Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

[geezer]

The tower staffing and operating conditions during the unfortunate events bother me a whole lot.

There were 5 controllers present, one of whom was a trainee.

3 controllers had duties that did not include in flight planes, and performed satisfactorily.
The planes in flight controller was covering both fixed wing and helicopters, was the trainee to inexperienced to trust with just the helicopter(s)?

There was a supervisor and a supervisor trainee present.

I have been many towers as a guest, including the old DCA, IAD, BWI, ADW, Craig and Panama City, FL, and several others. When there is a shortage for any reason, the supervisor took the position until the shortage was ended, even hours later.

Why was it more important to train the supervisor than to step in to the helicopter slot, and show the training supervisor how that should be done to assure safety issues did not result from a personnel shortage?

Alternately, the supervisor could hands on train the new controller on the helicopter position, while the supervisor trainee learned how that should be done.

As an experienced training and safety supervisor, I am very happy that I am not answering these questions at DCA tower.

 

[TonyG]

You mean , it is preferable to risk death and general destruction to the surrounding public rather than suspend whatever fake training mission you are on ?

I took that (as posted by @Hunter Handsfield, I haven't seen the video) to mean drop training when there is a conflict. Take the NVGs off, turn away, look for traffic, etc.

Yeah, looks like I misread it.

If Biancolo was talking about those times when there's a conflict, I gotta agree. I bet there WILL be folks saying we should shut down anything that smells of training into/near DCA, but this probably wasn't one of those times. Sorry for the kerfluffle.

 

[Hunter Handsfield]

I wasn't proposing IFR only, just raising it for consideration. And of course not to abandon all training in that environment; those flying the corridors have to learn how to do it. As I said, I'm a private pilot and not a professional (although highly experienced, including loads of IFR in IMC and many hours in complex airspace). But yes, stop the training and look out the window when things are busy. And if IFR only (no VFR) would not improve safety at reasonable cost, of course don't do it.

All these discussions have risks of generating more heat than light -- all I'm hoping is to stimulate rational, non emotional, apolitical discussion.

Regards to all-- HHH

 

[Mikey52]

Preliminary report of the data flight recorder, from CNN, suggests the CRJ pilots may have seen the helicopter in the last moments and started a climb to avoid it.

https://www.cnn.com/2025/02/01/us/black-hawk-helicopter-training-plane-crash/index.html

HHH

View attachment 137749

Or he could have got a little low on papi and was adjusting.

 

[35 AoA]

Yes. This is something we seem to see frequently in military aviation accident investigations, and the conclusions are usually not good. I think in many areas, safety is viewed as weakness. In the military, where toughness is a virtue, this can be exacerbated. Attitudes of leaders can make or break the safety of entire units and entire careers.

Unless you are an active military aviator, of the same community that an accident involves, you have never actually seen the real military accident investigation. You may have seen a JAGMAN because they become public documents. Do not confuse that investigation with the actual privileged mishap investigation. They are very much two different things. They can and have come to different conclusions. I can't think of an example of a real mishap investigation becoming public knowledge, other than maybe a few leaked snippets of the Kara Hultgreen mishap, which of note, were illegally released. I've found the *real* SIRs that have been released during my career, to be every much as good as what the NTSB provides us for civil accidents. A lot of good learning has occurred over the years due to their detail and candor. It would be very unheard of for "toughness" to become involved in the findings. Safety, to the extent that we can honor it operationally, is an enormous concern even in the military. What are you on about?

 

[Mikey52]

If they went ifr only, traffic would crawl. They let pilots do visual so they can decrease spacing and move more aircraft.

 

[Velocity173]

I was thinking today, just push that route 4 over 295 but watching this vid, the airliners swing it out wide sometimes. Still gonna be in conflict. It would also put them in a bad area for the RNAV 33 VGF at 490 ft.

I think the computer generated UH-60 cockpit simulation in this vid is probably fairly accurate. Just replace the green imagery with white and move the fixed wing slightly higher. Still shows how difficult to make out an aircraft with a city background.

Apparently media reports of a “proficiency flight” or APART (eval) wasn’t accurate either. It was a “continuity of government training drill.”

 

[AV8R_87]

The other benefit, and it’s most applicable in the DCA area, is it’s better at low altitude vs VHF. VHF commonly gets blocked due to terrain / obstructions. UHF has excellent reception at the lower altitudes.

