5 related adults dead in Cessna 340 crash

[Ryan F.]

They are challenging based on my experience and knowledge. Any irregularities or deviations from the absolute norm become more difficult to manage in those conditions. On any risk assessment I've ever used, weather of this nature drives the risk up and it complicates the decision making. Any risk assessment that ignores this type of weather isn't worth using. If you are concerned about a culture of safety as your initial post suggested, publicly trivializing the effects that weather has on flights like this isn't helping your cause.

We can argue about who has more experience, but the fact is your comfort level doesn't change the nature of some of the difficulties presented by fog and very low visibility. In some situations, a takeoff in these conditions would simply be mitigated by a more thorough takeoff brief. In others, it would be addressed by delaying the flight until better conditions are present. The question is what drives the necessity for takeoff and what is it that determines that the risk is worth taking. My problem with your post is that you are refusing to acknowledge the high risk factor. We know that this is a flight with family heading to a vacation type atmosphere. This guy may be a very capable pilot. That reduces the risk but it doesn't eliminate it. Based on the link you posted, everyone is prone to error and the article states that error itself is inevitable. With that in mind, when the margin for error is reduced the risk is increased. This is worth pointing out and discussing.

And to answer your question, yes. I probably would judge you to some extent if you were taking off in temporarily poor conditions in a private airplane with your family to go grab lunch somewhere. I think that judgement contributes to safety, it doesn't diminish it.

Thank you for the thoughtful reply. I appreciate the care you put into what you wrote, and I think you make some good points.

The more we converse, the more we seem to actually be indicating our tendency to be in agreement rather than vice-versa. I also think you have misunderstood a key element of my position on this matter, probably due to my own poor communications skills than for any other reason. For one, I am certainly not wanting "trivialize" the potential deadliness involved anytime a very low IMC departure is under consideration. That is absolutely something which scores highly on a FRAT and deserves careful analysis and preparation, particularly in any "light" piston twin. It would certainly give me pause, and as I indicated in a different response, those conditions exceed my own for departure in my personal aircraft, although they don't for my work aircraft. Hopefully the multifaceted nature of that position indicates the complexity of the decision-making and the highly variable nature of how risk management is handled by different pilots with different equipment. It's a "deep" enough rabbit hole that knee-jerk reactions are of little use, and for that matter, often counter-productive.

My responses to you have been based on the supposition that a) the weather may or may not have had something to do with this accident and b) the risks of departing in these conditions may have already been mitigated or at least considered by the pilot. There's a bit of devil's advocate in there because the idea that this was automatically a bad idea to depart hasn't been demonstrated yet, even slightly, despite the Sheriff's judgement to the contrary. All we know is that there was an accident, there was low IMC at the time, and that the aircraft and pilot were both appropriately equipped/rated to handle that challenge. Additionally, it was a legal operation. Grady Judd will look a might foolish if it turns out contaminated fuel was to blame, or something else that had nothing to do with the conditions local to the field at that time. It's just very unbecoming to blame or judge the pilot for any aspect of this operation given how little we know.

Speculation is fine, and I frequently speculate (and publicly) right after an accident, but always with the caveat that it's without prejudice or judgement. My issue from the get-go has been that this pilot's decision-making isn't on trial yet. And that the blanket assumption that this sort of operation is dumb or unsafe is also a very unhelpful attitude. That's not necessarily what you were saying, but others were, and that's how our conversation started.

In any case, I appreciate the discussion.

 

[denverpilot]

It's his job James. We know you have little respect for law enforcement, so really man, enough of the insults. You only make yourself look foolish.

It’s not his job to speculate and his PIO would not have recommended that. No matter how many people he talked to in his real or fictitious Flight department. Here’s how our Sheriff would handle the same thing:

“Investigators from the FAA and NTSB will be working to determine the cause of the accident.”

Reminds me of the time I wanted to applaud with the USAFA PIO was giving the press conference about a false report of a shooter on campus to the gaggle of idiot reporters who gathered at well past midnight.

As he’s finishing up one young reporter shouts out, “What do you think about the problem of false reports on Social Media being a problem in our society?”

“That’s the nature of social media and the media in general, m’aam. Goodnight everyone.”

He turned and walked off.

Flight instructors do a poor job training pilots on decision making. It's all about learning NDB approaches and other stupid things. How about a requirement to study 30 different accidents about loss of control situations or crap like that. Nope - go practice that NDB approach you will never use in your GPS equipped aircraft.

I know a number of Flight instructors who have books full of accident reports for the types they fly with students who’ve analyzed the most common causes of accidents in type, and base at least one significant ground school session on it.

Especially in multis. Many multis have interesting and novel ways to kill people, behind the usual ways.

I also don’t know any CFIIs who spend any considerable time on NDB approaches in aircraft not-equipped with said gear, and the ADF questions have been removed from the written rest question pool by FAA.

