N. Las Vegas Mid-air

eman1200 said:
Not a bad call but I’m curious, what’s difficult about doing S turns on final? Home field put me behind a stearman on final so I did s turns the whole way down to give us more spacing. Absolute nothingburger.
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It depends on the aircraft. Would you do them in a KA 350? I'm a stickler for planning my approach and flying the rails.
 
3393RP said:
It depends on the aircraft. Would you do them in a KA 350? I'm a stickler for planning my approach and flying the rails.
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I probably would, depending on the situation at the time. is a king air not capable of basic s-turns? either way, I'd like the opportunity to try it :) and don't get me wrong, I'm not questioning someone's decision to go-around. I just thought s-turns were a pretty basic maneuver, one that I've used quite often on final for various reasons.
 
3393RP said:
It depends on the aircraft. Would you do them in a KA 350? I'm a stickler for planning my approach and flying the rails.
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I've done them many times in a KC-135. Also in a 757, and other planes that are smaller than those. I don't think 20* turns left and right are really pushing the envelope. But, like @eman1200 said, I'd never fault someone for going around if they don't feel comfortable.
 
absolutely nothing we haven't already discussed so far

 
With both the Centennial midair and now this one, it really brings up should VFR parallel ops be staggered. Doesn’t matter what we believe a controller should do, this op (simultaneous parallel) is authorized. I didn't notice if a traffic call was issued but even the lack of clarity in that rule supports the controller as well. Based on rules and equipment limitations and not perception, it’s 100 % on the Malibu pilot.
 
Velocity173 said:
With both the Centennial midair and now this one, it really brings up should VFR parallel ops be staggered. Doesn’t matter what we believe a controller should do, this op (simultaneous parallel) is authorized. I didn't notice if a traffic call was issued but even the lack of clarity in that rule supports the controller as well. Based on rules and equipment limitations and not perception, it’s 100 % on the Malibu pilot.
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Yep, 100% Malibu pilot. However, a traffic call would've been helpful. At KSEE, controllers always call out traffic in the parallel. Especially base and final.
 
Velocity173 said:
With both the Centennial midair and now this one, it really brings up should VFR parallel ops be staggered.
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Agree, that is really the central question. It appears from discussion that current practice is to rely on centerline for lateral separation, with patterns operating independently. Worth asking whether diagonal separation should be required for VFR approaches like it is for IFR approaches in some situations.

diagonal.PNG
 
Shawn said:
Runway mixups by pilots on parallel runways are common and known to be common. What would I add? Explicit traffic advisories to each pilot that another aircraft was on final of the parallel runway in their vicinity. If that was not provided I absolutely put blame on the controller for contributing to the accident for giving them instructions that would put them so close to each other without warning because yes, at least one pilot made a mistake but it was the proximity of those two aircraft potentially unbeknownst to each other yet should have been know to the controller that led to that mistake being deadly.
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No. Pilot in command failed to use the proper runway. Pilot. In. Command.
 
A simple parallel runway traffic call by ATC might snap a pilot out of a continuation bias for the wrong runway.
 
Sluggo63 said:
I've done them many times in a KC-135. Also in a 757, and other planes that are smaller than those. I don't think 20* turns left and right are really pushing the envelope. But, like @eman1200 said, I'd never fault someone for going around if they don't feel comfortable.
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I felt I was too close to the runway to disrupt the approach. But we all have to make decisions based on limitations of the aircraft, weather, communications, external events, and personal standards. It's no big deal.
 
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t3chiman said:
The FAA's reliance on voice-grade communication channels is dismaying in these days of high-speed data networking. We all carry around portable comm terminals with 4 UHF and microwave transceivers, and high-resolution graphics displays. Call them tablets, smartphones, whatever; they are ubiquitous, reliable, effective, and cheap.

Scenario: upon startup, have the app locate the nearest ATC facility, and select "W"; hit SEND. No need for 25 seconds of chatter: "Ground, this is Skyhawk 567 Mike Alpha at Area 5 with Quebec, West departure". Instead, in 50 milliseconds, the app sends airplane N number and GPS coordinates to the local controller, whose own app responds with taxi instructions, bitmap of the taxiway path, and overlays it with text of the ATIS. Pilot hits the ACK key, starts rolling. No talking, no "readback of all runway crossings", just progressive permissives issued to the pilot as he navigates to the runway for his West departure, and awaits the takeoff clearance message.

