KWVI Watsonville MId Air, Multiple Fatalities

Let's remember the Twin pilot was NOT in landing configuration. He crashed flaps up and gear up at 200mph. We need to be predictable in the pattern, and a missile coming through in cruise configuration is not a common occurrence on our field.

The investigation showed this knuckle-headed twin pilot landed at our airport monthly and would never enter the pattern. If the patter was full, he would break overhead and make right traffic over near the jump zone (as the pictures above shows) and reenter for another direct to final. This is a left traffic pattern runway.

The twin pilot was a ticking time bomb who should have been stopped earlier.

What amazes me is that the twin pilot was only one mile out without having the base-leg traffic in sight, and did not begin his go-around right then and there. It also amazes me that the base-leg aircraft continued across the final-approach course after hearing that the twin pilot was only one mile out without having him in sight. No matter who has the right of way (or THINKS they do), in the interest of putting survival above being right, both pilots should have taken evasive action at that point.
 
...a missile coming through in cruise configuration is not a common occurrence on our field.
A very good description! When making a straight-in you really need to be slowed down and constantly on the lookout for traffic popping into view on base leg. They come at you out of nowhere, out from the haze, from behind window posts and engine nacelles. As a corporate pilot I made lots of them, but I never flew as though that gave me the right of way. If the pattern was busy, I'd be happiest to circle the field and get a good look at the situation. Even at busy tower-controlled fields you can have close encounters. Straight-ins need to be approached as though you're catching a poisonous snake with your hands.
 
A very good description! When making a straight-in you really need to be slowed down and constantly on the lookout for traffic popping into view on base leg.

It also helps to coordinate on the radio. Instead of simply talking into the blind, having two courteous pilot speaking with each turns this into a nothing-burger. I frequently have other traffic at our local uncontrolled airfield. I make sure both myself and the other pilot are clear on who is #1 to land and who is #2. If I appear closer in than I call #1 and ask if they are ok with that. If they appear closer than I ask if they would like to be #1. Either way no difference to me as long as we both know who is first and who is second.

On the off chance the other pilot is a D**** than I will just do a 360 and let them do what they are going to do.

fwiw - I do straight in approaches, mid-field cross overs and left downwind entries. Whatever seems convenient for where I am coming from. It all seems to work. On straight in approaches, I do make the initial radio call at 10 nm out but I do not consider myself (nor call myself) on final until I make the call at 5 nm out. I also do a short final call @ 1 nm in case somebody just turned their radio on and missed the other calls.
 
The investigation showed this knuckle-headed twin pilot landed at our airport monthly and would never enter the pattern. If the patter was full, he would break overhead and make right traffic over near the jump zone (as the pictures above shows) and reenter for another direct to final. This is a left traffic pattern runway.

Is this documented somewhere? The 340 pilot normally did overhead breaks to enter the pattern?
 
Is this documented somewhere? The 340 pilot normally did overhead breaks to enter the pattern?

The information came from someone who participated in the investigation. Monthly the 340 pilot would fly direct to final, and if someone was on final, he would break right over the runway and past the jump area to return back for another attempt direct to final. I was left with the impression he didn't repeat the maneuver twice on the same sortie, as it was not necessary. Likewise when he return home, direct to final.

The whole thing is just sad and avoidable with a little more prudence.
 
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...fwiw - I do straight in approaches, mid-field cross overs and left downwind entries. Whatever seems convenient for where I am coming from. It all seems to work. On straight in approaches, I do make the initial radio call at 10 nm out but I do not consider myself (nor call myself) on final until I make the call at 5 nm out. I also do a short final call @ 1 nm in case somebody just turned their radio on and missed the other calls.
When you're ten miles out, whether you consider yourself to be on final would seem to me to be a moot point, and in fact there was an aircraft that landed successfully after the twin pilot made his ten-mile call.

At what distance would you consider yourself to be on final?
 
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At what distance would you consider yourself to be on final?
For straight in to an uncontrolled airport:
When I pass the FAF when on an instrument approach then I make a VFR call that I am on final.
When not flying an instrument approach then then I make a VFR call at 5 nm miles out and announce on final.

In addition to the VFR CTAF calls, these points (FAF or 5 nm) are also where I am preparing for landing. First notch of flaps, mixture, props, drop gear, landing lights, [check] seat belts. Speed needs to already be under control and on a proper rate of descent for a stabilized approach.