So it’s a nice rant and all, but very little reality behind it. I’ve seen a few lazy instructors in my day, one who was downright dangerous, but not a majority. And even that guy wasn’t teaching Instrument stuff.

What’s up with the rant? Did you hit the jackpot and get one of these?

 

[jordane93]

Same here. Personally, I depart in a light twin at or above Cat I minimums. That's where I feel comfortable. I also load the airplane appropriately for the terrain and elevation to ensure I can climb into the enroute structure and return to the departure airport for the approach.

In a jet, 0-0 is fine.

The Cessna 340? I don't know - I've never flown that aircraft. It's a higher performance piston twin than the one I fly, but has far less than the nearly 28,000 lbs. of thrust I have available to me in the Gulfstream 450. I might feel comfortable, with time and experience, departing in the Cessna 340 from a sea level airport in low IFR conditions, knowing that the fog would burn off in the next hour or so and that I had many nearby airports to consider for emergency return.

So, I can't say the pilot made a good decision, or a bad one, not at this juncture, anyway.

I haven’t flown a piston twin in over a year and don’t plan on flying one any time soon. It’s an irrational fear but most piston twins scare me to death.

 

[Zeldman]

Our medevac crews with two experienced pilots don't do below minimum takeoffs on their part 91 positioning flights.

The hardest decision to make in medevac flying is say no, knowing the patient will die if they are not transported to a place with better facilities.

Empty medevac flights are easy to cancel. No one in back needs to be transported.

 

[Zeldman]

Well... one thing for sure in this thread..... the Christmas cease fire didn't take place....

 

[mscard88]

Well... one thing for sure in this thread..... the Christmas cease fire didn't take place....

Christmas is over.

 

[Zeldman]

Christmas can't be over, I am watching "Santa Claus Conquers the Martians" again....

Great shots of some old "buffs" taking off and flying.

 

[mscard88]

Christmas can't be over, I am watching "Santa Claus Conquers the Martians" again....

Again?!

 

[GRG55]

Well... one thing for sure in this thread..... the Christmas cease fire didn't take place....

Stop shaking hands with the enemy and get back to your machine gun post in the trench.
Kids these days...

 

[denverpilot]

I haven’t flown a piston twin in over a year and don’t plan on flying one any time soon. It’s an irrational fear but most piston twins scare me to death.

It’s not completely irrational, depending on expected performance in today’s conditions. There’s places on the performance charts where the options aren’t too great and carry a fairly high likelihood of fatality.

The amazing thing is the extremely high number of fatalities after a high altitude engine failure with plenty of altitude to trade to reach and airport, and the airplane augering in, a mile from the end of a runway, in a Vmc roll or high speed off airport landing. The unholy number of those in the light twin NTSB reports indicates a need to pause and think about why. (That accident is extremely high when you remove training accidents in light twins. It’s one of the leading accidents in light twins flown for personal use.)

Getting low and slow with one mill operating, when one started out in the low Flight Levels or teens, is nearly unforgivable silliness, sitting here on the ground talking about it, but it happens over and over and over to twin owners outside of the training environment. A very odd statistic.

 

[Zeldman]

Again?!

Yes again....there are some great shots of B-52s taking off and refueling, plus some older jet fighters I am not familiar with, then some shots of old AF radar and other ancient high tech AF technology.

And then there are the Martians..... And of course this was the first documented appearance of Mrs. Claus in a motion picture.

Of course no one can forget that this film regularly appears on lists of the worst films ever made....

 

[Paulie]

Some here may think the fog shouldn't have kept it grounded, but unless this is a pilot that regularly practiced such low visibility departures single pilot IMC, I would disagree.

Reported < 1/4 mile visibility; we have no idea if actual was somewhat worse or perhaps better in that moment, or if was even constant over the runway length. I think he would have been travelling about 150 ft per second just before lifting off, covering 1/4 mile in about 8 seconds at the rotation speed of a 340. After peering out the window (just off the nose instead of the more usual down the runway) to keep the airplane on the centreline in low viz conditions, that requires a rapid and perfect transition to instruments immediately with little time to catch, correctly diagnose and respond to anything going wrong with engines, props or instruments.

This accident reminds me of another eerily similar Dec 24th accident in fog conditions in the UK seventeen years ago. Beech King Air 200. Took off in dense fog. Crashed near the airport perimeter, 200 yards from the end of the runway. Five fatalities in that one also, four from the same family + one friend.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/1085486.stm

Turned out the plane had just come out of maintenance and during that work the throttle friction lock had been backed off. Although it was on the pre-take off checklist, investigators believe it was overlooked and one throttle backed off on take-off causing the airplane to roll and turn close to the ground. If you read the full accident report anyone can see how there was little time to figure what was the cause and correct it before impact.

That was visibility, wonder what RVR was, but I doubt the airport has the equipment.

