Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

NYT did a 3D recreation. The cockpit view heading seems a bit off to me, but is still useful to show the other possible aircraft that could have been mistakenly identified as the traffic called out, especially through the soda straw of NVGs.

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Without a reference to back that up, I disagree. Look at the ILS or LOC Runway 1 approach for example. "Runway 1" is in the title, but other runways are included via the circling minima section. On the CVFP they could've specified runway 1 in the body of the chart like they do on other CVFPs, but they used "airport" instead. Same charting concept to me as IFR SIAPs.
Where are the circling minimums on the Mt Vernon plate? And on an instrument approach, aside from circling, when can you land on a runway other than the one specified in the procedure title?

In any case, the airlines have clearly been doing the 295 thing forever, so clearly the FAA is OK with it.
I agree that the application of visual separation seems a little too routine between controllers and PAT. PAT is allowed to initiate visual separation after being issued traffic. The problem that I have, based on the audio I’ve heard, it seems tower is using an incomplete form of pilot applied visual separation.

It was brought up earlier about how the RJ wasn’t given traffic on the H-60. Weren’t told that the H-60 was maintaining visual sep on them either. It could be buried in the audio but I didn’t hear it. Now, if their courses aren’t converging, it’s not necessary. In this case, it sure looks like that their courses are converging when the traffic was issued to PAT25. Just like in the PAT11 vid from the day prior, traffic was issued to the airliners on PAT11. That doesn’t appear to be the case with the PAT25 accident. Also, it sure sounds like PAT11 is just mumbling “request visual separation” without even saying “traffic in sight.” Could be just poor audio but I wonder if that was common omission in their phraseology.
This. There's a backup to everything in aviation, and with traffic this close under visual separation, the backup is that both aircraft have each other in sight. It's far too easy/common to misidentify which target you're supposed to be avoiding visually to allow that to be the sole thing keeping aircraft separated, and it appears that the military and ATC have been doing exactly that for a long time. Normalization of deviance.
 
max alt of 200f means fly at 100f to allow for errors due to distraction, turbulence, or other ac being low. 100f on goggles is not hard over water with horizon. Knowing this its hard grasp how they could have been above 300f
 
This. There's a backup to everything in aviation, and with traffic this close under visual separation, the backup is that both aircraft have each other in sight. It's far too easy/common to misidentify which target you're supposed to be avoiding visually to allow that to be the sole thing keeping aircraft separated, and it appears that the military and ATC have been doing exactly that for a long time. Normalization of deviance.
No 121 pilot I know would ask for visual separation, and about 50% will report traffic not in sight even if it is — so that ATC does not attempt to offer it. This Army operation had a vastly different safety culture.

Should changes be made to visual separation policy at the ATC level?
a) require both aircraft to have each other in sight in order for visual separation to be issued to either
b) only allow visual separation between same category/class
c) only issue visual separation to non-converging traffic (e.g. traffic behind or following other traffic)

I think any of these would improve safety without decreasing traffic flow into busy airports.
 
IMO there is a lot of incredibly good analysis and expertise, interspersed with periodic injections of stupidity from a minority of participants. So, better than your average Internet forum, where the ratios are reversed.
I don’t disagree. I do think some of the idiotic posts are very contrary to how we normally do business. I was thinking henning had returned but in a less amusing version.
 
Interesting. AA 5342 being low on the horizon May of just blended into the ground lights. The other two aircraft would stand out more.
:yeahthat: Not only that, but also little to no relative movement apparent because the aircraft are converging. Surprising a similar accident hadn't happened before now.
 
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No 121 pilot I know would ask for visual separation, and about 50% will report traffic not in sight even if it is — so that ATC does not attempt to offer it. This Army operation had a vastly different safety culture.
Agreed. I wouldn't be surprised to see ATC being a bit less deferent to the military traffic as well. It's one thing to say "OK, it's visual separation and it's on them now", but it's an entirely different thing to start there and then see a fireball out your window.
Should changes be made to visual separation policy at the ATC level?
a) require both aircraft to have each other in sight in order for visual separation to be issued to either
b) only allow visual separation between same category/class
c) only issue visual separation to non-converging traffic (e.g. traffic behind or following other traffic)

I think any of these would improve safety without decreasing traffic flow into busy airports.
And I think we're likely to see some changes like this.
 
IMO there is a lot of incredibly good analysis and expertise, interspersed with periodic injections of stupidity from a minority of participants. So, better than your average Internet forum, where the ratios are reversed.
Definitely better than FB I can tell you that. A few of my friends are posting their analysis of the accident on FB. I’m just not gonna do it because there’s far too many non aviation friends who 1) will never understand and 2) try and interject politics into the discussion. This is the only place I’ve posted an opinion on it. No way we’re all gonna agree on what happened but I think we’re on the same page that the DCA area could use some closer inspection on how they operate with helo routes and fixed wing.
 