If my target is 120 (mph) and I am currently at 180 (mph) at my FAF/5nm then I have badly mismanaged my descent and speed. I certainly have made this mistake. This is not a stabilized approach. I am not going to try and muscle it down. I made a mistake and it happens. Break off the approach. Announce it. Correct the speed and find the best way to fit back into the pattern at that point for a stabilized approach.
 
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When you're ten miles out, whether you consider yourself to be on final would seem to me to be a moot point, and in fact there was an aircraft that landed successfully after the twin pilot made his ten-mile call.

At what distance would you consider yourself to be on final?

For what it's worth, according to the Pilot Controller Glossary the controller considers you on final when you are aligned with the final approach course or aligned with a landing area, and they define the final approach course on an instrument approach with respect to alignment with a runway without regard for distance.

Interestingly, for an airport without an instrument approach procedure, it looks like "final" simply means "aligned with a landing area".

One of the hazards with situations like Watsonville is the way self-interpretation of the rules allows both pilots in converging aircraft to assume that they each have the ROW. What's different about Watsonville is that the twin pilot was operating outside of sensible practice on his approach.

Final.jpg
 
Five miles out is not a final in my book, let alone further than that. And 90 seconds is enough time to go from midfield downwind to off the runway in what I'm flying. That's obviously the other extreme of the spectrum, but seems like a more reasonable metric. I'm all for courtesy, but it goes both ways. How many 360s should people in the pattern have to do so that someone else can make a long straight in and not be inconvenienced?
 
...How many 360s should people in the pattern have to do so that someone else can make a long straight in and not be inconvenienced?

in this particular case, absolutely none. if he extended downwind for 20 seconds he could have let the twin barrel into the hangars all by himself.
 
Let's remember the Twin pilot was NOT in landing configuration. He crashed flaps up and gear up at 200mph. We need to be predictable in the pattern, and a missile coming through in cruise configuration is not a common occurrence on our field.

The investigation showed this knuckle-headed twin pilot landed at our airport monthly and would never enter the pattern. If the pattern was full, he would break overhead and make right traffic over near the jump zone (as the picture above shows) and reenter for another direct to final. This is a left traffic pattern runway.

The information came from someone who participated in the investigation. Monthly the 340 pilot would fly direct to final, and if someone was on final, he would break right over the runway and past the jump area to return back for another attempt direct to final. I was left with the impression he didn't repeat the maneuver twice on the same sortie, as it was not necessary. Likewise when he return home, direct to final.

The whole thing is just sad and avoidable with a little more prudence.

The 340 reported on the radio that he was on a "straight in" for the runway, but it seems like that wasn't really correct. "Straight in" would have involved him getting slowed, configured, and started on his descent before he got to the field.

If the 340 was being honest, he would have reported on the radio that he was inbound for the runway, and intended to do a right hand overhead break.

I don't recall all the "hazardous attitudes of flying" or whatever they're called, but it sure seems like the 340 pilot felt the rules didn't apply to him, and he could do as he pleased, regardless of the situation in the pattern.
 
Five miles out is not a final in my book, let alone further than that. And 90 seconds is enough time to go from midfield downwind to off the runway in what I'm flying. That's obviously the other extreme of the spectrum, but seems like a more reasonable metric. I'm all for courtesy, but it goes both ways. How many 360s should people in the pattern have to do so that someone else can make a long straight in and not be inconvenienced?

I didn't write the Pilot Controller Glossary, but that's their book.

The distance defining final is not nearly as relevant as the distance that exists between two aircraft approaching the same runway, and when the regulation defines ROW and which aircraft must remain clear of the other that should determine the action taken to manage that hazard. The distance between two aircraft converging in cruise is not specified either, but when that distance becomes a hazard, it's clear which aircraft is required to remain clear of the other.
 
I didn't write the Pilot Controller Glossary, but that's their book.

The distance defining final is not nearly as relevant as the distance that exists between two aircraft approaching the same runway, and when the regulation defines ROW and which aircraft must remain clear of the other that should determine the action taken to manage that hazard. The distance between two aircraft converging in cruise is not specified either, but when that distance becomes a hazard, it's clear which aircraft is required to remain clear of the other.
Yeah, I'm not arguing any of that. And it's a very different situation when ATC is involved. I was once told to make straight in from 7 miles out and cleared to land. In a J3. The line of planes at the hold-short line when I crossed the threshold.....