 

[Radar Contact]

No speculation on this accident, just my comments about foggy departures:

I have departed in 0-0, once. When I was around 19 or 20 I was a pilot for an aerial mapping company and flew their 401. My boss talked me into departing one day in very thick fog (I was too young and dumb at the time and accepted it). It was so thick I could barely make out one center-line stripe in front of the aircraft once I eventually found the runway. By the time I made it to rotation speed I felt lucky to still be on the runway using the DG (as the takeoff roll progressed I was too scared to abort thinking the safest thing was just to get into the air at that point). Even being as young and dumb as I was as soon as I got on top and my heart rate came down I promised myself I would never do that again.

My reasoning for never departing in thick fog again is based on several factors but a few key ones are: If you did lose an engine it would be very hard/improbable to get it stopped on the runway because once you stop focusing on the center-line it's hard to get back. If you had a little surge on an engine (for whatever reason) the asymmetric imbalance could easily allow for losing the center-line. If at any point in the departure you lose the center of the runway and clip lights or signs it's game over. If you had any reason that required returning to land, chances are you'd have to fly for a ways to find an airport you can get into. I found that the initial acceleration/rotation forces acting on my equilibrium were very different than after establishing flight and entering IMC (already articulated better by others).

My personal departure mins have evolved into the same arrival mins to land at that same airport.

My speculation on this accident (obviously I may be way off):

If you look at the position of the elevator trim tab, it is full up. If it was in the position during the take-off, it would have been likely to cause the aircraft to slam back down shortly after lift off. The elevator trim tab is currently under a recent AD due to issues that cause full deflection/loss of control. It is an easy/cheap fix...if fixed properly. Mine has been done and I visually inspect it prior to every flight. Back in September a 402 crashed back down on the runway with this exact same issue.



Here is the September incident...



See attached PDF for the NTSB Preliminary

 

[mryan75]

What instruments did you use to stay on the runway centreline during the take-off roll? Heading indicator/DG only?

I've played around in a sim doing that but I would never launch down a runway single pilot IFR with no peripheral visual cues. I'm just not quite that daring.

The commercial guys at least have a pilot in the right seat to work with them (calling out airspeed for example). An attorney flying a private airplane is unlikely to have anywhere near comparable experience or recurrent training to try to do this. Solo pilot.

Not in this case they don’t. They wouldn’t be taking off if they weren’t part 91.

 

[mryan75]

Well I’m just a student pilot but I think that the Sheriff had it right.

Let’s forget the disorientation scenarios and suppose that it was a simple mechanical failure on takeoff, which sounds entirely plausible, indeed probable.

So you do a forced landing straight ahead or up to 30 degrees to either side. Quite a trick if you’re in pea soup fog with no visibility.

Or you could wait 30-120 minutes for the fog to burn off.

Don’t change your attitude as you gain experience. The one you demonstrate here will serve you well for the rest of your flying career. And this is not a sarcastic remark, but rather meant very sincerely.

 

[mryan75]

Still a guy and his family members just died, just before Xmas, he could keep his mouth shut on the donut squads opinions.

Do you get pulled over a lot or something?

 

[Ryan F.]

It’s not his job to speculate and his PIO would not have recommended that. No matter how many people he talked to in his real or fictitious Flight department.

Exactly. It's not his job! Keep in mind this is an elected official, and he has two helicopters in his flight department with tail numbers that end in GJ (Grady Judd) and WJ (for one of his family members.) He also has quite the rep for running his mouth and holding press conferences as often as possible. A very political fella.

It is not the place of the Sheriff to do anything other than share the facts. His comment colored a lot of initial opinions on this accident, and a fair number of pilots (some of whom participated in this thread) were 'programmed' to go along with that right from the get-go. It's the human condition, I suppose. As creatures, we are very susceptible to suggestion. If a person in position of authority insinuates a pilot exhibited bad judgement -- even if that authority figure has no experience whatsoever in aviation -- then a lot of us assume he must be right and start parroting his words. Just terrible.

It was such an unprofessional showing that it really ate at me. Called one of my cop buddies to grouse and he said to check the Polk County Sheriff's office twitter account, which reads: "As a reminder, our agency has nothing else to release regarding the #BartowPlaneCrash. @FAANews and @NTSB_Newsroom will release any further info about the crash." According to my buddy this meant that Judd had been told to "stay in his lane" (his words.) Sounds about right.

 

[seand]

What makes departing in Central Florida patchy fog conditions risky is that you are probably negative return, all nearby airports likely have similar conditions, and a forced landing will be beyond dicey. Based on my experience in the area, I suspect the pilot had okay runway visibility and expected to be in IMC for seconds before popping out into unlimited visibility blue skies. While it is possible the pilot bungled up a 0/0 departure, it doesn't seem like that perfect of an explanation to me.

