Dana
Final Approach
But only those who can see it and know what it signifies.it's an ingeniously simple practice that provides an excellent warning to those around the aircraft that it is potentially hazardous.
But only those who can see it and know what it signifies.it's an ingeniously simple practice that provides an excellent warning to those around the aircraft that it is potentially hazardous.
Congrats on your 10 year POA anniversary!I’ve not posted on here in a coons age
That’s our Young Eagle policy, too. Our vests tend to disappear during the year, so every December I usually order another dozen. We run 20-30 people on our ground team, of course 12-18 show up at any time. The advantage or disadvantage of running at 2 airports all year.Any pilots from the UK here? At GA fields there I have noticed everyone is required to wear hi-viz vests, to the point they are not even allowed to disembark until someone walks up to the plane and hands them out.
Agreed. Opening window/door and ‘clear prop’ takes focus from inside, to outside.“Clear Prop!” doing so did cause a … delay in my engaging the starter
worth the 28 yrs of doing it
I wish more CFI's would teach that "clear prop" isn't just something you say but also something you do.Agreed. Opening window/door and ‘clear prop’ takes focus from inside, to outside.
(both audibly and visually clear area prior to start)
I wish more CFI's would teach that "clear prop" isn't just something you say but also something you do.
That isn't my experience in the UKIn the UK, on a "towered" grass field, you had to request permission to start your engine
Oh yes, let's not "offend" anyone by saying who made a mistake in a simple "Cause and Effect" case. We can say it was an "accident" because "accident" means nobody is at fault, right??? Somebody did something which caused a death. We investigate who, when, what, where and why to find out exactly what went on. Somebody was walking around and not observing SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. That "somebody" was the final line of defense against something bad happening. That somebody wasn't paying attention. This fatal injury was not the fault of the aircraft or anything else other than somebody's lack of situational awareness. If that person had been observing awareness, this would not have happened. Sounds cold but people make mistakes all the time. Most of our mistakes don't have this type of horrendous end result. Anybody and everybody who has business on a ramp can and should learn from this.Assigning blame is not the same as understand causality. I absolutely support a disciplined inquiry to understanding the accident chain and putting in place measures that will prevent further similar tragedies.
Beginning that process with "who is to blame?" both limits your ability to successfully do that and it announces that you are looking for heads to put on a spike which encourages people to participate in as minimalist and as defensive a manner possible.
Its called a "CHECK LIST" for a reason..."CHECK AND OBSERVE THE ITEMS ON THE LIST"!kind of like the rest of the checklist... don't just blather the words, actually check for three green, etc etc etc
It is for the ones that you didn't think of, never saw, and absolutely came out of nowhere. It costs you nothing at all, so why not just do it?Well on my sonex I can see the whole prop. I need to lean a little bit but it’s doable. I generally start the engine very soon after entering the aircraft so unless someone comes running across the ramp and hides underneath my cowel as I’m climbing not the cockpit, yelling clear prop isn’t going to prevent any safety related issues.
If people really think it’s an issue then why have no manufacturers put warning sirens or alarms that go off outside the airplane right before you go to start it? That to me would be more useful than hoping someone hears you yell clear prop from inside the cockpit.
This.I do it even if it's 3am and the only other creatures around are jackrabbits. Just like I use my blinkers every single time. Because it's easier than worrying about whether or not someone's out there who might benefit. If there's no one to hear, then there's no harm yelling your fool head off. And if there is someone who can hear, then there's potentially someone who could benefit from being alerted, even if it's for no other benefit than becoming aware they're about to get blasted by propwash.
First thing on my universal checklist. “Rotating beacon on…”On my plane, I'd put on the rotating beacon before starting.
That "somebody" was the final line of defense against something bad happening. That somebody wasn't paying attention. This fatal injury was not the fault of the aircraft or anything else other than somebody's lack of situational awareness. If that person had been observing awareness, this would not have happened.
Sometimes there is a single cause for a mishap. The insistence that a "Swiss cheese" collection of contributing events to a mishap always occurs can be incorrect.That presumes there is always one single root cause. Unless a thorough incident investigation is done, we can’t say that the person that was killed was the only cause. What you suggest is correct as one preventative (corrective) measure, but it presumes things and draws conclusions. I get what you’re trying to say however.
Sometimes there is a single, isolated cause for a mishap that's just pure bad luck, but rarely. I've investigated a fair number of mishaps and the reality is that there are almost always multiple causal and contributory factors which lend themselves to using Reason's Swiss Cheese model as a way of helping the general pilot population to understand the incident.Sometimes there is a single cause for a mishap. The insistence that a "Swiss cheese" collection of contributing events to a mishap always occurs can be incorrect.
Sometimes there is a single cause for a mishap. The insistence that a "Swiss cheese" collection of contributing events to a mishap always occurs can be incorrect.
If a person walks into the propeller of an aircraft before the pilot can react (and pulling the mixture isn't an instantaneous remedy), then that's quite cut and dried. In this case, saying hot loading is a factor isn't accurate in my mind, because that's a reality of some jump operations, and the decedent was experienced in those operations.
She chose to be in close proximity to the airplane, and the most obvious factor appears to be inattention on her part. Is that harsh? Perhaps. But a convoluted explanation for the event may not be accurate. Bad things happen when people do inexplicable things around danger.