The ROW rules are ambiguous in those and other ways, including their application in the pattern.
 
in this particular case, absolutely none. if he extended downwind for 20 seconds he could have let the twin barrel into the hangars all by himself.

If he had known the twin was at the speed it was at, sure. But, we have no reason to believe he understood that part.

There is nothing to suggest the single engine pilot was doing a "I'm landing first because of a technicality" move. Matter of fact, we have the audio that once he understood the situation he tried to get out of it instead of demanding right of way. He failed, true, but it goes to intent on his part.

This is going to be difficult to rule on, because you have different issues. At a minimum you have:

1) right of way. This thread alone has shown there is no firm consensus in THIS case.
2) where is an acceptable point to declare to be on final. (related, but not exactly the same as point 1)
3) reasonable speeds when conducting operations near the airport with the stated intention to land.

The bottom line, in my opinion, is that neither pilot really understood the situation until it was too late. If they understood it (singly or together) we wouldn't be having this discussion.
 
I was once told to make straight in from 7 miles out and cleared to land. In a J3.

Sounds like the controller considered 7 miles as "final" in that case. :)

I'm not sure why the people that are actually at risk of getting killed should consider a shorter distance.
 
While "a straight-in aircraft farther than X miles out is not on final" is an interesting discussion, I question its relevance, for the following reasons:

1. If the rule is that a straight-in aircraft is on final regardless of distance, the regulation still permits another aircraft to pass in front if it is able to remain "well clear."

"When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear."​

2. If the rule is that a straight-in aircraft is NOT on final if it is farther than X miles out, it IS on final as soon as it gets closer than X miles out. In this case, the collision occurred about twenty seconds after the twin reached (and announced) being one-mile out.

Twenty seconds should have been enough time for either pilot to avoid the collision. Considering the amount of disagreement on this subject, no one should base their survival on an assumption that another pilot will yield the right-of-way.
 
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Yeah, I'm not arguing any of that. And it's a very different situation when ATC is involved. I was once told to make straight in from 7 miles out and cleared to land. In a J3. The line of planes at the hold-short line when I crossed the threshold.....

The ROW rules are ambiguous in those and other ways, including their application in the pattern.
I've had a similar experience, both as the pilot in the slow airplane, and as the pilot at the hold-short line. As the Austin incident illustrates, while some controllers are overly conservative about that, sometimes one is not conservative enough.
 
This is going to be difficult to rule on, because you have different issues.
I have no doubt this will realistically be settled in civil court with a lawsuit.

imho This is unlikely to go to trial and will be a negotiated settlement. From a civil point of view the facts which appear to be available seem quite lopsided from a civil lawsuit point of view.
 
I have no doubt this will realistically be settled in civil court with a lawsuit.

imho This is unlikely to go to trial and will be a negotiated settlement. From a civil point of view the facts which appear to be available seem quite lopsided from a civil lawsuit point of view.

I was thinking more from the NTSB investigation recommendations point of view.

And I agree w/ a settlement vs a lawsuit.
 
If he had known the twin was at the speed it was at, sure. But, we have no reason to believe he understood that part.

There is nothing to suggest the single engine pilot was doing a "I'm landing first because of a technicality" move. Matter of fact, we have the audio that once he understood the situation he tried to get out of it instead of demanding right of way. He failed, true, but it goes to intent on his part.

The twin's three-mile call, and especially his one-mile announcement of not having the base traffic in sight, were clues that were missed by both pilots. They still had at least twenty seconds to avoid each other after the latter call.

This is going to be difficult to rule on, because you have different issues. At a minimum you have:

1) right of way. This thread alone has shown there is no firm consensus in THIS case.

True.

2) where is an acceptable point to declare to be on final. (related, but not exactly the same as point 1)

Who says what on the advisory frequency does not determine who has the right-of-way. It DOES provide information that may help others to become aware of potential collision hazards, so from that point of view I would say that there is more upside than downside to announcing it early.

By the way, on the recording I listened to, the twin pilot never did use the word "final."

3) reasonable speeds when conducting operations near the airport with the stated intention to land.

Whether that would be sufficient for a finding of "careless or reckless," I can't predict. I won't be surprised if the NTSB finds it to be a contributing factor, however.

