The Civil War (no offense meant)

[Dave Siciliano]

Banks writes Halleck (Union General) that he is afraid his men won't attack. Many signed up for nine months service and are near the end of their commitment.

Halleck replies: When a column of attack is formed of doubtful troops the proper mode of curing their defection is to place artillery in their rear, loaded with grape and canister, in the hands of reliable men, with orders to fire at the first moment of disaffection. A knowledge of such orders will probably prevent any wavering, and, if not, one such punishment will prevent any repetition of it in your army.

Best,

Dave

 

[Capt. Geoffrey Thorpe]

Banks writes Halleck (Union General) that he is afraid his men won't attack. Many signed up for nine months service and are near the end of their commitment.

Halleck replies: When a column of attack if formed of doubtful troops the proper mode of curing their defection is to place artillery in their rear, loaded with grape and canister, in the hands of reliable men, with orders to fire at the first moment of disaffection. A knowledge of such orders will probably prevent any wavering, and, if not, one such punishment will prevent any repetition of it in your army.

Best,

Dave

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decimation_(Roman_army)

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

Hmmm.....

I think there's lots of "common knowledge" anachronistic criticism of 19th C tactics, to wit: "They just stood in lines and shot at each other!" without considering the alternatives.

In large scale combat, one side gained the field by pressuring the other side to retire. This was a result of mass, not precision accuracy.

The myth of the American rifleman taking out entire British lines is -- a myth. In open combat those "stupid" lines rolled over American superior accuracy over and over.

The Boer war did portend many 20th C "improvements" to tactics -- concentration camps, targeted strikes, mobile units, and civilian control, for starters.

But the Civil War had its share of innovations.

Tacticians have to be conservative -- they can look back on engagements and prove "This works!" The innovation hasn't been tested yet and is therefore risky.

Rommel was Germany's foremost tactician. yet in Attacks! he wrote that the soldier's best weapon is the shovel. This from the ace of fluid, mobile land warfare.

No doubt about any of that whatsoever - what you've written is completely accurate.

Yet, and I might be completely missing your point, are you suggesting that it was acceptable to fight the First World War, under any standard that we might apply, in the way that it was fought right up until the last German offensive?

I'm not criticizing 19th century tactics, as they were used in the 19th century. While I'm not sure that we can say there were always clear winners, there were always clear losers. Yet, the writing was on the wall even fairly early in the war. What happened in the Civil War, though in many instances was utter insanity, is far different from what happened in the First World War.

It's one thing for one massed formation to charge an opposing massed formation - dug in or not - when both sides' weapons are kind-of-accurate, at best, at ~150 yards, and they've only got one shot.

It's another thing to pull a Pickett's Charge in the face of an enemy that has rifles that pretty-stinking-accurate, in the hands of an average shot, to ~400 yards. Not to mention the great advances in artillery that were made. Now, was that known in the Civil War? No, at least not at the beginning; and both sides had some varying degrees of success despite the seemingly small changes in technology, thus reinforcing the methods used. But they eventually learned. Some more quickly than others.

Look at how the Civil War ended up. Petersburg. A battle of attrition, because even though outnumbered, the defense had the clear advantage with the technology of the day. Until the supply lines were cut, at least.

So, my criticism isn't really directed at the Civil War. They worked with what they knew. Which, in turn, led to new developments.

My criticism is directed at the fools - and there is no other description for it - who didn't learn from what happened in the Civil War and elsewhere.

In my eyes, and this is of course only my opinion, that failure was inexcusable.

 

[RyanShort1]

In regards to the comment about Pickett's Charge above, there's an interesting book out called Lee's Lost Triumph that puts out the only theory on the charge that makes sense to me so far. Well, that and the information in R. E. Lee by Douglas Southall Freeman.

Ryan

 

[Noah Werka]

Somebody posted a U Tube link about the Civil War with The Ballad of the Green Berets as background music. Lost it. Anyone have that link?