Analogously, pilots of arriving aircraft just hit the "L" key on the app, and get their unambiguous landing instructions displayed in milliseconds. Without chatter, channel saturation, or tragic misunderstandings.
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IMHO, aviation is a business sector that is (overall) very dependent on technology, but the hardest to upgrade. I tend to think of aviation from a US-centric viewpoint, but optimally technological upgrades should, at least, be somewhat harmonized across the globe.

Airlines don't want to pay for 4 different systems that do essentially the same thing. It takes time for ideas to be proposed, (somewhat) agreed upon, technical specs to be written, ATC systems to be modified, and equipment aboard aircraft to be replaced.

Meanwhile technology keeps marching forward during this time, and a new (better) solution is identified. Should the system scrap the first, more primitive program and chase the shiny new one, or implement something just to "get something done?"

While you're thinking about the newest program, please also he thinking about how you're going to handle aircraft that can't (or refuse to) upgrade to the latest technology. Do you exclude them from certain segments of the system, or do you make them backward-compatible, reducing the effectiveness of the upgrade?

All of these issues can be overcome, but it sure puts lots of obstacles in front of the adoption of a system as you proposed.
 
PastZTL said:
While you're thinking about the newest program, please also he thinking about how you're going to handle aircraft that can't (or refuse to) upgrade to the latest technology. Do you exclude them from certain segments of the system, or do you make them backward-compatible, reducing the effectiveness of the upgrade?
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Airline aircraft especially. Airlines almost never do avionics upgrades of their aircraft from birth to graveyard. Whatever system was installed in that 737/Airbus/Embraer at the factory, is what it will have until it is retired. It is too expensive to upgrade a fleet, simulators, and training for individual types. I know it wasn't that long ago, and maybe still true, that some US airline aircraft still did not have GPS, even though nearly every car on the road and a lot of GA aircraft do.

ADS-B was the biggest exception, but only because it was mandated. I believe some aircraft were actually retired versus the cost to upgrade.
 
Kenny Phillips said:
No. Pilot in command failed to use the proper runway. Pilot. In. Command.
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Correct...and controller also failed to provide basic traffic advisories to either of the pilots in a critical phase of flight. Was the the sole cause? No...Was that a contributing factor that may have prevented the deadly accident?...Absolutely IMO.

Accidents are rarely a single cause...high wing vs low wing + failure to provide any advisories of two aircraft in close proximity + pilot mistake + who knows what else all factor in. Take just one of those factors away and maybe people don't die.
 
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Ed Haywood said:
Agree, that is really the central question. It appears from discussion that current practice is to rely on centerline for lateral separation, with patterns operating independently. Worth asking whether diagonal separation should be required for VFR approaches like it is for IFR approaches in some situations.

View attachment 108743
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The problem will arise with the FAA trying to decide the standards of diagonal separation and how to implement it in a tower environment. With your example, that’s a radar approach / center controller function with a display specifically designed for radar separation. A lot of times at busy fields that’s one controller just working finals. A tower is a whole other ball game. Even with a Certified Tower Radar Display, it would be quite a task for the local controller to try and stagger all VFR arrivals when their primary focus should be on the runways. Especially in a busy D like KVGT.

A traffic call on the other hand is well within their capabilities. Considering these two were converging, I definitely would’ve issued one.
 
Mxfarm said:
The more foolproof the engineering the more nature improves the fool. Left, right, 29, 30, 31 - someone will still overcome and mess it up.
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Oh no doubt. I just like the idea. For some reason I can more easily disambiguate 29, 30, 31 in my head than 30L, 30C, 30R. Like, the mental latency is less to separate those for me mentally -- Others may not be that way. :)
 
schmookeeg said:
Oh no doubt. I just like the idea. For some reason I can more easily disambiguate 29, 30, 31 in my head than 30L, 30C, 30R. Like, the mental latency is less to separate those for me mentally -- Others may not be that way. :)
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I would not like that at all. With L/R it’s easy to look out the window and know which one is 30L and which one is 30R. Using different numbers without the L/r requires me to know which runways the airport has in its numbering series. If you fly from the same one all the time sure but if not it would be confusing to me and require more trips to the AFD to remember the number painted on the runway I’m seeing.
 