Separately, if you think you are adjusting your go/no-go risk tolerance to the purpose of your flights... check your prior flights in your logbook and see how many would have had a material impact on you or other people if you cancelled them. The lunch flight makes an excellent bar for making go/no-go decisions instead of whatever psychological pressure you feel in the moment.

 

[SaltH2OHokie]

Whether it has anything to do with crash being discussed or not, I'm struck by the sunny skies in the background of the charred wreckage.

It really reinforces that various clichés about "it'll be sunny when they find the wreckage", etc.

Again, whether or not that had anything to do with this one, it has to do with some number of accidents and for some reason that photo, coupled with the description of the weather at time of incident really make it hit home for me.

 

[Cooter]

His comment colored a lot of initial opinions on this accident, and a fair number of pilots (some of whom participated in this thread) were 'programmed' to go along with that right from the get-go. It's the human condition, I suppose. As creatures, we are very susceptible to suggestion. If a person in position of authority insinuates a pilot exhibited bad judgement -- even if that authority figure has no experience whatsoever in aviation -- then a lot of us assume he must be right and start parroting his words. Just terrible.

Aren't you violating the very idea that you proposed in an earlier post?

As an industry, we have started to move forward towards finding the systemic errors in our training and our culture and focus on those elements instead of just shaking our heads and blaming a guy for his bad day.

It seems you are saying we shouldn't blame pilots, but you certainly seem ok blaming posters without understanding the conditions that led to their post. It seems a bit judgmental. What if the pilots have a very valid reason for posting as they did? Are you not open to hearing their reasoning? Or have you simply shut the door on them because they have fallen prey to the human condition and are stuck in old ways of thinking?

 

[Ryan F.]

What makes departing in Central Florida patchy fog conditions risky is that you are probably negative return, all nearby airports likely have similar conditions, and a forced landing will be beyond dicey. Based on my experience in the area, I suspect the pilot had okay runway visibility and expected to be in IMC for seconds before popping out into unlimited visibility blue skies. While it is possible the pilot bungled up a 0/0 departure, it doesn't seem like that perfect of an explanation to me.

While that has certainly been true at times, it wasn't common in my experience of living, teaching, and flying in Central Florida from 1999 to 2015. Due to the nature of Florida being comprised of uneven swampy terrain, Usually low morning fog was patchy and localized. I could depart ORL or Sanford in very low IMC, be out of it by 100 feet AGL, and see all kinds of fields, roads, etc. Further, ISM could be totally socked in (surrounding waters) but MCO was good VFR, etc.

From '03 to '06 I commuted to TPA from SFB about 15 times per month using my light twin, often with extremely early AM departures. That was necessary in order to get to work early enough to get an ancient Hawker 700 ready to go by sunrise. I had some very low IMC departures, always with good options for return, but of course I flew a light twin so that I could make those decisions safely. I don't think I'd have done that in a single, even then. (My risk tolerance has decreased in the last 12 or so years.)

I think I only canceled for weather once. I also launched for TPA knowing that the METAR read VV001 but that it would burn off by the time I got there 40 minutes later. It was quite predictable, and as such, nearly always did. I even landed to refuel at ZPH to let it burn off, sometimes. ZPH would be in the clear, yet TPA would still have a low layer sitting on top of it.

My point is that the accident pilot may have had similar thought processes running through his head, may have had good analysis at hand and risk management at play, and experience with local operations... but could have made an unrelated error (elevator trim?) or dealt with an unusual mechanical anomoly (again... trim?) We can't rule out his decision-making, but to automatically assume he disregarded obvious danger cues is completely unwarranted at this point.

 

[Ryan F.]

Aren't you violating the very idea that you proposed in an earlier post?

... I don't believe so, no.

Are you not open to hearing their reasoning? Or have you simply shut the door on them because they have fallen prey to the human condition and are stuck in old ways of thinking?

I'm open to hearing any reasonable discussion on subjects I find interesting. How about you?

 

[Tantalum]

check your prior flights in your logbook and see how many would have had a material impact on you or other people if you cancelled them. The lunch flight makes an excellent bar for making go/no-go decisions instead of whatever psychological pressure you feel in the moment

Definitely a fair way to do a self assessment of your personal limits. I adjust mine somewhat, but not because of some "get-there-itis, work the next day, etc." factor, but more depending on who my pax are. I have hard upper limits that will never be exceeded, but there is a difference in my lower limits if I'm taking someone for the first time, or a nervous person, or another pilot, etc.

 

[Cooter]

... I don't believe so, no.
I'm open to hearing any reasonable discussion on subjects I find interesting. How about you?

I'm not trying to be argumentative, although I'm sure it seems that way. But you did seem to show up casting judgment on the crowd here, without soliciting any information as to what shaped their opinions. Instead this:

It's time to be a little more modern and productive with our post-accident thinking and review... blaming a pilot for being stupid is, well, stupid.

