Jeju Air, South Korea

midwestpa24 said:
I am kind of wondering if this was similar to Transair flight 810, where the crew inadvertently shut down the good engine. Or possibly killed both engines on the go-around, leaving them dead stick or nearly that for the eventual landing.

Another possibility, just throwing it out there, that the cockpit also took a bird strike causing damage to the overhead panel which could have killed power to all kinds of stuff that wouldn't normally have been affected.
Click to expand...
My tag line came from a quote about that incident.
 
Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
 
LWGII said:
Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
Click to expand...
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.

The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
 
Larry in TN said:
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.

The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
Click to expand...
"Turn your key Sir"
I'm on the edge of my seat on this one. Can't wait for a definitive answer.
 
Larry in TN said:
Trips the generator field relay, closes pylon firewall valves for the fuel, hydraulics, and pneumatics. Arms the fire extinguisher bottles to fire to that engine.

The fire handles are normally latched. The latch is removed if a fire is being detected for the associated engine/apu. The latch can be overridden with a release that is difficult to operate with a single hand. Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist. It is a couple of steps into the checklist after the memory items. Confirmation from both pilots is required prior to pulling the handle.
Click to expand...
Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instant of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?
 
Last edited:
Probably not four minutes unless a plane drops like a rock down a well. Something a little less. Hard to say what switches were pulled or not pulled at this point, but dual fire bottles could explain some but not all. Pilot panic/loss of situational awareness looks like it could explain a bit too. We’ll see…
 
Last edited:
Larry in TN said:
Pulling a fire handle is NOT a memory item on the engine fire, severe damage, separation checklist.
Click to expand...
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
 
In a very few years I’ve seen that change three times… in the same company.

I’ve also flown the same jet for two different companies where it was and wasn’t.

That sort of inconsistency makes mistakes related to their use even more suspect.
 
LWGII said:
Dan Gryder, POA's favorite, thinks the pilots pulled a fire handle. That apparently severs all fuel and electric connections to the engine, including the generator. I don't know how that extrapolates to both engines, unless both fire handles were pulled.
Click to expand...
Was this based on anything he stole from the crash site?
 
Spinka said:
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
Click to expand...
On the Boeing FM, just the autothrottle and thrust lever are memory items. Pulling the engine fire switch is step 4.
 
The checklist and memory items have changed over time. The law of primacy takes over a lot. And the checklist and memory items for the same aircraft may be different on carrier A vs carrier B.

My law of primacy example. I was first required at carrier A on aborted take off due to engine failure to reduce thrust, deploy reversers then pull speed brake handle, which was really just confirmation that ground spoilers had deployed. They were automatic on ground with reversers deployed. At carrier B it was reduce thrust to idle, deploy spoilers the reverse thrust. I spent the rest of my career at carrier B repeating the aborts, even though I briefed ahead of times the steps, because I I did what was taught at carrier A.
 
3393RP said:
Uh, Dan, if both fire handles were pulled at the instant of ADS-B, CVR, and DFDR failure, how did the aircraft manage four more minutes of flight and a teardrop reversal return to the runway?
Click to expand...
Perhaps the right handle was pulled when we saw the puff of smoke and the other pulled later.
 
LesGawlik said:
Perhaps the right handle was pulled when we saw the puff of smoke and the other pulled later.
Click to expand...
It wouldn't make much sense to pull the fire handle on your only operating engine. Even if it's on fire. As long as it is producing power, you need that power to land.
 
Larry in TN said:
It wouldn't make much sense to pull the fire handle on your only operating engine. Even if it's on fire. As long as it is producing power, you need that power to land.
Click to expand...
But if you've misidentified the lame engine ...
And that has happened more times that pilots would like to admit.
 
A lot of assuming US air carrier practices to a foreign carrier with vastly different cultural and operational practices.

Just look at Asiana 214.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
But if you've misidentified the lame engine ...
And that has happened more times that pilots would like to admit.
Click to expand...
Then you didn't follow the procedures.

Pulling the fire switch is not a memory item because it is supposed to be done methodically with confirmation from both crew members.

The memory item has you confirm, and then reduce the thrust lever to idle. If you have misidentified the engine then this step should make that obvious and you can push that thrust lever forward again.

You then go the checklist and review the two memory items (autothrottles off and thrust lever, confirmed, idle) before moving on.

