Ethiopian Airlines Crash; Another 737 Max

Chip Sylverne said:
Wow. If that theory holds, Boeing really did push the airframe. The correct answer to the instability in pitch should have been a redesign of the tail control surfaces and actuators, not a technological patch. Of course, that would mean time and lots of money, as in the end you have a different airplane.
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What I’ve heard is it would have pushed the MAX over the edge into requiring it to be a new Type.

Bombardier had the same issue with the CRJ. Originally the CRJ-900 was going to be a separate Type from the -200 & 700. But the Airline b$@$@ed about the costs of training crews. So Bombardier backed down and threw out brand new systems and installed the crappy -200 systems. So it’s basically a 200 cockpit with a few more automated system. Plus the -900 flight characteristics are 180° different from the -200. But it satisfied the FAA into keeping it a CL-65

What the CRJ-900 was suppose to be became the CRJ-1000 and A220.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
I am confused. I am not sure how an AOA indication has anything to do with an airspeed indication.
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Angle of Attack also affects the relationship of the relative wind to the Pitot tubes so AOA data is fed to the Air Data Computers and the corrected airspeed is displayed on the PFD.
 
ARFlyer said:
What I’ve heard is it would have pushed the MAX over the edge into requiring it to be a new Type.

Bombardier had the same issue with the CRJ. Originally the CRJ-900 was going to be a separate Type from the -200 & 700. But the Airline b$@$@ed about the costs of training crews. So Bombardier backed down and threw out brand new systems and installed the crappy -200 systems. So it’s basically a 200 cockpit with a few more automated system. Plus the -900 flight characteristics are 180° different from the -200. But it satisfied the FAA into keeping it a CL-65

What the CRJ-900 was suppose to be became the CRJ-1000 and A220.
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Is the CRJ-1000 a separate type from the 200/700/900?
 
Tj1376 said:
How many a320neos are flying?
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Don't know how many are flying but this is Airbus's version of the 737 max, i.e., NEO=new engine option. And it went through its own grounding via Airbus/EASA after its introduction. But if operators think they can dump the max and go neo they may have to wait a few years as Airbus neo backlog is reported at 6-7 years.
 
ARFlyer said:
Yep, it’s considered a CL-66. This is due to, from what I was told, major system differences that was meant for the -900.
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Thread drift and quick question! I don’t remember if I already asked you this. My CFI renewal is coming up next month and a few people at company posted on our Facebook group that their local FSDOs are renewing their CFIs due to being a 121 captain. Is that dependent on the FSDO? Have you heard of people renewing their CFI based on being a 121 captain? I thought that was only for check airmen. The people that posted it on the Facebook group were not check airmen. They were just regular line captains. Really it’s not a big deal but if I can just drive to the local FSDO and renew my CFI that would save me a few hours clicking through slides on my computer.
 
jordane93 said:
Thread drift and quick question! I don’t remember if I already asked you this. My CFI renewal is coming up next month and a few people at company posted on our Facebook group that their local FSDOs are renewing their CFIs due to being a 121 captain. Is that dependent on the FSDO? Have you heard of people renewing their CFI based on being a 121 captain? I thought that was only for check airmen. The people that posted it on the Facebook group were not check airmen. They were just regular line captains. Really it’s not a big deal but if I can just drive to the local FSDO and renew my CFI that would save me a few hours clicking through slides on my computer.
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Depends on the fsdo. Its a legit way to renew but some won’t do it because of the volume of renewals if word gets out they will do it. Our office only does it for LCA’s and sim instructors. They used to do it for all captains when there were only 150 vs over 800 now.
 
Bell206 said:
Don't know how many are flying but this is Airbus's version of the 737 max, i.e., NEO=new engine option. And it went through its own grounding via Airbus/EASA after its introduction. But if operators think they can dump the max and go neo they may have to wait a few years as Airbus neo backlog is reported at 6-7 years.
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I thought the number of a320neos flying was zero. I thought none had yet been delivered, but was hoping someone else more knowledgeable could confirm.

TJ


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
 
Tj1376 said:
I thought the number of a320neos flying was zero. I thought none had yet been delivered, but was hoping someone else more knowledgeable could confirm.

TJ


Sent from my iPhone using Tapatalk
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If the NEO is the one with the big engines, there have been deliveries. I see a couple at Narita every time I am there.
 
jordane93 said:
Thread drift and quick question! I don’t remember if I already asked you this. My CFI renewal is coming up next month and a few people at company posted on our Facebook group that their local FSDOs are renewing their CFIs due to being a 121 captain. Is that dependent on the FSDO? Have you heard of people renewing their CFI based on being a 121 captain? I thought that was only for check airmen. The people that posted it on the Facebook group were not check airmen. They were just regular line captains. Really it’s not a big deal but if I can just drive to the local FSDO and renew my CFI that would save me a few hours clicking through slides on my computer.
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Kansas City has done mine twice that way. The caveat is that I had to show in the operations manual where the Captain was a mentor to the First Officer, ore words to that effect.
 
Tj1376 said:
I thought the number of a320neos flying was zero. I thought none had yet been delivered, but was hoping someone else more knowledgeable could confirm.

