My friend died in a fiery plane crash

HPNFlyGirl said:
It is with a heavy heart that I report the death of my freind Maureen McGee. She was the pilot of the 414 that went down in Pottstown, PA 12/26/06.

http://www.wpxi.com/news/10616098/detail.html?rss=burg&psp=news
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Bummer, sorry to hear it. It's always tough to have your friends crash. Sadly, while this may be your first, if you stay involved in aviation, it won't be your last. Welcome to the club that faces west, though it's a meloncholy club.
 
Henning said:
Bummer, sorry to hear it. It's always tough to have your friends crash. Sadly, while this may be your first, if you stay involved in aviation, it won't be your last. Welcome to the club that faces west, though it's a meloncholy club.
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Yeah thats the truth Henning. Its not a matter of if...but a matter of when. Maureen was the closest friend I have lost by far. I lost anohter back in 2005.
 
Some news today about that crash on Aero-New Network
Johnstown, Pennsylvania

On December 26, 2006, at 1555 eastern standard time, a Cessna 414 (N400CS, file photo of type at right) operated by Flight Source LLC, was destroyed when it impacted terrain at John Murtha Johnstown- Cambria County Airport (JST), Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The certificated commercial pilot and the flight nurse were fatally injured. The flight was operating on an instrument flight rules flight plan between Morgantown Municipal-Walter L. Bill Hart Field (MGW), Morgantown, West Virginia, and Teterboro Airport (TEB), Teterboro, New Jersey. The positioning flight was being conducted under Part 91.
According to preliminary air traffic control information, the airplane was en route at 7,000 feet when the pilot advised the Cleveland Air Route Traffic Control Center that she had encountered icing, and wanted to divert to Johnstown. The pilot subsequently flew the Instrument Landing System approach to Runway 33. After descending below a 500-foot overcast cloud layer, the pilot attempted to land on runway 33, but then aborted the landing. The airplane was then observed to climb to an estimated 300 feet, bank to the right, and nose over into the ground near the center of the airport.
The investigator-in-charge is Paul Cox from the Safety Board's Northeastern Regional Office in Ashburn, Virginia. The case number is NYC07FA051.
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So close to making it :(
 
Interesting I tried to google the company "Flight Source LLC" ad came up with nothing.
 
Henning said:
Bummer, sorry to hear it. It's always tough to have your friends crash. Sadly, while this may be your first, if you stay involved in aviation, it won't be your last. Welcome to the club that faces west, though it's a meloncholy club.
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Brook, this is what I was going to say but Henning already said it. I've known several pilots to die in accidents and I think they would want me to:

Learn from their mistakes or misfortune.
Never forget them.
Hoist a beer in their memory every now and then.

I'm sorry for your loss!!
Bill
 
I attended the AOPA Air Safety Foundation's new "What Went Wrong" seminar last night in Fort Worth; they take a pseudo-NTSB approach to analyzing "what went wrong" in four different fatal incidents, with the goal of improving our decision making skills. They go through the flight, NTSB photos, ATC transcripts, weather, decision making, etc.

This flight was Case #1; as they were going through it, I remembered this thread with a "this is VERY familiar" feeling. Sorry again for the loss of your friend, Brook. I thought you'd want to know this case was in the seminar, in case you attend. Better to know in advance when it hits close to home.
 
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Troy,

I plan to attend this seminar in Houston tonight... did you find it informative?
 
Brooke, I can only imagine how you, her other friends and family must be feeling. Grief takes a long time and changes over time. My prayers are with you and all the others who are affected by this tragic event.
 
t0r0nad0 said:
Troy,

I plan to attend this seminar in Houston tonight... did you find it informative?
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I did. As with all of these seminars, each attendee usually takes one or two new "nuggets" of "I can make use of that in my flying and aeronautical decision making", and its different for each. I also find the nuggets usually come more from the dialog of the presenter than any information on the slides. That was the case for me last night, with our presenter, an ex-Delta airlines pilot.
 
Very sad, especially when she was doing that kind of flying, enjoying it, and was so close to making it. I hate it when friends die. :(

So, Troy, what did they conclude went wrong?
 