I probably missed it...surely someone here has figured it out by now....
I'm curious
this route is defined, right? location, route width, max altitude, etc...
so
given the 3 degree glideslope, and whatever tolerance there is in the papi low to high indication.
and also given whatever the route width is for that helicopter route
assuming an aircraft is on the low side of the glideslope
and assuming a helicopter is at the upper altitude limit for the route and on the Western most edge of that route corridor, how much vertical separation is there?
 
2) try and interject politics into the discussion.
I'm glad we don't have much of that around here. Sure it pops up from time to time, but an online forum that doesn't automatically revert to gotchaism over politics is a welcome breath of fresh air.
 
I probably missed it...surely someone here has figured it out by now....
I'm curious
this route is defined, right? location, route width, max altitude, etc...
so
given the 3 degree glideslope, and whatever tolerance there is in the papi low to high indication.
and also given whatever the route width is for that helicopter route
assuming an aircraft is on the low side of the glideslope
and assuming a helicopter is at the upper altitude limit for the route and on the Western most edge of that route corridor, how much vertical separation is there?

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I talked with a guy at work who was a helo instructor across many .mil services, he said 70% helo guys, 20 % atc, 10 % FISDO for previous close calls. I agree with this assessment from what we know now.
 
Should changes be made to visual separation policy at the ATC level?
a) require both aircraft to have each other in sight in order for visual separation to be issued to either
b) only allow visual separation between same category/class
c) only issue visual separation to non-converging traffic (e.g. traffic behind or following other traffic)
How are you gonna separate jets and gliders?
 
Thanks for writing this. I was going to reply with essentially the same thing, but you were much more eloquent.

If @Roller has some sort of business, a customer should be able to get all of his records.

But the irony is, I think @Roller says he flies for a 121 airline. If that’s the case, if we ever bought a ticket on his carrier, or shipped something with his carrier we should be able to ask for all his employment and training records because “I PaY hIs SaLaRy.”

What would even be richer is if he flies for one of the major passenger 121 airlines here in the US… those guys took more money from the government during Covid to stay afloat via the CARES act than any E-4 taking $20 out of the collection plate.
No, I could not care less what an airline (or any other business ) does or how they conduct their business and if I am really opposed to it, I can make pretty firm commitment to stay away from them and their business and guess what will happen if I do so …. 1,2,3 ….nothing !

If I try that with the federal government , people with “weapons of war” will show up at my door and , if I still resists, will kill me and then take my stuff anyway so no , you don’t get to hide behind privacy or any other BS and if you don't like it, I guess “public service” is not for you.
 
a) require both aircraft to have each other in sight in order for visual separation to be issued to either
I don't think that will work because is can be used in cases where one airplane can't see the other.

I really think the end result could be as simple as not allowing visual separation between Route 4 and Rwy 33 arrivals. It will depend on the NTSB 's analysis of the ability of the helicopter to identify and track the CRJ under those conditions.

this route is defined, right? location, route width, max altitude, etc...
No specific width is defined for the helicopter routes.

assuming a helicopter is at the upper altitude limit for the route and on the Western most edge of that route corridor, how much vertical separation is there?
As little as none.
 
With the pivot mount, I think if it was a hard enough hit to take the iPad down you wouldn’t be worried about the iPad

Shame they don’t use the tech

Having all the plates, weather, traffic, documents, etc right there is a game changer

Helps with spoofing too
Correction to the above. Suction cup is allowed. The AWR just says the EFB can’t be attached to the glare shield or the center console.
 
One thing not discussed is the TCAS did in fact give a verbal alert and would have displayed a visual alert to impact. I flew that approach often and would go around if we could not acquire traffic on a collision course on TCAS. I could care less if they said they saw us. I wanted to see them.
 
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Where are the circling minimums on the Mt Vernon plate? And on an instrument approach, aside from circling, when can you land on a runway other than the one specified in the procedure title?

In any case, the airlines have clearly been doing the 295 thing forever, so clearly the FAA is OK with it.
The circling categories I referred to, as I said, are on the ILS or LOC Runway 1 approach, but they're too roomy for traffic efficiency, that's why the more restrictive charted visual approach exists. You can land on a runway not listed in the title if there are IFR circling minimums or via a visual approach or if you cancel IFR and land under VFR, for three general instances I can think of, maybe more.

I-295 has been there since 1964, Bolling Army base was there forever, and the helo traffic remains while the base closed circa 1975. I doubt there were a lot of airline flights flying runway 33 visual approaches over Bolling Field, closed or not, back in the 1970s. Mostly just corporate aircraft were relegated to 33, IIRC, and at my company I was trained to follow the Potomac to avoid Bolling. I don't think the wording on the Mt Vernon Approach is any different now than back then — for sure it's the same as 25 years ago because I still have a copy.
 