The next step is to confirm the start lever on the affected engine then move it to cutoff. This is a second confirmation that you are dealing with the correct engine.

I'm not sure how you get this far without realizing that you've shutoff your good engine.

Finally, you confirm then pull the fire switch. If the engine wasn't indicating a fire the fire switch won't pull. You have to push the override latch while pulling the fire switch. This is quite difficult to do with one hand so the PM is usually doing it with two hands.
 
Spinka said:
Really? Sure is for us. Requires confirmation from the other pilot, but still a memory item. Was the same on the 777 when I flew it.
Click to expand...
On the 777 right now. Not a memory item for us.

757 was the same.

Edit: just to expand, ENGINE FIRE isn’t even a memory item for us at all. We don’t do anything without reference to the checklist.
 
Last edited:
Interesting. I'm with a foreign carrier and they have always been memory items here. Still are.
 
Spinka said:
Interesting. I'm with a foreign carrier and they have always been memory items here. Still are.
Click to expand...
In the old days they were. (I was young then, it was easy to learn longer memory item checklists) More recently, there was an effort to minimize the memory items to just what needs to be done promptly to reduce the mistakes that are likely to be made while trying to recall a long list of memory items in an emergency.
 
Dovetailing off this, is reducing memory items possibly applicable to single-engine piston aircraft for something such as an engine failure? Would the time consumed by using the checklist instead of doing memory items make a critical difference between a restart and an engine-out landing? Or is the need to memorize the steps to attempt a restart overstated?
 
ateamer said:
Dovetailing off this, is reducing memory items possibly applicable to single-engine piston aircraft for something such as an engine failure? Would the time consumed by using the checklist instead of doing memory items make a critical difference between a restart and an engine-out landing? Or is the need to memorize the steps to attempt a restart overstated?
Click to expand...
It's a very different environment. On a transport jet, you have a pilot-flying and a pilot-monitoring. The PM can read and do checklists without affecting the PF's ability to maintain aircraft control. The PF is kept in the loop by the PM reading aloud then doing each step of the checklist.
 
Larry in TN said:
It's a very different environment. On a transport jet, you have a pilot-flying and a pilot-monitoring. The PM can read and do checklists without affecting the PF's ability to maintain aircraft control. The PF is kept in the loop by the PM reading aloud then doing each step of the checklist.
Click to expand...
There is that. I’m just always wondering about and looking for better ways to do things, plus need to know the why behind everything.
 
TCABM said:
A lot of assuming US air carrier practices to a foreign carrier with vastly different cultural and operational practices.

Just look at Asiana 214.
Click to expand...
I made this same observation on another forum, using the example of Asiana 214 in a neutral and circumspect manner. Several immediate replies to my comments, made in an accusatory and heated manner, blasted out with the usual labels that make rational discourse impossible.

But the NTSB report on that mishap documented obvious cultural and operational issues, particularly deference to authority and seniority by junior crew members, that were critical components in the sequence of actions that caused the Asiana crash.

There have been inflammatory comments in some discussions regarding the Jeju event when these subjects are mentioned.

That's unfortunate, because I believe those cultural and procedural differences between Asian and Western aviation practices do exist. Repressing honest examination of all factors in this terrible mishap must be avoided, especially since it's clear finding the facts and determining the cause will be most difficult.
 
3393RP said:
That's unfortunate, because I believe those cultural and procedural differences between Asian and Western aviation practices do exist.
Click to expand...
The US has worked hard to fix this in the aftermath of some nasty and preventable crashes.

There is one (flight number escapes me right now) where a captain verbally abused a first officer (for missing something on the preflight) to the point that he gave up on even being pilot monitoring. I recall the captain didn't set the flaps correctly and the FO didn't even attempt to challenge him anymore.
 
ateamer said:
Dovetailing off this, is reducing memory items possibly applicable to single-engine piston aircraft for something such as an engine failure? Would the time consumed by using the checklist instead of doing memory items make a critical difference between a restart and an engine-out landing? Or is the need to memorize the steps to attempt a restart overstated?
Click to expand...
Depends on the checklist and what they say the memory items are. For me, an engine failure in a single would be:

1M) Airspeed - Begin reducing to Vg
2M) Landing area - Identify and maneuver while completing (1)
3M*) Undo anything engine or fuel related that you changed within the past 3 minutes.
4M*) Pump on, if equipped and it's not already on
5M*) Tank - Switch, unless done recently and undone in (3)
6M*) Carb Heat/Alternate Air on, as applicable
7) Mixture - Rich
8) Mags - L, R, Both. Start if not windmilling.

