Korean 777 Down in SFO

As I pointed out to a group of non-pilots I was discussing this with last night, U.S. airline pilots used to have a cultural norm of excessive deference to the captain, which led to the development of cockpit resource management training. I don't think pointing that out is an expression of racial prejudice against my own race!
...and your race would be "US airline pilot"? :rolleyes:

Sorry, couldn't resist. I'm sure your audience had some indication of your race.

Bill "black US pilot" Watson
 
I think that it what he meant to say.

Like I said, IIRC, and I didn't. ;)

I did recall that the two pilots had no clue which way the other was commanding and if they don't move in conjunction, that was the actual situation.

Thanks

Cheers
 
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Could some Boeing pilot confirm the info that is in the media - A/T won't engage if flight directors disagree (one is ON anther is OFF).
 
Which leads to two distinct possibilities....either the A/T malfunctioned (which is possible) or the flight crew did not fully understand the automation they were using (also possible).

Or they set it there before they got out of the cockpit in a vain attempt to cover their asses
 
No one has yet made any racial comments.

No one has yet dismissed "...Asians [as] not being able to fly airplanes."

If this is the take-away message you are getting, you are not reading closely. Every environmental contributor to the accident chain must be considered, and to pretend that personal and/or societal norms cannot play a factor is simply silly.

Obviously, we do not know whether these factors materially contributed to this particular accident or not, or whether variances in training and qualification related to societal norms made it more likely to occur. Wait and read the report.

Most importantly, however, is this: for one to throw down the "racial comments" or "racist" card like this, when the commenter has no way of knowing the motives or beliefs of those about whom they complain, is the true measure of intolerance.

You're not finding them because at least some of the offending posts have been deleted. For instance, go locate the quote that post #268 is responding to.

I don't object to "culture" being worked (correctly) into training and human factors responses to the accident, provided independent evidence really does point to that as a factor. I do object to culture being blamed in the absence of other evidence. The latter is indeed racist, and more importantly, useless in preventing accidents. And it WAS done in this thread. If you don't think an assumption about race "explaining" this accident is racist, I'd be very interested in what you think racism is. No, it is not limited to burning crosses on people's lawns.
 
In "Flight Level Change" mode of descent the auto throttles will not wake up if 0000 is dialed in the Altitude window as it might be if one was high on the approach to start out with. It's considered a very poor technique because of this gotcha. He should have disengaged the autopilot but left auto throttles on with target speed dialed in and just hand flown it in.
 
You're not finding them because at least some of the offending posts have been deleted. For instance, go locate the quote that post #268 is responding to.

I don't object to "culture" being worked (correctly) into training and human factors responses to the accident, provided independent evidence really does point to that as a factor. I do object to culture being blamed in the absence of other evidence. The latter is indeed racist, and more importantly, useless in preventing accidents. And it WAS done in this thread. If you don't think an assumption about race "explaining" this accident is racist, I'd be very interested in what you think racism is. No, it is not limited to burning crosses on people's lawns.
No, you're just back peddling now because you're actually starting to realize your Kumbah Ya crap isn't cutting it and the true explanation lies in a cultures norms preventing CRM to work in the spirit in which it is TRULY intended.
 
No, you're just back peddling now because you're actually starting to realize your Kumbah Ya crap isn't cutting it and the true explanation lies in a cultures norms preventing CRM to work in the spirit in which it is TRULY intended.

Backpedaling?

No, it is WRONG to ASSUME that race is the cause here without external evidence. That is the complete absolute sum total of everything I said here on the topic.

And you're assuming that it plays a role here. DID cultural norms play a role in defeating CRM in this accident? If you claim you know the answer right now, you're either one of the four pilots involved, or you're relying on a racist assumption.
 
Backpedaling?

No, it is WRONG to ASSUME that race is the cause here without external evidence. That is the complete absolute sum total of everything I said here on the topic.

And you're assuming that it plays a role here. DID cultural norms play a role in defeating CRM in this accident? If you claim you know the answer right now, you're either one of the four pilots involved, or you're relying on a racist assumption.

I think if you substitute "cultural conditioning" for "race" you can assign a contributory factor, but I am becoming more and more confident that group think and inadequate cross checking are root causes here.
There was no indication or communication to ATC of any abnormal conditions, no adverse weather factors, no facility infrastructure factors not covered by NOTAM, apparently just three heads up and locked.
 
Spoiler alert.

Denzel, er...

