Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

[dtuuri]

It's called the MOUNT VERNON VISUAL RUNWAY 1. When you're no longer going to runway 1, you're no longer on that procedure and you can maneuver as necessary.

Without a reference to back that up, I disagree. Look at the ILS or LOC Runway 1 approach for example. "Runway 1" is in the title, but other runways are included via the circling minima section. On the CVFP they could've specified runway 1 in the body of the chart like they do on other CVFPs, but they used "airport" instead. Same charting concept to me as IFR SIAPs.

I'm not making a case to assess blame; rather to better understand what happened and to have an immediate change that could prevent another catastrophe while the investigation is done, i.e., give the river to the jets, the land to the helos. Of course, maybe not all airline pilots have the skills. Or maybe the highway is the only thing that works in a simulator so they just "fly like they train".

 

[Larry in TN]

You said you used to fly this approach in a simulator, right? Could the simulator have had a field of vision issue that made flying over the river impossible, so they followed the highway as a workaround?

The reason I trained for it in a simulator was so that I could fly it in an airplane, which I did.

The simulator was a Level D with 180 degree visuals.

From the runway threshold to the east bank is 4,000'. Put a target point at 750' and that puts you at 249' on the PAPI. If you stayed over the water, at what altitude would you be when you rolled wings level? That doesn't work in a transport jet. We are normally established on Final at a minimum of 500'.

 

[Velocity173]

Watching Dan Millican's update this evening. He played audio from a couple recent near misses of a PAT helo and a RJ. In both cases, the PAT non- chalantly said "traffic in sight, request visual separation" and ATC fired back "VS approved". It certainly sounded like something they had both done a thousand times. I suspect the PAT helos did this every night. The airliners were just part of the scenery to them.

Normalization of deviance.

I agree that the application of visual separation seems a little too routine between controllers and PAT. PAT is allowed to initiate visual separation after being issued traffic. The problem that I have, based on the audio I’ve heard, it seems tower is using an incomplete form of pilot applied visual separation.

It was brought up earlier about how the RJ wasn’t given traffic on the H-60. Weren’t told that the H-60 was maintaining visual sep on them either. It could be buried in the audio but I didn’t hear it. Now, if their courses aren’t converging, it’s not necessary. In this case, it sure looks like that their courses are converging when the traffic was issued to PAT25. Just like in the PAT11 vid from the day prior, traffic was issued to the airliners on PAT11. That doesn’t appear to be the case with the PAT25 accident. Also, it sure sounds like PAT11 is just mumbling “request visual separation” without even saying “traffic in sight.” Could be just poor audio but I wonder if that was common omission in their phraseology.

 

[dtuuri]

From the runway threshold to the east bank is 4,000'. Put a target point at 750' and that puts you at 249' on the PAPI. If you stayed over the water, at what altitude would you be when you rolled wings level? That doesn't work in a transport jet. We are normally established on Final at a minimum of 500'.

Agreed that it doesn't fit the stabilized approach definition. That Mt. Vernon approach, though, has been around a lot longer. I first flew it in 1976, I think. In view of the special procedures for DCA, rolling out slightly below 500 AGL doesn't seem like an exception that's unwaivable to me. You don't HAVE to use a 3° glide path, do you?

 

[Rene]

Ugh. Some of these media reports are just flat out confusing the public. The female Captain was not “commanding the flight.” She’s a Captain but that means absolutely nothing in the cockpit. The briefed pilot in command for the flight would be the more experienced CW2 IP conducting the eval. The Captain may or may not (remains to be seen) have a pilot in command (PC) sign off. But even if she did, she would not be acting PC or allowed to log PC (military logging) if even on the controls.

Another thing. Yes an H-60 generally flys nose low in cruise flight as do most traditional helicopters. But, the the speeds (104 GS) they were traveling at just prior to impact, they were pretty close to nose level. Wind (320 @10-15) was roughly a crosswind and with the temp / alt at the time, difference between indicated and true AS would be negligible. If I had to guess, at the most they’d be one degree nose low. The nose doesn’t really start to seriously tuck until you get above 140-150 indicated. Even then, it’s only a few degrees below horizon. Point being, the nose wasn’t below the horizon enough to hide an airliner above them.

Edited that for brevity to fit John Q's 8-second attention span.