The bottom line, in my opinion, is that neither pilot really understood the situation until it was too late. If they understood it (singly or together) we wouldn't be having this discussion.

Amen.
 
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While "a straight-in aircraft farther than X miles out is not on final" is an interesting discussion, I question its relevance, for the following reasons:

1. If the rule is that a straight-in aircraft is on final regardless of distance, the regulation still permits another aircraft to pass in front if it is able to remain "well clear."

"When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear."​

2. If the rule is that a straight-in aircraft is NOT on final if it is farther than X miles out, it IS on final as soon as it gets closer than X miles out. In this case, the collision occurred about twenty seconds after the twin reached (and announced) a one-mile final.

Twenty seconds should have been enough time for either pilot to avoid the collision. Considering the amount of disagreement on this subject, no one should base their survival on an assumption that another pilot will yield the right-of-way.

Quoting my own transcription from back then:

24:07 to 24:14 - 0WJ - Watsonville area traffic, twin Cessna 740WJ, three miles, straight in, two-zero, full stop, Watsonville

24:17 to 24:21 - 931 - And Watsonville traffic Cessna 931 turning left base, two-zero, Watsonville

24:37 to 24:47 - 0WJ - Watsonville area traffic, Twin Cessna 740WJ, one mile, ah, straight in, two-zero, full stop, looking for traffic on left base

24:47 to 24:49 - 931 - Yeah, I see you, you’re, uh, behind me

25:00 to 25:03 - 931 - Gonna go around then, because you’re coming at me pretty quick, man


Let’s not forget that 30 seconds prior to the midair, the 340 was actually 1.5nm out and that in the 10 seconds it took him to finish the “one mile” final call (now 20 seconds prior to impact), he’d traversed .5nm. That’s room for about one transmission each at the rate of closure and the speed these guys cumulatively talked. A reasonable approach speed of 120 would have given a them an extra 15 seconds (50% more time) and maybe one more comm each.

From the three mile call, I’d assume most normal traffic to be about 90-120 seconds out. The 340
was 60 seconds out and not slowing.
 
I look at, "What's the overall lesson in this? What if both pilots had a history of basically doing what they did in this case, particularly in the case of the twin pilot?" With enough complaints involved and reported to the FSDO the FAA without taking a certificate action would likely at the VERY least advised the pilot of the twin that his approach technique could be considered careless and reckless and could result in certificate action if continued. A stern warning.

The C172 pilot had not repeatedly cut in front of any aircraft on final, but had he done it in this case but without the collision and the twin pilot complained, I'm guessing that the FAA would likely have simply reminded the C172 pilot that he should have remained well clear and not cut in front of the aircraft on final, i.e turned back into the pattern without obstructing the maniac on final.
 
he should have remained well clear and not cut in front of the aircraft on final
If going strictly by ROW regs, do not skip over an important part of that which has the words "... TO LAND ..."
" Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of this rule to ..."

The physical evidence which has been discussed indicates the twin had no intention of landing whereas the single clearly was attempting to land until such point as the single announced intention to go-around.

This section goes on to say:
"When two or more aircraft are approaching an airport for the purpose of landing, the aircraft at the lower altitude has the right-of-way, but it shall not take advantage ..."
Which again has the phrase "... FOR THE PURPOSE OF LANDING ..." and in this case, it will not take much for a lawyer to be arguing in a civil lawsuit that the twin was not there for the purpose of landing.

It is not possible to know what was going through the mind of the pilots involved but it will be the job of a handful of people to come to a conclusion. Blame will be assigned and financial damages will be awarded.
 
If going strictly by ROW regs, do not skip over an important part of that which has the words "... TO LAND ..."

I hope you're not suggesting that it's up to the pilot contemplating turning from base to final to question the intentions of a pilot on final who has not in any way indicated that he's doing anything but landing. Discussion of physical evidence in retrospect doesn't really count.

I don't think for one second that the estate of the twin pilot won't be drained by this event, but that's not really the issue here.
 
I hope you're not suggesting that it's up to the pilot contemplating turning from base to final to question the intentions of a pilot on final who has not in any way indicated that he's doing anything but landing. Discussion of physical evidence in retrospect doesn't really count.

