Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

Depth perception has almost nothing to do with visual separation. Probably a little oversimplified, but If the aircraft is moving in your windshield, you’ll miss. If the aircraft is stationary in your windshield, you’ll hit.
But you have to see the airplane that’s not moving in the windshield.

Having read they were on a NVG training flight is interesting. Trying to pick out an aircraft light source with no relative motion that’s framed against a light saturated city is damn hard to do. NVG’s make light sources miles away look very close sometimes. Of that whole crew was on NVG not seeing the jet doesn’t surprise me at all.
 
a satellite follows your car with a very big zoom lens. it's definitely not a 'fake' image of the car from above with all the camera views stitched together around it. it's definitely a satellite image of your car.
I bet the tin foil won't help, will it...
 
Curious to know what certificate Roller holds, how many hours, and how many of those hours are at low altitude in an urban area, or on approach to Class B.
 
Seems ATC could have provided more position info on the CRJ after the initial advice. Just asking the helo whether they have the CRJ in sight during later calls when both are moving is far less precise when the tracks show a potential collision. Always more helpful when they say "Traffic 5 miles at 2 o'clock"
When he pointed out the traffic he gave the CRJ's position over a prominent landmark and what the CRJ was going to do. He later asked to verify that the CRJ was still in sight and instructed the helicopter to pass behind the CRJ.

It’s the PAT helicopters who are nearly automatic in their “request visual separation” line, it’s the PAT helicopters who set off RAs, not fixed wing, or even private helicopters constantly busting altitudes and flying too close to the arrivals and departures there.
Fixed wing can't fly the helicopter routes.

I’ve flown in that area and had the same “how the heck is this allowed” thought when it came to all the silly state helicopters zipping all over the place
Wouldn't a simple fix be to stop using visual separation on those routes and, instead, provide RADAR separation? That would inconvenience the helicopter operators, to some extent, but wouldn't affect the rest of the airport's operators.

I believe that Velocity has said that RADAR separation would be 1-1/2 miles and 500'.
 
Tower shoulda had 2 controllers.
Curious as to what you think would have changed had there been two controllers. You mean one controller per runway? There was obviously more than one on duty due to the noise of reactions recorded in the tower upon impact. My point is that in my opinion, it wouldn’t have mattered. In fact I think it would have been even more problematic if one controller was talking to the helicopter while the other one was talking to the RJ. The helicopter wasn’t at the correct altitude for that route. They said they had the RJ in sight as were maintaining visual separation. I don’t care if there were 6 controllers per runway, all they could do was helplessly watch it happen.

And look out the window wondering, what is that guy doing?

Just my opinion, worth exactly what you paid for it
 
Curious as to what you think would have changed had there been two controllers. You mean one controller per runway?
I read this morning that the second position at this tower is dedicated to managing helicopter traffic.
 
When he pointed out the traffic he gave the CRJ's position over a prominent landmark and what the CRJ was going to do. He later asked to verify that the CRJ was still in sight and instructed the helicopter to pass behind the CRJ.


Fixed wing can't fly the helicopter routes.


Wouldn't a simple fix be to stop using visual separation on those routes and, instead, provide RADAR separation? That would inconvenience the helicopter operators, to some extent, but wouldn't affect the rest of the airport's operators.

I believe that Velocity has said that RADAR separation would be 1-1/2 miles and 500'.


My point exactly, it’s not only one category of aircraft, it’s of one group of helicopters causing this mess.

Based on ATC history I don’t think the majority of PATs in that area would be able operate even with that separation from the airliners going into DCA

Curious to know what certificate Roller holds, how many hours, and how many of those hours are at low altitude in an urban area, or on approach to Class B.
ATP, little over 11k, I also fly (not current) helicopters, most of my flying these days is into class Bs for work, and my personal plane seldom flys over 1k AGL
 
I read this morning that the second position at this tower is dedicated to managing helicopter traffic.
There are more than two. In my tower there are 5. We use was is called the “tower team concept” which means that everyone is responsible for looking out the window and speaking up if they see something unusual or a flight strip isn’t marked correctly, etc. I can’t testify as to Reagan but I’m sure that it’s similar
 
There are more than two. In my tower there are 5. We use was is called the “tower team concept” which means that everyone is responsible for looking out the window and speaking up if they see something unusual or a flight strip isn’t marked correctly, etc. I can’t testify as to Reagan but I’m sure that it’s similar
"""
On Wednesday evening, the position of helicopter controller — a role typically staffed until 9:30 p.m. — had been combined ahead of the crash with that of local controller, according to the report.
"""
 
@Flymy47 you guys require two CE / FEs in the back at night?
We are required to have two NRCM's in the back for NVG's doing base tasks. However, that CAN be waived down to one, but it's rarely done. Two is definitely better in a -47. Unaided, I think only one required, but nobody does that on purpose unless you are just arriving as the sun goes down.
 
