Very bad news...

And now I'm saddened by this, too. I'm very sorry, Lance. :(
 
Sorry to hear this Lance. I have known far too many people that have died in airplanes, two in the past year. It never gets any easier. Hopefully the rest of us can learn some lessons and avoid this type of tragedy.

my condolences to you and his family.
 
Lance,

Very sorry for your loss, Mary and I will keep you and his family in our thoughts and prayers.
 
I'm really sorry to hear it, Lance - I just went through the same thing and it sucks out loud. :(
 
Lance, I'm soooo sorry. :( It's really hard to put into perspective, especially when it's someone we know and someone we've flown with and/or mentored. Sometimes words aren't enough.......
 
Sorry Lance. That is just awful.
 
It doesn't change the sad result, but I can add a little information to the thread:

I was at MIC until just after 10. Maybe 3 or 4 minutes before the accident. WX was as reported, which doesn't look too bad until you think about how long he'd been flying, all the city and airport lights glistening against the wet ground, and his wet windshield. FlightAware shows him as "arrived" almost 20 minutes before the accident so I'm wondering if he canceled IFR on the way in. Unless he had requested an approach he almost certainly would have been cleared for a visual.

He had talked to the tower and reported 3 miles and the field in sight; they told him they were closing. I didn't hear an exact time for this.

Some CAP pilot friends were outside the CAP building (maybe 1000' feet away, see airport diagram) at the time of the accident and reported hearing an engine "spool up" (the unusual phrase is from an email) and then the impact. The airplane was upside down and almost immediately on fire. Someone in that group called 911, then they ran with some of the tower people but could do nothing.

From a couple of sight lines yesterday, looking at the investigation vehicles, it appears that the impact was just south of taxiway Alpha and a little bit to the east of 14L, which is the lighted runway of the two parallels. This is a little less than halfway down the 3300' runway.

It rained for much of the day but had let up by 10. Things were pretty wet, but I'd be surprised if aquaplaning was a problem. I'm sure the ground was soft enough that they will be able to tell whether he was airborne (i.e. departure stall) or on the ground before the airplane flipped.
 
Looking at flight aware he had flown about four hours the day before the accident and seven hours (with a couple of fairly short breaks) the day of. That would be a long day...even with an autopilot.

Stay safe everybody.
 
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scottd said:
Sorry to hear about this tragic accident. I don't know Steve, but I've had the privilege to help a lot of pilots like Steve improve their skills in weather. I agree with Bruce, there are usually two issues with the pilots that come to me for help. (1) They got very little *practical* training. (2) They've forgotten most of what they were taught.
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Ironically, during a phone conversation last Friday when Steve was questioning his lack of weather knowledge I had directed him to your website. But given the reported weather at the time of the crash and the fact that he actually made it to the airport (there's currently some question as to whether he first touched down beside the runway or (more likely) lost control on the touchdown and veered off the runway. All I know for certain is that the wreckage was alongside the runway he was flying a GPS approach to.

The other thing that I believe is missing is having a mentor, especially when it comes to weather. It doesn't matter if you have 100 hours or 5,000 hours. Having someone else to go through the details on a tough cross country flight is a great way to be complete and thorough and to be sure you have not overlooked an important detail. I am mentoring about 20 pilots right now - they are learning to make good decisions.
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For the most part, that was me.:sad:
 
airdale said:
It doesn't change the sad result, but I can add a little information to the thread:

I was at MIC until just after 10. Maybe 3 or 4 minutes before the accident. WX was as reported, which doesn't look too bad until you think about how long he'd been flying, all the city and airport lights glistening against the wet ground, and his wet windshield. FlightAware shows him as "arrived" almost 20 minutes before the accident so I'm wondering if he canceled IFR on the way in. Unless he had requested an approach he almost certainly would have been cleared for a visual.

He had talked to the tower and reported 3 miles and the field in sight; they told him they were closing. I didn't hear an exact time for this.

Some CAP pilot friends were outside the CAP building (maybe 1000' feet away, see airport diagram) at the time of the accident and reported hearing an engine "spool up" (the unusual phrase is from an email) and then the impact. The airplane was upside down and almost immediately on fire. Someone in that group called 911, then they ran with some of the tower people but could do nothing.

From a couple of sight lines yesterday, looking at the investigation vehicles, it appears that the impact was just south of taxiway Alpha and a little bit to the east of 14L, which is the lighted runway of the two parallels. This is a little less than halfway down the 3300' runway.

