How much did poor training contribute to this accident?

My hope is that the CFIs emphasize these (and some other) aspects of flying as grave danger for the pilot and their families.
:yeahthat:

Some topics that get discussed and examined in PP orals are more likely to kill you than others. I'd be very surprised if anyone ever died because they couldn't explain the difference between AWOS 2 and AWOS 3, or because they didn't know the rules about reporting a DUI. But things like CG location or takeoff performance kill pilots if they're ignored, and I think we can do a better job of driving those things home.
 
There are too many scenarios to cover by the CFI and examine by the DPE.
However, I am talking about the most basic things here, like W&B, DA, and climb rates near the GW.
My hope is that the CFIs emphasize these (and some other) aspects of flying as grave danger for the pilot and their families.

Why do you presume both the CFI and DPE are the root cause?

I mean I would hazard to guess this was not the first time this CFI and DPE combo sent a new pilot into the wild. Do either have a track history of their students/examinees having mishaps (fatal or otherwise)?

Sucks to say it, but until there’s evidence suggesting both the CFI and the DPE got it wrong, the presumption is the pilot is where the root cause will lie.
 
Well, these types will be these types. Not much to be learned there.

So what can we do to help going forward? Don’t BLAME the CFI/DPE, but maybe try to bend their paradigm to catch these sorts of attitudes more than drilling math or ASOS decoding skills…

A good pilot doesn’t know ALL this stuff… but knows the basics well enough to go check the details when necessary. Good decision making is the single most important thing to evaluate.
 
Why would (or should) this be less likely right after a checkride than any other time in a pilot’s life?
Isn't the period between 100-200 hours statistically the most dangerous? The checkride was awhile ago, and complacency sets in before real skills are acquired.
I'll have to admit that I cram for my BFRs...it's a matter of pride that I do the ground portion closed-book. CFI usually drops the manual between us, and I don't touch it.
I've been doing the ground part online... the CFI I use prefers it that way, I don't think he really likes doing orals.

I've calculated a W&B precisely once for each of the past five airplanes I've owned... for all of them there is no way I could load them out of limits unless I was carrying lead bricks or gold bullion in the baggage compartment. I can't afford gold bullion anyway. :(
 
Sometimes the simple explanation is what happened.

The guy knew enough to pass the oral and check ride. But he was just “that guy” who does what he wants to do because of arrogance and / or laziness.
 
. . . . I've calculated a W&B precisely once for each of the past five airplanes I've owned... for all of them there is no way I could load them out of limits unless I was carrying lead bricks or gold bullion in the baggage compartment. I can't afford gold bullion anyway. :(
"When empty weight C. G. falls within range given, computation of critical fore and aft C. G. positions is unnecessary. Range is not valid for non-standard arrangements." I ran the numbers anyway . . . true, unless I weighed something like 60 pounds and / or my passenger weighed 300.

Let's see . . . 20 pounds of gold would go for $490,906 (at $2,045.64 / oz.). 20 pounds of anthracite nut coal (Santa's favorite) is just $6.50.
 
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And some people think flight reviews are a waste and insulting.
I consider mine a waste. Every two years, I have to fly an airplane with over twice the horsepower, four times as many seats, a digital panel, with CG concerns (mine is almost impossible to load out of range), and that requires attention to approach airspeed. My first "landing approach" in this brand-new (to me) airplane is always deadstick (e.g., simulated engine failure). Not really reasonable. FAA used to allow single-seat BFRs, wish they'd go back.
I've been doing the ground part online... the CFI I use prefers it that way, I don't think he really likes doing orals.
I've only had one online ground section, about 15 years ago. Complete waste of time. Random selection of items from Part 91, none of them with any relation to my usual operations ("91.805: Final compliance: Subsonic airplanes"? Really?).

On the other hand, I find the verbal review aspect of the ground portion very useful. All the instructors I've had have tailored it to my own operational situation (flying under a Class B veil). Time well spent, and I agree the refresher is nice.

Ron Wanttaja
 
Why do you presume both the CFI and DPE are the root cause?

I mean I would hazard to guess this was not the first time this CFI and DPE combo sent a new pilot into the wild. Do either have a track history of their students/examinees having mishaps (fatal or otherwise)?

Sucks to say it, but until there’s evidence suggesting both the CFI and the DPE got it wrong, the presumption is the pilot is where the root cause will lie.
Sorry, I did not mean to blame either the CFI or the DPE.
I am questioning the training system, where priority is given to the questions on the checkride. In addition to that, I think they need to emphasize more fundamentals.
 
I'm amazed by the number of people who don't bother to check W&B. If I had a dollar for every time I've heard "it'll carry anything you can fit in the doors", I'd have enough to get MY plane out of balance.

I'll never forget when I was plane shopping; I went to go look at a Cherokee Six. The W&B was so far out of date that nothing on it was still in the panel. The owner's just laughed it off and said the above. I passed.