Shawn said:
Correct...and controller also failed to provide basic traffic advisories to either of the pilots in a critical phase of flight. Was the the sole cause? No...Was that a contributing factor that may have prevented the deadly accident?...Absolutely IMO.

Accidents are rarely a single cause...high wing vs low wing + failure to provide any advisories of two aircraft in close proximity + pilot mistake + who knows what else all factor in. Take just one of those factors away and maybe people don't die.
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Were the two airplanes on different frequencies?

If they were I could see some validity to your position. If they were on the same frequency there was no requirement for a traffic call from tower. I’m betting both pilots were aware of the traffic. Just one guy screwed up and lined up on the wrong runway and they never saw each other. I think the traffic call you mention would have made no difference.
 
Tarheelpilot said:
Were the two airplanes on different frequencies?

If they were I could see some validity to your position. If they were on the same frequency there was no requirement for a traffic call from tower. I’m betting both pilots were aware of the traffic. Just one guy screwed up and lined up on the wrong runway and they never saw each other. I think the traffic call you mention would have made no difference.
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Well, we DO know that there was NO traffic call and people died, so we know that not doing it because it was not regulatory certainly did not work.
 
Chances are that if you had given advisory calls to both aircraft in regards to the other they both would have replied looking but no joy and neither of them had any idea that one of them was on the wrong runway.
 
Shawn said:
Well, we DO know that there was NO traffic call and people died, so we know that not doing it because it was not regulatory certainly did not work.
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I wasn’t referring to regulations when I said it wasn’t required. Both of the airplanes were on frequency to hear the controller clearing the other plane to land. The controller didn’t have to specifically call traffic for them to know about each other. That’s what I’m saying. An addition traffic call would have been redundant. I’m not talking about regs.
FFS
 
Silvaire said:
Chances are that if you had given advisory calls to both aircraft in regards to the other they both would have replied looking but no joy and neither of them had any idea that one of them was on the wrong runway.
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Agreed.

The way to prevent it would've been to put the piper on a downwind until they either reported the Cessna in sight, or it was no longer a factor.
 
Looking at the flight path displayed in Post #2, I'm thinking that the staggered runways may have been a factor. Considering how close in they turned downwind, and that it was a continuously turning approach until short final, it's possible that the 30R threshold was the first one that they saw. There probably wasn't much time to discover the error.

What is the recommended approach speed for that type aircraft?
 
Palmpilot said:
Considering how close in they turned downwind, and that it was a continuously turning approach until short final, it's possible that the 30R threshold was the first one that they saw. There probably wasn't much time to discover the error.

What is the recommended approach speed for that type aircraft?
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More importantly, what was the aircraft's actual speed, due to the short radius and required bank angle of the turn? No doubt quite a bit faster than a 172.

Also consider the Malibu crossed the airport at or above TPA. Yet in a very short amount of time it was fast and low enough to overtake and strike the 172, which by then was on short final to 30R.

It appears to me a very undisciplined and unsafe manuever was the cause of this incident.
 
3393RP said:
More importantly, what was the aircraft's actual speed, due to the short radius and required bank angle of the turn? No doubt quite a bit faster than a 172.

Also consider the Malibu crossed the airport at or above TPA. Yet in a very short amount of time it was fast and low enough to overtake and strike the 172, which by then was on short final to 30R.

It appears to me a very undisciplined and unsafe manuever was the cause of this incident.
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The ground-speed stamps from Post #2 show it at 147 kts crossing midfield, gradually reducing to 114 kts immediately after rolling out of the turn on short final. I haven't looked up the wind velocity at the time of the crash.
 
Palmpilot said:
Looking at the flight path displayed in Post #2, I'm thinking that the staggered runways may have been a factor. Considering how close in they turned downwind, and that it was a continuously turning approach until short final, it's possible that the 30R threshold was the first one that they saw. There probably wasn't much time to discover the error.

What is the recommended approach speed for that type aircraft?
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Final approach speed for a Malibu is 90 knots. I wouldn't fly the entire pattern that slow however.

