KWVI Watsonville MId Air, Multiple Fatalities

[dbahn]

And apparently the NTSB has come out and kind of arbitrated this to determine that the 340 was not considered to be on final. . .

. . . which is nonsense. If he wasn't on final, where was he? Even the FAA pilot/controller glossary defines final as "commonly" meaning being on the final approach course OR is alingned with the landing area without regard to distance.








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[luvflyin]

But everyone needs to think logically. You're on base and close to turning final when you realize you may have a conflict from an aircraft on final who you don't see, who has the ROW and may not even be able to see you below his nose. Which way do you turn?

My argument is that you immediately turn left to the inside of the pattern and remove the risk of collision if he either (1) continues on final to land or (2) goes around and moves to the right side of the runway. You simply get out of his way without entering the final approach path, in this case on the assumption that trying to turn back to the downwind puts you head to head with him, because it's way too late to just "extend downwind". Both these guys were communicating but were not processing it well, and they had plenty of time to do that.

Yeah. But like someone said, we’ve already done like 26 pages of discussion on all this. That being said, the report might have contained a ‘contributing cause’ like many do.

 

[Ed Haywood]

the plane on final always has the right of way. Its defined at 14 91.113 or something.

That is not what the FAR says. 91.113 says the lower aircraft has the right of way. It then goes on to admonish pilots not to abuse that rule by cutting in front of other aircraft "on final approach to land." It never says aircraft on final have the ROW. That is an interpretation.

Note the NTSB report says nothing about a violation of ROW by the 152. The sole causal factor cited was the failure of the twin pilot to see and avoid.

 

[dbahn]

That is not what the FAR says. 91.113 says the lower aircraft has the right of way. It then goes on to admonish pilots not to abuse that rule by cutting in front of other aircraft "on final approach to land." It never says aircraft on final have the ROW. That is an interpretation.

It's actually the first thing that the regulation says about landing ROW in 91.113, which may be why people seem to miss it.




Note that there's an "even though" about that first sentence, i.e. it can't use the ROW to force another aircraft that has already landed off the runway. So there's also an "even though" about the aircraft at the lower altitude, i.e. it can't use that ROW to cut in front of an aircraft on final. So how SHOULD that be interpreted??????

 

[Ed Haywood]

It's actually the first thing that the regulation says about landing ROW in 91.113, which may be why people seem to miss it.

You're right, and that is why I missed it.

 

[ElPaso Pilot]

Note the NTSB report says nothing about a violation of ROW by the 152. The sole causal factor cited was the failure of the twin pilot to see and avoid.

^^^ This.

 

[Lindberg]

It's actually the first thing that the regulation says about landing ROW in 91.113, which may be why people seem to miss it.


View attachment 127398

Note that there's an "even though" about that first sentence, i.e. it can't use the ROW to force another aircraft that has already landed off the runway. So there's also an "even though" about the aircraft at the lower altitude, i.e. it can't use that ROW to cut in front of an aircraft on final. So how SHOULD that be interpreted??????

Was the twin "on final approach to land"? I don't think so. I also don't think ROW matters much to the NTSB's analysis. The twin barreling down final with no intention or preparation to land is a bad actor.

 

[dbahn]

And that may well be why the NTSB listed the sole cause as attributable the twin, based on the gear up/flaps up configuration at the point of impact. In that regard I agree with their decision, since 91.113 doesn't even apply to an aircraft making a high speed pass over the field at or below pattern altitude.

But what if this whole scenario could be re-played, which IMHO is the only value to these discussions? How does the C150 pilot KNOW that the twin isn't landing? They both were communicating, and of course the twin pilot wasn't about to announce a low pass or any intention not to land - any more than he did on previous occasions. The C150 never saw the twin, much less his gear or flap configuration, and I don't think he could have known the twin's speed. I feel sorry for the C150 pilot, but have no similar feelings for the pilot of the twin.

Ultimately, it all reverts to the (b) in 91.113: "General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft." Unfortunately, that means you need to take into account that other pilots will be doing stupid things, and there's something to be learned from an accident like this where one of them is clearly doing something VERY stupid. Sadly, the C150 seemed to be following that general guidance in 91.113, just too little, too late . . .

 

[2-Bit Speed]

But what if this whole scenario could be re-played, which IMHO is the only value to these discussions? How does the C150 pilot KNOW that the twin isn't landing?

He doesn't. I wonder if part of the reason for NTSB's decision was due to the lies made by the Twin pilot on radio. He reported being On Final To Land. Honesty is a virtue.