I could just as easily say, that blaming pilots on a forum for being stupid, is, well, stupid.

Sorry, man. Whether you see it or not, you are using the very mentality that you criticize. If you want to sell your new and improved path, you should make more effort to apply it consistently.

Believe it or not, there is a lot of experience and knowledge here on POA. It gets obscured by the arguing and the back and forth and some of the adolescent humor. But I've been humbled (not completely ) into reserving my opinion (sometimes) because there are others here that in many, if not most, cases do know more than me. I've learned a lot here, and some of it from people I don't often agree with or care for.

So maybe there is some reasoning worth considering when pilots look at this story and quickly conclude that it was a risky flight, and one that wasn't worth taking. Possibly because many of us have seen a very similar circumstances kill someone we know. Drawing the battle lines and calling people stupid isn't going to bring fruit to the discussion.

 

[mryan75]

If you look at the position of the elevator trim tab, it is full up. If it was in the position during the take-off, it would have been likely to cause the aircraft to slam back down shortly after lift off. The elevator trim tab is currently under a recent AD due to issues that cause full deflection/loss of control. It is an easy/cheap fix...if fixed properly. Mine has been done and I visually inspect it prior to every flight. Back in September a 402 crashed back down on the runway with this exact same issue.

View attachment 58777

Here is the September incident...

View attachment 58778

See attached PDF for the NTSB Preliminary

Just an aside here: I’ve noticed for whatever reason that a lot of retract guys are pulling up the gear the second the mains leave the pavement all of the sudden. I always thought you were supposed to wait until you could no longer land back on the remaining portion of the runway. If the 402 guy had done that he might still have a functioning aircraft...

 

[mryan75]

Lot of armchairs around here.

Like it or not, agree with me or not, this was a legal flight.

Was the plane and pilot instrument current..??

Did he hit something before rotation, like runway lights..???

What happened? At this point nobody knows.

Nobody is saying it wasn’t legal. We’re saying it wasn’t perhaps the wisest choice. Like the philosopher Chris Rock once said, “You can drive a car with your feet if you want to. That doesn’t make a good $*@#ing idea.”

 

[Ken Ibold]

Believe it or not, there is a lot of experience and knowledge here on POA. It gets obscured by the arguing and the back and forth and some of the adolescent humor. But I've been humbled (not completely ) into reserving my opinion (sometimes) because there are others here that in many, if not most, cases do know more than me. I've learned a lot here, and some of it from people I don't often agree with or care for.

For what it's worth, I've flown with Ryan a number of times, and you would be hard pressed to find a more able aviator. He hasn't posted much here, but he definitely is not some wet-behind-the-ears neophyte. Flying and instructing in taildraggers, acro, helicopters, piston twins, bizjets ... and teaching *piloting*, not just flying. He's got an impressive array of experience. I'll be listening to what he has to say.

 

[Ryan F.]

I'm not trying to be argumentative, although I'm sure it seems that way. But you did seem to show up casting judgment on the crowd here, without soliciting any information as to what shaped their opinions. Instead this:

I could just as easily say, that blaming pilots on a forum for being stupid, is, well, stupid.

Sorry, man. Whether you see it or not, you are using the very mentality that you criticize. If you want to sell your new and improved path, you should make more effort to apply it consistently.

Look, Cooter, you are making this far more complicated than it really is.

I'm all for reasoned discussion and debate, even speculation on accidents. But these kinds of comments are inappropriate, misguided, and simply offensive:

I cannot imagine what this pilot was thinking. (Apparently, nothing.)

I guess he had to fly the diphtheria serum to Key West.

Meanwhile, there are people here who appear not to realize how blatantly stupid this was.

Just one of the reasons why taking off into pea soup fog on a pleasure flight was a really stupid decision.

I'm in the camp of "the pilot was stupid".

Most likely, his ego couldn't let him not launch.

I don't care if someone wants to go kill themselves, but when they take passengers who have put their trust in them, it just makes me angry.

There is simply no defending that kind of commentary from pilots, about a pilot who just died two days ago with his daughters on board. I'm not going to get into a debate about that -- it's wrong and should be called out.

At this point in time we have no information to go by, with which we could judge a dead pilot in such a way. It utterly disgusts me to read those sorts of statements. They don't fall into the purview of reasoned debate and discussion. They are personal, they come from a totally uninformed position, and cast a poor light on the entire aviation community. I could see those comments from laypeople who don't know any better... but pilots?

So we'll have to just agree to be in violent disagreement, here. I don't think there's much wiggle room here; either you think those opinions have validity or you don't. I'm firmly of the opinion that when you have no information, casting stones on a dead pilot is revolting, and there's not much more to say if you think we should be giving voice to those opinions. That's something for you to decide about your own character, not mine.

