Lion air crash - TOMATO FLAMES

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Matthew Rogers

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Looks like the Lion Air crashed plane had a broken airspeed indicator for the past 4 flights. Did they forget their TOMATO FLAMES check? I assume that is still required equipment even on a brand new 737.
 
TOMATO FLAMES is a VFR acronym, so no.

They would use MEL.
 
I am going to guess a 737 has more than one airspeed indicator.

Not sure if that airline operates with a MEL or not though.
 
Zeldman said:
I am going to guess a 737 has more than one airspeed indicator.

Not sure if that airline operates with a MEL or not though.
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Yeah, I’m willing to bet there’s a rat in the woodpile somewhere.

I have no idea how Indonesian Airlines operate, so as you’ve said, an MEL may or may not apply.
 
So when you say it had a broken airspeed indicator, what exactly do you mean? Do you mean that one of the crew’s PFDs that displays it was inop? Do you mean the standby ASI? Do you mean that one ADC was inop and either not outputting data or outputting erroneous data? Do you mean there was a problem with the pitot/static going to the ADC? What was inop? And if you know what was inop, do you know if it is deferrable in the MEL and if so what are the M&O procedures?
 
SkyDog58 said:
So when you say it had a broken airspeed indicator, what exactly do you mean? Do you mean that one of the crew’s PFDs that displays it was inop? Do you mean the standby ASI? Do you mean that one ADC was inop and either not outputting data or outputting erroneous data? Do you mean there was a problem with the pitot/static going to the ADC? What was inop? And if you know what was inop, do you know if it is deferrable in the MEL and if so what are the M&O procedures?
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It’s a greenhorn stated question without any credible evidence.
 
According to the available information, the problem was unreliable airspeed indications, not an inoperative ASI.

Of course, trying to correlate the airspeed sensing and display system of a modern airliner to a simple general aviation mnemonic is nonsensical at best.
 
3393RP said:
According to the available information, the problem was unreliable airspeed indications, not an inoperative ASI.

Of course, trying to correlate the airspeed sensing and display system of a modern airliner to a simple general aviation mnemonic is nonsensical at best.
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Unless you GOOSE A CAT. That one even works for the Space Shuttle. I’m sure of it.
 
Matthew Rogers said:
Looks like the Lion Air crashed plane had a broken airspeed indicator for the past 4 flights. Did they forget their TOMATO FLAMES check? I assume that is still required equipment even on a brand new 737.
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Maybe they don't like tomatoes.......
 
Where I grew up there was a pizza restaurant called "Flying Tomato Pizza".

Wasn't very good but they had a hot air balloon in the shape of a tomato.
 
Matthew Rogers said:
Looks like the Lion Air crashed plane had a broken airspeed indicator for the past 4 flights. Did they forget their TOMATO FLAMES check? I assume that is still required equipment even on a brand new 737.
Click to expand...

I think the issue was always “fixed” by maintenance. I looked at pictures of the flight deck for the new 737 and never saw an airspeed indicator. It’s not like there was one inoped or something.
 
We're finally getting some answers. I made a rather frustrated post in the other thread about this BS, but gradually more information is becoming available. Adjustments were made to our manuals today to address the AD, and it appears the issue has to do with a software bug in a system called MCAS, which is new to the MAX (excerpt is straight from Boeing):

"MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation."

I just got out of recurrent training yesterday, and as you can imagine this was a hot topic while I was there. What's been frustrating to us is that we had NO idea that this MCAS even existed. It was not mentioned in our manuals anywhere (until today). Everyone on the 737 had to go through differences training for the MAX and it was never mentioned there either. I've been flying the MAX-8 a couple times per month for almost a year now, and I'm sitting here thinking, what the hell else don't I know about this thing? Not that this is necessarily Boeing's fault - there's a general feeling out on the line that the differences training was more minimal than it should have been. It's entirely possible that my company simply didn't disseminate everything.

@Larry in TN - I'm curious, did your manuals discuss anything about MCAS on the MAX?
 
Now I understand your reaction, and owe you an apology for criticizing your post. When a function is added that has the ability to affect the flight controls in what appears to me a rather drastic fashion, it shouldn't be buried in the FCOM.
 