Things with an M would be memory items, with M* being "optional memory items". As in, great if you can complete them by memory, but lower on the list because it's not the end of the world if you don't do them immediately for the most part. And once you've gone down the list as far as you can remember, you pull out the actual checklist and start over from the top.

But, that's just me. :dunno:

I looked up the C172SP POH checklists because it's the only one I can think of in GA that actually specifies memory items. They don't even have landing area on the list at all, and all of the rest of their memory items after Airspeed are fuel related (Shutoff valve, selector, aux pump, mixture). They don't have anything on the checklist about alternate air, the only two non-memory items are ignition to Both/Start and to turn the pump back off (which I don't think I'd bother with in this scenario, that's a troubleshooting step for after we're back on the ground).
 
Speaking from my extensive anecdotal experience of 1 engine failure in a single, I strongly recommend that checklist be memorized and brief. It happens fast and you will probably be focused 100% on flying the plane. Everyone assumes engine failure will occur enroute with plenty of altitude, but it is at least equally likely to happen at or below pattern altitude.
 
Ed Haywood said:
Speaking from my extensive anecdotal experience of 1 engine failure in a single, I strongly recommend that checklist be memorized and brief. It happens fast and you will probably be focused 100% on flying the plane. Everyone assumes engine failure will occur enroute with plenty of altitude, but it is at least equally likely to happen at or below pattern altitude.
Click to expand...
Take the example of the Southwest engine failure/decompression that landed in Philly a few years ago. I think they were on the ground 17 minutes after the initial failure, and basically had 4 checklists to complete on the way (decompression, emergency descent, engine shutdown, and one engine inop approach & landing.) There were so many distractions that pulled them out of the checklist, they couldn’t get through one top to bottom.

Good news is, they understood their airplane and its systems and checklists, so they were able to get all of the important stuff done.
 
Last edited:
AV8R_87 said:
The US has worked hard to fix this in the aftermath of some nasty and preventable crashes.

There is one (flight number escapes me right now) where a captain verbally abused a first officer (for missing something on the preflight) to the point that he gave up on even being pilot monitoring. I recall the captain didn't set the flaps correctly and the FO didn't even attempt to challenge him anymore.
Click to expand...
I think something like this happened. Still not buying the "missing 4 minutes" excuse. The Hultgreen cover-up attempt opened my eyes
 
MauleSkinner said:
Checklists primarily deal with systems. Airmanship is generally on the pilot.
Click to expand...
They do... But in an emergency situation, you have no idea what frame of mind a pilot will be in, so it needs to include everything important, just in case. We'd all like to think we'll be steely-eyed missile men and cool as a cucumber when the time comes, but nobody really knows. So I'm putting it on my checklist anyway.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
They do... But in an emergency situation, you have no idea what frame of mind a pilot will be in, so it needs to include everything important, just in case. We'd all like to think we'll be steely-eyed missile men and cool as a cucumber when the time comes, but nobody really knows. So I'm putting it on my checklist anyway.
Click to expand...
Which is how checklists get ridiculously overblown to start with. One checklist I’m aware of for electrical smoke or fire in a jet takes 45 minutes for the test pilots who wrote it to complete. Life expectancy with smoke or fire is less than half of that.
 
FlightmechH3 said:
I think something like this happened. Still not buying the "missing 4 minutes" excuse. The Hultgreen cover-up attempt opened my eyes
Click to expand...

Maybe I'm naive, but I'm not smelling a cover-up over the missing 4 minutes. I would suspect a cover up would either include the entire device being wiped, lost, or damaged beyond repair. I can't imagine it would be very convenient to selectively erase the last 4 minutes of a CVR/FDR. Even if they could, they would have likely needed to already know that time period was the smoking gun and needed to be covered up, all things that I wouldn't imagine would happen so quickly into the investigation. I find it much easier to believe that something that occurred during the accident chain of events led to an interruption of power.

