Flying the Osprey

I admit I don’t know squat about the osprey, but in a helicopter you avoid VRS by coming in with speed, it’s coming straight down that results in VRS.
If the Osprey tries to come in fast like a helicopter they develop the aforementioned vortex ring state. They run out of lift, crash spectacularly and kill everyone. The change that made them safe is they don't come in fast, since they can't. Problem is they were acquired to replace helicopters, which deliver troops to the front lines. The Osprey can't take on that mission, as it can neither land fast nor defend itself all that well (smaller caliber guns aboard to save weight). As such it's a miserable failure. Yes it can cart troops and VIPs around when the bullets aren't flying, but lots of airplanes and helicopters can do likewise at a fraction of the cost. Yes, it looks pretty in the movies, though I'd not want all that light and noise in a war zone.
 
One of the interesting design choices is how to set up the pilots’ controls. Like a helo or a fixed wing? Collective, cyclic, twist grip and rudder pedals or Stick (or yoke), rudder pedals and throttle or some kluge?

Where to get the pilots from, Fixed wing, Helos, anybody?

What you do? This is POA so let the games begin.

Cheers
I recall that this was a major discission during development. I followed it in the press. USMC put a General in charge who had a majority FW background. Naturally, he chose mostly F/W pilots for his team. Of course, they all had to have helo quals also. They decided that the helo type controls were undesirable and cobbled up the present hybrid controls. Of course, the contractor, Bell, tried to talk them out of that. The customer is always right. Right?
The program was open to all pilots. It was reported that those selected were mostly high time F/W that also had some helo experience. What could go wrong?
Well, the Corps put on a night 4 ship demo simulating a combat assault with full loads. It was in front of dignitaries. The last ship was piloted by a Major with loads of C-130 time & about 600 - 800 helo hrs. That A/C closed the distance on the flight too fast and had to decel. It turned out to be an almost hover at about 800'. A seasoned helo pilot would have taken a better interval and be ready for a go around. The vid that I saw showed a right roll and it going in inverted. The high hover and the R rotor "breaking" first looked like classic vortex ring state to me. About a 30 body count.
I was awed the first time I saw the Bell XV-15 fly. I regret that I was born too late for Corsairs and too early for Ospreys. Then it was announced that the outfit that I was "Digging ditches in the sky" with slapped down deposits on two Augusta 609s. Check my avatar. It's a 609 in Bristow colors. Augusta photo shopped it over Bristow hq in Houston. I was employed at the time by Bristow Western Hemisphere. (Later Bristow N & S America) My plan was to challenge the writ, but the FAA didn't even have that category at the time.
Augusta (now Leonardo) now has the 609 program and it has a fair record. Only one accident to my knowledge. About 2017/2018 they did an aerodynamic cleanup on the aft fuselage and two test pilots had it in cruise about 300KTs. It came apart and scattered parts over couple miles near Milan. The FDR showed that the BAE Tripple redundant auto pilot input a tad too much rudder to compensate for a small aileron deflection. Increased in amplitude and developed a Dutch roll. The FDR showed the test pilot inputting full deflection aileron to counter. Everyone who has flown a S-76 with no yaw dampener knows that Dutch roll is countered with yaw inputs. Like dancing. Need to get in step with it.
There is a USAF MV-22 Squadron about 40 miles from home at Hurlburt AFB. I see them going into NAS P'cola from time to time. 20th Spec Ops Squadron. I used to socialize with them in Nam. They were on Nha Trang AFB and were the 20th Air Commando Sq then. I wonder if I threw some names around, I could get some sim time.
 
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If the Osprey tries to come in fast like a helicopter they develop the aforementioned vortex ring state. They run out of lift, crash spectacularly and kill everyone. The change that made them safe is they don't come in fast, since they can't. Problem is they were acquired to replace helicopters, which deliver troops to the front lines. The Osprey can't take on that mission, as it can neither land fast nor defend itself all that well (smaller caliber guns aboard to save weight). As such it's a miserable failure. Yes it can cart troops and VIPs around when the bullets aren't flying, but lots of airplanes and helicopters can do likewise at a fraction of the cost. Yes, it looks pretty in the movies, though I'd not want all that light and noise in a war zone.