 

[Ed Haywood]

. . . which is nonsense. If he wasn't on final, where was he? Even the FAA pilot/controller glossary defines final as "commonly" meaning being on the final approach course OR is alingned with the landing area without regard to distance.

IMO that interpretation is based on an incorrect assumption. The PCG defines "final" as a colloquial term synonymous with Final Approach Course, which has only an alignment criteria. But FAR 91.113 does not use the standalone term "final". It uses the phrase "final approach to land". The two terms should not be equated.

IMO a better match would be "final approach segment" from the PCG, or "final approach" from the PHAK. Both of those terms contain both an alignment criteria and an altitude/activity criteria ("descent for landing"). In the context of an instrument approach, both of those also carry a positional criteria, which is inside the FAF or FAP. In the context of a VFR approach, the term "final leg" from the AFM is probably the best match. It also carries an altitude/activity criteria: descending from TPA to land.

Bottom line, the FAA did not intend to create a situation where an aircraft could line up 10 miles out, declare the magic incantation "on final", and tell everyone else to get the hell out of the way. If they did, the NTSB conclusion would have stated "failure of 152 pilot to observe ROW rules."

It's a bit of an academic discussion anyways, since the twin pilot was not actually on a final approach to land. He was doing a low pass, and lied about his activity.

 

[wanttaja]

Was the twin "on final approach to land"? I don't think so. I also don't think ROW matters much to the NTSB's analysis. The twin barreling down final with no intention or preparation to land is a bad actor.

The ROW was written in an era WITHOUT aircraft radios being common. What you say on the radio doesn't matter. Would the CAA have believed that a plane ten miles out was on "Final"? Don't think so.

There's an unfortunate tendency for some people to think that announcing their actions on CTAF at an untowered field is the same as gaining "permission." Was behind a guy on final once, who decided he was too close to the plane in front of him and announced he was doing a 360. What, exactly, did he expect me to do? What I *did* do is wave as he went by in the opposite direction.

Ron Wanttaja

 

[TCABM]

Dead men tell no tales, so everyone, including the NTSB, is making a lot of assumptions on what thought processes were at play. Those may be informed assumptions, but they’re still assumptions.

The lesson to be learned is sometimes being right results in being dead right.

 

[Ed Haywood]

One thought just occurred to me. Did the 152 pilot know the twin was a twin? Or did he just hear Cessna xxx?

I would not turn base in front of a biz jet or twin on 3 mile final. But I would turn in front of a Cub. Or a Cessna 152 or 172.

 

[Ed Haywood]

The ROW was written in an era WITHOUT aircraft radios being common. What you say on the radio doesn't matter. Would the CAA have believed that a plane ten miles out was on "Final"? Don't think so.

Good point. From abeam the numbers, I can typically spot aircraft on final from 2 to 3 miles, depending on size. If I cannot see any traffic, then I know I have at least 90 to 120 seconds to land. Likewise on final, I know when I get within 2 to 3 miles I should be able to see anything on base. All that works radio or not.

Fortunately, most NORDO aircraft are slow.

 

[Palmpilot]

The ROW was written in an era WITHOUT aircraft radios being common. What you say on the radio doesn't matter. Would the CAA have believed that a plane ten miles out was on "Final"? Don't think so.

There's an unfortunate tendency for some people to think that announcing their actions on CTAF at an untowered field is the same as gaining "permission." Was behind a guy on final once, who decided he was too close to the plane in front of him and announced he was doing a 360. What, exactly, did he expect me to do? What I *did* do is wave as he went by in the opposite direction.

Ron Wanttaja

I once did a 360 on the 45 because I didn't have time to think of a better solution when I found myself head-to-head with a plane doing an overhead entry. There was another plane behind me on the 45 and I don't know how he avoided me when I announced the 360, but fortunately, he did. (In retrospect, I think it would have been safer to turn upwind.)

In the situation you describe, I assume that doing a go-around at the appropriate time would have been better than a 360.

 

[Palmpilot]

I think some of the blame rests with the FAA for writing a regulation that says a plane on final approach to land has the right-of-way, while publishing guidance that makes it sound like traffic already in the pattern has the right-of-way. That sets up a recipe for conflict right there.

 

[Palmpilot]

That was after turning final in front of what he assumed was a twin that was far enough away for him to safely execute a touch and go - and what would have been a far away enough plane had the twin been appropriately configured and utilizing appropriate speeds for the environment.

The twin was definitely going way too fast. However the 152 turned base after the twin announced being three miles out. Would that have been enough time if the twin had been flying its normal final approach speed? Maybe it would have provided enough time for them to see-and-avoid each other, but I'm not sure.