Ted DuPuis said:
Very sad, especially when she was doing that kind of flying, enjoying it, and was so close to making it. I hate it when friends die. :(

So, Troy, what did they conclude went wrong?
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She was carrying a LOT of ice. This presentation showed NTSB photos of the ice chunks that were left on the runway--and sheets of ice from the underside of the wing, from flying at a high angle of attack to maintain altitude in icing conditions. She was unable to climb to 13K, even in a lightly loaded (female pilot and a nurse) Turbo 421. ATC transcripts with Center shows she diverted to a nearby localizer approach (at the airport where she crashed) and her intentions were to descend to MDA on the approach, and if the ice shed by getting lower, she'd go missed and continue the flight; if it didn't, she'd land.

She was right of final (they estimate full deflection) when she got out of the clouds, fast, and not configured for landing (decision not yet made to land or go around, and likely concerned about config changes with that much ice). Tower called "check gear down", and they suggest law of primacy took over, she lowered the gear, corrected left towards the runway, and impacted the runway at high speed, gear not fully extended (as shown by the measurements of the distance between the rubber marks left by the mains). Bounced back into the air, tried to go around at that point (after prop strike and heavy tail strike). Might have suffered an engine failure at that point too, but climbed only about 100 feet before banking right into the ground.

Very sad.

What's your take-aways? Then I'll share what the ASF program suggested.

The seminar was interactive, giving you bits of information as the event progressed, soliciting your thoughts as things went along, which I thought was very useful for going through "your mindset" as a pilot should you find yourself in a similar situation.
 
I suppose my questions (to help my own thought process):

- If the icing was that bad, wasn't shedding, couldn't climb out of it, and made the decision to divert, why consider continuing the flight if it did shed off?
- Why not put the gear down if doing the ILS with the intent of landing, or was this likely just an oversight?

Wasn't there, and I don't have near the experience to really have a good idea of procedures there or for that aircraft to have any other ideas. Honest questions, I'd like to learn for my own thought processes.
 
Ted DuPuis said:
I suppose my questions (to help my own thought process):

- If the icing was that bad, wasn't shedding, couldn't climb out of it, and made the decision to divert, why consider continuing the flight if it did shed off?
- Why not put the gear down if doing the ILS with the intent of landing, or was this likely just an oversight?

Wasn't there, and I don't have near the experience to really have a good idea of procedures there or for that aircraft to have any other ideas. Honest questions, I'd like to learn for my own thought processes.
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There's the NTSB report, and then there's what "everybody knows" in and around that operation.

There are inconsistencies.
 
Ted DuPuis said:
- Why not put the gear down if doing the ILS with the intent of landing, or was this likely just an oversight?
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If the ice was *really* bad, and it sounds like it may have been, the extra drag of the gear hanging out could have resulted in the plane being unable to maintain glideslope even at full power. :hairraise:
 
flyingcheesehead said:
If the ice was *really* bad, and it sounds like it may have been, the extra drag of the gear hanging out could have resulted in the plane being unable to maintain glideslope even at full power. :hairraise:
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That thought had crossed my mind, was wondering what else.
 
Ted DuPuis said:
That thought had crossed my mind, was wondering what else.
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Keep in mind the my comments below are based solely on the little I've read of this accident and are meant to address the scenario as I see it in hindsight. Without having been in the plane at the time it's near impossible to say what I would have done under the same circumstances.

It would take a lot of guts to deliberately belly in, but carrying so much ice that you couldn't maintain the GS with the gear out seems to make that the only option. I don't know the gear speed of a 421 though. My Baron can extend in 3-5 seconds so theoretically you could pop the gear out 50 ft above the runway and touch down on the wheels. That said, if you cannot maintain a 3 degree GS with the gear out, you probably won't be able to arrest the descent once the gear is deployed so chances are you're gonna wreck the plane anyway but I think the survival chances are much better when using the gear to absorb the impact.

One other thought pops out from what I read on this thread: I think that in almost any desperate situation like this, once contact is made with the runway there's little potential advantage in attempting to abort the landing and doing so adds a huge risk. It's not certain but it sure sounds like this could have had a much better outcome had the pilot made the plane land/crash at or just after the first contact with the ground. An attempt to regain the air in a relatively unflyable airplane (carrying lots of ice and having damage from striking the ground) is just begging for a return to earth with greater vertical velocity and/or less favorable attitude.