Lee Kang-kuk is hanging out at his dad's old crop duster place -- with no runway, which might explain why it went under -- thinking about all the generations of pilots he flew with, while chugging a bottle of whiskey, and enjoying the "company" of his new addict friend he met in the hospital stairwell.

Next year he'll have a big epiphany on the witness stand after John Goodman brings him some drugs and parties with him.

Oh... Wait. I slipped into Hollywood land again.

Damn these mental breaks from reality.. I'm going to have to get that checked out.

;) ;) ;)

(That's probably some of the sense of the general public's view of this whole thing, of course. Thanks Hollywood.)
 
You're not finding them because at least some of the offending posts have been deleted.
Okay, so the poster who made the initial allegedly 'racist' comment deleted his comment so as not to further offend anyone (which he stated was not his intention) and yet you are still waving the racism flag.....if you don't like it, let it die man. At this point, you are the one who is keeping it alive.

If the allegations are true, it will at most be a contributing factor rather than the cause.
 
Just an additional piece of info. Was talking with a friend today.

The seawall is 350 feet short of the runway, but almost 900 feet short of the touchdown zone (which is where they should have been aiming).....

Makes the fail bigger than I initially thought.
 
Just an additional piece of info. Was talking with a friend today.

The seawall is 350 feet short of the runway, but almost 900 feet short of the touchdown zone (which is where they should have been aiming).....

Makes the fail bigger than I initially thought.

To make it an even bigger fail, they should have been aiming for the 1000 foot markers.:nono:
This will get spun several ways, but the reality, in my opinion, is three pilots sat and watched, or didn't watch, the airspeed and altitude slowly get way too low.:mad2: Blame it on cultural norms or whatever you want, they screwed up and 2 people died. The conditions were perfect for a visual approach, not many excuses, but I'm sure we'll hear a couple. :mad2:
 
Just an additional piece of info. Was talking with a friend today.

The seawall is 350 feet short of the runway, but almost 900 feet short of the touchdown zone (which is where they should have been aiming).....

Makes the fail bigger than I initially thought.

If you watch the video carefully you'll see the aircraft was surfing for a few hundred feet before it hit the seawall.

The video also shows the extreme nose up angle, which seems to confirm they chased the glide path to the detriment of airspeed.

Considering how far right of the centerline the strike was, I'd say they had completely lost control of the aircraft and it was in the process of stalling as it hit the water and seawall.
 
More from another guy who's BTDT w/T-shirt





From:
Sent: Tuesday, July 09, 2013 8:51 AM
To:
Subject: FW: B-777 Accident summary

Dave was my maintenance officer in VA 146. Naval Test Pilot grad and instructed at the AF Test Pilot School at Edwards. Did the spin test on the A-7. Thought you'd enjoy. Another friend indicated that the 777 was at 103 kts at impact.
Dear Admiral Jim,
I am sending this reply to you . . . please feel free to distribute it to members of your address list as you see fit. For starters . . . the “accident” at SFO was, in a word, inexcusable! Utterly inexcusable! In fact to call it an “accident” is a stretch. It smelled bad from the start, and the more information that leaks out . . . the worse it gets. The First Officer was the “Pilot Flying” (PF) in FAA parlance. The Captain was the “Pilot Monitoring” (PM) in FAA parlance. In the FAA world, the Captain would have to have been a certified “Line Check Airman” (LCA). A LCA is a company pilot who is screened, first by his or her corporation and then by the FAA, who then receives considerable additional training both in ground school and the flight simulator as well as being supervised in the cockpit through a qualification check. LCAs have two normal functions . . . they administer “Route Checks” to each flight crew . . . actually, to each Captain on a yearly basis. The other primary function of an LCA is to administer “Initial Operating Experience” or “IOE” to new Captains who are upgrading to the Captains position or to new First Officers who are just learning the aircraft. IOE has a very specific syllabus, both ground school and inflight training, and specific grading criteria that a pilot moving into either seat must accomplish successfully before being released to fly as a part of an unrestricted flight crew. The normal time to complete the syllabus is 25 flight (Block) hours and a certain minimum number of landings . . . at FedEx the landing requirement was six if my memory serves me correctly. Additional flight time can be assigned if the ‘student’ is considered weak or not proficient/comfortable in any part of the syllabus. “Students” can ‘fail’ IOE and at FedEx failures were required to return to their previous seat position and pass a check ride for that seat to remain employed. Some companies handle the ‘failure’ situation differently. During my twenty-three years with FedEx, I was a Captain Line Check Airman for over fifteen of those years and have performed IOE with literally a couple hundred pilots who were moving into the B-727. When I got hired in 1987 I was the 743 pilot on the seniority list . . . when I retired the Company had over 4,100 pilots.

