Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

As a non-121 guy, it doesn’t bother me one bit. Night CTL in an airliner bothers me. It bothers the FAA, too.

Since many ATPs have a CTL restriction on their type rating or in their company ops specs, I wonder why DCA gets this special carve out.

Don’t have to be a 121 driver, lots of your friends and family ride in the back


Lots state “circling VMC only”

My ATP has no restrictions, however my type has that restriction, we also don’t even train for a circle, it’s not a good idea cat D, we don’t do LAHSO ether

Maybe the regionals flying smaller CRJs allow the circle? No idea personally
 
I highly doubt ORD tower goes down to one controller at night but I could ask. There are at least 3 controllers there that I trained many years ago
JFK goes down to 1, or at least they did when my flight to Paris was delayed until 2am a few weeks ago.
 
The check pilot for one. If you're 150 feet high and heading under a landing path I'd be telling the pilot to get their altitude down.
How do you know he wasn’t?
ATC for another. Hey PAT25 emergency decent to 200 and halt forward motion.
ATC verified visual separation with the helicopter 8 seconds before impact.
If I got caught doing that here I'd be getting a phone number to call.
Radio communication was interrupted.
 
How do you know he wasn’t?

ATC verified visual separation with the helicopter 8 seconds before impact.

Radio communication was interrupted.
You seem to be on a mission to prove what ? … that everything worked as designed and we should move on as there is nothing to see here ??
 
How do you know he wasn’t?

ATC verified visual separation with the helicopter 8 seconds before impact.

Radio communication was interrupted.
And ATC let them get away with the same near miss just over 24hrs prior to the crash.

I posted the YouTube link to the ATC audio and tracks.

Had they been treated like any other entity they would have been given a number and at very least not allowed to “try again” the very next day.
 
And ATC let them get away with the same near miss just over 24hrs prior to the crash.

I posted the YouTube link to the ATC audio and tracks.

Had they been treated like any other entity they would have been given a number and at very least not allowed to “try again” the very next day.
If it was the same crew the day before, I agree wholeheartedly, they shouldn’t have been allowed to be there.
 
NYT reports helo was half mile west of route. That loses 150 feet of vertical separation on 3 degree glide slope. Add that to the apparent 150 foot vertical deviation. Either error by itself was not fatal, but the combination of both created a dangerous situation.

Whether ADS-B might have helped is unknowable. IF the helo aircrew tallied the wrong aircraft for visual separation, seeing it presented on their moving map MIGHT have cued them to look again. The CRJ was at their 10 to 11, while the other visible aircraft were to the right of their nose.

Visual separation requires situational awareness. Loss of SA renders visual separation unreliable, since the controller has no assurance that an aircraft reported in sight is THE aircraft.

Swiss cheese holes lining up.
 
If it was the same crew the day before, I agree wholeheartedly, they shouldn’t have been allowed to be there.

This was allowed to happen far too many times.

Those flights proved prior to the crash that PAT was ether unable or unwilling to comply with the already overly accommodating routes they were allowed to fly.
 
And ATC let them get away with the same near miss just over 24hrs prior to the crash.

I posted the YouTube link to the ATC audio and tracks.

Had they been treated like any other entity they would have been given a number and at very least not allowed to “try again” the very next day.
No matter how many times you claim it, your video doesn’t depict a near miss. 500 ft vertical is standard separation in that situation. Also, PAT11 was adhering to the route and altitudes depicted. Again, this only shows how RAs don’t jive with standard NAS procedures.

PAT doesn’t get a pass from ATC either. If they violated something, ATC would be on them. You make it like they’re the only users of these routes and get special treatment. Minus presidential transport, PAT has no more priority than police, FBI, CIA or whatever other government organization that uses these routes. It’s just another Army Aviation Battalion.
 
No matter how many times you claim it, your video doesn’t depict a near miss. 500 ft vertical is standard separation in that situation. Also, PAT11 was adhering to the route and altitudes depicted. Again, this only shows how RAs don’t jive with standard NAS procedures.

PAT doesn’t get a pass from ATC either. If they violated something, ATC would be on them. You make it like they’re the only users of these routes and get special treatment. Minus presidential transport, PAT has no more priority than police, FBI, CIA or whatever other government organization that uses these routes. It’s just another Army Aviation Battalion.


I fly in the NAS a good amount, I don’t get RAs on short final, that is not normal, not even in some of the 3rd world places I fly.

PAT is practically the only users of that route, who else is cleared in the inner ring and gets to play on that river like that?