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Agreed. I wouldn't be surprised to see ATC being a bit less deferent to the military traffic as well. It's one thing to say "OK, it's visual separation and it's on them now", but it's an entirely different thing to start there and then see a fireball out your window.

And I think we're likely to see some changes like this.
I am sure there will be changes. Much of the 7110.65 is written in blood, as is FAR 91 and other FARs like 121, 135 etc. Something bad happens and the rules are changed in the hope of preventing a reoccurrence.
 
max alt of 200f means fly at 100f to allow for errors due to distraction, turbulence, or other ac being low. 100f on goggles is not hard over water with horizon. Knowing this its hard grasp how they could have been above 300f
No doubt what I'm going to say might ruffle some feathers, but it's worth saying.

I know it's been mentioned here a dozen or more times that a 100' altitude deviation is normal and acceptable, but if the limit is 200', then 300' is a 50% deviation. Considering the implications of that when sharing traffic with DCA, it makes me wonder if there is an organizational issue with the helicopter squadron and an acceptance by leadership of lax airmanship. Will there be introspection and an evaluation of standards by command?

I believe the result of that error demands it. YMMV.
 
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Are they still saying that ATC radar was showing the chopper at 200'? If so, a static system problem affecting both the mode S encoder and the cockpit display would explain the altitude deviation.
 
Should changes be made to visual separation policy at the ATC level?
I could easily see a change that visual separation will only be authorized between non-airline traffic…much like ATC doesn’t provide LAHSO separation by telling a non-airline aircraft to land and hold short of an airline landing.
 
…this route is defined, right? location, route width, max altitude, etc...

and also given whatever the route width is for that helicopter route…
Are they?

Read the Mount Vernon Visual 1 and then the Heli Route descriptions and tell me if there’s the level of granularity you expect.
 
Are they still saying that ATC radar was showing the chopper at 200'? If so, a static system problem affecting both the mode S encoder and the cockpit display would explain the altitude deviation.

Radar indicating 200 feet is not necessarily reliable. +-75 feet is the tolerance, and the system rounds to the nearest 100. They could have been at 324 feet, with the altimeter showing 249, and the radar rounding to 200. This is why standard vertical separation is at least 500 feet, to account for the tolerance errors. Add in an extra +- 100 feet for pilot tolerance.

And yes, everyone keeps repeating but ATC gave the helicopter visual separation. But in my mind, that doesn't permit ATC to punch out and go home if they still observe the two aircraft on a collision course. The entire point of ATC and controlled airspace is to keep the dots separated.
 
I agree that the application of visual separation seems a little too routine between controllers and PAT. PAT is allowed to initiate visual separation after being issued traffic. The problem that I have, based on the audio I’ve heard, it seems tower is using an incomplete form of pilot applied visual separation.

It was brought up earlier about how the RJ wasn’t given traffic on the H-60. Weren’t told that the H-60 was maintaining visual sep on them either. It could be buried in the audio but I didn’t hear it. Now, if their courses aren’t converging, it’s not necessary. In this case, it sure looks like that their courses are converging when the traffic was issued to PAT25. Just like in the PAT11 vid from the day prior, traffic was issued to the airliners on PAT11. That doesn’t appear to be the case with the PAT25 accident. Also, it sure sounds like PAT11 is just mumbling “request visual separation” without even saying “traffic in sight.” Could be just poor audio but I wonder if that was common omission in their phraseology.
… and always look both ways when crossing extended centerlines
 
A little thread drift, but.........

A decade before dtuuri was at Bolling AFB I visited Annacostia-Bolling Airbase several times.

A mechanic friend based at Bolling told me of the AF Colonel who arrived from the south in a C47, was instructed by tower to fly the east side of the Potomac, and land on the southern runway (Not the northern, Annacostia runway).
He landed, and requested taxi instructions, and the tower advised they did not see him, make a 90 degree turn, to differentiate from parked aircraft. He complied, they still did not see him, and requested a 360.

Washington National tower called Bolling tower and advised there was an Army C47 doing odd maneuvers on runway 36, (now runway 1). Bolling tower advised the Colonel to contact Washington tower on a new frequency, and get permission to fly to Bolling.

Back in the C47 and DC3 days, flying up the river in those planes and turning in to 33 would have been a piece of cake. Back in those days, I personally knew a pilot who flew the Norfolk-Washington daily round trip in a DC3 ang did fly that approach. The stall speed of those planes was very low, and landing more than half way down 33 still left plenty of stopping distance.

By comparison, the DC3 cruise was about the same as CRJ's stall speed.

For laughs, just to the right of the seaplane hangars at Annacostia N.A.S. was a berm for the Colt 45 target range, and if you shot over that berm, the rounds went into the War Collège grounds. The military can have some interesting safety standards. The W.C. officers were not unaware of this risk, they did their annual qualifications on that range.


Yes, I am that much older than dtuuri.
 
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