Thanks,
Noah Werka

 

[RMCN172RG]

It's one thing for one massed formation to charge an opposing massed formation - dug in or not - when both sides' weapons are kind-of-accurate, at best, at ~150 yards, and they've only got one shot.

It's another thing to pull a Pickett's Charge in the face of an enemy that has rifles that pretty-stinking-accurate, in the hands of an average shot, to ~400 yards. Not to mention the great advances in artillery that were made. Now, was that known in the Civil War? No, at least not at the beginning; and both sides had some varying degrees of success despite the seemingly small changes in technology, thus reinforcing the methods used. But they eventually learned. Some more quickly than others.

At Picketts charge they were still using rifled muskets and balls and muskets as the primary rifle. Range from 150 to 400 yards. Capable of firing up to three times per minute. With a wall of targets accuracy probably wasn't a concern.

The Gap is 3/4 of mile with the last 1/4 to 1/8 of a mile coming under enemy rifle fire. Assuming a normal walking speed and maximum reloading speed the enemy can effectively fire eight to ten times in that last quarter mile. At a trot which the attack has historically been depicted as that number would be halved.

The plan called for Artillery to soften the Union line and silence it's artillery for a Dawn attack combined with a Flanking Cavalry attack to further draw off the resistance.

The artillery didn't do its job and Pickett did not receive the message to have his troops ready to go at Dawn. Highlighting the true major problem for both sides during the Civil War which was communication and coordination.

 

[Dave Siciliano]

Ray: have you read the studies of how many rounds fired in battle were effectively aimed at the enemy? One civil war studies showed results of one in ten. They found rifles that had been reloaded many times, but not fired. Many just pointed and discharged the weapon; never aimed.
Don't get me wrong; some troops were much better than others, but many didn't effectively aim fire.
The Union artillery seemed to out-gun Confederate guns in most major battles. They seemed to have better artillery, more of it and more ammunition.

Best,

Dave

 

[ScottM]

Ray: have you read the studies of how many rounds fired in battle were effectively aimed at the enemy? One civil war studies showed results of one in ten. They found rifles that had been reloaded many times, but not fired. Many just pointed and discharged the weapon; never aimed.
Don't get me wrong; some troops were much better than others, but many didn't effectively aim fire.
The Union artillery seemed to out-gun Confederate guns in most major battles. They seemed to have better artillery, more of it and more ammunition.

Best,

Dave

They also found guns with several round packed into the. The soldiers just kept reloading and not firing.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

Ray: have you read the studies of how many rounds fired in battle were effectively aimed at the enemy? One civil war studies showed results of one in ten. They found rifles that had been reloaded many times, but not fired. Many just pointed and discharged the weapon; never aimed.
Don't get me wrong; some troops were much better than others, but many didn't effectively aim fire.
The Union artillery seemed to out-gun Confederate guns in most major battles. They seemed to have better artillery, more of it and more ammunition.

Best,

Dave

There's a similar study from the Second World War, I think chaired by AJP Taylor. It found similar results - I want to say it found that ~75% of all of the rounds fired by Allied troops weren't aimed.

How you determine something like that, I don't know.

Be it 10% or 25%, or even 50%, that were well-aimed...it makes you wonder what the casualties would have been had the aiming been higher. They were horrendous as it was.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

They also found guns with several round packed into the. The soldiers just kept reloading and not firing.

Who knows the reason, but I think it would be a fairly easy to thing to do to forget to put a new cap on and then not notice that the rifle didn't fire.

 

[dmccormack]

There's a similar study from the Second World War, I think chaired by AJP Taylor. It found similar results - I want to say it found that ~75% of all of the rounds fired by Allied troops weren't aimed.

How you determine something like that, I don't know.

Be it 10% or 25%, or even 50%, that were well-aimed...it makes you wonder what the casualties would have been had the aiming been higher. They were horrendous as it was.

I think you're referring to S.L.A. Marshall's book, Men Against Fire, in which he reveals less than 25% of US infantrymen ever fired a shot in anger.

His premise has been challenged, but a more recent book by Dave Grossman addresses this problem in On Killing.

Both are required reads for those trying to understand infantry behavior in the 19th and 20th centuries.