Again, you are using fairly imprecise terms for what is a fairly complex discussion. Not everything that happens in a "war zone" is a firefight with bullets flying. Operational maneuver involves putting troops in place before the enemy can react in force. If you can move faster and farther than the enemy, you gain positional advantage before shots are fired. Carting troops around wins campaigns and battles. The C-17 and C-130 cart troops around too, and they are definitely not failures.

The Osprey was never designed or intended to be a tactical assault platform, which is why the Army never bought any. The whole "hot LZ" thing is a Vietnam anachronism, BTW. Nobody deliberately plans to go into direct fire, because we have learned the hard way that bad things happen, even with helicopters designed for the purpose. Red Wings and Extortion 17 reminded us of that. Sometimes you gotta do it, but you don't take an Osprey along on that operation, because that is not what it is made for.

The Marine Corps originally bought the Osprey to enable their "Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)" concept. The underlying issue was that amphibious assault doctrine was being rendered obsolete by precision weapons, particularly by anti-ship missiles like the Exocet. That threat meant the Marines could not bring their ships close enough to shore to stage a seaborne assault landing, and ATGMs would make short work of AAVs. For a while the workaround was helicopters, but the inherent range and speed limitations of helos became more of an issue. Realizing that the classic beach assault would eventually become impossible, they developed a concept to bypass the beaches and go straight to their inland operational objectives. But that required ship-launched air platforms with greater range and speed than helicopters could deliver. Hence the Osprey. You can read all about it here: MCCP 1

The Air Force later tacked onto the procurement because it met a CSAR capability cap, mainly that the old MH-53's used for downed pilot rescue were too slow, had limited range, and required frequent refueling. SOCOM supported it for similar reasons, but also never intended it to be a primary assault platform. When the golden hammer wants to land on someone's doorstep, TF-160 helos get the nod.

You could have a discussion about whether OMFTS is still valid, but I don't think that book has been written yet. The CV/MV is pretty well suited to the Pacific operational environment because of the distances involved, and could play a significant role an a conflict against China over Taiwan or the various disputed islands in the South China Sea.
 
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Yeah, you know better. ;)

Well like I said, I think a true multi ship air assault in an Osprey would be a disaster.

It’s hard enough to do an air assault with recirculation acting on a traditional helo. You get recirculation in an Osprey, in a tight LZ, that’s an accident waiting to happen. These guys got into recirculation just trying to land onboard an LHD and look what happened. :(

https://news.usni.org/2018/05/21/in...ash-excessive-aircraft-weight-may-contributed
 
Again, you are using fairly imprecise terms for what is a fairly complex discussion. Not everything that happens in a "war zone" is a firefight with bullets flying. Operational maneuver involves putting troops in place before the enemy can react in force. If you can move faster and farther than the enemy, you gain positional advantage before shots are fired. Carting troops around wins campaigns and battles. The C-17 and C-130 cart troops around too, and they are definitely not failures.

The Osprey was never designed or intended to be a tactical assault platform, which is why the Army never bought any. The whole "hot LZ" thing is a Vietnam anachronism, BTW. Nobody deliberately plans to go into direct fire, because we have learned the hard way that bad things happen, even with helicopters designed for the purpose. Red Wings and Extortion 17 reminded us of that. Sometimes you gotta do it, but you don't take an Osprey along on that operation, because that is not what it is made for.