As to the accident . . . first of all, every airline that I am aware of requires that the aircraft be “stable” at a specific point (referred to as the Stable Gate at FedEx) in any approach. The term “stable” has very specific criteria attached. The aircraft must be fully configured to land . . . landing flaps down and locked and the landing gear down and locked, airspeed must be plus five to minus zero from Bug . . . the Reference Approach speed. Engines must be spooled up . . . normal approach power setting for the flap configuration . . . and the Before Landing Checklist must have been completed. During VFR conditions when using a Visual Approach, all of this had to be completed prior to 500 feet AGL or a Missed Approach (Go Around) was MANDATORY. If the aircraft was in IMC conditions and instruments approaches were being used . . . the “stable” call had to be made prior to 1,000 feet AGL . . . or a Missed Approach was MANDATORY. I would be stunned if Ariana Airlines did not have a very similar policy. Virtually all major carriers use some form of this procedure. Second . . . the decision was made a long time ago that safety would be enhanced by incorporating technology into the cockpit to ‘ease’ the pilot workload. For the most part this has been a blessing . . . but, the unintended consequence has been that real pilot stick and rudder flying skills are permitted to atrophy . . . and . . . with enough ‘technology’ you can hide very weak flying skills. Believe me . . . there are plenty of pilots who worship at the altar of “automation”. We had plenty of very senior First Officers (Co-Pilots) at FedEx that were in the DC-10, A-300 or MD-11 . . . all highly automated aircraft, who would not even try to upgrade to Captain in the B-727 because . . . you had to know how to fly to operate a B-727. We have destroyed nine widebody aircraft at FedEx in the past fifteen or sixteen years . . . all . . . every one . . . due to poor flying skills. In fact, we crashed a DC-10 at Memphis several years ago with a LCA in the Captain’s seat and a ‘problem pilot’ in the right seat . . . on a beautiful day . . . not a cloud in the sky . . . with a fifteen knot cross wind (the aircraft limit is 30 knots on the beam). They landed in a skid, collapsed the right main gear . . . punctured the left main fuel tank . . . slid down the runway and burned . . . and lived to tell about it.

The first real red flag for the SFO accident was that IOE was in progress and the ILS was NOTAMED out of service. This was reportedly the First Officer’s first attempt at landing the real aircraft . . . not the simulator. Everyone needs to see and memorize the correct “on glideslope” picture from the cockpit when learning to fly a new aircraft . . . everyone. So this ‘student’ should not have been performing this landing unless he had demonstrated proficiency landing the aircraft previously. (As a by the way, it is not at all uncommon in situations like this where there is a parallel runway whose ILS is operating . . . to tune it and use the glide path indicator as a ‘reference’ for the approach. As long as the touchdown zones are close to each other, it works fine.) The second red flag was the huge airspeed deviation. All FAR Part-25 Certified aircraft (as the B-777 is) are certified to land at 1.3 Vstall . . . or 130% of the aircraft’s stall speed in that configuration at the approach gross weight. The Stick Shaker activates at around 1.1 Vstall . . . so this aircraft was probably over twenty knots below the Bug speed for its gross weight . . . a HUGE deviation! HUGE! The next red flag was the reported 1400 fpm descent rate during the approach. The wind was out of the Southwest at eight knots and they were attempting to land on 29 Left . . . so they had a three or four knot headwind component . . . their average descent rate should have been in the neighborhood of 700 fpm at that approach speed. The need for 1400 fpm suggest that the First Officer, lacking an ILS glideslope or Middle Marker . . . did not recognize the correct sight picture to commence his descent and started down late . . . sorta the ‘High coming down all the way” approach at the ship. Now . . . the next comment is pure speculation . . . but I will buy you dinner if I am wrong. The First Officer was using “Auto-Throttles”. We, at FedEx have banged up a couple of big airplanes because auto-throttles virtually encourage the pilot to remove airspeed from his scan . . . even from his consciousness. With landing flaps selected and 1400 fpm descent rate . . . the auto-throttles in all likelihood had both engines at flight idle and when it was obvious that there was a problem . . . the throttles already should have been pushed up to break the descent rate. I’m just guessing . . . but I have that ‘hair standing up on your neck’ feeling that neither the LCA (Captain) or the First Officer had looked at airspeed until the stick shaker/aural warning sounded. My last comment is that the Captain of that flight should be fired . . . anyone who lets a ‘student’ deviate that far . . . for that long . . . and lives to tell about it . . . should start looking for another line of work. Utterly incompetent! The lack of professionalism of this Captain is astounding in so many respects. I have long since lost count of the number of times that I have had to “take” the airplane from a new pilot to the B-727 because they got overwhelmed by the circumstances. It can be a wonderful ‘teaching moment’ if it is handled correctly.