It rained for much of the day but had let up by 10. Things were pretty wet, but I'd be surprised if aquaplaning was a problem. I'm sure the ground was soft enough that they will be able to tell whether he was airborne (i.e. departure stall) or on the ground before the airplane flipped.
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Knowing Steve as I do, I'd say there's an awfully good chance that he was flying the RNAV 14 approach and the FlightAware track seems to confirm that (no reason to fly a 5 mile final in the opposite direction of your arrival route for a visual).

Another airport tenant and friend reported (2nd hand) that it sounded/looked like he touched down hard on the runway then lost control. IIRC this is about what happened recently at KFBL in another Cirrus accident that killed 4. From what I've read, most runway loss of control accidents don't result in serious injuries, let alone fatalities.

I've also wondered if there's any chance the rocket motor on the chute ignited and/or exploded during the crash, any insight on that?
 
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gismo said:
For the most part, that was me.:sad:
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I, for one, felt I learned a tremendous amount just from an hour around you last weekend. Don't feel you shorted him any in your mentoring, Lance, I'm certain nothing could be further from the truth.
 
Aw, ****.

Lance, really sorry to hear this.

Bruce is right - at that dew point spread things can change quickly. Living in Texas and flying the Gulf Coast taught me a real lesson about flying in close spreads.

I really learned the lesson shortly after moving to San Antonio. Went out one evening for practice - close spread. Things looked clear. Shot the ILS into HYI, and found myself in a fog bank at 400'. Didn't break out at mins. Climbed up, and I could see the ground lights.

I hightailed it back to Stinson, canceled IFR, and took the visual. I was on final and the tower said that the field was IFR. I indicated that I was able to see the runway lights just fine, and asked for a special. Granted, and at 50' I was in a cloud bank at approach speeds. I broke out at touchdown. By the time I got the plane in the hangar, the I couldn't see 100' in front of me for the drive home. (Had I refiled, I would have had to go to an alternate).

But note that I could see the runway lights on approach when looking down. FLight vis vs ground vis.

I have reflected on that lesson for a long, long time afterward.

Given that, I've also learned that looking straight upward is much different than horizontal on approach.

We'll never know for sure what happened, and airdale's comments are noted. I'm just making a comment about weather conditions.

Again, Lance, very sorry for the loss.
 
Ted DuPuis said:
I, for one, felt I learned a tremendous amount just from an hour around you last weekend. Don't feel you shorted him any in your mentoring, Lance, I'm certain nothing could be further from the truth.
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Thanks Ted. It's just that nagging feeling that I could easily have done more for Steve and maybe that would have made a difference. I know it's spilled milk but the feeling is hard to shake.
 
gismo said:
Thanks Ted. It's just that nagging feeling that I could easily have done more for Steve and maybe that would have made a difference. I know it's spilled milk but the feeling is hard to shake.
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You did do a lot for Steve. I know that I have learned a lot from you over the years. In fact, when I see your name I always read the post, most people I just skip reading. Accidents will always happen, and there is no one that can make them impossible with their teachings.

I have been thinking this through a lot the last few days--trying to figure out what went wrong. Obviously the approach was likely a success.

I don't know much about the Cirrus systems. Does the autopilot run the trim at all? I keep thinking about how easy it would be to disconnect an auto-pilot with your hand off that side-stick and how bad that could be with an out-of-trim airplane down low.

It is also very possible that there may have been a visual illusion that caused him to make a very bad control input. I know I've seen illusions landing at night before that have damn near made my heart stop before my brain finally processed what I was actually seeing. Any idea on his night experience? Crystal isn't the best night airport.

I really wish we knew what the vertical speed and deck angle was on impact. Does the system log any of this? If so I wonder if it survived (probably doesn't and wouldn't have survived if it did).
 
Do not even begin to second-guess yourself, Lance. As one who I know (from the two times we have met) is passionate about aviation and av. safety, I know you did all you could as a mentor to Steve.

My deepest condolences, to both you and your family.

Jim
 
I've also wondered if there's any chance the rocket motor on the chute ignited and/or exploded during the crash, any insight on that?
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I don't recall anyone saying. I'll ask next time I see them.