 

[CJ Rader]

I'm not going to pass judgment on the PIC of the Florida flight, the Sheriff (who, according to some news outlets, was friends with the pilot who died) who worked the accident, or anyone in this thread, one way or the other.. However, accidents like this only reinforce what I've been reading and learning about ADM and risk-management. It's hammered into our heads in flight training to always have a back-up plan and be willing to cancel a flight and drive to your destination if conditions aren't right. My personal minimums are pretty darn strict, not the least of which is because I'm a student pilot. However, as respects the weather, I won't tangle with it, personally. Speaking for myself alone, if I was confronted with an airport socked in with fog with that lack of visibility, I don't care if I'm an IFR god, I'm not flying in that weather. That's a risk I am not willing to take. Period. Certainly not for a pleasure flight to get lunch. And I don't care if the FAA manual says it's ok for me to do so.. Just because I legally can do a thing, doesn't mean it's advisable or wise for me to do that thing. Risk management, for me, means not making decisions that increase the possibility or percentage that something could go horribly wrong. There's always risk, I grant that. I could have an engine failure, avionics failure, etc. etc., on a perfectly sunny, no-wind day. But I've accepted the odds of those failures, and have done my best to mitigate them. I'm not adding zero vis fog to that equation. Just like I wouldn't add thunderstorms in the area to that equation. Or a real risk of icing. I'd rent a car and drive if I really needed to get where I was going. That's me. That's my comfort level. I lost an older sister in a head-on collision to a drunk driver. A classic example of the axiom: crap happens. Time and unforeseen occurrence can befall any of us, on the ground, in the air, trying to get in the air, or trying to get back on the ground.. I'm certainly acquainted with the existence of the no-win scenario. But I also know that the shrewd one sees the (potential) calamity and makes other plans. For me, fog like that would have been and will continue to be a firm 'no-go,' and I'm sticking to it.

 

[Cooter]

For what it's worth, I've flown with Ryan a number of times, and you would be hard pressed to find a more able aviator. He hasn't posted much here, but he definitely is not some wet-behind-the-ears neophyte. Flying and instructing in taildraggers, acro, helicopters, piston twins, bizjets ... and teaching *piloting*, not just flying. He's got an impressive array of experience. I'll be listening to what he has to say.

I don’t doubt that in the slightest. I’m simply pointing out that he’s undermining his own message. I’ve taken the time to read all his posts and the link he included so that I understand what he’s saying. Debate and disagreement doesn’t imply malice. If he understands what I’m saying, I think it will improve his message, not hurt it. Thinking critically means looking into the assumptions and trying to grasp what’s communicated, not just said. The bottom line is, he isn’t extending the benefit of the doubt that he is proposing in another context.

 

[Ken Ibold]

I'm not going to pass judgment on the PIC of the Florida flight, the Sheriff (who, according to some news outlets, was friends with the pilot who died) who worked the accident, or anyone in this thread, one way or the other.. However, accidents like this only reinforce what I've been reading and learning about ADM and risk-management. It's hammered into our heads in flight training to always have a back-up plan and be willing to cancel a flight and drive to your destination if conditions aren't right. My personal minimums are pretty darn strict, not the least of which is because I'm a student pilot. However, as respects the weather, I won't tangle with it, personally. Speaking for myself alone, if I was confronted with an airport socked in with fog with that lack of visibility, I don't care if I'm an IFR god, I'm not flying in that weather. That's a risk I am not willing to take. Period. Certainly not for a pleasure flight to get lunch. And I don't care if the FAA manual says it's ok for me to do so.. Just because I legally can do a thing, doesn't mean it's advisable or wise for me to do that thing. Risk management, for me, means not making decisions that increase the possibility or percentage that something could go horribly wrong. There's always risk, I grant that. I could have an engine failure, avionics failure, etc. etc., on a perfectly sunny, no-wind day. But I've accepted the odds of those failures, and have done my best to mitigate them. I'm not adding zero vis fog to that equation. Just like I wouldn't add thunderstorms in the area to that equation. Or a real risk of icing. I'd rent a car and drive if I really needed to get where I was going. That's me. That's my comfort level. I lost an older sister in a head-on collision to a drunk driver. A classic example of the axiom: crap happens. Time and unforeseen occurrence can befall any of us, on the ground, in the air, trying to get in the air, or trying to get back on the ground.. I'm certainly acquainted with the existence of the no-win scenario. But I also know that the shrewd one sees the (potential) calamity and makes other plans. For me, fog like that would have been and will continue to be a firm 'no-go,' and I'm sticking to it.

This is a great attitude for you to have. You will find that as you gain more experience flying, you will necessarily re-visit these judgments time and again. As you expand your envelope of "been there, done that" and fly different kinds of airplanes, some -- but not all -- of your "I will not" determinations will change. It is the process of setting these personal minimums for yourself -- and understanding WHY you have set them -- that enables you to stick with them when you are really faced with the situation. Danger can arise when you are faced with a confluence of events you haven't considered before and try to set a personal minimum in real time, when you are under psychological pressure to act in a particular way (usually GO).

