Medical helicopter down ...

benyflyguy said:
That “ad” is very telling of the culture.
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Having been involved in the industry for over 30 years you have to put that "ad" and "culture" in its proper context. The other two declining companies had self-imposed weather minimums higher than the FAA requirements. Survival Flight used the stated FAA minimums. Period. As do other operators. So you can read it how you want. I'm not a supporter, nor ever have been, of single engine, VFR, night ops scene work. However, to simply point fingers at the "culture" is not a correct assessment either. The current laws and free market provide the avenue for which this will continue, but no different than pro football leads to CTE deaths or the 250,000 deaths attributed to medical errors every year--even of those who have been successfully transferred to the medical facility by helicopter.
 
How does this work now. Are positioning flights part 135 even if the crew are all employees of the operator ?
 
Weather really was not an issue if you fly a helicopter...
 
weilke said:
How does this work now. Are positioning flights part 135 even if the crew are all employees of the operator ?
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Correct. As is the flight home after drop off as well.
 
Velocity173 said:
Ugly. Don’t even know where to begin.

https://www.nbc4i.com/news/local-news/ntsb-air-ambulance-employees-had-pilots-fly-in-bad-weather/
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It's sobering to read the narrative that the flight nurse wrote before she was killed. Her efforts to be professional and avoid confrontation allowed a rogue pilot to continue flying. The accident pilot apparently wasn't the same pilot she complained about, as her narrative used male pronouns and the accident pilot was a female.

The narrative identified an extremely lax safety culture.
 
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3393RP said:
It's sobering to read the narrative that the flight nurse wrote before she was killed. Her efforts to be professional and avoid confrontation allowed a rogue pilot to continue flying. The accident pilot apparently wasn't the same pilot she complained about, as her narrative used male pronouns and the accident pilot was a female.

The narrative identified an extremely lax safety culture.
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Yep. I couldn’t believe they’d let a pilot like that continue to work there. To yell at crews, sexist comments, pushing weather etc. Just a complete lack of management enforcement of safety culture and standardization. Sounded like a complete **** show there.
 
Interesting. The operator didn't require a 135.293 check for the B407, considered it only "differences" from the B206.

Also IIMC was not noted on the last 135.293 form (which is a required check).

Also, the DOT seems like a real piece of work. And he is also the DOS. Bad.

Also, the culture of the management team........just really bad.
 
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weilke said:
That's the report from two of the subgroups. In high profile crashes, that sometimes precedes the final getting scheduled for a public hearing of the board.
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That's also a direct link to the same report that was embedded in the commercial site @Velocity173 linked. Cut out the middleman. The Aero group report is also in the docket, as are reference docs summarized in the reports. None are comfortable reads.

Nauga,
the outside observer
 
nauga said:
That's also a direct link to the same report that was embedded in the commercial site @Velocity173 linked. Cut out the middleman. The Aero group report is also in the docket, as are reference docs summarized in the reports. None are comfortable reads.
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Right, the investigation is still at the prelimnary report stage, not even a 'factual'. The release of the group reports doesn't just happen by chance, it seems to happen in cases where they see a systemic issue and want to get a discussion going.
 
NTSB is suspecting IIMC. I get that their safety culture was inadequate, but it’s still incumbent on the pilot to make rational decisions. Intentionally skipping the RA and not grabbing NVGs at 0625? I have no doubt that while the decision to go in the weather was questionable, NVGs would have made the difference in avoiding IMC. Just poor decision making.

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Documents/2020-CEN19FA072-BMG-abstract.pdf
 
I always get intrigued by some of the rabbit holes these investigations go down, and this one really got me...
"Lack of accurate terminal doppler weather radar data available on the HEMS
(helicopter emergency medical services) Weather Tool. "

TCMH barely covers Zaleski (accident site) and is far enough out in the scope as to not be entirely useful/accurate. In a light snow/icing situation, that TDWR would probably just be showing non-descript garbage echoes out there by Zaleski. As a meteorologist I just can't see the usefulness of a TDWR in this situation and location, about the the only time I'd be tapping into TDWR that far out would be a severe/tornadic situation. Also, do turbine helicopters not have their own on board radar? That said, TDWR data is available for like $10 a year on the RadarScope app so it's not like this is some huge secret.
 
The other part of it farther down is they tell NWS to make TDWR data available. That's FAA data, NWS had to beg the FAA to finally get it for use in tornado warnings.
 
Velocity173 said:
I have no doubt that while the decision to go in the weather was questionable, NVGs would have made the difference in avoiding IMC. Just poor decision making.
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It's my understanding, it was shift change and she "hot-seated" into the aircraft and used the previous pilot's info. She never checked. Don't know on NVGs.
Todd82 said:
do turbine helicopters not have their own on board radar?
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Depends on the aircraft type. A 407 would not have onboard radar.
 
Bell206 said:
It's my understanding, it was shift change and she "hot-seated" into the aircraft and used the previous pilot's info. She never checked. Don't know on NVGs.

Based on the report, she had her helmet and knee board and told the off going night pilot she didn’t need the NVGs. I’m assuming she didn’t have her own personal set. So basically is sounds like she rolled right into a flight with no RA, no record of a weather, no real crew brief / check of maint logs and no NVGs.

What I find strange is they had no real NVG use policy. People just grabbed the goggles if they wanted or if they thought it was dark. Just the fact the accident pilot flew in the preceding 8 months 16.4 night hours and only 9.7 hrs of those were NVGs should be a red flag.
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