If you watched that video of the ATC tracks & audio


just a day prior to the crash and thought that was OK, I honestly think we are so far apart on what constitutes OK I don’t think we will find a middle ground
 
Where in the world is a 300' error in altimeter reading allowed? Especially at the low end of the scale?
When checking in with ATC, 300 is their limit. However, we as pilots should be verifying within 75' on every flight.
If you just want to jump in and declare you have it all figured out, nobody is going to take you seriously, and some are going to mock you.
I'm starting to understand why @Roller voted for Dan Gryder's petition to become FAA administrator.
An RJ on final for 01 in front of the mishap aircraft was asked if they would accept a visual for 33, and the reply was "unable." ATC immediately cleared them to land on 01.
That doesn't really mean anything though. 33 is significantly shorter, so when they ran their performance calculations, they likely knew what LDA would be required and either knew they wouldn't have it at night, or they may have a restriction against doing circling approaches at night, or who knows what.

The accident crew, OTOH, may have realized that they'd be fine. I don't know very many pilots who won't go out of their way to help out ATC, and most air carrier ops are fairly black and white about what is allowed. I'm assuming that PSA does not have a restriction on circling to a new runway in night VMC, and that the crew knew their numbers and knew they could make the landing on 33, so they took it.
Maybe we’d be better off to lose “Maintain Visual Separation” at night.
We can’t do it imc.
Much harder to miss a target in day vmc.
Seems like the big impediment to visibility in this case was simple darkness.
Maybe no factor bigger than the fact that you can't tell whether those landing lights are on an RJ or a 737 at night. They'd have likely had a better chance of picking out the correct aircraft during the day.
This one is odd to me. It appears that the RJ is rolling uncontrollably to the left after the chopper hits them from the right and there's an explosion, indicating the chopper probably hit a fuel tank. I would think that in most scenarios, getting hit from the right would cause you to roll to the right.

Scary ride for everyone aboard, though, looks like they got hit, did a complete roll plus another quarter in the few seconds before they hit the water.
 
I fly in the NAS a good amount, I don’t get RAs on short final, that is not normal, not even in some of the 3rd world places I fly.

PAT is practically the only users of that route, who else is cleared in the inner ring and gets to play on that river like that?

If you watched that video of the ATC tracks & audio


just a day prior to the crash and thought that was OK, I honestly think we are so far apart on what constitutes OK I don’t think we will find a middle ground
I watched the video twice. What part of the route did they break? If you have a problem with 500 ft separation, then file a complaint to the FAA.

As far as not flying within 500 ft vertical from VFRs I don’t know what to tell ya. I’ve flown a few hundred feet below aircraft on final in 3rd world countries. Not long ago at work I was cruising out of CHA at 5,500 ft. Approach took a regional jet right over the top of me at 6,000 ft. Regional jet told approach they were responding to an RA on me. Approach nonchalantly replied “well that’s standard separation.”

These are several vids on YT that show an airliner responding to RAs when indeed ATC had required separation. Then in the remarks you have the usual comments from the uninformed about how dangerous it was. Then the current / former controllers chime in and say “well, don’t know what he’s complaining about. That’s standard separation.” Or “Visual separation…completely legal.”

Now if there needs to be changes in rules / policy, well that’s a conversation that can take place. But, don’t tell me an aircrew (PAT11) is in the wrong when they’re just adhering to the route that’s published.
 
WC’s take on the accident with a quote from former CG pilot who’s flown the route. Not much different than what’s already been speculated.

I have some questions that you're the most likely person to know the answers to. Ward reads the comments by the Coast Guard pilot, and they touch on specifics I'm curious about. In a way, I'm asking you to pass judgement on the helo crew's actions, and if you don't want to do that, I understand.

One, it's probably the helo crew's discretion to be on the goggles in an urban environment. What's your take? During normal clear nighttime ops at DCA, no other aircraft in the proximity to DCA has them on, and they see just fine. Is it bad judgement to use them in that context, considering the need to clearly discern the situation around the airport? Next, the comment about washout is something I've wondered about since the mishap occurred. It seems to me NVGs would be an impediment when used in that bright urban setting, reducing the clarity needed to pick out traffic, especially when multiple aircraft on final approaching the helo head on have landing lights on.

Considering the lineup of landing traffic approaching DCA from the south, it seems critical that ATC would provide specific information on the target aircraft to the helo, as in "Traffic at your 12 o'clock, one mile, an RJ on approach to RWY 33." Instead, there was the clearly inadequate "Do you have him in sight?" or similar verbiage, and the collision apparently occurred just seconds later.