It shows what I have stated a few times, the route and the approach into DCA has a too small a margin

I really don’t care how many times it has been flown anymore than how many times someone drove drunk and nothing happened, some things are just a bad idea, unfortunately nothing happens until something happens
The same could be said for driving on two lane highways. They’re a significant contribution to the over 40K highway deaths every year but no one (sane) is saying get rid of two land highways.

This route, is like a two lane highway in that it’s predicated upon two things. 1) staying in your lane and 2) seeing the other traffic. The fact that an accident occurred here isn’t de facto a dangerous route. There’s no trend of accidents to base your conclusions on.

This also has nothing to do with PAT’s operating procedures as you stated from your attached vid. In both those cases, PAT11 was not just using visual sep, they even had the required vertical sep without visual. First airliner passed over head 500 ft above them and the second 700 ft above them. PAT’s phraseology of requesting visual sep isn’t all that far off. It’s nothing more than pilot applied visual separation so the tower doesn’t have to come back with “PAT11 maintain visual separation.” They can simply say “approved.”

Now, if you want to talk about RA parameters vs ATC standard separation, I’ve brought that up several times. The two don’t mesh; meaning, the RAs are set up with much more stringent tolerances of alerts than what common ATC separation parameters are. Therefore, aircraft with TCAS alerts are usually following an RA when the controller is dumbfounded as to why. I saw the same thing in the early days of TCAS with commuters when I worked approach. Nothing is going to change in that regard unless the FAA bumps up VFR vs IFR sep in both Cs and Bs…and really everywhere else in between where there isn’t even prescribed separation. Doubtful.
 
"""
On Wednesday evening, the position of helicopter controller — a role typically staffed until 9:30 p.m. — had been combined ahead of the crash with that of local controller, according to the report.
"""
Not a subscriber so I can’t read the article. However, I can read the headline about controllers doing “double duty.” This is typical on two levels, the first that reporters don’t know what the hell they’re talking about and secondly, very true of any tower I’ve ever worked in. In fact I just got off two mid shifts on which I’m the sole controller on duty so if something happened on my watch, the headline would read: “ He was doing the work of 5 controllers “. It is common practice to combine positions for many reasons. One being when not much is going on and two, there are simply not enough controllers available to have all positions manned. Controllers are human. We take bathroom breaks, go downstairs to make a phone call to make sure the kids were picked up from soccer practice, just…life, and someone has to watch two positions while that happens. It’s comical hearing speculation about controllers being overworked by reporters and people that have no idea what goes on in a control tower

This is why we have several controllers on this forum to answer questions and dispel rumors.

By the way, I haven’t said it in a while so…

EVERY ATC facility is a teaching facility so when they try the “the controller was in training “ angle, know that they had at least two people who could over key them and make things right
 
Had a thought. Sam the FO I bet was PF and Captain was PM. Sam had his full attention on the runway environment. The helicopter came from his side. Wild guess the CVR will tell.
 
Had a thought. Sam the FO I bet was PF and Captain was PM. Sam had his full attention on the runway environment. The helicopter came from his side. Wild guess the CVR will tell.
The technical term is “fixated”, but I guess it’s possible.
 
The same could be said for driving on two lane highways. They’re a significant contribution to the over 40K highway deaths every year but no one (sane) is saying get rid of two land highways.

This route, is like a two lane highway in that it’s predicated upon two things. 1) staying in your lane and 2) seeing the other traffic. The fact that an accident occurred here isn’t de facto a dangerous route. There’s no trend of accidents to base your conclusions on.

This also has nothing to do with PAT’s operating procedures as you stated from your attached vid. In both those cases, PAT11 was not just using visual sep, they even had the required vertical sep without visual. First airliner passed over head 500 ft above them and the second 700 ft above them. PAT’s phraseology of requesting visual sep isn’t all that far off. It’s nothing more than pilot applied visual separation so the tower doesn’t have to come back with “PAT11 maintain visual separation.” They can simply say “approved.”

Now, if you want to talk about RA parameters vs ATC standard separation, I’ve brought that up several times. The two don’t mesh; meaning, the RAs are set up with much more stringent tolerances of alerts than what common ATC separation parameters are. Therefore, aircraft with TCAS alerts are usually following an RA when the controller is dumbfounded as to why. I saw the same thing in the early days of TCAS with commuters when I worked approach. Nothing is going to change in that regard unless the FAA bumps up VFR vs IFR sep in both Cs and Bs…and really everywhere else in between where there isn’t even prescribed separation. Doubtful.



I get what you’re saying, but there ain't many airports like DCA where helicopters and airliners are flying that close together—it’s a mess. If they moved those helicopter routes farther out, it’d be a lot safer for everyone.

Compared to roads we all use every day, those government helicopter routes ain’t anywhere near as important. Let’s be real—some politician’s air limo service ain’t exactly what the Founding Fathers had in mind for this country.

Flying for work, I can't remember the last time I cleared another aircraft by just 500 feet. There’s plenty of ATC videos showing those PATs getting into tight spots and not following the right altitudes. If they were tour helicopters instead, they would've been kicked out of that airspace long ago, probably facing some serious FAA penalties.
 