This has nothing to do with "offending" anyone. It's about getting to the right answer and making the rest of us safer.Oh yes, let's not "offend" anyone by saying who made a mistake in a simple "Cause and Effect" case. We can say it was an "accident" because "accident" means nobody is at fault, right??? Somebody did something which caused a death. We investigate who, when, what, where and why to find out exactly what went on. Somebody was walking around and not observing SITUATIONAL AWARENESS. That "somebody" was the final line of defense against something bad happening. That somebody wasn't paying attention. This fatal injury was not the fault of the aircraft or anything else other than somebody's lack of situational awareness. If that person had been observing awareness, this would not have happened. Sounds cold but people make mistakes all the time. Most of our mistakes don't have this type of horrendous end result. Anybody and everybody who has business on a ramp can and should learn from this.
Others here have qualified it, but I'm going to flat out say it: There is never just one cause.Sometimes there is a single cause for a mishap. The insistence that a "Swiss cheese" collection of contributing events to a mishap always occurs can be incorrect.
Not at all. Why was that person there? Why was the prop turning in the first place? Were any procedures in effect to attempt to protect against this type of accident? Were the people present properly trained in those procedures? Were they following the procedures? If they were following the procedure, what is missing from the procedure such that it didn't prevent the accident? If they weren't following the procedure, why not? Is there any recurrent training in the procedure, is it often enough, and did it happen?If a person walks into the propeller of an aircraft before the pilot can react (and pulling the mixture isn't an instantaneous remedy), then that's quite cut and dried.
The fact that it happens frequently, and even happens frequently without incident, doesn't mean it wasn't a factor. This is pretty much the basis of normalization of deviance. "We've hot loaded a thousand times without anyone getting hurt, so it's perfectly safe." Nope, not so.In this case, saying hot loading is a factor isn't accurate in my mind, because that's a reality of some jump operations, and the decedent was experienced in those operations.
And just to be clear, “we’ve hot loaded a thousand times without anyone getting hurt” is a data point. Using that data point doesn’t make it normalization of deviance. Using ONLY that data point to determine that “it’s perfectly safe” is normalization of deviance. Where the actual crossing of a line occurs where not having and/or using proper procedures makes it a normalization of deviance is a little harder to pin down.The fact that it happens frequently, and even happens frequently without incident, doesn't mean it wasn't a factor. This is pretty much the basis of normalization of deviance. "We've hot loaded a thousand times without anyone getting hurt, so it's perfectly safe." Nope, not so.
Exactly.And just to be clear, “we’ve hot loaded a thousand times without anyone getting hurt” is a data point. Using that data point doesn’t make it normalization of deviance. Using ONLY that data point to determine that “it’s perfectly safe” is normalization of deviance.
Probably at the point where someone justifies not having procedures because nothing has happened yet. The part that's harder to pin down is, what if nobody ever suggests that there should be a procedure in place to mitigate the added risk of hot loading? "We've always done it that way" can be a real killer.Where the actual crossing of a line occurs where not having and/or using proper procedures makes it a normalization of deviance is a little harder to pin down.
Deviance from what? If it's their normal operating procedure, they aren't deviating from anything.This has nothing to do with "offending" anyone. It's about getting to the right answer and making the rest of us safer.
Others here have qualified it, but I'm going to flat out say it: There is never just one cause.
Not at all. Why was that person there? Why was the prop turning in the first place? Were any procedures in effect to attempt to protect against this type of accident? Were the people present properly trained in those procedures? Were they following the procedures? If they were following the procedure, what is missing from the procedure such that it didn't prevent the accident? If they weren't following the procedure, why not? Is there any recurrent training in the procedure, is it often enough, and did it happen?
The fact that it happens frequently, and even happens frequently without incident, doesn't mean it wasn't a factor. This is pretty much the basis of normalization of deviance. "We've hot loaded a thousand times without anyone getting hurt, so it's perfectly safe." Nope, not so.
Reminds me of the joke about the mathematician, the engineer, and the beautiful woman.@flyingcheesehead makes the point better than I could. Procedure #1 can reduce the chance of someone having a bad day. Procedure #2 can reduce the already reduced chance. It’s like always going halfway to your destination, mathematically you’ll never get there. And eventually the procedures reach a point where it’s “good enough”, but it’s never zero.
Hey, I didn't name it.Deviance from what? If it's their normal operating procedure, they aren't deviating from anything.
Similar experience here regarding investigations, but one time I saw a material failure one might consider a gray area exception. The doomed crew was doing everything right. It's just the part was not built properly by the OEM and failed inflight. More like one exceptionally weak link in the chain of events.I’ve led and been involved in numerous major incident investigations and have never had a case where there was only one root cause. My mileage may vary…
Right....including FIRST AND FOREMOST anybody walking on the ramp!There is no doubt that this was a horrible and tragic thing that happened. From the article: "37-year-old Amanda Gallagher was taking photos at the Air Capital Drop Zone of people getting on and off of planes when she backed into an active airplane propeller."
It appears they may have been hot loading skydivers when this occurred. If so, there seems to be some responsibility to be had by the ramp safety crew and/or the pilot making a decision to load/unload people with the props turning. Regardless of who is to blame it won't change the outcome. But it is also clear that lessons should be learned from an event like this with such a great cost i.e. the loss of a life.