UHF is even more line of sight than VHF, and subject to blockages by obstacles and terrain.
What disadvantages VHF on a helicopter is poor antenna installations, with less than ideal ground planes. Especially on military birds where VHF is an afterthought.

If they can just hover, why would they need approach plates?

It's a lot easier to fly a helicopter when you have some forward airspeed. Over 50kts or so it behaves pretty much like a fixed wing.
Takes less power, allowing you to continue flying if an engine goes on strike. Also easier to deal with a tail rotor failure. Plus, a heavy helicopter can end up in a situation where it can hover in ground effect, but not out of it.

Helicopters have a Height/Velocity diagram - you can be slow or you can be low, but low and slow can be deadly.
At 200ft you can't hover safely, in case something goes wrong you're dead.



Good article about HV diagrams:

Understanding 'The Dead Man’s Curve'

There’s never a good time for an engine failure, but limiting your time in the “avoid” area of the height-velocity diagram increases your chances of a safe escape.

verticalmag.com

If so, how difficult is it to stop and hover at night a couple hundred feet over a dark river with potential false horizons due to lights on the shore?

Not familiar with the DC lighting environment, but it has enough cultural lighting that false horizons shouldn't really be a problem. The problem is the HV diagram.

Also, same question but with NVGs? I would guess that NVGs make hovering in that situation really difficult?

You train for that, good crew coordination helps a lot. Again, you won't be hovering at 200 or 400ft, and at low altitudes you have other visual cues, mostly looking around the NVGs.

 

[Velocity173]

UHF is even more line of sight than VHF, and subject to blockages by obstacles and terrain.
What disadvantages VHF on a helicopter is poor antenna installations, with less than ideal ground planes. Especially on military birds where VHF is an afterthought.


It's a lot easier to fly a helicopter when you have some forward airspeed. Over 50kts or so it behaves pretty much like a fixed wing.
Takes less power, allowing you to continue flying if an engine goes on strike. Also easier to deal with a tail rotor failure. Plus, a heavy helicopter can end up in a situation where it can hover in ground effect, but not out of it.

Helicopters have a Height/Velocity diagram - you can be slow or you can be low, but low and slow can be deadly.
At 200ft you can't hover safely, in case something goes wrong you're dead.

View attachment 137761

Good article about HV diagrams:

Understanding 'The Dead Man’s Curve'

There’s never a good time for an engine failure, but limiting your time in the “avoid” area of the height-velocity diagram increases your chances of a safe escape.

verticalmag.com

Not familiar with the DC lighting environment, but it has enough cultural lighting that false horizons shouldn't really be a problem. The problem is the HV diagram.


You train for that, good crew coordination helps a lot. Again, you won't be hovering at 200 or 400ft, and at low altitudes you have other visual cues, mostly looking around the NVGs.

Not sure where you heard that from. UHF is far better in urban areas with buildings / terrain over VHF.

What does "Ultra High Frequency (UHF)" mean? • GlobeAir

Ultra High Frequency (UHF) refers to a range of radio frequencies between 300 MHz and 3 GHz. In aviation, UHF is used for various communication systems, including aircraft-to-aircraft and aircraft-to-ground communications, particularly in military aviation.

www.globeair.com

What is the difference between UHF and VHF two-way radios?

Learn about UHF and VHF radio frequencies and in which situations they are most common.

www.aircomm.com

The Ultimate Guide to Choosing the Right Aircraft Radio | AIR TEAM

Enhance your flying safety and communication! Our comprehensive guide covers everything from the basics of aircraft radios to advanced functionalities. Discover the perfect radio for your needs, whether you're navigating busy airspaces or managing remote flights. Learn about COM radios, NAV/COM...

www.airteam.eu

 

[flyingcheesehead]

The tower staffing and operating conditions during the unfortunate events bother me a whole lot.

There were 5 controllers present, one of whom was a trainee.

3 controllers had duties that did not include in flight planes, and performed satisfactorily.
The planes in flight controller was covering both fixed wing and helicopters, was the trainee to inexperienced to trust with just the helicopter(s)?

There was a supervisor and a supervisor trainee present.