The Marine Corps originally bought the Osprey to enable their "Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS)" concept. The underlying issue was that amphibious assault doctrine was being rendered obsolete by precision weapons, particularly by anti-ship missiles like the Exocet. That threat meant the Marines could not bring their ships close enough to shore to stage a seaborne assault landing, and ATGMs would make short work of AAVs. For a while the workaround was helicopters, but the inherent range and speed limitations of helos became more of an issue. Realizing that the classic beach assault would eventually become impossible, they developed a concept to bypass the beaches and go straight to their inland operational objectives. But that required ship-launched air platforms with greater range and speed than helicopters could deliver. Hence the Osprey. You can read all about it here: MCCP 1

The Air Force later tacked onto the procurement because it met a CSAR capability cap, mainly that the old MH-53's used for downed pilot rescue were too slow, had limited range, and required frequent refueling. SOCOM supported it for similar reasons, but also never intended it to be a primary assault platform. When the golden hammer wants to land on someone's doorstep, TF-160 helos get the nod.

You could have a discussion about whether OMFTS is still valid, but I don't think that book has been written yet. The CV/MV is pretty well suited to the Pacific operational environment because of the distances involved, and could play a significant role an a conflict against China over Taiwan or the various disputed islands in the South China Sea.

F58D67B9-07FD-42D2-A0DF-AC856CDE6E6F.jpeg
Well technically the AATFC can order to fight through the contact in a hot LZ. But like you said, the odds of that these days I’d say slim.

Seen the CSAR “Pedro” boys hesitant to go into a hot LZ once. They we’re trying to get a status from the OH-58 LZ security team before they went in. Lot of SAFIRE going on and Pedro wanted to know if it was “Cherry” or not. I’ll never forget the 58 guys reply. “I don’t know man but we got your back.” :D They finally went in and pulled the wounded out which was good because we (C2 aircraft) decided as a crew if they weren’t going, we were. I was really hoping not to get shot up pulling a mission that we really weren’t set up for. ;)
 
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Well technically the AATFC can order to fight through the contact in a hot LZ. But like you said, the odds of that these days I’d say slim.

Seen the CSAR “Pedro” boys hesitant to go into a hot LZ once. They we’re trying to get a status from the OH-58 LZ security team before they went in. Lot of SAFIRE going on and Pedro wanted to know if it was “Cherry” or not. I’ll never forget the 58 guys reply. “I don’t know man but we got your back.” :D They finally went in and pulled the wounded out which was good because we (C2 aircraft) decided as a crew if they weren’t going, we were. I was really hoping not to get shot up pulling a mission that we really weren’t set up for. ;)

My uncle won a Silver Star in Vietnam on a hot LZ. He was the PL of the lead platoon of a company air assault. Landed in a circular ambush. Got pinned down on the LZ as soon as they landed, and could not get any more aircraft in. Took most of the day to get enough fire support on the treeline to get the rest of the force in. Of course tactics have progressed a long way since then, especially our night capabilities and the use of ISR to avoid surprises like that.
 
My uncle won a Silver Star in Vietnam on a hot LZ. He was the PL of the lead platoon of a company air assault. Landed in a circular ambush. Got pinned down on the LZ as soon as they landed, and could not get any more aircraft in. Took most of the day to get enough fire support on the treeline to get the rest of the force in. Of course tactics have progressed a long way since then, especially our night capabilities and the use of ISR to avoid surprises like that.
ISR?
 
Command & Control. A modified Black Hawk with a console in the back where the AATFC runs the show. Basically a sitting duck in a real war. ;)
Got it. I remember some airworthiness releases (AWR) on them for various mods. Certainly would cut down on your troop/cargo hauling payload.

Back in the day (over a half century ago in another far away land) we called them Charlie Charlie birds, which consisted of an ordinary UH-1 "Slick" equipped with a colonel, perhaps a major or captain, and a sergeant/RTO with a couple radios. I guess we're going to have to set up a glossary for war stories.

Anyway, it was not uncommon for charlie charlie to perform hasty medevacs, usually over the objections of the colonel. I did a few of those myself and never had a moment's regret.
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, sorry. In this context, usually fixed wing aircraft like a King Air or UAV with stabilized night vision camera balls to check out the LZ surroundings and watch for enemy activity. Of course that might get tricky in a fight against a near-peer.
 