 

[Larry in TN]

Agreed that it doesn't fit the stabilized approach definition. That Mt. Vernon approach, though, has been around a lot longer. I first flew it in 1976, I think. In view of the special procedures for DCA, rolling out slightly below 500 AGL doesn't seem like an exception that's unwaivable to me. You don't HAVE to use a 3° glide path, do you?

As I've said, the MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1 doesn't apply to runway 33.

The PAPI is 3 degrees on rwy 33. You can fly a bit over 3 degrees but you start running into problems maintaining airspeed, exceeding your maximum allowable vertical speed, and not having any margin to correct for being high or fast.

I don't know what the largest airplane you have flown might be so I don't know if you're familiar with flying approaches at these speeds. His target speed on Final was likely no lower than somewhere in the 140s. Or that when we don't meet stabilized approach criteria a go-around is required.

 

[mark.staggs]

Opposing Bases did a great episode on the mishap today. I certainly learned things from it.

Yeah, I definitely learned a few things, particularly about visual separation. They were very measured and did a fantastic job of presenting facts with details from direct anecdotal experience for these approaches and heli routes.

 

[dtuuri]

As I've said, the MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1 doesn't apply to runway 33.

The PAPI is 3 degrees on rwy 33. You can fly a bit over 3 degrees but you start running into problems maintaining airspeed, exceeding your maximum allowable vertical speed, and not having any margin to correct for being high or fast.

I don't know what the largest airplane you have flown might be so I don't know if you're familiar with flying approaches at these speeds. His target speed on Final was likely no lower than somewhere in the 140s. Or that when we don't meet stabilized approach criteria a go-around is required.

As for the applicability to runway 33, I've made my case, so I won't repeat it again.

The planes I flew could keep up with anything below 10,000 ft., so not likely a factor. If the ones you fly can't do the Mt. Vernon, perhaps you need an "I-295 Visual to Runway 33"?

 

[Brad W]

Watching Dan Millican's update this evening. He played audio from a couple recent near misses of a PAT helo and a RJ. In both cases, the PAT non- chalantly said "traffic in sight, request visual separation" and ATC fired back "VS approved". It certainly sounded like something they had both done a thousand times. I suspect the PAT helos did this every night. The airliners were just part of the scenery to them.

Normalization of deviance.

I haven't seen Dan's video yet
but I've been mulling this tragedy for a few days now, and trying to not judge or place blame on any individual person....but instead, I've been trying to think "bigger picture"

we all make mistakes, and we all know that we all make mistakes. None of us are immune from that.

So with that in mind, I keep coming back around to an idea that seems pretty clear and elementary to me.... the procedure that allows VFR traffic to pass under the arrival of IFR airline traffic when it's that close to the ground just seems idiotic. I think there is no way that the two operations should have been allowed to happen concurrently.

Sort of like Enman's traffic light idea, but more strict...I basically can't believe that the entities involved ever dreamed up such a situation.

Should have been as simple as this.
if traffic is on that helo route...anywhere on it...then runway 33 is closed. certainly No IFR or air transport traffic.
If runway 33 is in use, then that helo route is closed, and nobody is on it anywhere.

(I can maybe see mixing up the two routes concurrently with all slow movers with the controller actively separating, but this isn't that kind of airport!)

Not exactly the same thing probably since it's class B, but Paul B did a video about tower controllers (in Class D towers) don't do what most folks think they do. My takeaway, as I recall,l is that they aren't tasked with preventing mix-ups in the air.... they are focused only on preventing mix-ups on the runway.

 

[Tarheelpilot]

You new here??

Nope but there is some new stupid.

 

[Ed Haywood]

The level of stupidity on this thread is hard to comprehend.

IMO there is a lot of incredibly good analysis and expertise, interspersed with periodic injections of stupidity from a minority of participants. So, better than your average Internet forum, where the ratios are reversed.

 

[catmandu]

Hi, I have a question for the group and apologize if this has already been covered (I looked)
Would not a simple ADSB-in receiver prevented this tragedy?
I saw one post that said "ADSB wouldn't have helped" but no elaboration and couldn't tell if they were referring to -in or -out.
The reason I ask is ADSB-in has been a game changer for me, since the 2020 mandate. I do not have near the experience of the people on this group (vfr and only 4000 hours), but for me, when a controller calls traffic, it makes it very easy to correlate with the ADSB pic and verify I am looking at the right guy. I think it is a common occurrence to misidentify traffic and while the -in picture is not a panacea and should not be subsituted for a scan outside, it really helps, and given there were two other people on the helo, one of them could have been looking at the ADSB pic and told the pllot they were looking at the wrong traffic.
One might say it is a tactical aircraft and a civil adsb receiver has no place on it, but I would say "not flying your helicopter into an airliner" is part of the tactical mission.