 

[dmccormack]

My criticism is directed at the fools - and there is no other description for it - who didn't learn from what happened in the Civil War and elsewhere.

In my eyes, and this is of course only my opinion, that failure was inexcusable.

WW1 ended in stalemate because the tactics, equipment, training, and numbers were about even.

Prior to WW2, the Germans learned and formed the Blitzkrieg doctrine in response. The French had superior armor, but the German tanks had radios and could react and take the initiative. The French sprinkled armor into infantry units and were limited to a man's walking pace.

While it's fun to claim the french hate to fight, surrender at the first sign of provocation, etc, the reality is that in June 1940 the French army was destroyed not by lack of will, but by a leap forward in tactics. The British, Russians, and Americans all had time to learn and adapt after France fell.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

I think you're referring to S.L.A. Marshall's book, Men Against Fire, in which he reveals less than 25% of US infantrymen ever fired a shot in anger.

His premise has been challenged, but a more recent book by Dave Grossman addresses this problem in On Killing.

Both are required reads for those trying to understand infantry behavior in the 19th and 20th centuries.

That's exactly it. It's what happens when you go by your first three initials, I guess.

I could kick myself for not remembering, though.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

WW1 ended in stalemate because the tactics, equipment, training, and numbers were about even.

Prior to WW2, the Germans learned and formed the Blitzkrieg doctrine in response. The French had superior armor, but the German tanks had radios and could react and take the initiative. The French sprinkled armor into infantry units and were limited to a man's walking pace.

Again, right on. Which is good to remember because it isn't always logistics that is the controlling issue - if it's a short fight, logistics might be irrelevant. Which is, of course, what the Japanese gambled on....

While it's fun to claim the french hate to fight, surrender at the first sign of provocation, etc, the reality is that in June 1940 the French army was destroyed not by lack of will, but by a leap forward in tactics. The British, Russians, and Americans all had time to learn and adapt after France fell.

In this regard, something else to remember is that when Poland was invaded, it wasn't us that stood up for the little guy. While I like to make fun of the French as much as anyone, it's worth remembering that they (along with a few other nations) were doing the dying in 1939/40, to the tune of 100,000+ dead.

 

[AdamZ]

True, except there's a big difference between a small piece of dirt right smack dab in the harbor of your biggest, most important city, and a state 1000 miles away, which is the situation with Iran.

Ryan

I see what your saying however consider that the world is a much smaller place than it was in the late mid 1800s So troops garrisoned at Sumter may have the same effect as a nation state ramping up a nuke program even it its thousands of miles away, But I digress and don't want to jack Daves thread. Just interesting stuff thats all.

 

[dmccormack]

The artillery didn't do its job and Pickett did not receive the message to have his troops ready to go at Dawn. Highlighting the true major problem for both sides during the Civil War which was communication and coordination.

In hindsight we view "Pickett's Charge" as noble 19th C mass suicide.

More likely Lee believed that the center was weak and that the charge would cross the ground only lightly affected by Union artillery. There was also a known tendency to fire high down rising ground, and Lee may have assumed the infantry would arrive at the center largely intact.

 

[RyanShort1]

In hindsight we view "Pickett's Charge" as noble 19th C mass suicide.

More likely Lee believed that the center was weak and that the charge would cross the ground only lightly affected by Union artillery. There was also a known tendency to fire high down rising ground, and Lee may have assumed the infantry would arrive at the center largely intact.

It makes a LOT more sense if you buy the theory in Lee's Lost Triumph.

Ryan

 

[dmccormack]

It makes a LOT more sense if you buy the theory in Lee's Lost Triumph.

Ryan

I'm a fan of Occam's Razor: entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem

Tr.: The simplest explanation is usually the right one.

 

[Capt. Geoffrey Thorpe]

In hindsight we view "Pickett's Charge" as noble 19th C mass suicide.

More likely Lee believed that the center was weak and that the charge would cross the ground only lightly affected by Union artillery. There was also a known tendency to fire high down rising ground, and Lee may have assumed the infantry would arrive at the center largely intact.