I have been many towers as a guest, including the old DCA, IAD, BWI, ADW, Craig and Panama City, FL, and several others. When there is a shortage for any reason, the supervisor took the position until the shortage was ended, even hours later.

Why was it more important to train the supervisor than to step in to the helicopter slot, and show the training supervisor how that should be done to assure safety issues did not result from a personnel shortage?

Alternately, the supervisor could hands on train the new controller on the helicopter position, while the supervisor trainee learned how that should be done.

As an experienced training and safety supervisor, I am very happy that I am not answering these questions at DCA tower.

The trainee was a supervisor trainee, not a trainee controller. So, there were a supe, a supe trainee, a ground controller, a local controller, and a "local assist" controller - NOT a trainee. I haven't heard of local assist before, but it sounds somewhat like a "D-side" for a radar position - Someone that's there to not talk on the radio at all, but to monitor the situation and take care of various side tasks to take workload off the guy on the radio.

Or he could have got a little low on papi and was adjusting.

Nope... There was a "verbal reaction" in the cockpit that corresponded to the pitch up, and they collided one second later.

Unless you are an active military aviator, of the same community that an accident involves, you have never actually seen the real military accident investigation. You may have seen a JAGMAN because they become public documents. Do not confuse that investigation with the actual privileged mishap investigation. They are very much two different things. They can and have come to different conclusions.

I'm thinking of things I've read, so something that's public. Or presumably, public enough for us nerds who read accident reports all the time.

I've found the *real* SIRs that have been released during my career, to be every much as good as what the NTSB provides us for civil accidents. A lot of good learning has occurred over the years due to their detail and candor. It would be very unheard of for "toughness" to become involved in the findings. Safety, to the extent that we can honor it operationally, is an enormous concern even in the military. What are you on about?

Sorry, it appears there was a misunderstanding. I'll have to go back and check my wording. I didn't mean the toughness thing would ever be in a report, it's just an attitude thing that happens in and out of the military as well as in and out of aviation. It's a challenge for anyone who is in charge of safety to create the right culture, and there are "macho man" attitudes out there that tend to cast safety in a negative light, and the more macho men there are around, the easier that attitude spreads and the more people avoid following procedures that are there for safety and take shortcuts that cause accidents.

I feel like I've read multiple military accident reports where there has been a cultural or training or attitude issue that is found to be base-wide or unit-wide, generally not confined to one crewmember, though sometimes that crewmember is known to be the worst offender. Looking for reports, maybe I just keep remembering the ones that fit this profile - The Fairchild B-52, the Elmendorf C-17, and the Ellsworth B-1.

 

[PPC1052]

Do we each get our own satellite following us?

Only those of us who received the mandatory covid "vaccine."

 

[Bob Noel]

Only those of us who received the mandatory covid "vaccine."

those that didn't, get the stealth helicopters.

 

[dtuuri]

I was thinking today, just push that route 4 over 295 but watching this vid, the airliners swing it out wide sometimes.

I'd like to see a simulator video of a 140 KIAS approach that stays over the water near the east shore to see if "swinging it out" is really required. Where's @Crashnburn when you need him?

 

[bonefishpete]

Helicopter pilot said they had the aircraft in sight. They requested visual separation and that was approved. How can this be the controllers fault ? Does a controller have to hold everyone’s hand and monitor every action the pilots make.

I do realize DCA is very unique and these operations would not be tolerated in any other airport. (running aircraft 200’ under finale approach 2000’ from thresholds).

 

[Larry in TN]

I was thinking today, just push that route 4 over 295 but watching this vid, the airliners swing it out wide sometimes. Still gonna be in conflict. It would also put them in a bad area for the RNAV 33 VGF at 490 ft.

That won't work. It would have them turning final at around 200' AFL. We don't do that in transports.

I went through PSA's training for Rwy 33 in 2014 then later flew the same Vis 1 to Vis 33. The procedure was to fly up I-295 until turning final, just like the accident airplane did.

I do realize DCA is very unique and these operations would not be tolerated in any other airport. (running aircraft 200’ under finale approach 2000’ from thresholds).

Again, this is not tolerated at DCA. Minimum separation standards are 1-1/2mi laterally and 500' vertically. That's why the helicopter crew requested visual separation. Without it, ATC would have had to hold them north of the Rwy 33 Final until the airplane had passed. With visual separation, they can visually maneuver to pass behind the airplane and avoid a conflict. For some reason, they didn't. Why they didn't is a big part of what the NTSB will try to find out.