Got it. I remember some airworthiness releases (AWR) on them for various mods. Certainly would cut down on your troop/cargo hauling payload.

Back in the day (over a half century ago in another far away land) we called them Charlie Charlie birds, which consisted of an ordinary UH-1 "Slick" equipped with a colonel, perhaps a major or captain, and a sergeant/RTO with a couple radios. I guess we're going to have to set up a glossary for war stories.

Anyway, it was not uncommon for charlie charlie to perform hasty medevacs, usually over the objections of the colonel. I did a few of those myself and never had a moment's regret.

Yeah I had no problems pulling someone out on CASEVAC but if dedicated MEDEVAC (Pedro) was in the area, that’s the preferred method. They were big on at the time of the AATFC making that decision. Could be the difference between life and death.
 
If the Osprey tries to come in fast like a helicopter they develop the aforementioned vortex ring state. They run out of lift, crash spectacularly and kill everyone. The change that made them safe is they don't come in fast, since they can't. Problem is they were acquired to replace helicopters, which deliver troops to the front lines. The Osprey can't take on that mission, as it can neither land fast nor defend itself all that well (smaller caliber guns aboard to save weight). As such it's a miserable failure. Yes it can cart troops and VIPs around when the bullets aren't flying, but lots of airplanes and helicopters can do likewise at a fraction of the cost. Yes, it looks pretty in the movies, though I'd not want all that light and noise in a war zone.
The Osprey can come into a threat area far faster than any helo can even conceive of flying. Ring Vortex is a vertical not forward speed issue and also affects helicopters. In addition the Osprey allows power projection at far longer distances and shorter time frames than any existing helo.
How did the Syrian special ops mission helo’s due recently or the ones involved in the Killing of Osama? Think back to our failed Iranian mission. The Osprey could have handled that without a need for desert refueling. Keeping tasks forces another hundred miles offshore when trying to project power is a tremendous safety enhancement for the fleet. You can go on and on about the new capabilities the Osprey brings.
 
I spent a little time on Navy ships exactly because of the Marines inabilities to project power in certain situations with their aviation attack assets…Osprey did not change that capability or we would be using them on such missions…personal experience and personal opinion so your mileage may vary…
 
This guy is spot on in his comments.

https://breakingdefense.sites.break...ick-the-tiltrotor-v-22-test-pilot-tells-army/

Speed and range might be “transformational” for the Marines, it’s not that big of a deal for the Army. Even for the Marines it’s still not that critical. If it were, they’d scrap all of their traditional helos and go full up tilt rotor.

Ground wars are fought in relatively close proximity to the rear area assembly areas or base camps. Been that way in the past, will be that way in the future. That’s not an archaic way of fighting, it’s just logic based on the ground commanders plan. Example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we set up FOBs and COPs all over the country. Same setup as Vietnam. You need aircraft embedded with these “camps” because that’s where the fight is. Having soldiers stationed long distancing from the threat doesn’t make much sense. They will always be a need to go on convoy patrol and the infantryman will always be required to go on foot patrol. So again, massing your combat air power near your soldiers will always be necessary. Therefore speed and range aren’t as important as those might make you believe.

Furthermore, aircraft survivability from ground based threats is more about cover and concealment, and a good ASE suite (Chaff, IR jammer, flares, etc) than just outright speed. By the time a crew identifies a Mach 2.5 MANPAD, it’s either going to miss you because your ASE worked, or it’s going to be an aluminum shower. In that case, the difference between a 250 kt aircraft vs a 150 kt aircraft ain’t going to amount to squat.

Speed and range are critical for CSAR and MEDEVAC. Outside of that, it’s just a nice to have.
 
Speed also allows 3 Ospreys to fly the same number of missions as 5 helo’s. That frees up incredibly valuable deck and hangar space. It can take 24 troops from the ship to 470 miles away with the ramp gun installed and return without refueling. It can get the troops there in 2 hours. Let me know the helo that does that. In a pinch they can seat 32 troops if needed. Range goes down to about 400 miles. It can also self deploy worldwide, that’s a huge plus.
 