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I didn't mean it in a bad sense. Only that the FO had to have his attention on the runway ahead.
 
Not a subscriber so I can’t read the article. However, I can read the headline about controllers doing “double duty.” This is typical on two levels, the first that reporters don’t know what the hell they’re talking about and secondly, very true of any tower I’ve ever worked in. In fact I just got off two mid shifts on which I’m the sole controller on duty so if something happened on my watch, the headline would read: “ He was doing the work of 5 controllers “. It is common practice to combine positions for many reasons. One being when not much is going on and two, there are simply not enough controllers available to have all positions manned. Controllers are human. We take bathroom breaks, go downstairs to make a phone call to make sure the kids were picked up from soccer practice, just…life, and someone has to watch two positions while that happens. It’s comical hearing speculation about controllers being overworked by reporters and people that have no idea what goes on in a control tower

This is why we have several controllers on this forum to answer questions and dispel rumors.

By the way, I haven’t said it in a while so…

EVERY ATC facility is a teaching facility so when they try the “the controller was in training “ angle, know that they had at least two people who could over key them and make things right
That’s the problem with the media on this. Is there a controller shortage? Heck yeah but in this case, combining positions could easily be the sup / CIC sending the controllers home early to combine the position. Completely within their power based on traffic load.
 
One of the safety culture slides is always the “well that’s what we have always done it”, during your never ending recurrent computer training, that’s never the correct answer lol

I always laughed like “who would think that would be a good idea”

See it all the time, some road intersections, office stuff, and so on, you’ll see something and think that’s a accident waiting to happen, sadly nothing happens until someone breaks their neck on the messed up stairs, or a school bus gets nailed in the intersection.

That airport and ATC practically normalizes RAs and threading a needle for no good reason.

This was not “normalization of deviation” (not deviance either, I always laugh when people call it that). Normalization of deviation is when you deviate from rules, norms, or policy so many times that it reinforces that the deviation is somehow safe. Helicopters and airplanes in their respective lanes is not deviation. What you’d be saying by using “normalization of deviation” is that folks have routinely deviated from the procedure and it caused an accident. That’s not what you’re saying so stop using that reference you found on the internet because you are using it incorrectly.
 
I have what is probably a stupid question for the controllers here. I'm assuming the Jet had an IFR clearance. If that's true, shouldn't ATC be providing radar separation for the jet even if the Heli was VFR?

What am I getting wrong?
 
I am wondering too. To add to @Salty's question - do large Class B airports' controllers use radar or ADSB, or a combination of both? Meaning - would the controller have known that the helo's altitude was off?
 
“ He was doing the work of 5 controllers “
Can you imagine how many positions the ORD tower controller is working at 3am?

had his full attention on the runway environment. The helicopter came from his side
Also, in a left bank lining up on the runway fairly close in for the airspeed they're flying.

I've flown that approach, Vis 1 -> Vis 33. It takes a lot of attention to manage the glidepath as you make the turn to line up to the short runway. There isn't much margin to fix things if you get high and/or fast.

I have what is probably a stupid question for the controllers here. I'm assuming the Jet had an IFR clearance. If that's true, shouldn't ATC be providing radar separation for the jet even if the Heli was VFR?
The CRJ was IFR on a visual approach clearance. Visual separation was being applied. Without the visual separation, RADAR separation would have been applied.

do large Class B airports' controllers use radar or ADSB, or a combination of both? Meaning - would the controller have known that the helo's altitude was off?
The display in the tower is a digital composite. Altitude can be provided by ADSB Out, Mode-C, or Mode-S.

The actual altitude of the helicopter has not been established. The altitude reporting from the airplane is not as accurate as many suggest. Tolerances can be as high as 300'. The NTSB will determine a more accurate altitude by examining all sources.
 
a
This was not “normalization of deviation” (not deviance either, I always laugh when people call it that). Normalization of deviation is when you deviate from rules, norms, or policy so many times that it reinforces that the deviation is somehow safe. Helicopters and airplanes in their respective lanes is not deviation. What you’d be saying by using “normalization of deviation” is that folks have routinely deviated from the procedure and it caused an accident. That’s not what you’re saying so stop using that reference you found on the internet because you are using it incorrectly.
PATs did the same thing the day before, and times before that, made airliners go around, never even given so much as a phone number to call.

You don’t need dead bodies for it to be normalization, though as seen here that is where the path unfortunately can lead
 
A wise man once said, if you think there's a simple solution, you don't understand the problem.

Often people over complicate matters when they are trying to avoid the simple solution.
 
Can you imagine how many positions the ORD tower controller is working at 3am?
I highly doubt ORD tower goes down to one controller at night but I could ask. There are at least 3 controllers there that I trained many years ago
 
The actual altitude of the helicopter has not been established. The altitude reporting from the airplane is not as accurate as many suggest. Tolerances can be as high as 300'. The NTSB will determine a more accurate altitude by examining all sources.
Well, we do know that the helicopter was at exactly the same altitude as the CRJ.
 
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