Finally, I also questioned the stated intent to consider flying a missed approach if the airplane happened to shed some or all of it's ice load at the LOC MDA rather than planning to put the plane on the runway no matter what. For one thing, IME it takes a fair amount of time to shed a big load of ice even when the air temp is well above freezing so the time available at the MDA was likely insufficient in the first place. And there's nothing to guarantee it will shed symmetrically nor would there be much chance of determining whether enough ice came off to return the airframe to a "normal" condition. Add to that the workload issues of evaluating the sufficiency of the shedding while dealing with a barely flyable airplane compressed into the short time available at the MDA before the decision had to be completed and then needing to reconfigure if landing was the chosen option and it almost makes some sort of crash a foregone conclusion once the plan to shed ice at the MDA was hatched.
 
I saw the presentation last night. It was well done and addressed a variety of points in all four accidents studied. The presenter was very good, too - more on him in a second.

WRT this particular accident and why she wouldn't have just put the gear out and landed, it is my (very limited) understanding that when you have ice and the airplane is still flying, you don't make ANY configuration changes at all. She was trying to descend to MDA to shed the ice in the warmer air down low, but didn't want to land. The presenter said that someone in a previous session made the point that if you descend and go missed, you can continue to your destination on your original plan. If you land, you have to re-file, and in the NE section of the country when there's bad weather, you might not get a slot again for several hours. She did tell Approach that she'd make the decision whether or not to land at MDA. The fact that she had a lot of ice on the underside of her wings (as evidenced by the large sheets found on the runway near her impact point) evidences that she was at a high angle of attack for an extended period of time, exposing the underside of the wing to the icing conditions. Thus, she likely had a lot of nose-up trim in there (I'm guessing). When she impacted and shed the ice load, then tried to initiate a go-around, the plane pitched up violently and stalled/spun.

This wasn't mentioned in the session, but I have two wild-ass guesses as to why the stall turned into a spin:

1) There was evidence of a prop strike on the right engine at the initial impact point. It is possible that the prop was damaged, and even the engine too, which prevented the right engine from producing symmetrical power on the go-around (the spin was to the right).

2) The ice might not have shed from the airplane evenly, causing asymmetrical lift between the wings.

All of the above is pure speculation on my part based on reading the NTSB report and hearing the facts as presented last night.

Another note about the presenter - not only is he a retired Delta Airlines captain, he is Kevin Garrison, author of the AvWeb column 'The CEO of the Cockpit', and the book of the same name. Regretfully, I forgot to bring my copy of the book with me for him to sign. I got the opportunity to chat with him for a while before and after the session, he seems to be a really cool and funny guy. He did a great job in the presentation, interjecting enough smart-alecky humor to keep it relatively light, while still being respectful of the subject matter.
 
Thank you, Lance, that's exactly what I was looking for.

In the case of the Aztec, the gear is fairly slow to extend (at least 5 seconds). Gear speed is also 150 mph. On the Aztec, the gear is not especially draggy (at least not in comparison to the rest of the airframe with the aerodynamic qualities of an F-350), and doesn't result in major changes in flying characteristics. The other thing is the Aztec gear either extends across the longitudinal axis of the plane (forward/backward), rather than folding in. I don't know anything about the twin Cessnas, I'm just thinking through this stuff ahead for my own flying. I suppose the one thing I could see with the gear (as prompted by the "Check gear down" comment from tower) is that it was just forgotten about. That would make sense given the stress I'd expect anyone to be under during that sort of flight condition.

Another thing I thought about tailplane stall concerns, but my understanding was that tended to be a flap issue. I could easily see not wanting to use flaps in this scenario, and that would make sense.

Just trying to get some thoughts going back and forth with icing season coming up.
 
gismo said:
One other thought pops out from what I read on this thread: I think that in almost any desperate situation like this, once contact is made with the runway there's little potential advantage in attempting to abort the landing and doing so adds a huge risk. It's not certain but it sure sounds like this could have had a much better outcome had the pilot made the plane land/crash at or just after the first contact with the ground. An attempt to regain the air in a relatively unflyable airplane (carrying lots of ice and having damage from striking the ground) is just begging for a return to earth with greater vertical velocity and/or less favorable attitude.