As a rotary wing pilot with ATC experience, can you comment on the failure to use standard callout language? Would you request further clarification from ATC if you're looking at the stack of lights lined up on the river ahead? Because of the greatly reduced separation in the Route 4/aircraft on final situation, is it incumbent upon the helo pilot to inform ATC he's sure which aircraft he sees with some specificity, instead of "Traffic in sight?"

Thanks.
 
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The helicopter is apparently intact after collision, with tail and body clearly visible and connected, so the rotor or skids could be the suspect part that hit. The jet looks like a possible failure of the left wing and the flash would seem to be from that source, since the helicopter can be seen afterward. And the timing of the impact is past the centerline of the jet. Reports are the jet was in three sections. One wing looks like it is missing a section as it rolls over. I had wondered at first if the helicopter fuel tanks were suspected as the source of the fire flash.


1738386830526.png
 
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This is entertaining and somewhat informative, but until the facts are known and a root cause investigation is completed, those of you essentially saying you think something should be stopped or changed are way jumping the gun; it’s not even 48 hours later. You sound more uninformed about the post-incident process than the media types. Have fun, but a soap-box is unnecessary for most of your audience on POA.
I can say without hesitation that something should be changed.

I just don't know what yet. Give it a year and I bet they'll tell us...
 
The helicopter is apparently intact after collision, with tail and body clearly visible and connected, so the rotor or skids could be the suspect part that hit. The jet looks like a possible failure of the left wing and the flash would seem to be from that source, since the helicopter can be seen afterward. Reports are the jet was in three sections. I had wondered at first if the helicopter fuel tanks were suspected as the source of the fire flash.


View attachment 137674
Do you have any idea the size of Black Hawk rotor blades?

The rotor blades of a Black Hawk helicopter are about 24 feet long and have a chord of 1.73 feet. The main rotor diameter is 53 feet and 8 inches.


Explanation


  • The main rotor blades of a Black Hawk helicopter are made of titanium strips and Nomex honeycomb material.
  • The blades are tilted at an angle to create lift when they rotate at high speeds.
  • The blades have nitrogen-filled sensors to detect cracks.
  • The main rotor blades are fully articulated.
Additional details


  • The main rotor blades of a Black Hawk helicopter have a tip speed of 725 feet per second.
  • The main rotor blades of a Black Hawk helicopter have a negative blade twist of 18 degrees.
  • The main rotor blades of a Black Hawk helicopter have a tip swept aft 20 degrees.
 
According to the net, the diameter of the Black Hawk's rotor disc is 53 feet, 8 inches.
 
The helicopter is apparently intact after collision, with tail and body clearly visible and connected, so the rotor or skids could be the suspect part that hit. The jet looks like a possible failure of the left wing and the flash would seem to be from that source, since the helicopter can be seen afterward. And the timing of the impact is past the centerline of the jet. Reports are the jet was in three sections. One wing looks like it is missing a section as it rolls over. I had wondered at first if the helicopter fuel tanks were suspected as the source of the fire flash.


View attachment 137674
I see that too, but admittedly this doesn't really matter because the magnitude of the tragedy outweighs my silly speculation. The helicopter's rotor appeared to impact and separate the left wing and fracture the RJ fuselage aft of the wings. The helo continued forward with the fuselage mostly intact, you can see the rotating beacon flash as it descends into the river. I think the left wing was hit because the aircraft was turning and it was lower than the right wing.

The photo of the main wreckage in the river appears to be the center section of the fuselage with the right wing attached.
 
That doesn't really mean anything though. 33 is significantly shorter, so when they ran their performance calculations, they likely knew what LDA would be required and either knew they wouldn't have it at night, or they may have a restriction against doing circling approaches at night, or who knows what.

The accident crew, OTOH, may have realized that they'd be fine. I don't know very many pilots who won't go out of their way to help out ATC, and most air carrier ops are fairly black and white about what is allowed. I'm assuming that PSA does not have a restriction on circling to a new runway in night VMC, and that the crew knew their numbers and knew they could make the landing on 33, so they took it.
My post was just a reply to this question asked by another poster. I was affirming that the RWY 33 offset offer by ATC is a discretionary action, refused by that particular crew that was landing ahead of the mishap aircraft:

RJ from what I heard was asked to circle to 33. I suppose they were planning rwy1. Could the RJ refuse the circle 33 and insist on a rwy 1 approach? If yes then we wouldn't be talking about this.
 
This one is odd to me. It appears that the RJ is rolling uncontrollably to the left after the chopper hits them from the right and there's an explosion, indicating the chopper probably hit a fuel tank. I would think that in most scenarios, getting hit from the right would cause you to roll to the right.