It is now being reported bird remains were found in both engines. My guess is that after the bird strike they initiated a go-around for whatever reason, but during the go around things started falling apart and led to a deadstick or nearly deadstick attempt to land. They then overshot the runway trying to get the plane down in a hurry at the only suitable spot available. I would not rule out crew actions that took a bad problem and made it worse, even the choice to go around when already on final.
 
midwestpa24 said:
It is now being reported bird remains were found in both engines.
Click to expand...
I will preface this by stating that I have no idea how the engine firefighting system is set-up in the 737, and clarification on this by a type rated 737 piliot us welcome.

In some aircraft, two actions are required to discharge a fire bottle: first you arm it, and then you pull the T-handle/flip the switch. Going to the ARM position of the fire bottle will shut off the fuel to that engine/APU, which will cause fuel starvation as soon as the fuel lines downstream of the valves empty, but not instantaneously.

Could it be a case of the crew arming the bottles, not realizing the secondary effects of that action?
Once the engines are off, both generators are off-line. No RAT on the 737, and the APU is probably off. You're down to battery power, and probably not a lot of systems on that bus. Even if the flight recorders are powered, chances are the data acquisition unit for the FDR was not on the battery bus. And we still don't know what electrical bus the recorders are supposed to be on. Maybe they're not even on the battery bus.
 
AV8R_87 said:
Once the engines are off, both generators are off-line. No RAT on the 737, and the APU is probably off. You're down to battery power, and probably not a lot of systems on that bus. Even if the flight recorders are powered, chances are the data acquisition unit for the FDR was not on the battery bus. And we still don't know what electrical bus the recorders are supposed to be on. Maybe they're not even on the battery bus.
Click to expand...
I assume the FDR would record the selection of ARM before it lost power and/or quit getting inputs? Or do FDRs not look at those types of switch positions?
 
AV8R_87 said:
I will preface this by stating that I have no idea how the engine firefighting system is set-up in the 737, and clarification on this by a type rated 737 piliot us welcome.
….
Click to expand...
A 737 guy (Larry in TN) has posted several times in this thread how the system works.
 
I am not typed but did full sim training in the 737 for a few days, we did a dual engine flameout. You lose everything, pressurization, hydraulics, and then avionics / electrical. There’s 2 Fire bottles for each engine and for the APU. You pull and turn to use each, I remember there’s also a button underneath them can’t remember what for. Plus the checklist. It takes time to go thru the checklist and to discuss what your plan of action is. But if you lose power in both engines near the ground then you don’t have much options, not sure about putting out the fires in both engines because you might still be getting some needed thrust from one or both engines to get you on the ground. Once you use the fire bottles in both engines then you have nothing.
 
AV8R_87 said:
In some aircraft, two actions are required to discharge a fire bottle: first you arm it, and then you pull the T-handle/flip the switch. Going to the ARM position of the fire bottle will shut off the fuel to that engine/APU, which will cause fuel starvation as soon as the fuel lines downstream of the valves empty, but not instantaneously.
Click to expand...

mandm said:
I am not typed but did full sim training in the 737 for a few days, we did a dual engine flameout. You lose everything, pressurization, hydraulics, and then avionics / electrical.
Click to expand...

The red handles are called fire switches. There is one for each engine and another for the APU. There are two fire agent bottles, each of which can be released to either engine. The APU has its own, separate, fire bottle.

The switches are latched and can not be pulled unless that engine, or APU, is detecting a fire. The latch can be overridden by pushing a release while pulling the switch. This is difficult to do with one hand and most will use two hands to do it.

When the switch is pulled, the generator field relay is tripped, and pneumatics, hydraulics, and fuel are shutoff prior to the engine. At that point, you haven't lost anything except the engine itself. The other engine's generator, or APU's generator, can power the aircraft as can the other engine's pneumatics. The associated hydraulic system (A for left engine, B for right) still has pressure for the associated electric hydraulic pump. All electrical busses are still powered and pressurization is maintained.

Pulling the fire switch also arms the fire agent bottles to discharge to that engine. To discharge the fire agent you twist and switch either left or right. One direction fires one bottle and the other direction fires the other. The procedure is to fire one then wait 30 seconds. If the fire indication does not stop then you fire the second bottle.

In the case of a loss of both engines, you lose the A/C busses and need to start the APU to recover them. That takes about 55 seconds in an NG. The main priority is to get an engine running. Engine start switches (both) to FLT, engine start levers (both) cutoff, when EGT decreases, engine start levers (both) idle. That process continues until an engine relites.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top