There seems to be a general feeling that flying over gross weight is no big deal. Like driving 5-10mph above the speed limit. "Hell, Alaska gives you 10% over".
It's not that simple. A plane flown by a solo pilot with half fuel can have 10% more HP/lb than the same plane at max gross weight. And that does not translate into a 10% performance gain, but a lot more. People modify 150HP engines in their planes to get 160HP. That might seem trivial and not worth the time and effort, but you're improving the performance a lot more than 6%, because that's 10HP added not to the 150, but to the 30 or 40 normally available for climbing, once all the straight and level drag has been accounted for. So the actual climb performance will increase substantially. Same thing, fail to account for high density altitude on a hot day, and the 10-20 HP loss in a 150HP engine will have a dramatic impact on climb performance, which might not be apparent if you look at the total numbers.
This is an excellent explanation. I've never thought of it that way, but it makes a lot of sense.
 
:yeahthat:

Some topics that get discussed and examined in PP orals are more likely to kill you than others. I'd be very surprised if anyone ever died because they couldn't explain the difference between AWOS 2 and AWOS 3, or because they didn't know the rules about reporting a DUI. But things like CG location or takeoff performance kill pilots if they're ignored, and I think we can do a better job of driving those things home.
I'd be surprised if anyone failed a check ride for failing to explain the difference between AWOS 2 or AWOS 3 or even to report a DUI. But I know applicants have failed for being unable to calculate W&B or density altitude. Where is it that these things are not taught and tasted?

It seems more likely to me that the pilot decided those were just things he needed to know for the test and not worry about in the real world.
 
There’s nothing about a private pilot certificate that magically prevents stupid.
100!
It's amazing to me that so many people are jumping on the poor training and DPE bandwagon without any knowledge of this accident pilot's training history. Density Altitude and CFIT kill experienced high time pilots every year. To err is human and no amount or type of training will change that. Sadly, not everyone has the temperament or judgement for aviation...
 
I consider mine a waste. Every two years, I have to fly an airplane with over twice the horsepower, four times as many seats, a digital panel, with CG concerns (mine is almost impossible to load out of range), and that requires attention to approach airspeed.
Fortunately the local FBO has a J-3 I can use for mine.
I'm amazed by the number of people who don't bother to check W&B. If I had a dollar for every time I've heard "it'll carry anything you can fit in the doors", I'd have enough to get MY plane out of balance.
It depends on the plane. For most of the planes I've owned it really is true. But I agree that knowing how to do a W&B is something any pilot (or A&P!) absolutely has to know. And sadly, some don't.
 
Why would (or should) this be less likely right after a checkride than any other time in a pilot’s life?
I would think it would happen rather close to the checkride, when one takes everyone up in the plane because we are a pilot. I probably gave 20 people rides.
 

I am questioning the training system, where priority is given to the questions on the checkride. In addition to that, I think they need to emphasize more fundamentals.
So the training system is the problem. Okay, the hypothesis is the knowledge test, experience requirements and ACS performance standards produce pilots that are unwilling to implement the knowledge and experience in part 91 operations.

How do you test the hypothesis?

I would think it would happen rather close to the checkride….
Maybe. What does the data say? That could help us test the hypothesis above.

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The chart above indicates something is resulting in lower accident rates across the board for non-commercial fixed wing.

The chart below is interesting. Because Instrument is a rating across certificates, the data isn’t quite granular enough.
4d1e0114b1842a35a2bc0d5335cdfc29.jpg
 
Everybody knows you should brush your teeth and floss. Sometimes instruction is not the issue, compliance is. It is very hard to test people in a way that reliably predicts behavior once the supervision is absent. That is why we value experience so highly.
 
Everybody knows you should brush your teeth and floss. Sometimes instruction is not the issue, compliance is. It is very hard to test people in a way that reliably predicts behavior once the supervision is absent. That is why we value experience so highly.
I love that metaphor. And my point is: show people pictures of bad teeth and videos of Alzheimer's patients that had bad oral health. That is much more powerful than simply repeating "brush your teeth every day".
 
Believe it or not, there are people who would see those pictures and still do what they want.
 
Believe it or not, there are people who would see those pictures and still do what they want.
I agree, but would they improve the effect? I think they would.
 
I appreciate the nod of approval, but GWLs (graphic warning labels) have shown to be ineffective.

Wow, that is very surprising. Thank you for sharing.
So the reason we have so many fewer smokers is simply because of cigarette prices?
 
Probably has more to do with how limited the advertising is, and public education.
 
And nowadays, smoking is so much rarer that the smell is significantly more obvious. I learned this the hard way when my family moved to California in the 90s. Smoking wasn't nearly as popular in that region and all of a sudden I was getting bullied for the smell of my clothes. That had never happened to me before.
 
Seems to me that not too long ago we had a VERY long discussion about some young lady from TN who blatantly ignored/forgot everything she was ever "taught."
So when are the videos being released to the public?
 
Given that they've all been removed from YT I doubt we'll ever see them again. Especially given how much the aviation community came down on the absolutely terrible airmanship. At this point, I think most of us are waiting to see what the NTSB finds.
 