Without going through all 20 pages, I believe the answer is that there may have been ADS-B information in the cockpit, and that does not always help every pilot, and there was a basic failure to "see and avoid" as well as a failure to maintain a proper altitude.

And 4000 hours is a lot.

 

[luvflyin]

Opposing Bases did a great episode on the mishap today. I certainly learned things from it.

1:42:38. Aagh!!! Do you know when this subject starts?

 

[Rene]

IMO there is a lot of incredibly good analysis and expertise, interspersed with periodic injections of stupidity from a minority of participants. So, better than your average Internet forum, where the ratios are reversed.

To clarify, I would like to point out that all of my online stupidity is well reasoned and quite intentional.

 

[Ed Haywood]

Would not a simple ADSB-in receiver prevented this tragedy?

Unknowable, but certainly possible. If the cause was misidentification of traffic by the helo pilots, then a graphic presentation might have cued them to look harder in the right place.

@Velocity173 was a Blackhawk pilot. He says Army helo pilots are allowed to use iPads and ADS-B receivers. So it's entirely possible they had it. However, usage in an NVG environment might be tricky.

I wouldn't be surprised if one outcome of this accident was some kind of TCAS capability in Army helos. How hard would it be to integrate an ADS-B feed into their Nav screens? All it takes is money.

 

[TCABM]

1:42:38. Aagh!!! Do you know when this subject starts?

Uh, the entire podcast is dedicated to the subject.

For reference, one host is a current tower controller and retired Army helicopter pilot who’s flown the DC Heli routes in question enough to have been certified to instruct other crews on them. The other host is a former (14year) tower controller and current airline pilot previously flew into/out of DCA in CRJs for about 5 years.

Try 1.5x. You’ll actually learn some things if you’re interested in learning. If you’re looking for a DTSB probable cause type episode, it’s not your cup of tea.

 

[Half Fast]

Just wait until we add UAM to the mix.....

 

[Half Fast]

If the cause was misidentification of traffic by the helo pilots, then a graphic presentation might have cued them to look harder in the right place.

Maybe. What's the delay for displaying ADSB traffic? A couple of seconds won't matter when you're looking for a plane a few miles away, but when the traffic is this close it does. I could easily imagine looking for traffic at 10:00 when it's already at 12:00.

BTW, one feature I'd appreciate would be a better aural traffic indication. My EFB will give me a ding in my headset to alert me to traffic, and a more annoying squawk when the traffic is close. I'd really appreciate it if it would tell me "Traffic 2:00 same altitude" or something similar so I could look for the traffic without having to look at the display first.

 

[midwestpa24]

Just wait until we add UAM to the mix.....

That is a whole other thread, and been my belief from the get go. The only place UAM is even remotely financially viable is in the mega population centers, areas with already over congested and complicated airspace. People in this thread have gone nuts over the idea of military helicopters swarming around DC with "VIPs", just wait until hundreds if not more "drone" people carriers are buzzing around.

 

[Daleandee]

I'd really appreciate it if it would tell me "Traffic 2:00 same altitude" or something similar so I could look for the traffic without having to look at the display first.

I don't have audio alerts (yet). Yesterday I had three on the screen at close range (two red and a yellow). I spotted two outta three but as you know it's the one you don't see that gets ya ...

 

[Piperonca]

But, the the speeds (104 GS) they were traveling at just prior to impact, they were pretty close to nose level. Wind (320 @10-15) was roughly a crosswind and with the temp / alt at the time, difference between indicated and true AS would be negligible. If I had to guess, at the most they’d be one degree nose low. The nose doesn’t really start to seriously tuck until you get above 140-150 indicated. Even then, it’s only a few degrees below horizon. Point being, the nose wasn’t below the horizon enough to hide an airliner above them.

Can't find it now, but one radar display screenshot showed ~80 KT GS and gradually decelerating for the Black Hawk. It did look like the slower speed to me on the crash video. Very frustrating to watch--the helicopter at constant altitude until impact.