for communications and for filing the flight plan to St. Petersburg, FL.
Something smells fishy.