 

[dtuuri]

That won't work. It would have them turning final at around 200' AFL. We don't do that in transports.

I went through PSA's training for Rwy 33 in 2014 then later flew the same Vis 1 to Vis 33. The procedure was to fly up I-295 until turning final, just like the accident airplane did.

You only have about a 45° change in heading if you follow the shoreline, assuming you will land into the wind. An extended centerline crosses the east shore at, what, 4500 ft or so? So, you actually begin banking with that much distance plus the radius (diameter? EDIT: Ok, 1/2 radius) of turn at your airspeed. What I'd like to see is someone post a video of their MS simulator to see how it all works out. DCA is a special place. Wiggling down the river from the north to 19 doesn't seem to me to be a whole lot different, but it's the norm.

Maybe the helo crew assumed the CRJ would be over the water, since the Mt. Vernon visual explicitly says to stay there, and unwisely restricted their vigil to that concept?

 

[CaptainDoug]

IMO being at the same altitude isn't the issue. PAT25 was instructed to fly behind the CRJ and for some reason didn't do that. I've been in traffic patterns and on visual approaches where I've been instructed to pass behind traffic at my altitude so I adjusted my course to follow instructions. PAT25 didn't hit the CRJ because they were at the same altitude they hit because PAT25 didn't adjust their course.

200' max altitude is the "law" for those helicopters. PAT 25 hit the RJ mainly because they were at the wrong altitude.
Yes, there were plenty of other reasons - the pilot in the left seat with inexperience of 500 hours or less certainly
didn't help. I'm thinking that her recency of experience might have been very low as well, but we'll find out soon enough.
It's a bad combination to be low-time and not proficient due to a lack of flying in very complex airspace at night.

PAT 25 hit the RJ because they were looking at the wrong plane - they most likely identified the Airbus on final for
01 instead of the RJ on base to final for 33. A major flaw there was not starting at the Wilson bridge as a starting
point as to where to look because that's where they were called out by tower.

So, even with all of those screw ups, this accident would NOT have happened if PAT 25 was following the "law"
of that corridor - flying at a maximum altitude of 200' over the eastern shore of the Potomac. The only
reason to deviate from that "law" would be when the PIC was using his / her command authority due to avoiding
traffic, birds, big balloons, a drone, etc. Here, none of that was a problem - so PAT 25 should have been following
the "law."

It's my personal opinion that the PIC was too inexperienced to hold altitude at night. But I can't particularly
blame her for that - we all screw up like that when we're nervous in tight airspace with little time. I have
a feeling that she was so busy trying to identify the traffic that she couldn't hold altitude. It's very similar
to instrument flying - when you're not current you easily get fixated on one thing and everything else falls
apart. For example, you're so 'happy' that you're holding your bank angle that you're too engrossed to hold altitude -
your mind can't do everything that's necessary to be proficient. Before you know it, your VSI is reading a decent of
1,500 FPM (or worse) and then you overcorrect - that's how spatial disorientation happens. I guess we can call it
tunnel vision - we can't put the old fashioned "six pack" into one cohesive flow of understanding everything all at once.
The bottom line is that the more I fly and practice instrument flying (ideally at night) all of those procedures become
second nature. But that takes a lot of time - probably akin to a delicate surgical procedure. But the problem is
that skill deteriorates quickly - so it must be done regularly. And please don't test that out in class B airspace with
a lack of recency like PAT 25 - go to less busy airspace to get current again.

Lastly, I also read that four pilots should have been aboard PAT 25 - which would have one on each side of the helo in
the back- that could have prevented this tragedy - in this accident there were only three with the third on
the right side and that couldn't helps spot the RJ that was in the 10 o'clock position. That's what I read
elsewhere - so don't quote me on that just yet.

 

[CaptainDoug]

The tower staffing and operating conditions during the unfortunate events bother me a whole lot.

There were 5 controllers present, one of whom was a trainee.

3 controllers had duties that did not include in flight planes, and performed satisfactorily.
The planes in flight controller was covering both fixed wing and helicopters, was the trainee to inexperienced to trust with just the helicopter(s)?