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Speed also allows 3 Ospreys to fly the same number of missions as 5 helo’s. That frees up incredibly valuable deck and hangar space. It can take 24 troops from the ship to 470 miles away with the ramp gun installed and return without refueling. It can get the troops there in 2 hours. Let me know the helo that does that. In a pinch they can seat 32 troops if needed. Range goes down to about 400 miles. It can also self deploy worldwide, that’s a huge plus.
I am trying to figure out that mission on the modern battlefield…dropping small groups of legs 400 plus miles from support because you can…sounds like a one way mission, but as an Army Attack guy we think more like grunts…Even the 18th Airborne Corps is only good for 2-3 days without support and if it’s that desperate even a Ranger battalion, is set up better to secure that long range objective. My sea time on LHA’s just reinforces that…the Marine Corps is currently trying to figure out where they fit in…personally I feel they need to be smaller more compact and focus on a true amphibious force rather than a land based Navy version of the Army that has limitations and sustainability issues…Go Army beat Navy
 
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This guy is spot on in his comments.

https://breakingdefense.sites.break...ick-the-tiltrotor-v-22-test-pilot-tells-army/

Speed and range might be “transformational” for the Marines, it’s not that big of a deal for the Army. Even for the Marines it’s still not that critical. If it were, they’d scrap all of their traditional helos and go full up tilt rotor.

Ground wars are fought in relatively close proximity to the rear area assembly areas or base camps. Been that way in the past, will be that way in the future. That’s not an archaic way of fighting, it’s just logic based on the ground commanders plan. Example, in both Iraq and Afghanistan we set up FOBs and COPs all over the country. Same setup as Vietnam. You need aircraft embedded with these “camps” because that’s where the fight is. Having soldiers stationed long distancing from the threat doesn’t make much sense. They will always be a need to go on convoy patrol and the infantryman will always be required to go on foot patrol. So again, massing your combat air power near your soldiers will always be necessary. Therefore speed and range aren’t as important as those might make you believe.

Furthermore, aircraft survivability from ground based threats is more about cover and concealment, and a good ASE suite (Chaff, IR jammer, flares, etc) than just outright speed. By the time a crew identifies a Mach 2.5 MANPAD, it’s either going to miss you because your ASE worked, or it’s going to be an aluminum shower. In that case, the difference between a 250 kt aircraft vs a 150 kt aircraft ain’t going to amount to squat.

Speed and range are critical for CSAR and MEDEVAC. Outside of that, it’s just a nice to have.

One of the problems with Iraq and Afghanistan is that it fixated the military on the tactical level. Warfare at the operational level requires a different set of priorities. At the top of those priorities are speed and range, which enables campaign maneuver. To be prepared for the next fight, which may be against a near peer (Russia or China), we have to forget some of what we learned over the last 20 years of COIN and CT.

We went thru the same mental process as an institution after Vietnam. While we had optimized our TTP's and equipment for close combat in the jungle, we realized that LRP patrols and Hueys were not going to beat the Soviets in the Fulda Gap. Air Land Battle doctrine was developed, the all volunteer professional force implemented, and numerous platforms developed (AH-64, UH-60, Abrams, Bradley, A-10) to implement that doctrine.

The Marines have different operational needs from the Army. At the heart of those needs is the ability to project power from ship to shore. The ocean is flat, with zero cover or concealment other than the curvature of the earth. Ships within range of shore-based missiles are sitting ducks, and inbound aircraft can be detected for a long way off. Range and speed have become essential to their reason for existence.

I was Army, but I went to USMC Command and Staff College in 2000-2001. C&S is where the services focus on operational level warfare. It was very clear at the time that the senior USMC leadership viewed the Osprey as the #1 priority for their force. That wasn't because they wanted a fancy cool new toy. It was because they did the analysis and realized that in 20 years the Marine Corps would cease to exist as a viable fighting force without a solution for the threat of precision weapons, especially anti-ship missiles. Without amphibious force protection, they would just be a smaller Army with cooler uniforms.