Re the flight visibility speculation, it did not seem to be that kind of WX to me. And while it may still have been raining a little bit, the on-the-airport rain was not enough to make vision through the windshield anything more than smeared. Not streams of water anyway.
 
gismo said:
Thanks Ted. It's just that nagging feeling that I could easily have done more for Steve and maybe that would have made a difference. I know it's spilled milk but the feeling is hard to shake.
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I understand. In the past few years, two of my friends have met untimely deaths, and both times that feeling nagged me for months, and I think about both of them every day. I hope that you can find peace for yourself soon.

Whatever you do, please don't stop mentoring. I, for one, have much left to learn.
 
gismo said:
Another airport tenant and friend reported (2nd hand) that it sounded/looked like he touched down hard on the runway then lost control. IIRC this is about what happened recently at KFBL in another Cirrus accident that killed 4. From what I've read, most runway loss of control accidents don't result in serious injuries, let alone fatalities.
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Blown tire + slippery runway + castering nose wheel = loss of control ...... maybe? Just a guess not based on any evidence. But if it caught him off guard perhaps, just perhaps, the ensueing result is what occured.

This is a compelte SWAG.
 
jesse said:
I don't know much about the Cirrus systems. Does the autopilot run the trim at all? I keep thinking about how easy it would be to disconnect an auto-pilot with your hand off that side-stick and how bad that could be with an out-of-trim airplane down low.
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The autopilot always attempts to keep the plane in trim both in roll and in pitch. If the pilot applies force to the sidestick while the autopilot is flying the airplane the result would be an out of trim situation, the trim error being dependent on the amount of pilot force and it's duration. I'm pretty certain that Steve was well aware of this issue though.

It is also very possible that there may have been a visual illusion that caused him to make a very bad control input. I know I've seen illusions landing at night before that have damn near made my heart stop before my brain finally processed what I was actually seeing. Any idea on his night experience? Crystal isn't the best night airport.
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I don't know about his recent night experience but I do know he did a fair amount of his IR training in the dark. Given that Crystal was his home base I suspect he'd be relatively immune to any illusions there.

[/quote]I really wish we knew what the vertical speed and deck angle was on impact. Does the system log any of this? If so I wonder if it survived (probably doesn't and wouldn't have survived if it did).[/quote]

AFaIK his Avidyne PFD and Garmin GPSs didn't record any of this.
 
gismo said:
AFaIK his Avidyne PFD and Garmin GPSs didn't record any of this.
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I've been reading through NTSB reports for Cirrus fatalities...I did see this (from a completely unrelated SR-22 report):
Data extracted from the onboard global positioning system revealed that the airplane's last altitude was 838 feet; vertical speed was down -444 feet per minute, indicated airspeed was 60.3 knots, with a pitch attitude of up 4.98 degrees and a left roll of -31.73 degrees. These parameters indicate the airplane had or was about to enter the early phase of an aerodynamic stall.
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Perhaps this was from a different or newer system though.
 
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jesse said:
I've been reading through NTSB reports for Cirrus fatalities...I did see this (from a completely unrelated SR-22 report): Perhaps this was from a different or newer system though.
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Or a 296/396. I can't say for certain that the Avidyne PFD/MFD doesn't record but I don't think it does.
 
gismo said:
Or a 296/396. I can't say for certain that the Avidyne PFD/MFD doesn't record but I don't think it does.
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An x96 wouldn't record exact pitch and roll angles like that, though. I'm not sure, but I think it might record some data for a limited amount of time. :dunno:
 
gismo said:
I've also wondered if there's any chance the rocket motor on the chute ignited and/or exploded during the crash, any insight on that?
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There is a good chance of this. The rocket is triggered by a cable from the handle in the roof of the cabin between the seats, all mechanical. Deformation of the airframe can stretch the cable enough to light off the rocket. It has been seen before, but fortunately in those cases the plane was right side up.


gismo said:
Or a 296/396. I can't say for certain that the Avidyne PFD/MFD doesn't record but I don't think it does.
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The Emax MFD records the last 100 hrs of flight. What exactly is recorded depends on the vintage. Later ones include altitude. On mine I don't get altitude, but things like RPM, MP, OAT, EGT, CHT, buss voltages, amperage, Oil temp and Pressure, GPS derived lat/lon. These are downloaded from a USB port.

The PFD has a much smaller memory that records all the AHRS, and ADC data I'm not sure how much. This takes sending flash cards to Avidyne to read.

I just checked the COPA site and his 2004 G2 is a bit older than mine so altitude was not in the MFD logs.

Sorry to hear about this Lance.

Joe
 
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I didn't know Steve, but I talked to a guy today that said he talked to an eye witness of the Cirrus accident.