Scary ride for everyone aboard, though, looks like they got hit, did a complete roll plus another quarter in the few seconds before they hit the water.

If an object with wings gets hit from underside of the right wing with enough force to shear that wing off, I imagine enough inertia is imparted on the body to roll it left? At least for a moment before aerodynamic forces intervene......which might take too long to happen at a couple hundred feet.
 
I have some questions that you're the most likely person to know the answers to. Ward reads the comments by the Coast Guard pilot, and they touch on specifics I'm curious about. In a way, I'm asking you to pass judgement on the helo crew's actions, and if you don't want to do that, I understand.

One, it's probably the helo crews discretion to be on the goggles in an urban environment. What's your take? During normal clear nighttime ops at DCA, no other aircraft in the proximity to DCA has them on, and they see just fine. Is it bad judgement to use them in that context, considering the need to clearly discern the situation around the airport? Next, the comment about washout is something I've wondered about since the mishap occurred. It seems to me NVGs would be an impediment when used in that bright urban setting, reducing the clarity needed to pick out traffic, especially when multiple aircraft on final approaching the helo head on have landing lights on.

Considering the lineup of landing traffic approaching DCA from the south, it seems critical that ATC would provide specific information on the target aircraft to the helo, as in "Traffic at your 12 o'clock, three miles, an RJ on approach to RWY 33." Instead, there was the clearly inadequate "Do you have him in sight?" or similar verbiage. As a rotary wing pilot with ATC experience, can you comment on the failure to use standard callout language? Would you request further clarification from ATC? If you're looking at the stack of lights lined up on the river ahead, is it incumbent upon the helo pilot to make sure which aircraft he sees?

Thanks.
Well first the NVG thing. As attached in the article, a good chance they were wearing them along with the attached HUD. There isn’t a regulatory policy on their use in Army Aviation though. Units I was in, they were only required by SOP for terrain flight (at or below 200 ft) or at all times on deployment because it’s dark as crap in the desert. Zipping over tree tops or the desert at NOE is hard enough with NVGs, without them would be suicide. I also knew guys that always wore them even on VFR XCs at several thousand feet up. Their prerogative and does have a safety benefit in the event of an off field unplanned landing. In the clouds, pretty much everyone flipped them up because they’re just a distraction in that environment.

As far the the conditions around DCA? I talked to another former Black Hawk guy yesterday and he said no way he’d wear them with that much illum. The problem is, well several. First, there’s no distinguishing color such as “red right returning.” Lights are just varying degrees of bright green or in this case (phosphor) white spots. An aircraft with very little lateral movement on the windscreen could easily be mistaken for a tower. Other thing is LEDs on towers. Under NVGs, some of them are almost indistinguishable due to their wavelength. There’s an FAA SAFO message that addresses this. Also, external lights, especially on a high humidity night, produce a lot of halos and glare. This obviously restricts clarity. The final thing is their restricted FOV. 40 degrees. It’s like looking through a soda straw. A lot of the newer pilots get focused straight ahead and don’t keep their head on a swivel. It’s is a very uncomfortable and can be a disorienting thing to constantly turn your head left and right while on the controls. It’s something that I probably didn’t get comfortable with until somewhere around 250 hrs NVGs. Even today at over 1,500 hrs NVGs I’m not as comfortable night vs day. Just too many limitations. Depth perception being the primary.

So, if I were giving the eval in this case? Well I’d keep her aided and allow her to concentrate on flying and I’d go unaided. Id still be able to see the water with all the exterior illum, backing that up with the RADALT which by the way is on both sides of the panel. It would be easier to differentiate aircraft from towers. Even today when I fly over a city, sometimes I’ll flip my goggles up to ID aircraft because that flashing red beacon or landing light is easier to see unaided. Usually I’ll flip them up again on landing. Plenty of illuminated references to judge closure rates to a city pad.

As far as the local controller traffic call? Well early in I heard only the last snippet about “PAT25 do you have the RJ in sight?” Then the extended clip came out with a better traffic call but honestly, I couldn’t make out much of the details. Personally I would’ve liked to have heard a clock position and distance but that didn’t happen. Now, towers generally issue traffic in reference to a landmark or a relative position from you. With a certified tower radar display (CTRD), which I’m sure DCA has, a radar traffic call with clock position can be made. All depends on facility letters allowing them to use it just as an approach controller would. No idea if DCA has any restrictions on their radar displays.