As you observed, those needs aren't really a thing for the Army. Speed and range in the context of heavy land warfare is how fast can an Armored Division cover 500 miles with all their support and services accompanying. There wasn't really anything an Osprey could do for the Army that a C-130 full of paratroopers could not do, so we felt no need to buy them.
 
One of the problems with Iraq and Afghanistan is that it fixated the military on the tactical level. Warfare at the operational level requires a different set of priorities. At the top of those priorities are speed and range, which enables campaign maneuver. To be prepared for the next fight, which may be against a near peer (Russia or China), we have to forget some of what we learned over the last 20 years of COIN and CT.

We went thru the same mental process as an institution after Vietnam. While we had optimized our TTP's and equipment for close combat in the jungle, we realized that LRP patrols and Hueys were not going to beat the Soviets in the Fulda Gap. Air Land Battle doctrine was developed, the all volunteer professional force implemented, and numerous platforms developed (AH-64, UH-60, Abrams, Bradley, A-10) to implement that doctrine.

The Marines have different operational needs from the Army. At the heart of those needs is the ability to project power from ship to shore. The ocean is flat, with zero cover or concealment other than the curvature of the earth. Ships within range of shore-based missiles are sitting ducks, and inbound aircraft can be detected for a long way off. Range and speed have become essential to their reason for existence.

I was Army, but I went to USMC Command and Staff College in 2000-2001. C&S is where the services focus on operational level warfare. It was very clear at the time that the senior USMC leadership viewed the Osprey as the #1 priority for their force. That wasn't because they wanted a fancy cool new toy. It was because they did the analysis and realized that in 20 years the Marine Corps would cease to exist as a viable fighting force without a solution for the threat of precision weapons, especially anti-ship missiles. Without amphibious force protection, they would just be a smaller Army with cooler uniforms.

As you observed, those needs aren't really a thing for the Army. Speed and range in the context of heavy land warfare is how fast can an Armored Division cover 500 miles with all their support and services accompanying. There wasn't really anything an Osprey could do for the Army that a C-130 full of paratroopers could not do, so we felt no need to buy them.

I agree and like I said, the Marines consider speed in range important for their amphibious assault mission. Only thing I’d say that throws a wrench into that concept is the fact that Marine doctrine is going to require attack helo escort. They’re not going to send Ospreys 400 plus miles out, to a heavily defended area without attack (Cobra) escort. Well if your security escort can’t keep up or fly 400 plus miles like the transport, that creates a logistical nightmare. Almost negates the whole point of having that speed and range to begin with.

Now, CSAR and MEDEVAC to uncontested areas? That’ll work. Even then though what are the odds of not needing attack helo assets for escort? Take the Scott o Grady TRAP mission. They encountered resistance and Cobras were needed to suppress the threat. Same doctrine the Army uses for any hasty CSAR or air assault. They’re not going in with transport helos without attack weapons teams securing the LZ. Until we go full up tilt rotor or coaxial pusher, you’ll always need conventional helos.

There’s a reason why the AF went with the new HH-60G to replace their old Pave Hawks and that had a lot of people scratching their heads. Why not go full up Osprey for that mission? Well, what they don’t understand is that the Osprey will always have unique limitations. Friend of mine that works at the company went from Frogs to Ospreys in the Marines and I can tell you, he’s not at all won over by it’s capabilities. I’ve picked his brain before about all the common issues such as OR rates, VRS, recirc, HOGE ceiling, dirt ingestion of the engines, rotor wash / heat issues, etc. He confirmed my suspicions and then some. You can bet, there’s been information that’s either been suppressed or exaggerated to put the Osprey in a good light.