Looking at the flight profile in the second post and how tight the turn is, I can't help but wonder if they lost sight of 30L in the turn and mistook 30R as 30L. It would be an easy mistake to make.
 
mondtster said:
Looking at the flight profile in the second post and how tight the turn is, I can't help but wonder if they lost sight of 30L in the turn and mistook 30R as 30L. It would be an easy mistake to make.
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Given that they were based there, getting the runways mixed up would definitely seem like a sign of senility.
 
Palmpilot said:
The ground-speed stamps from Post #2 show it at 147 kts crossing midfield, gradually reducing to 114 kts immediately after rolling out of the turn on short final. I haven't looked up the wind velocity at the time of the crash.
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From METARs/ASOSs from around the incident time, winds look rather modest, roughly 4 kts:
METAR KVGT 171915Z AUTO 14003KT 10SM CLR 38/12 A2990
METAR KVGT 171910Z AUTO 08003KT 10SM CLR 39/12 A2991
METAR KVGT 171905Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 38/12 A2991
METAR KVGT 171900Z AUTO 33003KT 10SM CLR 39/12 A2991
METAR KVGT 171855Z AUTO 30005KT 10SM CLR 38/12 A2991
METAR KVGT 171853Z 32004KT 10SM CLR 38/12 A2991 RMK AO2 SLP112 T03830117
METAR KVGT 171850Z AUTO 31004KT 10SM CLR 39/12 A2992
METAR KVGT 171845Z AUTO 10003KT 10SM CLR 38/12 A2992
 
eman1200 said:
I probably would, depending on the situation at the time. is a king air not capable of basic s-turns? either way, I'd like the opportunity to try it :) and don't get me wrong, I'm not questioning someone's decision to go-around. I just thought s-turns were a pretty basic maneuver, one that I've used quite often on final for various reasons.
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I’ve done S-turns in Philladelphia flying an Airbus 320 to make spacing for some dork landing on 35. There was a government contract company using king airs for ag flying somewhere they needed to defoliate some drug fields. Pretty sure it don’t matter what you’re flying. You are either in a position to maneuver or not. I have gone around in little airplanes and have maneuvered in jets. Just depends on what else is cooking in the soup.
 
I'm in agreement with everyone that has said this seems to be 100% pilot error. First, because the instructions were clear, readback clear, and it's seems clear that the piper pilot flew to the wrong runway. But second because separation of aircraft, class D, VFR, is on the pilots.

What I'm wondering, though, is class D VFR operation any safer than class G? Not because the controllers are a problem, at all, but because the systems are designed to do things that I don't know that pilots all understand. In this particular situation, CTAF, maybe each pilot would have been talking with each other, and if both weren't happy with the separation one might have left? I really don't know the odds. To me, though, I have the feeling that going from G to D is done to improve traffic volume, not overall safety, as was expressed in another thread about remote towers.

And before I sound like I'm anti-D, I'm not. They're great around here, and I've had them go what seems to me to be a bit above and beyond at times to assist. One time in particular giving a separation suggestion outbound for an overtaking aircraft, where we were both just VFR. I just don't know if the overall safety is better, given that I think some pilots seem to disengage part of their brain when they're in controlled airspace....not a controller problem, but a pilot or pilot training problem.
 
There comes a point where traffic levels are so high that it would be both impractical and unsafe to not have a control tower. My home field is an example of this. There are nearby fields where traffic levels are usually low enough that a tower is not needed.

The controllers here are generally very sharp. No one is infallible, but right now I can think of only one case in the thirty years that I have been based here, in which a tower controller created a safety hazard that was up to me, as pilot-in-command, to resolve.
 
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The female Malibu pilot’s name was Carol. We know this because as she was turning base someone acknowledged her. That may have cause her to lose concentration and miss her runway.
Not making excuses for her sloppy work in the pattern.
 
PiperW said:
The female Malibu pilot’s name was Carol. We know this because as she was turning base someone acknowledged her. That may have cause her to lose concentration and miss her runway.
Not making excuses for her sloppy work in the pattern.
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It’s been mentioned that she handled the radios in the Malibu while her husband was the pilot flying.
 
i just don't really feel like there is much that can be done to prevent things like this. it sounds like two experienced pilots in the malibu lined up for the wrong runway at their home field? how can you really stop something like that?

a class d tower can't be expected to call the base for every person doing pattern work.
 
Could be buried in this thread, but are there published instrument final approach courses for the two runways?
 
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