 

[Cooter]

At this point in time we have no information to go by, with which we could judge a dead pilot in such a way. It utterly disgusts me to read those sorts of statements. They don't fall into the purview of reasoned debate and discussion. They are personal, they come from a totally uninformed position, and cast a poor light on the entire aviation community. I could see those comments from laypeople who don't know any better... but pilots?

So we'll have to just agree to be in violent disagreement, here. I don't think there's much wiggle room here; either you think those opinions have validity or you don't. I'm firmly of the opinion that when you have no information, casting stones on a dead pilot is revolting, and there's not much more to say if you think we should be giving voice to those opinions. That's something for you to decide about your own character, not mine.

Wow, ok. Its amazing to me that you're not seeing the irony and contradiction. You entered the post to push back against judgement. But your judgement has been firmly cast and there is no changing it.

We're in the process -- albeit slowly -- of moving past old thinking about automatically assuming pilots who made mistakes were bad pilots

They are personal, they come from a totally uninformed position

That is one h3ll of an assumption to make about other pilots. You might dislike their lack of taste or tact, but to accuse them of being TOTALLY uninformed is limiting your objectivity. Because of your distaste for their opinion, you have become the stronger and more informed person that you rejected earlier and have totally excluded any knowledge they may be able to contribute.

So we'll have to just agree to be in violent disagreement, here.

We're not in violent disagreement. I think your posts are in conflict with your own opinion. You think its ok to dismiss multiple posters on here because you disagree with them. They think its ok to dismiss this pilot because they disagree with his decision. But you have slammed them without seeing your own prejudice. Do you not see the connection?

That is one of my problems with POA and the internet in general. Trying to sort through ideas and discussion becomes argumentative and the assumption is that the other guy is being a j@ck@ss. Refining our thinking takes some effort and introspection. I'm only calling you to task because of the nature of your post. I don't doubt your credentials or your ability to helpfully contribute to the conversation. But if your message is confused, I think you should see it.

 

[Velocity173]

Nobody is saying it wasn’t legal. We’re saying it wasn’t perhaps the wisest choice. Like the philosopher Chris Rock once said, “You can drive a car with your feet if you want to. That doesn’t make a good $*@#ing idea.”

Based on the pilot’s experience, it might be a wise choice to depart. To say it’s unwise is to say that we should always wait for the weather to lift regardless of pilot experience.

In the Army, I had 0/0 authorization for IFR departures based on experience. Never had to do one real life but did plenty with a hood from a 3 ft hover and plenty in the sim. Difficult yes but not dangerous. While it helps to have a second pilot, I don’t recall ever needing their assistance in doing a 0/0 ITO. Dust / snow is just as difficult as a 0/0 takeoff due to fog and they do it on a regular basis in military helicopter operations.

So to say this pilot did something stupid is ridiculous and has little to do with ADM. We have no idea to his IFR experience. Doesn’t matter anyway, even the most experienced pilots have died just doing a simple IAP during actual instrument conditions. Doesn’t mean we should stop doing IAPs. Guy I graduated the Army instrument examiner course with died 3 months later...doing an IAP. No one is immune from spatial D.

 

[Cooter]

@Ryan F.

Feel free to PM me. Our thoughts aren’t that far apart but debating on stage can itself distract from the real discussion.

 

[Cooter]

Based on the pilot’s experience, it might be a wise choice to depart. To say it’s unwise is to say that we should always wait for the weather to lift regardless of pilot experience.

In the Army, I had 0/0 authorization based on experience. Never had to do one real life but did plenty with a hood from a 3 ft hover and plenty in the sim. Difficult yes but not dangerous. While it helps to have a second pilot, I don’t recall ever needing their assistance in doing a 0/0 ITO. Dust / snow is just as difficult as a 0/0 takeoff due to fog and they do it on a regular basis in military helicopter operations.

So to say this pilot did something stupid is ridiculous and has little to do with ADM. We have no idea to his IFR experience. Doesn’t matter anyway, even the most experienced pilots have died just doing a simple IAP during actual instrument conditions. Doesn’t mean we should stop doing IAPs. Guy I graduated the Army instrument examiner course with died 3 months later...doing an IAP. No one is immune from spatial D.

I might as well add to my enemies list and keep the challenges coming.

I have a problem with this thinking. On one hand you are saying that his experience could have made this a good idea and negates the weather’s risk. But on the other hand, your saying that experience doesn’t really matter because no one (even experienced pilots) is immune from Spatial D.

If no one is immune, regardless of experience, how is it a “good” idea to enter Spatial D inducing conditions unnecessarily? That sounds like a roll of the dice.