Finally, I also questioned the stated intent to consider flying a missed approach if the airplane happened to shed some or all of it's ice load at the LOC MDA rather than planning to put the plane on the runway no matter what. For one thing, IME it takes a fair amount of time to shed a big load of ice even when the air temp is well above freezing so the time available at the MDA was likely insufficient in the first place. And there's nothing to guarantee it will shed symmetrically nor would there be much chance of determining whether enough ice came off to return the airframe to a "normal" condition. Add to that the workload issues of evaluating the sufficiency of the shedding while dealing with a barely flyable airplane compressed into the short time available at the MDA before the decision had to be completed and then needing to reconfigure if landing was the chosen option and it almost makes some sort of crash a foregone conclusion once the plan to shed ice at the MDA was hatched.
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Your thoughts above are spot-on with the presentation's conclusions and take-aways for us pilots.

Commit to a course of action, and take the one that errors on the side of safety. When you're on the safe side of an action, stay there. That is, if you decide to land, land. If you strike props on the runway, LAND. If you stop due to weather and get a hotel room, STAY THERE THE NIGHT (case #4 was a Cirrus SR22 pilot in NM/AZ who crashed after stopping for day due to weather, and seeing a break in the clouds, hurriedly left the hotel and rushed back to the airport to continue the flight).

On the LOC, as she was (not ILS), at MDA with low vis you don't have much time to evaluate the effectiveness of any ice shedding or lack thereof, and reconfigure for landing. Commit to the landing, get the ice off the airplane, re-check the weather, and then decide.
 
Johnstown is probably the worst possible option in icing conditions -- LBE is close, yet a few miles away from the ice-making ridges.

FWIW, I don't know about "hours" for an IFR clearance...?
 
Interesting info, PJ.

One question I have (going back to thought process of the pilot), is whether by the time she got down to MDA she had intended on landing (and then the lack of the gear being down botched it up) or intended on continuing to fly. Probably something we can't truly find out at this point, all we know is that the initial intent was to try to shed the ice then continue, but by the time she got down to that point she may have changed her mind.

I'm not sure how much I buy the northeast filing issue. This is the area that I'm based out of. The only time there are issues getting a slot to come in are when the weather is really bad and you're trying to get into one of the Bravos. I've had couple-hour waits for getting into PHL with bad weather, but never for any other airport, and I fly under IFR in this area a lot. Even if I change my destination from PHL to PNE (Northeast Philly) then I can get off the ground virtually immediately. I just don't see it.
 
gear speed on the 421 is either 160 or 165 mph. it's fairly draggy. But I thought she was flying a 414?
 
TangoWhiskey said:
Commit to a course of action, and take the one that errors on the side of safety. When you're on the safe side of an action, stay there.
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The examiner I took my CFI ride with told and emphasized that same point to me. You make a decision, you stick with it, for better or for worse. Good advice.
 
until you realize that the decision you made was wrong
 
t0r0nad0 said:
1) There was evidence of a prop strike on the right engine at the initial impact point. It is possible that the prop was damaged, and even the engine too, which prevented the right engine from producing symmetrical power on the go-around (the spin was to the right).
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From the NTSB report:

An examination of runway 33 revealed an initial series of 12 gouges near the left side, beginning just prior to the 5,000-foot remaining sign (or 2,000 feet beyond the approach end of the runway.) The positions of the gouges correlated to the airplane's left engine propeller and ranged from approximately 43 inches apart at the beginning, to 47 inches apart at the end of the 40-foot series. The series veered about 20 degrees toward the runway's left edge.

About 70 feet beyond the end of the initial gouges, and just beyond the 5,000-foot remaining sign, were black skid marks. The skid mark positions correlated to landing gear wheels, with the main gear skid marks about 45 inches inboard from the normal, gear-fully-down position.

Immediately beyond the skid marks were two additional, parallel series of gouges, the same distance apart as the accident airplane's propellers would have been. Both series of gouges continued along the 20-degree veer toward the runway's left edge, and were about 20 feet in length. The distances between the seven gouges from the right gouge series increased from about 26 inches at the beginning, to about 52 inches by the end.