I think the internet archive might have a copy of those videos.
 
Did you see the video ar 4:18? He ran one out of gas as a student solo pilot and damange a DA 20.
That sez something right there, as to the pilot's abiltity to "PAVE". I hate using that acronym but the FAA is right about this.
Look at the problem- the pilot

Guy ran out of fuel during his solo x-country, which should have been done under close guidance of his CFI and flight school. In any case this to me speaks volumes about his ADM skills or lack of. The question comes down to his personality traits and how his CFI handled them. My guess is that he was a walking accident looking for the right combination of factors to crash
 
Un fortunately, most training is done at well below max gross, and perform better than POH values, leading many to expect that to be true when heavy.
I learned this on my PP checkride. Grumman Tiger, so 4 place, so training was max 2 pilot and many times, less than full fuel.

My instructor asked if I minded him riding in the back on my checkride. I was fine with this, as was the DPE.

First take off was to be a soft field. I banged the tail pretty hard due to the more aft CG. We did the rest of the checkride and the DPE asked if I wanted to do the soft field again. I said yes. My instructor said he was getting out. I told him he was fine, as I knew what happened and how to avoid it, but he got out anyway.

Second soft field went perfectly and I soon had my temp certificate.
 
Maybe a better title for the thread would be along the lines of “a failure in the leadership aspect of training”?
 
Ugh. This made me feel just like when I watched the video of the plane departing a really long grass strip with a really long flat grassy area past it, being unable to climb but not aborting, and finally crashing into trees.

Hope does not provide lift.
 
Maybe a better title for the thread would be along the lines of “a failure in the leadership aspect of training”?

So the expectation is every CFI in the US should have refused to train this mishap pilot? And every DPE should have refused to examine the airman?
 
No, but it probably could be emphasized more. Think about it, have you EVER heard of that? It’s RARE. And DIFFICULT.

But if there’s something to be learned, it’s likely this.

Edit: poor DPE is skills only, too small a window. This is more of a CFI thing. Not that someone can’t shop around and trick the system. This whole flying thing is about doing better, never gonna be perfect.
 
No, but it probably could be emphasized more. Think about it, have you EVER heard of that? It’s RARE. And DIFFICULT.

But if there’s something to be learned, it’s likely this.

Edit: poor DPE is skills only, too small a window. This is more of a CFI thing. Not that someone can’t shop around and trick the system. This whole flying thing is about doing better, never gonna be perfect.

I don’t disagree on the lesson to be learned comment, but the fact is training is fundamentally about creating behavioral changes and ingraining habit patterns. Motivational factors are incredibly difficult to change absent some type of corrective action.

Even as structured as .mil and 121 operations are, there are still human error caused mishaps that can be directly attributed to hazardous attitudes.

Nothing being perfect tacitly acknowledges there will be exceptions, and statistically the data shows mishaps are still incredibly rare.

Blaming the CFI who has no legal, moral, or ethical requirement to supervise the operational execution of a certificated pilot operating under Part 91 rules is a bit much though.
 
I read through the docket and final report. Unless I missed it, there’s plenty of talk about the intended destinations, but no concrete evidence regarding the intended route (a direct routing to BCE is only a reasonable assumption).

Pure speculation, as we’ll never likely know, but you might wonder if this wasn’t a gross navigational error. That the pilot thought he was following I-15 southbound until he rounded that first corner leading into the canyon and had no way out. I know it’s kind of a longshot as no reasonable person would confuse UT-14 with I-15, but I’ve seen pilots do dumber things, like thinking an overweight aircraft at those density altitudes could outclimb rapidly rising terrain like that. I dunno.

Either way, once he passed that first set of hills (at the Cedar Canyon trailhead on Google Maps) into the box canyon, there was no going back. And frankly, the sight picture of those foothills being at or above the aircraft level couple with an anemic climb rate should have given ample warning to turn back before reaching that point. It makes more sense if he thought it would flatten out like it does with 15 going to the south.

(Edit to add: contributing to the possibility of a navigational error- he didn’t give himself a lot of altitude or time to confirm the plan for exiting the Cedar City proper - either “exit” is only three or four miles from the airport. Both curve slightly right off of the “grid” and are surrounded by hills. One leads to safety, the other doom).

But with the performance they were getting, their fate was sealed at that moment. Regardless of whether this was a gross navigational error or the intended route, you can see how quickly and easily one wrong turn like that would turn fatal.
 
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in reality it's "Acceptable Losses"
Acceptable losses are inherent in the development of training requirements.

If no loss was acceptable, PPL would take 250 hours and include all instrument and commercial skills.

40 hours is a compromise. Make pilot status attainable with a reasonable effort, while keeping the mayhem at a level society will tolerate.
 
So the expectation is every CFI in the US should have refused to train this mishap pilot? And every DPE should have refused to examine the airman?
The dude ran out of fuel and crashed on his solo x-country, what other red flags do you need?
 
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