The account that he heard was the plane came in too high or too hot, landed about midfield, was on the mains, the pilot evendently did not like where he was in relation to his speed and position on the runway and hit the throttle to do a go around (this accounts for the engine spool up posted earlier) The trim was set heavy for decent (this was an assumption) and the plane pitched up and stalled.

I'm just repeating what was told to me.

Lance, I am sorry you have to deal with this.
 
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I was at MIC this noon with a CFII friend in the right seat of a 182. I asked him to look out his window on a right downwind to 32R to see if there were any tire tracks between the runway and the accident point. He said that he couldn't see any.
 
Been offline past couple of days so just now reading this.

Just know I'm sorry to hear of your loss, Lance.

I've been having "survivor's guilt", too, following the recent tragedy at my home airport. Had been talking to both victims just a few hours before. Keep thinking if I had been there instead of 200 miles away I might have been able to say something that would have changed the outcome. It just doesn't work that way. It just makes it harder knowing you shared a strong passion for a common interest and now the opportunity for that sharing has been diminished.
 
Lance, though we have not met, I have a great deal of respect for your wisdom and guidance through your postings. Losing someone is especially difficult and having it occur is an airplane makes it even tougher.

My thoughts and prayers are with you and the family.

Andy
 
I've pieced together a hypothesis from what I learned from a couple credible eyewitnesses, the weather, radar track, etc.

These are what I currently believe to be true:

The RNAV(GPS) 14 approach was being flown.

Steve had flown almost 7 hours the day of the accident.

The ground track etc from FlightAware indicate that the approach itself was flown well.

The groundspeed on the approach appears to be reasonable although the very last entry in the track log showed a 15-20 kt increase at the MDA.

It was raining "pretty hard" at the time of the landing but the visibility was at least a couple miles.

There was a lot of standing water on the runway.

The airplane impacted the ground beside the runway a couple hundred feet from the runway.

The plane came to rest upside down and probably impacted inverted and nose down.

At least two pilots at the airport heard the engine go to full power just prior to the crash.

It appears to me that Steve touched down on the runway then attempted a go-around for some reason. Possible reasons could be hydroplaning, too high a speed, a bounce, or something like that. At this point I suspect that the application of full power resulted in excessive nose up pitch and rapidly decreasing airspeed coupled with a total loss of any visual references and that may have lead to a stall or other loss of control.

I'm certain that Steve had practiced low altitude go-arounds but probably not at night and certainly not at night in heavy rain. From my own personal experience I would expect that at 10 pm after flying most of the day any pilot's reactions would be slower than normal. In addition I know it's not unusual for me to begin relaxing a bit once the wheels are on the ground, especially after a long day and an approach in IMC.

Have any of you had occasion to abort a landing under similar conditions? I don't think I ever have done a go-around from the runway at night. I have made several night takeoffs into IMC or even just under a mid level overcast sky and have been surprised at how quickly any useable horizon disappears when the nose comes up. Steve's plane had the Avidyne PFD which is normally pretty easy to interpret WRT the horizon but I suppose there's even a possibility that a hard touchdown disabled that (or worse yet caused erroneous indications).
 
gismo said:
Have any of you had occasion to abort a landing under similar conditions? I don't think I ever have done a go-around from the runway at night. I have made several night takeoffs into IMC or even just under a mid level overcast sky and have been surprised at how quickly any useable horizon disappears when the nose comes up. Steve's plane had the Avidyne PFD which is normally pretty easy to interpret WRT the horizon but I suppose there's even a possibility that a hard touchdown disabled that (or worse yet caused erroneous indications).
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I have done go around from runways at night, but never night and MVFR nor IMC. I wonder if that could have been a mitigating factor in your scenario. I have done one real missed approach but it was day and hard IMC.
 
I have done night go-arounds for various reasons, but ceilings were pretty high and visibility was always good in those conditions. I've never done them in night/heavy rain/low ceiling conditions as stated. Also, I've never flown a Cirrus so I don't know what the control inputs are like. I could see something like that being problematic in the Mooney I fly, as when you're on final you have the thing trimmed pretty well nose up and the elevator input forces required are pretty heavy. A go-around makes the plane tend to nose up, and you have to push hard on the yoke with one hand while trying to get the trim down, gear up, and flaps up. Obviously the gear is not an issue on a Cirrus, but if reactions are slow and you're tired (i.e. strength and precision may not be at their best), it could be bad.