There was a supervisor and a supervisor trainee present.

I have been many towers as a guest, including the old DCA, IAD, BWI, ADW, Craig and Panama City, FL, and several others. When there is a shortage for any reason, the supervisor took the position until the shortage was ended, even hours later.

Why was it more important to train the supervisor than to step in to the helicopter slot, and show the training supervisor how that should be done to assure safety issues did not result from a personnel shortage?

Alternately, the supervisor could hands on train the new controller on the helicopter position, while the supervisor trainee learned how that should be done.

As an experienced training and safety supervisor, I am very happy that I am not answering these questions at DCA tower.

geezer, very good points. Like almost all tragic accidents, there's a confluence of
errors that weaken the chain to the point that it breaks. There's mistakes on all
sides here. For example, when the stuff is hitting the fan (in beehive like airspace),
it's not uncommon at all to be given an immediate heading and altitude to avoid
a collision. I've been flying long enough to hear those instructions many times -
even for myself as PIC.

This tragic accident was obviously preventable as long as everyone kept the
integrity of the chain. Unfortunately, there were too many failures here that
lead to the worst aviation accident on US soil since my friend's American
Airlines accident back in 2001 - flight 587.

 

[Brad Z]

They have allowed fixed wing aircraft on some of those routes, but the PIC had to sit in the right seat.

As a former Fettermobile driver, I can confirm. IYKYK.

 

[bonefishpete]

That won't work. It would have them turning final at around 200' AFL. We don't do that in transports.

I went through PSA's training for Rwy 33 in 2014 then later flew the same Vis 1 to Vis 33. The procedure was to fly up I-295 until turning final, just like the accident airplane did.


Again, this is not tolerated at DCA. Minimum separation standards are 1-1/2mi laterally and 500' vertically. That's why the helicopter crew requested visual separation. Without it, ATC would have had to hold them north of the Rwy 33 Final until the airplane had passed. With visual separation, they can visually maneuver to pass behind the airplane and avoid a conflict. For some reason, they didn't. Why they didn't is a big part of what the NTSB will try to find out.

Yes but if the helicopter was given visual separation can they get closer to the other aircraft, less than 500’ and 11/2 miles?

 

[Ed Haywood]

Lastly, I also read that four pilots should have been aboard PAT 25

Crew, not pilots. There are only 2 pilots, plus one or two crew chiefs that can serve as spotters. Typically a mid grade NCO. If you have one GIB, he can easily switch back and forth between sides as needed. As always, @Velocity173 will correct me if I am FOS.

 

[Larry in TN]

Yes but if the helicopter was given visual separation can they get closer to the other aircraft, less than 500’ and 11/2 miles?

Yes. If it wasn't, what would be the point of using visual separation?

How would the pilot who is told to maintain visual separation going determine those distances?

 

[luvflyin]

Is the 500' universal or does it vary by aircraft type and avionics?


How many simultaneous voices are we expecting a controller to be able to process? I hate it when I call up on what I think is a clear frequency and I get nothing. I also will always monitor the other frequency if I can determine that a controller is working more than one and I can figure out what at least one of the others is.

For SA, maybe we should be getting a controller to put everyone on the same frequency when they're combined. If there is too much frequency congestion, maybe there needs to be another controller too.

That is not at all what I got from it. Frankly, I think the times I hear a government briefing of any sort that is delivered in the detached monotone you seem to want, it comes across as indifferent to their jobs, the families of the victims, and the citizenry that they're working for. I *want* people who have some emotion about their work, because they're putting more into it.


Here's the position of the RJ 18 seconds before with their track:
View attachment 137736
They never were all the way straight, but I'd call that halfway through a nice gentle turn, which pretty much continued until the collision.


It's only got a resolution of 100'. If you ever watch a transponder check/adjustment, you get to see how much the altitudes can vary for changing over from one hundred to the next.

Yes. This is something that seems to appear frequently in military aviation accident investigations, and the conclusions can be damning. I think in many areas inside and outside both the military and aviation, safety is viewed as weakness. In the military, where toughness is a virtue, this can be exacerbated. Attitudes of leaders can make or break the safety of entire units and entire careers.