 

[Radar Contact]

I always thought you were supposed to wait until you could no longer land back on the remaining portion of the runway. If the 402 guy had done that he might still have a functioning aircraft...

Some do, some don't. The problem with "no longer land back on the remaining portion of the runway", is that it is somewhat subjective. In the case of the 402, he stopped with about 50 feet of runway left. This was with the belly and props grinding on the runway. If he would have touched down on the wheels, who knows how far off the end he would have went? In a twin, the most likely problem immediately after departure is the loss of an engine. If that happens and you want a chance of climbing out to a safe altitude you must have the gear up.

For me, the gear come up at positive rate and blue line plus 5. Considering I rotate about halfway between blue and red line usually, it happens pretty quickly. If I lose an engine then all I have to do is feather the prop, set up the appropriate slip stream and climb. If I make the snap decision with things considered to put it back down, most likely I'd rather have the gear up as that gives me the best opportunity to stop before the concrete ends (this being on an average sized GA runway).

 

[denverpilot]

If no one is immune, regardless of experience, how is it a “good” idea to enter Spatial D inducing conditions unnecessarily? That sounds like a roll of the dice.

Every cloud is a possible “Spatial D inducing condition” [sic].

Using your logic, how is it a good idea to ever fly by reference to instruments?

 

[Cooter]

Every cloud is a possible “Spatial D inducing condition” [sic].

Using your logic, how is it a good idea to ever fly by reference to instruments?

Define my logic and I’ll be happy to answer.

 

[Tantalum]

So to say this pilot did something stupid is ridiculous and has little to do with ADM. We have no idea to his IFR experience. Doesn’t matter anyway, even the most experienced pilots have died just doing a simple IAP during actual instrument conditions.

Thanks, I feel like I'm in the minority here by not calling this guy an idiot and making him the poster child of "poor ADM." In reality he may have done the same departure dozens of times and been the best instrument aviator there was. I doubt he had any intention of putting his family in any undue risk and from what we know so far it seems like he was a pretty good airmen. Plus, with two engines on a capable twin the likelihood of a full power failure requiring a return to land at the same airport are virtually nil, so the 0/0 thing is kind of a non issue if you can keep coordinated.. like others have said a lot of the times these crazy thick morning fog layers are sometimes not even 100 feet high. I remember being at the top of a 55 foot mast on a sailboat on a foggy morning. At sea level you could hardly see to the front of the 40 foot boat, but at the top of the mast, viability was practically unlimited.. heck at night when the fog rolled back in you could even see the stars

*IF* you are proficient, competent, and capable, I don't see an inherent problem with the departure he did. Would I have done it? No, but I'm brand new this year to the IFR world.. maybe in 5-10 years and with a capable plane and a ton of experience I would have done it as well. It's worrisome to me that some people jump to the auto-conclusion of "he's an idiot, that was too dangerous"

**Many things may seem stupid at face value, that dozens of people do safely every day. It's a bit of a slippery slope, but some things come to mind like riding motorcycles, scuba diving, flying planes, sky diving, mountain climbing, etc. All of these things can be very dangerous, but they're not inherently reckless if done competently

So it’s a nice rant and all, but very little reality behind it. I’ve seen a few lazy instructors in my day, one who was downright dangerous, but not a majority. And even that guy wasn’t teaching Instrument stuff.

Yeah, my instrument training was very scenario and situational based. Most of the recently ticketed IR pilots I've flown with out here also put a huge emphasis on ADM and risks. I would say in my training at least we spent at least half the time not on going over rote memory items for approaches and holds, but working through various scenarios. We were in the clouds in actual IMC and the OAT was right at 0. We didn't pick any ice up in the Archer, but that was a good exercise from the CFI, he asked "alright, so you look out the window and see ice on your temp probe, but none on the wings, what do you do and why?" Those questions really made me think, pretty much all of our flights if we had 5-10 minutes or more we would go through these thought exercises.. we did a ton of stuff like that. And his words at the end of the course after I got my ticket where "you got lucky in acquiring some solid IMC time during your training, but don't go doing dicey takeoffs or approaches to mins; your new to this. Start with VFR to VFR with some IFR in the middle, and slowly build from there"

 

[Salty]

Assuming the pilot had enough visibility to stay on the runway until rotation; and assuming the pilot was trained, experienced and current in low IFR conditions; this departure does not sound unreasonable in a 340. If he had a flight director with GA (go around) pitch indication and set it up properly before rolling, one could actually say the departure was easy. Pilots should all have personal minimums based on many factors. I totally encourage that, and hope I always carefully evaluate all aspects of my intended departure and make an informed, safe decision before I push the throttles forward. We do not know enough about this tragic loss at this time to make a judgement about the pilot.

There wasn’t an airport within 100 miles that wasn’t fogged in.