To each his own...
Some people have a mind for the book work and take to it quite easily but are crap flyers. Others take to the controls like they were born to fly but suck at the book work.
I think the one that universally causes people to struggle in early (and even later) training is radio communications and learning the ins-and-outs of the equipment.
Radio communications is a problem that can be solved with time and effort. Advanced Stick and rudder skills is also a "problem" that can be solved with time and effort. Equipment though is one that I just dont see getting better as more and more technology creeps into the cockpit.
I mean how many of us can honestly say we use foreflight to 100% of its capabilities AND our aircraft installed GPS to the same? There's just too many features to be realistic about knowing they all exist, let alone mastering them all and some of them are rarely used to begin with (custom waypoints on a Garmin comes to mind).
As Julie Clark said in the below Flight Chops video starting at 4:18
I have to admit that I never really came to terms with that Airbus. There were so many ways you could solve the same problem and get to the same result... or it could trick you or you thought you had it programmed right and no matter what it is that isnt going right, you're still wrong. The typical conversation was one pilot said "Ive never seen it do that before." "well I've never seen that [either]" "well how long have you been on the airplane?" because it would just play tricks with you almost every leg, every trip
Notably, the video was released just 4 days after and presumably shot sometime before the Ethiopian Airlines 737-Max crash. Even if it was a "prepared" statement and the video footage was shot in the window between the crash and its release, I'd note exactly what happened was still a matter of pure speculation at the time of its release.
Despite that, I still think the pilots played a larger part in the Ethiopian crash than the media would lead you to believe. Based on the information available, they correctly diagnosed the problem, switched off the MCAS but failed to recover the plane and ultimately switched the MCAS back on. Should MCAS not have suffered the failure it did? Absolutely but the pilots should have been capable of working around the problem (again based on the information available that I've seen, if someone has contradicting evidence of this, I'd be happy to see and review it), especially given the awareness and bulletin issued by the FAA following the Lion Air crash.
The overall need for MCAS remains questionable as I've seen conflicting statements about MCAS being added in order to comply with the 737 type certificate. Without it, the plane still flew but required greater awareness of the pitch up moment. Whether Boeing added MCAS because they knew it wouldn't qualify for the 737 TC without it or because they promised a plane that did not require additional training (arguably, accounting for the pitch up moment requires awareness only in the hands of a competent and proficient pilot) but they built a flawed system with catastrophic results to account for an error that was more nuisance than anything else and probably could have been just as easily resolved with a stick shaker and awareness (if it were truly required at all since it was just a tendency to over pitch).