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Larry in TN said:
Yes, but I'd have to look it up again to say how much detail it has. We have 329 NGs and, by year's end, only 10 MAXs so I haven't flown one yet.
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Ah, interesting. Thank you. Just talked to my buddy at SWA, and he says that like us, the MCAS isn't mentioned anywhere in their documentation either. Glad to hear you guys got a little more background on the MAX than we did. We only have about 18 of them on the line, but I like day trips and commonly fly the LGA-MIA turn, which usually has a MAX on it.

Greg Bockelman said:
And me being based in “Paradise”, I’ll probably NEVER see one.
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The LEAP engines are definitely quieter and have less vibration - it's really noticeable. We made the interior worse to pack more people into the thing (172), but I've been surprised by how many *positive* comments I get from passengers about what a smooth, quiet airplane it is. Not this it's helping us much up front - the wind noise at higher IAS is very much like any other 737. :)
 
kayoh190 said:
We're finally getting some answers. I made a rather frustrated post in the other thread about this BS, but gradually more information is becoming available. Adjustments were made to our manuals today to address the AD, and it appears the issue has to do with a software bug in a system called MCAS, which is new to the MAX (excerpt is straight from Boeing):

"MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) is implemented on the 737 MAX to enhance pitch characteristics with flaps UP and at elevated angles of attack. The MCAS function commands nose down stabilizer to enhance pitch characteristics during steep turns with elevated load factors and during flaps up flight at airspeeds approaching stall. MCAS is activated without pilot input and only operates in manual, flaps up flight. The system is designed to allow the flight crew to use column trim switch or stabilizer aislestand cutout switches to override MCAS input. The function is commanded by the Flight Control computer using input data from sensors and other airplane systems.

The MCAS function becomes active when the airplane Angle of Attack exceeds a threshold based on airspeed and altitude. Stabilizer incremental commands are limited to 2.5 degrees and are provided at a rate of 0.27 degrees per second. The magnitude of the stabilizer input is lower at high Mach number and greater at low Mach numbers. The function is reset once angle of attack falls below the Angle of Attack threshold or if manual stabilizer commands are provided by the flight crew. If the original elevated AOA condition persists, the MCAS function commands another incremental stabilizer nose down command according to current aircraft Mach number at actuation."

I just got out of recurrent training yesterday, and as you can imagine this was a hot topic while I was there. What's been frustrating to us is that we had NO idea that this MCAS even existed. It was not mentioned in our manuals anywhere (until today). Everyone on the 737 had to go through differences training for the MAX and it was never mentioned there either. I've been flying the MAX-8 a couple times per month for almost a year now, and I'm sitting here thinking, what the hell else don't I know about this thing? Not that this is necessarily Boeing's fault - there's a general feeling out on the line that the differences training was more minimal than it should have been. It's entirely possible that my company simply didn't disseminate everything.

@Larry in TN - I'm curious, did your manuals discuss anything about MCAS on the MAX?
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Just saw this post referenced in a news article.

https://www.seattletimes.com/busine...atic-systems-change-linked-to-lion-air-crash/
 
kayoh190 said:
Ah, interesting. Thank you. Just talked to my buddy at SWA, and he says that like us, the MCAS isn't mentioned anywhere in their documentation either. Glad to hear you guys got a little more background on the MAX than we did. We only have about 18 of them on the line, but I like day trips and commonly fly the LGA-MIA turn, which usually has a MAX on it.
Click to expand...

Just curious - MCAS is not mentioned at all in your company FCOM? In the MAX FCOM I have (Rev 6 - August 16 2018), it is listed in the "Abbreviations" section on page 17, but not described otherwise.
 
slacktide said:
Just curious - MCAS is not mentioned at all in your company FCOM?
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It was mentioned in the Abbreviations section only. Our systems manual (which we call OM Volume II) combines both the -800 and MAX into one document. That’s why I was initially reluctant to blame this on Boeing - I thought perhaps the MCAS was overlooked while my company added the MAX stuff to OM II. But it appears it wasn’t in the MAX FCOM to begin with.
 
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