5,700 ft HOGE ceiling at ISA? Get out of town. Try 12,600 ft at 10 degrees above ISA! ;)

B9C31A01-EB45-46EB-A1A3-2C6F7A962A9F.jpeg

PS…sorry about using so many “helos” @Warlock. I know you hate that term.:D
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, sorry. In this context, usually fixed wing aircraft like a King Air or UAV with stabilized night vision camera balls to check out the LZ surroundings and watch for enemy activity. Of course that might get tricky in a fight against a near-peer.

The difference in the equipment needed to take on a near-peer vs a third tier foe is incredible, and the weapons don't translate back and forth well. Do you really want to use a Mach 2 jet to strafe in Pafganistan? Probably not the best use of that hardware. Do you really want to go into harm's way against anyone with decent AA defenses in an A-10 or Apache? Yikes!
 
The difference in the equipment needed to take on a near-peer vs a third tier foe is incredible, and the weapons don't translate back and forth well. Do you really want to use a Mach 2 jet to strafe in Pafganistan? Probably not the best use of that hardware. Do you really want to go into harm's way against anyone with decent AA defenses in an A-10 or Apache? Yikes!

What we choose to do vs making glow int the dark glass parking lots are two entirely different conversations.
 
I was a passenger on it a couple of times back in 08. One trip was from Ramadi to Baghdad and another was to Mosul and back. What a ride! It was similar to a CH-47 in feel during takeoff but obviously a fixed wing in flight. The landings were sporty with a low pass down the runway with a transition to a hover and air taxi to the helicopter pad. Quite the experience.
 
This was up around 12K in the Alps. That's the Swiss-Austrian border in the background of the second shot, with the Piz Buin glacier on the left. Me on the right.
View attachment 104593 View attachment 104594

No more than 30 minutes without O2 up there. ;) That rule was broken in Afghanistan on occasion. Gotta watch those belly antennas with snow that deep. My first snow qual flight in Germany we broke a search light in deep snow.
 
I agree and like I said, the Marines consider speed in range important for their amphibious assault mission. Only thing I’d say that throws a wrench into that concept is the fact that Marine doctrine is going to require attack helo escort. They’re not going to send Ospreys 400 plus miles out, to a heavily defended area without attack (Cobra) escort. Well if your security escort can’t keep up or fly 400 plus miles like the transport, that creates a logistical nightmare. Almost negates the whole point of having that speed and range to begin with.

Now, CSAR and MEDEVAC to uncontested areas? That’ll work. Even then though what are the odds of not needing attack helo assets for escort? Take the Scott o Grady TRAP mission. They encountered resistance and Cobras were needed to suppress the threat. Same doctrine the Army uses for any hasty CSAR or air assault. They’re not going in with transport helos without attack weapons teams securing the LZ. Until we go full up tilt rotor or coaxial pusher, you’ll always need conventional helos.

There’s a reason why the AF went with the new HH-60G to replace their old Pave Hawks and that had a lot of people scratching their heads. Why not go full up Osprey for that mission? Well, what they don’t understand is that the Osprey will always have unique limitations. Friend of mine that works at the company went from Frogs to Ospreys in the Marines and I can tell you, he’s not at all won over by it’s capabilities. I’ve picked his brain before about all the common issues such as OR rates, VRS, recirc, HOGE ceiling, dirt ingestion of the engines, rotor wash / heat issues, etc. He confirmed my suspicions and then some. You can bet, there’s been information that’s either been suppressed or exaggerated to put the Osprey in a good light.

5,700 ft HOGE ceiling at ISA? Get out of town. Try 12,600 ft at 10 degrees above ISA! ;)

View attachment 104584

PS…sorry about using so many “helos” @Warlock. I know you hate that term.:D

It seems extremely odd the Air Force even considered the Osprey and Blackhawk for the same mission. One has a 20,000 lb lift capability and one has a 2600 lb lift capability. They also have vastly different costs. The Osprey would normally be considered for missions that might also be filled by a CH47 or even a CH53.
 
It seems extremely odd the Air Force even considered the Osprey and Blackhawk for the same mission. One has a 20,000 lb lift capability and one has a 2600 lb lift capability. They also have vastly different costs. The Osprey would normally be considered for missions that might also be filled by a CH47 or even a CH53.

