Dave Siciliano
Final Approach
I've been reading trough Shelby Foote's three volume narrative on the Civil War and am completely engrossed in it. He has a wonderful perspective that is in marked contrast to other works I've read on the subject. He goes into depth on how Lincoln and Davis interacted with their generals; describes the setback and how some things went one way or another on the battle field for completely unexpected reasons.
I'd love to point out some passages. I'll have to look back to cite them. Wonderful perspective on how each leader dealt with very challenging political situations; examples of how Lincoln effectuated some situations in a manner that made it look like the free will of the other party were excellent.
A recent passage that really made an impression was when one Southern commander appealed to another for a diversion (Pemberton to Bragg). Bragg responded: ..by sending Forrest instructions to "throw his command rapidly over the Tennessee River and precipitate it upon the enemy's lines, break up rail roads, burn bridges, destroy depots, capture hospitals and guards, and harass him generally". (Volume two; page 65-66).
Ahhhh, the good old days!! Military orders I would have loved to have received back when I was on active duty.
And, Nathan Bedford Forrest performed them exquisitely from the Southern perspective at the expense of Grant<g>
One impression I have gained is how completely out matched the South was from the men and material perspective. At almost every turn, Union Armies were well manned, supplied and armed. Lincoln at one turn called for 300,000 volunteers. Lee only had 70,000 protecting Richmond.
In most matches, up to 1863 (which is where I am in the books), Union troops outnumber Southern forces by two to one or more. Union forces had supply trains bringing good quantities of weapons, ammunition, food and other supplies. The South was in a much less fortunate position. An advantage the South did have was it's internal RR system which could shuttle troops a supplies quickly from one point to another. As their defensive area got smaller, their RR system could respond faster (up to this point in the war).
Best,
Dave
I'd love to point out some passages. I'll have to look back to cite them. Wonderful perspective on how each leader dealt with very challenging political situations; examples of how Lincoln effectuated some situations in a manner that made it look like the free will of the other party were excellent.
A recent passage that really made an impression was when one Southern commander appealed to another for a diversion (Pemberton to Bragg). Bragg responded: ..by sending Forrest instructions to "throw his command rapidly over the Tennessee River and precipitate it upon the enemy's lines, break up rail roads, burn bridges, destroy depots, capture hospitals and guards, and harass him generally". (Volume two; page 65-66).
Ahhhh, the good old days!! Military orders I would have loved to have received back when I was on active duty.
And, Nathan Bedford Forrest performed them exquisitely from the Southern perspective at the expense of Grant<g>
One impression I have gained is how completely out matched the South was from the men and material perspective. At almost every turn, Union Armies were well manned, supplied and armed. Lincoln at one turn called for 300,000 volunteers. Lee only had 70,000 protecting Richmond.
In most matches, up to 1863 (which is where I am in the books), Union troops outnumber Southern forces by two to one or more. Union forces had supply trains bringing good quantities of weapons, ammunition, food and other supplies. The South was in a much less fortunate position. An advantage the South did have was it's internal RR system which could shuttle troops a supplies quickly from one point to another. As their defensive area got smaller, their RR system could respond faster (up to this point in the war).
Best,
Dave