So . . . the next time you strap yourself into one of these technological marvels . . . ask yourself if the two clowns up front can do anything but type sixty words a minute into a Flight Management System.

Cheers,
Dave
 
So, are 10,000 hour pilots in a new type not allowed to land at, say, SAN?
 
More from another guy who's BTDT w/T-shirt

T-shirt chest size is perhaps XXXL? He doesn't say or opine anything remarkably unique that I haven't already read here or elsewhere, but he certainly thinks highly of himself.

We have destroyed nine widebody aircraft at FedEx in the past fifteen or sixteen years . . . all . . . every one . . . due to poor flying skills. In fact, we crashed a DC-10 at Memphis several years ago with a LCA in the Captain’s seat and a ‘problem pilot’ in the right seat . . . on a beautiful day . . . not a cloud in the sky . . . with a fifteen knot cross wind (the aircraft limit is 30 knots on the beam). They landed in a skid, collapsed the right main gear . . . punctured the left main fuel tank . . . slid down the runway and burned . . . and lived to tell about it.

If this hadn't been copied and pasted from some other source one could ask him what became of the pilots of those aircraft.

...I would be stunned if Ariana Airlines...

The wind was out of the Southwest at eight knots and they were attempting to land on 29 Left . . . so they had a three or four knot headwind component . . .

Couldn't be bothered to get the name of the airline, the runway, or wind vectors correct. Asiana. Runway 28L. Winds:

32 minutes before:
KSFO 061756Z 21006KT 10SM FEW016 18/10 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP097 T01780100 10183 20128 51005

27 minutes after:
KSFO 061856Z 21007KT 170V240 10SM FEW016 18/10 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP098 T01830100

Can't wait for more copy-and-pasted expertise of dubious pedigree to appear here.
 
T-shirt chest size is perhaps XXXL? He doesn't say or opine anything remarkably unique that I haven't already read here or elsewhere, but he certainly thinks highly of himself.



If this hadn't been copied and pasted from some other source one could ask him what became of the pilots of those aircraft.





Couldn't be bothered to get the name of the airline, the runway, or wind vectors correct. Asiana. Runway 28L. Winds:

32 minutes before:
KSFO 061756Z 21006KT 10SM FEW016 18/10 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP097 T01780100 10183 20128 51005

27 minutes after:
KSFO 061856Z 21007KT 170V240 10SM FEW016 18/10 A2982 RMK AO2 SLP098 T01830100

Can't wait for more copy-and-pasted expertise of dubious pedigree to appear here.

Ok, thanks for proof reading an email. I guess with your pedigree you've never misspelled a name or gotten a number off. Sorry the rest of us don't live in your sciolist world.

I know what the majority of what he wrote was way, way over your head, but he does make valuable points for those who understand transport category operations and automation technology.
 
Now the news is saying they sat for 90 seconds after the crash before commencing the evac. FAs were apparently waiting for word from the pilots and only started the evac when they saw flames. Truly amazing that there weren't more fatalities.


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk HD
 
Players play, nit-pickers pick.

Ok, thanks for proof reading an email. I guess with your pedigree you've never misspelled a name or gotten a number off. Sorry the rest of us don't live in your sciolist world.

I know what the majority of what he wrote was way, way over your head, but he does make valuable points for those who understand transport category operations and automation technology.
 
Maybe the light that blinded him was the one in his head telling him he should be on a stabilized approach at 500'. If so, that explains why he'd never seen it before.
 
...and your race would be "US airline pilot"? :rolleyes:

Sorry, couldn't resist. I'm sure your audience had some indication of your race.

Bill "black US pilot" Watson

I was under the impression that during the period of time I was talking about, a high percentage of airline pilots were white. I don't think that pointing out the excessive deference to the captain that existed in pre-CRM days constitutes racism against whites.
 
I can't wait for the CVR transcript....


Sent from my iPad using Tapatalk HD

First draft released by Asiana PR dept:

하자 말 자동차가 고장 스로틀 .... 아니,의 우리가, 눈을 멀게했다 가정 해 봅시다 .... 하나는 내 플레이 보이를 참조하십시오? 맙소사! 우리는 더 나은 여기서 얻을 것이다! :D
 
First draft released by Asiana PR dept:

하자 말 자동차가 고장 스로틀 .... 아니,의 우리가, 눈을 멀게했다 가정 해 봅시다 .... 하나는 내 플레이 보이를 참조하십시오? 맙소사! 우리는 더 나은 여기서 얻을 것이다! :D

That's exactly what I thought they'd say!!:rofl::rofl:
 
Backpedaling?