From the previously-provided transcript:

24:07 to 24:14 - 0WJ - Watsonville area traffic, twin Cessna 740WJ, three miles, straight in, two-zero, full stop, Watsonville​

​

24:17 to 24:21 - 931 - And Watsonville traffic Cessna 931 turning left base, two-zero, Watsonville​

https://www.pilotsofamerica.com/com...d-air-multiple-fatalities.139336/post-3297162

 

[dbahn]

I once did a 360 on the 45 because I didn't have time to think of a better solution when I found myself head-to-heaith a plane doing an overhead entry. There was another plane behind me on the 45 and I don't know how he avoided me when I announced the 360, but fortunately, he did. (In retrospect, I think it would have been safer to turn upwind.)

In the situation you describe, I assume that doing a go-around at the appropriate time would have been better than a 360.

In general, when a situation in the pattern arises that I don't like, I feel most comfortable widening the pattern, then figuring out what to do next. By "widening" I include extending upwind, crosswind or downwind legs, but once you're on base leg you may need a different solution, particularly if there's an aircraft following (like a NORDO Cub that you can't see either). In that situation (e.g. Watsonville) it seems to me that the safest place is parallel to the runway but on the other side of where a go-around would be for an aircraft on final. The idea is that traffic is all flowing in the same direction around the runway and there's more time to make further adjustments in spacing.

If you adhere to the idea that aircraft on final has the ROW (and I always do) the two critical decision times to look very carefully at the final approach course are before turning base and all the way to entering the final. That's where the majority of fatal mid-airs occur.

I agree completely that the FAA is at fault with ambiguous guidance in their regulations vs. the advisory circulars.

 

[wanttaja]

I once did a 360 on the 45 because I didn't have time to think of a better solution when I found myself head-to-head with a plane doing an overhead entry. There was another plane behind me on the 45 and I don't know how he avoided me when I announced the 360, but fortunately, he did. (In retrospect, I think it would have been safer to turn upwind.)

In the situation you describe, I assume that doing a go-around at the appropriate time would have been better than a 360.

I don't see a 360 on the 45 being as much of an issue, because, technically, what you did was break off the pattern entry and come back to try it again. I wouldn't have any hesitation about doing that, as my airplane has excellent visibility. I might go out a bit further rather than make it a pure circle.

I was involved in an incident a couple of weeks back that I won't go into for now. But there was a plane that performed a 360 in the downwind/base area who apparently expected the other airplanes in the pattern to follow behind on his 360.

Ron Wanttaja

 

[dbahn]

The ROW was written in an era WITHOUT aircraft radios being common. What you say on the radio doesn't matter.

I remind people of this all the time and in some ways NORDO aircraft will always be a weak link, but that's an important thing to always remember.

Radios can be a huge help, but they can also sometimes serve as a catalyst for other problems, and Watsonville might be one example. I also think there's some wisdom in this old publication about pattern entry, presumably when radio communication at least wasn't emphasized. All aircraft essentially circled the airfield making left hand turns until they could identify the preferred runway and enter a downwind on the forty five (or the upwind) to land. I think when FBOs started using Unicom and reporting airport advisories (which they no longer routinely do) the procedure changed.

It still makes a lot of sense to me.

 

[iamtheari]

It's a bit of an academic discussion anyways, since the twin pilot was not actually on a final approach to land. He was doing a low pass, and lied about his activity.

He’s also 100% deceased. From his perspective after his last flight, every discussion of right of way is academic and moot. For the rest of us, I think the main lesson is unsurprising: You can’t trust other members of the species to act rationally, correctly, or with due regard for your life or their own.

 

[Hengelo]

That is some kinda dark worldview my dude. It's not that I don't share it, but written like that.... dark.

You can’t trust other members of the species to act rationally, correctly, or with due regard for your life or their own.

 

[Palmpilot]

I don't see a 360 on the 45 being as much of an issue, because, technically, what you did was break off the pattern entry and come back to try it again. I wouldn't have any hesitation about doing that, as my airplane has excellent visibility. I might go out a bit further rather than make it a pure circle.

I was involved in an incident a couple of weeks back that I won't go into for now. But there was a plane that performed a 360 in the downwind/base area who apparently expected the other airplanes in the pattern to follow behind on his 360.

Ron Wanttaja

After the fact, I was uncomfortable with the fact that I had trusted to luck that the plane following me on the 45 would be able to safely avoid me, especially considering that Half Moon Bay Airport does not have all that much maneuvering room between the downwind and nearby rising terrain. I'm not saying that it's always a bad idea, but given what I knew about where other aircraft were at the time, I felt it wasn't the best choice.