The Union army had a long history of pulling back when faced with underwhelming odds - and consider the location - middle of nowhere. It wasn't Washington or Philadelphia where the Union would be expected to make a hard stand.

Also timing - The Union typically took much longer to get their act together. By acting quickly and decisivly, Lee could have expected quick success against a poorly supplied line as in the past. Fast, bold, and risky had worked over and over again for Lee.

But, this time he was fighting a different Union army than he had fought in the past - they brought up reinforcements instead of falling back. Held back in the artillery dual to save munitions for the attack instead of wasting them on the woods.

A few months (and a union general or two) before, Pickets charge would have been another brilliant Lee success. And, if Picket had broken through, Lee would have divided the Union army into two small groups with exposed flanks that he could have taken apart at his leisure.

 

[dmccormack]

A few months (and a union general or two) before, Pickets charge would have been another brilliant Lee success. And, if Picket had broken through, Lee would have divided the Union army into two small groups with exposed flanks that he could have taken apart at his leisure.

Very true, but...

Lee's gambles flew in the face of conventional thinking (even at that time). One early frontal charge on American soil that also ended very badly was Abercromby's attack on Fort Carrilion.

Lots of glory, lots of chest thumping, lots of dead.

 

[Dave Siciliano]

Foot's book has just gotten to Gettysburg. It shifted over from Vicksburg during the siege. At this point, initial units have met and the battle is ebbing and flowing one way; then, another on the initial day. Lee has just committed more troops to turn the Union flank. Union troops are fighting well.

It is emphasized several times that Stuart's cavalry got separated to the east for seven days while Lee moved his army northward. Once east, the Union Army movements were so large, Stuart couldn't get back to link up with Lee's troops and once he could move west, he didn't know where they were. That cavalry was Lee's eyes and ears: he had no idea the Union army, now under Meade had moved north with him on the east side of the mountains.

It's as initial units are skirmishing, a spy tells Lee what is going on and that Meade is now commanding that force (at first Lee wouldn't meet with the spy because he was not trusted). While other Southern generals talk about the Union putting another mediocre commander in charge: Lee says Meade will make no mistake. Lee immediately moves to concentrate his troops.

We'll see what Foote's perspective on Pickett's charge is. There have been many errs already where written orders were given to units before an action and coordination errs caused real problems. The first action where units coordinated their attack by synchronizing watches had just been conducted a few months earlier. Most actions kicked off when one unit fired cannons or were just movements when the unit got there. So, coordination of a large attack was difficult. Many times, units just moved to the sound of the guns. Messengers rode with written messages, or commanders met one another many a time. Foote cites an axiom of war that linking up two large units in a coordinated manner to concentrate for an attack is one of the most difficult of military movements. There are just too many things that could change and the manners in which one could determine where another unit was were limited.

Best,

Dave

 

[dmccormack]

Foote cites an axiom of war that linking up two large units in a coordinated manner to concentrate for an attack is one of the most difficult of military movements. There are just too many things that could change and the manners in which one could determine where another unit was were limited.

Best,

Dave

So true, which is why Napoleon was a military genius -- he had the ability to assemble massed force at the critical point over and over.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

In hindsight we view "Pickett's Charge" as noble 19th C mass suicide.

More likely Lee believed that the center was weak and that the charge would cross the ground only lightly affected by Union artillery. There was also a known tendency to fire high down rising ground, and Lee may have assumed the infantry would arrive at the center largely intact.

I certainly agree that this is the most likely explanation - and based on the course of the battle to that point, it makes sense. Also, if you give any credence to the theory regarding Lee's health, then it becomes even more understandable.

But, where it becomes somewhat incomprehensible is when you remember that the Battle of Fredericksburg was, what, ~7 months earlier? I don't know if any of you have been there or not, but if you haven't, it might as well be the same as the ground at Gettysburg. Lee was there; he watched it in person. Granted, there was an extensive bombardment at Gettysburg prior to the charge, but is there any reason to think that the result of another frontal charge - after having to cross a great deal more open ground (even though the town of Fredericksburg didn't extend nearly as far then as it does now) - would be different?