Between the two parallel series of gouges, about 20 feet beyond the original skid marks, were paint scrapings of the same color as the airplane's paint.

The left series of gouges continued in a straight line, into the grass next to the runway, at increasing distances between each gouge. About 40 feet beyond the runway, there was an additional gouge, in a position consistent to where the airplane's left tip tank would have been.

The gouges, along with paint chips, ice chunks and displaced clumps of grass, continued to angle off for about 200 feet, then minimized as the path angled back toward the runway for another 200 feet, in a direction towards the final crash site. There were no additional marks on the runway.

http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief2.asp?ev_id=20070105X00011&ntsbno=NYC07FA051&akey=1

I think Lance hit the nail on the head - once she hit the runway, she should have let it stay down and rode it out.

I wonder if there wasn't some "get-there-itis" going on that led to the not so good plan of melting the ice off on the approach. The airport temp was 0 C, so like Lance said, it wasn't realistic to expect to melt much ice off in those circumstances.


Trapper John
 
I cannot tell you with certainty I could have done any better, but I hope so...
I can tell you from a lifetime of flying in the Great Lakes ice machine that I long ago decided the airplane is expendable...

If I am heavily iced - and I have been iced - these are my rules...
You carry insurance on the hull so you are not tempted to trade money for your life...
You make NO configuration changes when iced - or it WILL stall...
You descend by pushing forward on the yoke NOT by reducing power... And you land it on the belly (retractables) or the wheels, with the power on until you feel the ground, then yank the throttles and move the fuel selector(s) to cutoff...
If you do attempt to put the gear down do it only after you are at an altitude you would be willing to physically jump from the airplane... For me, that's about 3 feet...

Ignore the Controllers - they are not sitting there with you and they will make the wrong choices... I had a controller, on a black night over Lake Erie, insist that I MUST stay at 8000, when I was icing up like a Popsicle... I told her unable, and descended to warm air... Yes, she got an alarm on her radar - BFD...

So far, I have been lucky enough to avoid icing so heavy I would not dare lower the wheels as I crossed the numbers...
NASA has measured airframe icing rates as high as 1" per minute over the Great Lakes... That, of course, is not survivable in our GA tin cans unless you can belly it onto the ground right now...

denny-o
 
KMGW (the departure airport) was not reporting any ice.

KMGW is west of Laurel Ridge.

KJST is east of Laurel Ridge, with successive ridges east of the field.
 
tonycondon said:
until you realize that the decision you made was wrong
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But the point I take from that advice is, once you've committed to a course of action, it's probably safer to stay that course rather than make an abrupt change based on a split second decision.

Obviously if death is imminent, making a last minute change of action won't hurt your chances of survival.
 
Ted DuPuis said:
I'm not sure how much I buy the northeast filing issue. This is the area that I'm based out of. The only time there are issues getting a slot to come in are when the weather is really bad and you're trying to get into one of the Bravos. I've had couple-hour waits for getting into PHL with bad weather, but never for any other airport, and I fly under IFR in this area a lot. Even if I change my destination from PHL to PNE (Northeast Philly) then I can get off the ground virtually immediately. I just don't see it.
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FWIW, I believe she was going to TEB, which I hear can be a very busy airport in some of the busiest airspace in the country.

tonycondon said:
gear speed on the 421 is either 160 or 165 mph. it's fairly draggy. But I thought she was flying a 414?
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It was a 414.

Trapper John said:
From the NTSB report:

An examination of runway 33 revealed an initial series of 12 gouges near the left side, beginning just prior to the 5,000-foot remaining sign (or 2,000 feet beyond the approach end of the runway.) The positions of the gouges correlated to the airplane's left engine propeller and ranged from approximately 43 inches apart at the beginning, to 47 inches apart at the end of the 40-foot series. The series veered about 20 degrees toward the runway's left edge.
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Oops, I guess the left props hit first. I was sitting in the back of the room and they only showed one picture of the gouges and they were on the right side, so I guess I didn't get the full story. I stand corrected :).
 
tonycondon said:
until you realize that the decision you made was wrong
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Yeah, but I'd think that in some cases if you make a bad decision and then try to change your mind, the ensuing distraction and hasty reactions could likely be more dangerous than just going through with it. If you err on the safe side and get on the ground and stay there, well, that's probably not a bad thing.
 
t0r0nad0 said:
FWIW, I believe she was going to TEB, which I hear can be a very busy airport in some of the busiest airspace in the country.
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Ok, I could see that being a potential issue. I'd thought it was an airport in Maine.
 