No, it is WRONG to ASSUME that race is the cause here without external evidence. That is the complete absolute sum total of everything I said here on the topic.

And you're assuming that it plays a role here. DID cultural norms play a role in defeating CRM in this accident? If you claim you know the answer right now, you're either one of the four pilots involved, or you're relying on a racist assumption.

Do you equate cultural norms with race?

For example, do Koreans who are born and raised in the U.S. adhere to Korean cultural norms to as great a degree as those who were born and raised in Korea?
 
Ok, thanks for proof reading an email. I guess with your pedigree you've never misspelled a name or gotten a number off. Sorry the rest of us don't live in your sciolist world.

I know what the majority of what he wrote was way, way over your head, but he does make valuable points for those who understand transport category operations and automation technology.

Players play, nit-pickers pick.

Gentlemen, I was being kind. I already know that Wayne is so self-absorbed that he couldn't be bothered to realize that he copied-and-pasted in his earlier post 411 the same thing that Rex Kramer copied-and-pasted a day earlier in post 385. (Neither of which is the post I was being snarky about.) I saw no reason to mention his odd duplication then, but finally decided to make note of the self-irony on seeing him posting yet another copy-and-paste chest-pounding diatribe outraged at the obvious.

But it is true these things are over my head. For example, I really don't know what to make of the following, though, since it seems to imply the author of the quoted text might not be untainted by the same sins he feels has been committed in this "accident":

"During my twenty-three years with FedEx, I was a Captain Line Check Airman for over fifteen of those years and have performed IOE with literally a couple hundred pilots who were moving into the B-727.
[...]
We have destroyed nine widebody aircraft at FedEx in the past fifteen or sixteen years . . . all . . . every one . . . due to poor flying skills."
 
This would not had happen if they would have been ADS-B in/out equipped. Right?

José
 
Sorry you had to waste time clicking over a duplicate post, as I know it probably kept you from your Wikipedia research.

Gentlemen, I was being kind. I already know that Wayne is so self-absorbed that he couldn't be bothered to realize that he copied-and-pasted in his earlier post 411 the same thing that Rex Kramer copied-and-pasted a day earlier in post 385. (Neither of which is the post I was being snarky about.) I saw no reason to mention his odd duplication then, but finally decided to make note of the self-irony on seeing him posting yet another copy-and-paste chest-pounding diatribe outraged at the obvious.

But it is true these things are over my head. For example, I really don't know what to make of the following, though, since it seems to imply the author of the quoted text might not be untainted by the same sins he feels has been committed in this "accident":

"During my twenty-three years with FedEx, I was a Captain Line Check Airman for over fifteen of those years and have performed IOE with literally a couple hundred pilots who were moving into the B-727.
[...]
We have destroyed nine widebody aircraft at FedEx in the past fifteen or sixteen years . . . all . . . every one . . . due to poor flying skills."
 
Now the news is saying they sat for 90 seconds after the crash before commencing the evac. FAs were apparently waiting for word from the pilots and only started the evac when they saw flames. Truly amazing that there weren't more fatalities.

I heard a radio interview the day after the crash with a passenger who was seated in an exit row (window seat) just behind the right wing. Based on the interview, I wasn't under the impression he waited for permission to open the door. The door had no functioning slide (reason TBD), and there was a bit of a jump to the ground.

If the crew waited for a second to issue evacuation orders, they should be brought up on charges for endangering the passengers.

Frankly, with this apparent level of incompetence, they should all share a cell with the captain of the Costa Concordia.
 
Do you equate cultural norms with race?

For example, do Koreans who are born and raised in the U.S. adhere to Korean cultural norms to as great a degree as those who were born and raised in Korea?

I am ethnically Korean, born in the US, and consider myself culturally American though I am sure I like my Samsung LED TVs and Korean BBQ as much as anyone from Korea.
 
K. J. Choi's son and my youngest grandkid are in the same 4th grade class, play (and excel) on all the same sports teams, are very good friends and share the same first name. But we're iPad people with Samsung flat-screens in the MBR and great room. Go figure.

I am ethnically Korean, born in the US, and consider myself culturally American though I am sure I like my Samsung LED TVs and Korean BBQ as much as anyone from Korea.
 
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