 

[dmccormack]

I certainly agree that this is the most likely explanation - and based on the course of the battle to that point, it makes sense. Also, if you give any credence to the theory regarding Lee's health, then it becomes even more understandable.

But, where it becomes somewhat incomprehensible is when you remember that the Battle of Fredericksburg was, what, ~7 months earlier? I don't know if any of you have been there or not, but if you haven't, it might as well be the same as the ground at Gettysburg. Lee was there; he watched it in person. Granted, there was an extensive bombardment at Gettysburg prior to the charge, but is there any reason to think that the result of another frontal charge - after having to cross a great deal more open ground (even though the town of Fredericksburg didn't extend nearly as far then as it does now) - would be different?

I've been to both places (Fredericksburg more frequently due to work there) and still wonder what they were thinking.


Wait -- still nuthin'...

 

[RickH]

One of the lessons Lee perhaps should have taken from the suicidal persistence at Fredericksburg was that the Union steel was gaining temper and would no longer bend so easily. The Confederates suffered from multiple errors at Gettysburg, Pickett's charge only being the last. There were repeated failures to coordinate attacks. This was coupled with the fact that not only did the Union hold the high ground, they also had vastly superior interior lines, enabling them to move reinforcements from one point to another much more quickly than could the southern forces.

 

[dmccormack]

One of the lessons Lee perhaps should have taken from the suicidal persistence at Fredericksburg was that the Union steel was gaining temper and would no longer bend so easily. The Confederates suffered from multiple errors at Gettysburg, Pickett's charge only being the last. There were repeated failures to coordinate attacks. This was coupled with the fact that not only did the Union hold the high ground, they also had vastly superior interior lines, enabling them to move reinforcements from one point to another much more quickly than could the southern forces.

I think Lee believed the Union forces would continue to be ponderous and cautious in maneuver even with the advantage of interior lines.

 

[RyanShort1]

Lee's Lost Triumph deals extensively with the oft-unnoticed action on the flank between the cavalry forces. I think the author makes a pretty good argument that Pickett's Charge was always intended to be simultaneous with a flanking movement by the cavalry who would have attempted to hit the rear of the Union forces and sweep the cannons on the way to meet up with the infantry at the center. By the time the cavalry action was thwarted, it was too late to stop the infantry charge.
The theory makes a LOT more sense when you consider the famous battles of history that Lee would've been VERY familiar with.

Ryan

 

[Andrew Sego]

I took a civil war history class in college and it's pretty astounding how many people died fighting a rifle war with musket tactics.

One thing I have noticed is that, outside of the South, people really don't understand the effect the war had here. About 1/3 of southern males aged 18-40 died. It's difficult to travel somewhere in the South that the war didn't touch.

My college, the University of Mississippi, saw nearly the entire student body enlist and form Company A of the 11th Mississippi Infantry (the "University Grays"). They fought in many of the major battles of the war, including Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, and suffered 100% casualties. There's a monument on campus, as well as a mass grave for civil war casualties - the university was converted to a hospital during the war.

A couple of fairly interesting books (aside from the obviously fabulous works of Shelby Foote) are Company Aytch(a memoir of a Confederate soldier from Tennessee) and Attack and Die.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

...

One thing I have noticed is that, outside of the South, people really don't understand the effect the war had here. About 1/3 of southern males aged 18-40 died. It's difficult to travel somewhere in the South that the war didn't touch.
...

I don't know if something similar was noted in the South, but a *theory* about a factor contributing to WWII was that, in WWI, a huge portion of a particular generation was killed. Figure men between ~18-30 at the time of WWI, they would have been ~39-51 in 1939...about the age where, if you're going to have true influence, you've developed it or are on the verge.

If it hasn't been done, it would make an interesting study - and perhaps go a ways to confirming the idea about WWI/WWII - to see if the southern states had a similar experience.

