I don’t typically watch Dan Gryder’s videos but the one I watched yesterday he went to the site. After seeing the scene I don’t think a lack of shoulder harnesses would have made a difference, if they indeed didn’t have them.
Makes you wonder if they had dropped the flaps a couple of seconds before impact if they would have survived.
Lots of what if’s….we just don’t know.
"Gravity is still undefeated."
It’s called a “Rope Break” and it only works on gliders because your Angle of Climb (on tow) is MUCH higher than your Angle of Glide, so at approx 500ft AGL a Glider you have enough excess altitude it can make the 270+90 turns and still glide back.
This is the critical concept that is missed by crusaders advocating for a specific altitude that "works" to turn back. It depends on a whole slew of variables, but those variables need to be actually calculated and converted to an accurate climb angle and descent angle, because that's the ultimate math needed (including altitude loss in the turns). If you're not making that calculation (and no one that I know actually does) then you're back to guesswork, with potentially fatal consequences for the wrong guess.
I most cases putting the gear down before impact is preferred. The gear is designed to take an impact and absorb energy. Better to have that energy transferred into gear landing gear and than directly into the fuselage.
I would dispute 'most cases'.
I doubt they were seriously proficient with Cardinal emergency procedure ops. I've flown a BUNCH of different types of airplanes and you have to know what you're proficient in, and what you really aren't proficient in. If I have flown a plane a lot AND have practiced emergency ops, I might try something in that plane that I might not in another. It's definitely not the same to do that in the Super Cub as it is in the Cardinal. I've practiced return to the runway scenarios in my Luscombe and I think I've got a pretty good shot at that, but I personally don't think it's prudent in the RG with any sort of weight, or higher density altitude scenarios, and not below a personal minimum of 600' in ideal conditions with NO decent other options. I've been in RG's for about 500 hours per year for the better part of the last ten years and the ground track makes me uncomfortable. I think that there are places that it *might* work, but that terrain doesn't look like a place I'd try it.If Russ and Richard couldn't do it......I don't think any of us could have.
You sound like a much better pilot than either Russ or Richard.
I honestly doubt it. I'm definitely not good enough to be a Thunderbird pilot.You sound like a much better pilot than either Russ or Richard.
Maybe, maybe not.If Russ and Richard couldn't do it......I don't think any of us could have.
Could be......However, the guys from AOPA studied the impossible turn. Did videos demonstrating the turn in various aircraft. Spoke about it at Oshkosh. If I only knew of them from reading articles and watching pod casts I might have a different impression....but, I know these guys from the airport. They fly everything, from J-3 to EABs to Staggerwing Beeches to jets, and are highly skilled. The fact that Richard had practiced this maneuver, with his skill level and yet was not successful is very stunning. Short of aiming for the trees and hoping for the best......I seriously doubt anyone could have survived this.
Thanks. That explains a lot.
Yes, it's VERY noticable. Feels like you retracted a speed brake.
Consider, too, the psychological pressure of this. He'd taken the lead to demonstrate the "Impossible Turn" was possible. If he HADN'T attempted a turnback...what do you suppose the public reaction might have been? Might the realization of this have affected his decision process?
I would tend to believe that a partial power loss would make the turnback scenario easier...though it could, of course, affect the decision process.
Definitely. It's a hard call. I've nursed a sick J-3 Cub with a dead cylinder home - was only about 200' AGL on base, but also tried to make it back in a Glasair last year when the engine seized. I'm quite glad it seized when it did because the terrain along the way back to the airport was worse than it was where we ended up putting it down.
I can’t imagine that was even a thought in the moment.
Cowl flaps were open. Wonder what temps they were seeing. Normally it's cowl flaps closed for descent. The gear position wasn't conclusive, could be they had started them retracting again or not... prop was in high pitch, that might have made a difference based on what I've seen, but if they thought they were getting some power out of it, they might have left it alone until it wasn't helping them.
This is interesting:
Whatever they were doing, they made a decisive decision. Another possible takeaway, that I've thought before - if you have time to say something, state the nature of the emergency. It might help someone else even if you don't survive. All of us flying Cardinals want to know what went wrong.