"...For SA, maybe we should be getting a controller to put everyone on the same frequency when they're combined. If there is too much frequency congestion, maybe there needs to be another controller too..."
This is often done. It's where the phraseology 'change to my frequency' comes from. It sometimes doesn't work all that well at Centers when sectors are combined though. Some of those sectors are huge and line of sight issues come up. There can even be one sector that has two radio transmission sites and the Controller will have to select the other site when trying to communicate with a plane that is in a blind spot to the usual antennae spot. But yeah, everybody on the same freq can help pilots to get 'the picture.' That wouldn't work all the time at DCA because sometimes there are two Controllers on different frequencies working in the piece of sky. But if all them helos do have VHF radios, making SOP that they use them would help out when because of staffing issues, the positions get combined.

"...I think in many areas inside and outside both the military and aviation, safety is viewed as weakness..."
This came up in that airshow midair not that long ago where the big planes and the fighter were not de conflicted by altitude during the pre show briefing. Some there were speaking up about it and getting the don't be a weenie treatment. I think it was, N333RP or something like that, that had inside info on it.

 

[flyingron]

What I think a lot are missing is both aircraft were in VMC and most folks don’t understand the inherent limitations of procedural control limitations.

The VISUAL 1 approach plate lacks any altitude references, requires RADAR, and, inside 5.9DME, simply states “Follow the Potomac River to the Airport”.

There's no such procedure as VISUAL 1. I suspect you're talking about the Mount Vernon Visual Runway 1. But you are right, the last altitude is a "1600 recommended" 5.9 miles south of the airport (BADDN fix). It's just follow the river to the airport after that. Of course, the moment they were told to circle to 33, they ceased to be following that loosy goosy procedure.

 

[Lindberg]

200' max altitude is the "law" for those helicopters. PAT 25 hit the RJ mainly because they were at the wrong altitude.

According to the NTSB, the helicopter was reporting 200' and the plane was reporting 325'. Are you sure you know which was incorrect?

 

[dtuuri]

Of course, the moment they were told to circle to 33, they ceased to be following that loosy goosy procedure.

How do you figure? Runway 33 is on the airport, no?

 

[Ed Haywood]

It's my personal opinion that the PIC was too inexperienced to hold altitude at night.

I'm sitting next to a UH-60 and MH-53 pilot right now. His comment is that when you turn, you tend to climb.

 

[TCABM]

There's no such procedure as VISUAL 1. I suspect you're talking about the Mount Vernon Visual Runway 1. But you are right, the last altitude is a "1600 recommended" 5.9 miles south of the airport (BADDN fix). It's just follow the river to the airport after that. Of course, the moment they were told to circle to 33, they ceased to be following that loosy goosy procedure.

Yes, the Mount Vernon Visual RWY 1 is what I was referring to.
For those who haven’t seen it:

 

[Timbeck2]

The trainee was a supervisor trainee, not a trainee controller. So, there were a supe, a supe trainee, a ground controller, a local controller, and a "local assist" controller - NOT a trainee. I haven't heard of local assist before, but it sounds somewhat like a "D-side" for a radar position - Someone that's there to not talk on the radio at all, but to monitor the situation and take care of various side tasks to take workload off the guy on the radio.

We use the term “cab coordinator” instead of local assist but it’s the same thing. CC is there to take all the verbal requests from other ATC facilities such as APREQ (approve/request) and point outs which means that aircraft under control from other facilities are allowed to transit another facility’s airspace. They are also there to watch the radar and alert the local (tower) controller of aircraft that have been pointed out and any other conflict that may arise. Some of this is done electronically without CC interrupting the local controller such as a pointed out aircraft’s data tag turning yellow instead of the normal white.

I knew the “trainee” thing was going to be trotted out at some point. And yes, the trainee in question was an experienced controller who was training to be a supervisor. There will ALWAYS be a trainee somewhere. Controllers don’t emerge from the womb fully qualified to work any position in every ATC facility. People move around, retire, get fired and replaced etc., this is completely normal

 

[Piperonca]

I'm sitting next to a UH-60 and MH-53 pilot right now. His comment is that when you turn, you tend to climb.

Right turns especially, if memory serves.

 

[Ed Haywood]

Right turns especially, if memory serves.

Gyroscopic precession?