A couple of fairly interesting books (aside from the obviously fabulous works of Shelby Foote) are Company Aytch(a memoir of a Confederate soldier from Tennessee) and Attack and Die.

I haven't read the latter, but the former is excellent. It's been a long time since I read it, but what stands out in my memory is the recounting of Confederate soldiers trying to play catch with Union cannonballs that were bouncing towards them. For some reason, that stuck with me.

 

[Lawreston]

Mr. Foote's book probably doesn't have an early version photo of the house in my first image. One of my camera stores was located two buildings to the right of the house.
It has been a museum for many years, having been meticulously maintained to the standards of its mid 1800s vintage.

The Confederate Army(and sympathizers) did not look kindly to the resident-owner of the house, this Northern General whose statue is located across the street from his home; and on the corner of Bowdoin College of which he was president.

HR

 

[Capt. Geoffrey Thorpe]

Mr. Foote's book probably doesn't have an early version photo of the house in my first image. One of my camera stores was located two buildings to the right of the house.
It has been a museum for many years, having been meticulously maintained to the standards of its mid 1800s vintage.

The Confederate Army(and sympathizers) did not look kindly to the resident-owner of the house, this Northern General whose statue is located across the street from his home; and on the corner of Bowdoin College of which he was president.

HR

I don't think anyone can honestly disrepect Chamberlain...

 

[Dave Siciliano]

Harley: Not a lot of pics in Mr. Foote's books. There are battlefield renderings. He has a lot of kind words for many of the Union Generals. They just seem to be coming into their own around the time of the siege of Vicksburg and the battle at Gettysburg.

I think the greatest complement to a union general at this point was Lee's statement about Meade not making any mistake to his front.

He was very complementary of the exploits of Admiral Farragut in his exploits up and down the Mississippi. I just can't highlight every action as it has a tremendous depth of information on so many subjects.

Best,

Dave

 

[ScottM]

Mr. Foote's book probably doesn't have an early version photo of the house in my first image. One of my camera stores was located two buildings to the right of the house.
It has been a museum for many years, having been meticulously maintained to the standards of its mid 1800s vintage.

The Confederate Army(and sympathizers) did not look kindly to the resident-owner of the house, this Northern General whose statue is located across the street from his home; and on the corner of Bowdoin College of which he was president.

HR

My former boss is an alum of Bowdoin and he was honestly surprised that anyone outside Bowdoin knew who Chamberlain was. I had to explain why the former governor of Maine and president of the college was a genuine hero and possibly one of the few people who could lay claim to saving the Union.

He also told me that the house was in disarray until the 1990's when an effort was launched to fix it up and make it into a tourist destination.

 

[Lawreston]

My former boss is an alum of Bowdoin and he was honestly surprised that anyone outside Bowdoin knew who Chamberlain was. I had to explain why the former governor of Maine and president of the college was a genuine hero and possibly one of the few people who could lay claim to saving the Union.

He also told me that the house was in disarray until the 1990's when an effort was launched to fix it up and make it into a tourist destination.

. . . and he would be correct.

http://community.curtislibrary.com/pejepscot/jlchouse.htm

Depending upon when your former boss went to Bowdoin he probably would have been familiar with "Clinty." It goes back far enough for me -- to 1977 -- that I can't remember Clinty's last name; but he was known to all Bowdoin students who would buy bus tickets from him at Stowe Travel Agency. Clint lived for many years in one of the apartments in Chamberlain House and as a volunteer, tried to maintain the facility in its then state of condition and would give unofficial tours to those who were interested. Within the Link(above) is reference to "Miss Helen Johnson, a benefactor. Helen was a long time customer of mine. Her father, Doctor Johnson, was the Bowdoin College physician for a long career.

While touching upon the Bowdoin College aspect, the accompanying photo is one I did from over a spot just a ½ dozen buildings down Maine Street from Chamberlain House. It shows a portion of the college campus(Walker Art Building / Senior Center[Coles Tower - at one time the tallest building in Maine]/ and at the right, Farley Field House(athletic facility), named for benefactor William Farley(best known for Fruit of the Loom products).

HR