Ted DuPuis said:
Yeah, but I'd think that in some cases if you make a bad decision and then try to change your mind, the ensuing distraction and hasty reactions could likely be more dangerous than just going through with it. If you err on the safe side and get on the ground and stay there, well, that's probably not a bad thing.
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true, early recognition and correction is key.
 
Jack Spectre said:
But the point I take from that advice is, once you've committed to a course of action, it's probably safer to stay that course rather than make an abrupt change based on a split second decision.

Obviously if death is imminent, making a last minute change of action won't hurt your chances of survival.
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The concept of staying the course is mostly applicable to a crisis situation IMO and a key part of good ADM is a continual analysis of your current situation with appropriate changes in the plan should a change or new information suggest a better/safer plan. I also would rather think in terms of deciding on a course of action since once your truly committed, by definition there shouldn't be any abrupt changes. So to amend the thought:

Once you've decided on a course of action in a crisis situation it's generally much safer to stay that course rather than making an abrupt change, unless it becomes clear that the first plan is likely to lead to serious injury or death.
 
t0r0nad0 said:
Oops, I guess the left props hit first. I was sitting in the back of the room and they only showed one picture of the gouges and they were on the right side, so I guess I didn't get the full story. I stand corrected :).
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Wasn't trying to correct you, just pointing out that both props, the partially extended main gear and one tip tank all hit the runway before she tried to take off again.

But when you think about it, those first 12 prop strikes would have lasted only about 7/100 of a second if the engines were at 1,700 rpm. So, maybe with everything else going on she didn't know it happened?


Trapper John
 
Trapper John said:
But when you think about it, those first 12 prop strikes would have lasted only about 7/100 of a second if the engines were at 1,700 rpm. So, maybe with everything else going on she didn't know it happened?
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I could buy that. Highly stressful situation, everything happening very fast, not fully aware of what's going on. Would make sense to me.
 
Dr. O said:
I cannot tell you with certainty I could have done any better, but I hope so...
I can tell you from a lifetime of flying in the Great Lakes ice machine that I long ago decided the airplane is expendable...

If I am heavily iced - and I have been iced - these are my rules...
You carry insurance on the hull so you are not tempted to trade money for your life...
You make NO configuration changes when iced - or it WILL stall...
You descend by pushing forward on the yoke NOT by reducing power... And you land it on the belly (retractables) or the wheels, with the power on until you feel the ground, then yank the throttles and move the fuel selector(s) to cutoff...
If you do attempt to put the gear down do it only after you are at an altitude you would be willing to physically jump from the airplane... For me, that's about 3 feet...

Ignore the Controllers - they are not sitting there with you and they will make the wrong choices... I had a controller, on a black night over Lake Erie, insist that I MUST stay at 8000, when I was icing up like a Popsicle... I told her unable, and descended to warm air... Yes, she got an alarm on her radar - BFD...

So far, I have been lucky enough to avoid icing so heavy I would not dare lower the wheels as I crossed the numbers...
NASA has measured airframe icing rates as high as 1" per minute over the Great Lakes... That, of course, is not survivable in our GA tin cans unless you can belly it onto the ground right now...

denny-o
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A question here for my knowledge - you say if you're heavily iced, zero configuration changes (including gear), but that you haven't been in icing heavy enough to not dare lower wheels as you cross the numbers. So for you, how do you proceed? I generally push the gear lever down at the FAF (but I'm generally not iced). Are you suggesting waiting until over the numbers, then pushing the gear lever?

Thanks for sharing your advice/experience.
 
Ws this pilot flying for hire? That might be another big factor in this. I imagine it is very difficult for a professional pilot to purposely crash an aircraft. It must look horrible on one's professional record, and one would have to be really really convinced there was no other way. Far easier for us who fly our own airplanes, as we are beholden to no one save ourselves and our passengers.
 
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