One thing that hasn’t been mentioned is, if they actually saw the traffic, could they still impact not knowing how close they were? Well the NVGs have limitations and we’ve all had close calls flying formation but I’ve never had any issues avoiding another aircraft under NVGs that I knew was an aircraft. I honestly don’t think that happened. I think it was simple expectation bias and looking at the wrong aircraft (AAL3130) and complicating matters with the cockpit (door frame / green house frame) and inherent NVG limitations. Sad deal all around.

 
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"If an object with wings gets hit from underside of the right wing with enough force to shear that wing off, I imagine enough inertia. . . "

Right wing was intact with the fuselage wreckage. Left wing is missing an outboard section in the video Friday night. Aerodynamic forces are going to almost instantly overcome any inertia, as many tragic airshow accident videos show.
 
How do you know he wasn’t?

ATC verified visual separation with the helicopter 8 seconds before impact.

Radio communication was interrupted.
From what I've seen reported he was high for at least a minute, likely more. If the check pilot was dumb enough not to say "my controls" if he didn't react in 10 seconds he wasn't doing his job.

ATC never criticized the aberration and there was plenty of time for it. His computer must have been going nuts with a collision alert. A simple, Yeah I got it, not really sufficient when the radar is painting you that close together. Unlike a fixed wing a helo and be told to reverse and decend.

I expect we'll find that ATC was woefully understaffed, but still operating when they should have declared the environment was unsafe for months if not years. Not sure what to expect with the Military crew. Spending minutes above altitude while approaching an approach doesn't speak well of the oversight.
 
Did we discuss Logo Lights?
(Would they help? was the angle of impact such that they'd have been noticed in this event? Are they available for such aircraft? Cost? Annoying to pilot?)

Didn't read the whole thread...search box shows no recent hits for "Logo", "Logo lights"


Random internet image:

logolights.png
 
Did we discuss Logo Lights?
(Would they help? was the angle of impact such that they'd have been noticed in this event? Are they available for such aircraft? Cost? Annoying to pilot?)

Didn't read the whole thread...search box shows no recent hits for "Logo", "Logo lights"

Random internet image:

View attachment 137675
In the second, more detailed video, taken from a different angle, the tail logo lighting appears to be illuminated after the collision and until the aircraft strikes the water.

 
If an object with wings gets hit from underside of the right wing with enough force to shear that wing off, I imagine enough inertia is imparted on the body to roll it left? At least for a moment before aerodynamic forces intervene......which might take too long to happen at a couple hundred feet.
I saw a better copy of the video just a bit ago. Helo squeaked under the plane and sheared off the *left* wing. Aircraft rolls left 450 degrees on its way into the water. Looked like the roll rate wasn't constant, as if the crew tried to stop the roll, realized they couldn't, and then tried to get it all the way around similar to Alaska 261. There just wasn't nearly enough room for them to do anything. What a sickening ride, for a handful of seconds...
 
Did we discuss Logo Lights?
(Would they help? was the angle of impact such that they'd have been noticed in this event? Are they available for such aircraft? Cost? Annoying to pilot?)

Didn't read the whole thread...search box shows no recent hits for "Logo", "Logo lights"

Random internet image:

View attachment 137675

You don’t really notice them air to air
 
The simplest solution is to close DCA to fixed wing traffic of any kind.
I’ve been saying this for years. Move all the jets to Dulles and make DCA the mega heliport for all the helicopters around the capitol. Every agency under the sun around there has helicopters. Just put them all at DCA and make it a dedicated rotard base.
 
I watched the video twice. What part of the route did they break? If you have a problem with 500 ft separation, then file a complaint to the FAA.

As far as not flying within 500 ft vertical from VFRs I don’t know what to tell ya. I’ve flown a few hundred feet below aircraft on final in 3rd world countries. Not long ago at work I was cruising out of CHA at 5,500 ft. Approach took a regional jet right over the top of me at 6,000 ft. Regional jet told approach they were responding to an RA on me. Approach nonchalantly replied “well that’s standard separation.”

These are several vids on YT that show an airliner responding to RAs when indeed ATC had required separation. Then in the remarks you have the usual comments from the uninformed about how dangerous it was. Then the current / former controllers chime in and say “well, don’t know what he’s complaining about. That’s standard separation.” Or “Visual separation…completely legal.”

Now if there needs to be changes in rules / policy, well that’s a conversation that can take place. But, don’t tell me an aircrew (PAT11) is in the wrong when they’re just adhering to the route that’s published.
And it also appears that when PAT11 crossed under the first Southwest aircraft on approach, there was no issue with 6-500 ft separation. Looked like going under Brickyard he has even a bit more separation.

I think one thing that may come out of this is to change these procedures to no night operation on the rotor routes, or holding DCA traffic in the event of an emergency PAT night flight.
 
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