I could see that combination after a long, hard day of flying potentially leading to what happened. I know that on my approach into Williamsport last Sunday at 1:15 AM (after waking up in Oklahoma and having flown about 1500 nm) when I saw the runway lights there was a certain feeling of relaxation and "Whew, almost done." Probably not the best feeling to have when you've been up for 18 hours and flown for a good portion of those... at least until you're parked on the ground with the engine(s) shut off.
 
smigaldi said:
I have done go around from runways at night, but never night and MVFR nor IMC. I wonder if that could have been a mitigating factor in your scenario. I have done one real missed approach but it was day and hard IMC.
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I've done several "real missed approaches" but IMO that's nothing at all like a go around from the runway, something I've never done except daytime VMC. I'm wondering if this might be a weak spot in my training/experience or if I should just avoid it at all costs. Another friend of mine and Steve's who is an inactive pilot speculated that had Steve remained on the ground and just did the best he could to salvage the initial landing he probably wouldn't have even been injured although the plane might easily have been damaged. OTOH if it was a big bounce that precipitated the abort, that choice might not have been available. I'm not thinking so much of what could have been different, just musing on what I would/shoud do if I ever got into a similar situation.
 
gismo said:
I've done several "real missed approaches" but IMO that's nothing at all like a go around from the runway, something I've never done except daytime VMC. I'm wondering if this might be a weak spot in my training/experience or if I should just avoid it at all costs. Another friend of mine and Steve's who is an inactive pilot speculated that had Steve remained on the ground and just did the best he could to salvage the initial landing he probably wouldn't have even been injured although the plane might easily have been damaged. OTOH if it was a big bounce that precipitated the abort, that choice might not have been available. I'm not thinking so much of what could have been different, just musing on what I would/shoud do if I ever got into a similar situation.
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You are right, go arounds form the runway are a lot different. I am wondering if in that scenario one could have pulled flaps too soon, something I did once on a practice go around a few years back and I still remember the feeling of 'oh SH!@" as I sank back towards the runway. The reaction was to pull back further on the stick and that of course could have induced a stall and a real mess. Luckily I was able to salvage the go around.

A recent crash at 10C shows what can happen when you don't. Luckily everyone walked away but the airplane was a total loss. http://www.pilotsofamerica.com/forum/showthread.php?t=23517&
 
Ted DuPuis said:
Also, I've never flown a Cirrus so I don't know what the control inputs are like. I could see something like that being problematic in the Mooney I fly, as when you're on final you have the thing trimmed pretty well nose up and the elevator input forces required are pretty heavy. A go-around makes the plane tend to nose up, and you have to push hard on the yoke with one hand while trying to get the trim down, gear up, and flaps up.
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I only have a little time in Cirri, but it's my understanding that the pitch up forces are high if you apply full power in the flare. I was also told that (as expected) the climb is anemic with full flaps and that you're supposed to move the flaps up a notch right away which could be a significant distraction and/or require a third hand. The Cirrus does have electric trim on the sidestick but it's not real fast (I thought that Cirrus should make it work slow at first with increasing speed if the button is held but it doesn't work that way). Joe Areeda could probably add more qualified input on all this.
 
gismo said:
I'm not thinking so much of what could have been different, just musing on what I would/shoud do if I ever got into a similar situation.
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"Commitment to land" applies not only to OEI ops, but to all Engine ops. If it's not right, reject the landing early, even it requires a trip out to the IAF.
 
gismo said:
I only have a little time in Cirri, but it's my understanding that the pitch up forces are high if you apply full power in the flare. I was also told that (as expected) the climb is anemic with full flaps and that you're supposed to move the flaps up a notch right away which could be a significant distraction and/or require a third hand. The Cirrus does have electric trim on the sidestick but it's not real fast (I thought that Cirrus should make it work slow at first with increasing speed if the button is held but it doesn't work that way). Joe Areeda could probably add more qualified input on all this.
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I'm heading out for a currency flight with a partner in the Cirrus now and will examine a few of these things at altitude first.

I've done plenty of go arounds from low altitudes but none from slow on the runway.

Climb in a 22 with full flaps is not bad, I'll report on the rate later today. Trim is actually very quick as shipped in the 2004 22s. We typically beep it to get any precision. It was slowed down in later models.

My question (and I hate speculating) is how strong a torque roll tendancy is possible with a sudden application of full power and a sudden pitch up in ground effect.

Joe
 
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