I think their rationale is to continue to use HH-60s for dedicated CSAR and the CV-22s for situations of longer range outside the capabilities of the Pave Hawk.
 
Even in my days being around 60A’s could sling 8k externally…I think that’s higher now…seems like they sat on the ramp at 11,500 +/- and could ferry up to a gross weight of 24500…then again I am pulling out numbers from 35 years ago…pull the seats and you can pack 20-22 Rangers as well but we probably don’t do that anymore..
 
Even in my days being around 60A’s could sling 8k externally…I think that’s higher now…seems like they sat on the ramp at 11,500 +/- and could ferry up to a gross weight of 24500…then again I am pulling out numbers from 35 years ago…pull the seats and you can pack 20-22 Rangers as well but we probably don’t do that anymore..

Those numbers are accurate. I think what @Jeff767 is getting at is internal cargo weights. Those are accurate as well. The 2,600 lbs number is just a typical example of an internal load. Whoever came up with that just took a combat loaded troop (240 lbs) and multiplied by 11 (seats). You could fill more than 2,600 lbs in an H-60, but you wouldn’t have a need to. Just sling it.
 
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Don’t sit in the blue seats.

Edit: And don't eat the yellow snow.
 
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The recirculation accident off Australia that I referenced earlier. This recirc is a problem in formation landings as well. Very difficult to deal with in a helicopter at gross. I imagine even worse for an Osprey. RIP.

 
The underlying issue was that amphibious assault doctrine was being rendered obsolete by precision weapons, particularly by anti-ship missiles like the Exocet. That threat meant the Marines could not bring their ships close enough to shore to stage a seaborne assault landing, and ATGMs would make short work of AAVs.

Russians learned this lesson the hard way with the Moscva. They have a very capable naval infantry brigade afloat that they have been unable to land, forcing them to fight their way (unsuccessfully) up the coast towards Odessa.

Also note the current USMC food fight between the current and former Commandants over force structure. The Marines are ditching their tanks and heavy artillery in favor of mobile anti-ship missile batteries, in anticipation of a fight with the Chinese over the small disputed islands that control SLOCs in the Pacific.

All this is driven by the growth in capability of long range precision weapons and surveillance. Right now the only counter the Marines have to keep their embarked forces safe is standoff distance from the shore. But how do you retain offensive maneuver capability over longer distances? By increasing the range and speed of your forces. Hence the Osprey.

The war in Ukraine is slaughtering a lot of sacred cows of military doctrine. For 80 years Russian theory held that if you had enough tanks, nothing could stop you. They have lost around 1000 tanks so far.
 
That’s an ugly video…sure went from normal to bad fast.
 
Russians learned this lesson the hard way with the Moscva. They have a very capable naval infantry brigade afloat that they have been unable to land, forcing them to fight their way (unsuccessfully) up the coast towards Odessa.

Also note the current USMC food fight between the current and former Commandants over force structure. The Marines are ditching their tanks and heavy artillery in favor of mobile anti-ship missile batteries, in anticipation of a fight with the Chinese over the small disputed islands that control SLOCs in the Pacific.

All this is driven by the growth in capability of long range precision weapons and surveillance. Right now the only counter the Marines have to keep their embarked forces safe is standoff distance from the shore. But how do you retain offensive maneuver capability over longer distances? By increasing the range and speed of your forces. Hence the Osprey.

The war in Ukraine is slaughtering a lot of sacred cows of military doctrine. For 80 years Russian theory held that if you had enough tanks, nothing could stop you. They have lost around 1000 tanks so far.

I look at their tank losses similar to the problems the Soviets had with helicopters in Afghanistan. You can’t send helicopters that far without any ground forces or ISR. All the combat elements must be mutually supportive. I always laughed at Arty being “The King of Battle.” While I was surprised at how lethal it is in warfare, it’s only one piece to the puzzle. Leave one combat arm to fend for itself and it’ll never make it.
 
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