 

[StraightnLevel]

I was thinking today, just push that route 4 over 295 but watching this vid, the airliners swing it out wide sometimes. Still gonna be in conflict. It would also put them in a bad area for the RNAV 33 VGF at 490 ft.

VGF?

How common is this? I don't think I've ever seen VGF on an approach that I've flown, but there it is on the RNAV33 plate for DCA.

 

[brien23]

When they pull up the Helicopter see what the altimeter setting was to the setting should have been at the time of crash?

 

[Pinecone]

Why do we even allow for military choppers to be performing training flights in an airspace like that ?

Because that is where they fly in their day to day missions. So, you think they should practice at say KMRB with little traffic, then fly VIP passengers on the DC helicopter routes?

 

[Checkout_my_Six]

Because that is where they fly in their day to day missions. So, you think they should practice at say KMRB with little traffic, then fly VIP passengers on the DC helicopter routes?

So....what happens when "training" goes bad? I don't think you want to train on the "battle field".

 

[Larry in TN]

How do you figure? Runway 33 is on the airport, no?

Runway 33 is not served by the "MT VERNON VISUAL Rwy 1" approach.

 

[35 AoA]

I feel like I've read multiple military accident reports where there has been a cultural or training or attitude issue that is found to be base-wide or unit-wide, generally not confined to one crewmember, though sometimes that crewmember is known to be the worst offender. Looking for reports, maybe I just keep remembering the ones that fit this profile - The Fairchild B-52, the Elmendorf C-17, and the Ellsworth B-1.

My point was that none of those were the safety investigation report. You most likely read the publicly released AIB, which is the legal investigation.....a separate and parallel investigation, that is not allowed to "talk to" the safety investigation. Both boards are generally privy to the same evidence (aircraft or other material remains, ATC data, data recorders, recorded radio comms, etc), but testimony in the SIB (the safety investigation) is protected as privileged info, so that folks can be honest without worrying about being the subject of legal action/lawsuit/etc. Testimony at an AIB is not subject to the same protections. This doesn't necessarily mean that there are substantial differences between the two reports, but there certainly can be. The AIB is convened in order to determine if there was any misconduct that resulted in the mishap, while the SIB is convened in order to learn from what happened and improve safety. As you can see, https://www.afjag.af.mil/AIB-Reports/ is an Air Force Legal (JAG) function. We have the same processes in the Navy, we just call them SIR (SIB equivalent) and JAGMAN (AIB equivalent). When you read a media account of investigation findings, you are reading their paraphrasing of the legal investigation, not the safety investigation. Hopefully that is sufficiently confusing

This might be more explanatory than my drivel: https://www.safety.af.mil/Home/Mishap-Investigation-Process/

I would fully agree with you that in most mishaps, things like "aircrew error" are much more complex than just the error itself. There are often contributing factors that are not deemed to be "causal" in nature, which is an area that systemic cultural or training issues are commonly identified.

 

[Roller]

Because that is where they fly in their day to day missions. So, you think they should practice at say KMRB with little traffic, then fly VIP passengers on the DC helicopter routes?

After this crash, YES

They've shown they can't be trusted with that airspace. It's like KCM in airlines—if your crew's a bunch of idiots sneaking stuff, the whole outfit pays the price. This breach? Far worse than a flight attendant hiding a joint.


As for those "VIPs," if their safety's in danger, they ought to be moved to a military base, work there and live there, no commute problems now, they signed up to serve the people after all

 

[midwestpa24]

Because that is where they fly in their day to day missions. So, you think they should practice at say KMRB with little traffic, then fly VIP passengers on the DC helicopter routes?

I've seen a lot of back and forth and hand wringing here and in other boards about whether it was a training flight, VIP flight, etc, etc.

I really don't think the mission of the helo is the point to get hung up on. The bigger issue is the conflicting traffic patterns that have been allowed and used. I would compare this to being no different than a SID and a STAR using the same waypoint and altitude, and only by sheer luck has there not been a previous accident. In this case, there seem to be plenty of reports of previous close calls, it almost seems to just be accepted at DCA that normal separation standards go out the window. Normalization of deviance...

 

[Velocity173]

VGF?

How common is this? I don't think I've ever seen VGF on an approach that I've flown, but there it is on the RNAV33 plate for DCA.

Visual Guidance Fix. Seems very similar to a “point in space” helicopter IAP.