I don't think for one second that the estate of the twin pilot won't be drained by this event, but that's not really the issue here.
It’s been my contention from the start that it is not reasonable for anyone in the 152s position to expect the twin to be closing that quickly. I certainly would not have, and will not in the future. If I felt this was a common way to fly I would quit flying. And if happen to I see a pilot make those calls and still be going that fast across the threshold, with gear and flaps up, you bet I’ll be making a call to the Faa. A plane turning slowly to final cutting me off, like the 150 did, maybe I’d get a bit steamed, but I’d adjust and move on with life. Huge difference between what these planes did.
 
Discussion of physical evidence in retrospect doesn't really count.

I don't think for one second that the estate of the twin pilot won't be drained by this event, but that's not really the issue here.
That is the only thing that counts here and that is the only issue here.

The only thing that matters in the air is coordination. Who has the legal ROW is irrelevant. In the air at the moment if your intention is to live for the next day.
 
That is the only thing that counts here and that is the only issue here.

The only thing that matters in the air is coordination. Who has the legal ROW is irrelevant. In the air at the moment if your intention is to live for the next day.

That's a circular argument. Right of way governs coordination, but I do agree that coordination matters.

You wouldn't pull out of a driveway hoping the car already on the main road will just stop to avoid hitting you. You KNOW he has the ROW so yielding to him until it's safe to proceed is how the interaction is coordinated and the hazard is mitigated.
 
That's a circular argument. Right of way governs coordination, but I do agree that coordination matters.
You are intentionally misinterpreting my post. No worries. You do get to fly how you to want to fly.

I will fly with communication, cooperation and coordination.

The lawyers will get to argue which are the two pilots from this discussion had the legal right of way. One of the lawyers will win.
 
Without knowing the final approach speed of a twin Cessna, I wouldn't have assumed that it was safe to turn base after hearing its three-mile call. Even if the 340 were flying the recommended speed, it seems like it would be only about a mile-and-a-half behind me by the time I turned final. To have a plane about twice my speed that close behind me would not be within my comfort zone.
 
I will fly with communication, cooperation and coordination.

What if you don't have a radio? What if the other guy doesn't have a radio? What if neither of you have a radio?

Those are all possible scenarios at a non-towered field, and SOMETHING has to substitute for communication.
 
What if you don't have a radio? What if the other guy doesn't have a radio? What if neither of you have a radio?

Those are all possible scenarios at a non-towered field, and SOMETHING has to substitute for communication.

common sense?
 
You wouldn't pull out of a driveway hoping the car already on the main road will just stop to avoid hitting you. You KNOW he has the ROW so yielding to him until it's safe to proceed is how the interaction is coordinated and the hazard is mitigated.

That's probably a bad example. Drivers, in fact, do this every day. If you dont, you will rarely go anywhere because there is probably not many situations where there is not a car on the main road.

Rather, you see how far away the car coming is, you judge speed, and if you feel it is safe you pull out, even though there is a car on the road.

That is the point. The single engine pilot felt it was safe to do what he did. There is nothing to indicate this pilot felt he was challenging the twin. Nor did he persist in his behavior when he realized the situation.

WE know it was a bad move, but what we know is irrelevant to why he did what he did.
 
There are a lot of similarities and a lot of differences, but the common factor is that one of the converging objects has the right of way, and the other has to yield. If you are the one that is obliged to remain clear, you need to be sure that you can do so. If there's any doubt, don't cut in front of the aircraft on final (or the car on the road).

The only real mistake that I think the C152 pilot made was to cross the approach course instead of turning to remain on the pattern side, which gives the aircraft with the ROW the option of landing or stepping right to an upwind entry to the pattern on the go around.
 
Does anyone really care about what the NTSB says?

They’ve become almost useless as an investigative body.

They seem to put a lid on internet crash arguments... 2 years or so after the incident. So they're not completely devoid of value, you just need to look really hard. :)
 
What if the regs were rewritten so that length of final was associated with speed of aircraft? Like Cat 1 aircraft with speeds less that 120kt get 3 mi finals, twins get 5 mi finals and larger aircraft get 7 mi finals? Just a thought so don't skewer me.
 
What if the regs were rewritten so that length of final was associated with speed of aircraft? Like Cat 1 aircraft with speeds less that 120kt get 3 mi finals, twins get 5 mi finals and larger aircraft get 7 mi finals? Just a thought so don't skewer me.
How would a pilot on base know whether he had the right-of way or not?
 
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