TJ
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I was a passenger on a Lufthansa a320neo in January
 
Larry in TN said:
I've seen one incident reported (each pilot filed a separate report on the same incident). It involved an unexpected pitch-down when the autopilot was engaged. That would be unrelated to MCAS as MCAS only operates when the autopilot is disengaged and MCAS don't not operate the elevator, only the stabilizer trim. The A/P problem could have been a failure in the autopilot system or the crew could have had the vertical mode misprogrammed when they engaged the A/P. We've also seen the pilots' reports but not what the result of their maintenance write up which would have told us what problems, if any, were found.

The other report was a pilot who was complaining about what Boeing's differences training included. He didn't report any occurrence with the airplane.


No final reports or conclusions have been issued for either of the two accidents. We (still) know very little about the Ethiopian accident but we have quite a bit of information on the Lion Air accident.

What we know about Lion Air.

1. The accident airplane had AoA related issues on its last FIVE flights yet the airline continued to dispatch it.
2. On the flight immediately prior to the accident flight the aircraft experienced a stabilizer runaway due to an unschedule activation of the MCAS system due to invalid AoA data being fed to the air-data and flight control computers.
3. On that flight the operating crew were unable to handle the problem until their jumpseater pointed out the runaway stabilizer and reminded (?) them of the runaway stabilizer procedure.
4. Once the electric trim was disabled, the Captain elected to continue their two-hour flight with the electric trim disabled, no stall warning system (because the stick shaker continued to activate from liftoff until touchdown), and no autopilot system (because the electric trim was disabled). That type of decision would likely result in certificate action in the US and, I presume, most other countries.
5. The maintenance write-up that has been released for that flight did not mention that the stick shaker was activating for the entire flight.
6. The airline dispatched the airplane again for what turned out to be the accident flight.
7. On the accident flight the Captain was successfully flying the airplane after takeoff (with the stick shaker activating from liftoff). He had 21 MCAS activations and used the electric trim to return the aircraft to a trimmed state all 21 times.
8. The First Officer was trying to find the applicable procedure (runaway stabilizer) in the QRH but wasn't able to find it. The Captain transferred control to the F/O so that we could look for the procedure.
9. The F/O received 5 MCAS activations. He stopped the first 4 activations but failed to continue to re-trim the airplane back to a trimmed condition each time as had the Captain. The 5th activation was not stopped and it brought the stab trim to the full nose-down position which resulted in the loss of control.

That's what we know at this point. Some of those things may be revised or expanded in the final report but, from what we know now, what blame do you think the airline and crew should receive?

The media, and almost everyone else, has assumed that the Ethiopian accident was the result of another unscheduled MCAS activation. Tomorrow will mark two weeks since the accident yet that simple fact has not been confirmed nor ruled out.

French subject matter experts have had the Ethiopian DFDR for about a week. Protocol says that the French can not release any of the information that they recover from the recorder. Their action would be to forward that data back to the investigating agency (the Ethiopian equivalent of the NTSB) and then they would control the release of the information. It should be pretty easy to either rule in, or rule out, an unscheduled MCAS activation as the trimming patter it produces is distinctive. Why hasn't that information been released? I have no idea.

The information that we do have is as follows.

1. MCAS is disabled when the flaps are not retracted and/or when the autopilot is engaged.
2. The departure airport elevation is 7,657'.
3. The unofficial Flightstats data (from ADS-B) indicate that the airplane reached a maximum altitude of about 8,600' and that their rate-of-climb excursions started well before that. The 8,600' reading was at the end of the available data.
4. The 737 is not authorized to takeoff with flaps up. Authorized takeoff configurations are Flaps 1, 5, 10, 15, and 25. Due to the high elevation of the airport, their likely takeoff flap setting was either Flaps 1 or Flaps 5.
5. The acceleration and clean-up schedule for a 737, using an NADP-2 departure, would be to climb to 800' AFL (8,467'), lower the nose to accelerate, then retract the flaps as each flap maneuvering speed is reached. With slower acceleration due to altitude, it's unlikely that they would have started to retract the flaps until somewhat above the 8,600'. (An NADP-1 departure wouldn't have them accelerating and cleaning up until 3,000' AFL/10,657' MSL).

Given this information, how could MCAS have activated on this flight? Lacking data, I can only speculate.

1. Flaps misset for takeoff?
2. Flaps retracted early?
3. Flightstats data wrong?
4. MCAS didn't activate and the problem was something else?

We won't know until the DFDR data and analysis is released. Why hasn't that been released yet?

So, given this, are you still convinced that both accidents were caused by the same problem or do you think we should withhold judgement pending data that shows a second unscheduled MCAS activation?

The US got a lot of criticism for not immediately grounding the MAX as many other countries did. Canada and the US did not ground the MAX until the Ethiopian jackscrew was found in a nose-down position similar to the Lion Air jackscrew. That was the first hard data suggesting that the proximate cause of both accidents was a loss of control due to an excessive nose-down trim and it was that link that justified the grounding.

We know how the Lion Air jackscrew ended up in the full nose-down position. We don't yet know why the Ethiopian jackscrew ended up in a similar position. The DFDR and CVR data will tell us. Considering that a fleet of over 300 airplanes are grounded pending this information, why hasn't anything been released? I don't know.

So, who's blaming the crew without information?
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Thanks, that is an excellent overview. It was interesting and a very good summary.
On the other matte here, you only have to read through this thread to see a number of people that seem to have prejudged, and blame te pilots, at the same time absolutely absolving Boeing. Tantalum quite often, but others also.

I’ve read that this crew on the Ethiopian flight had been trained in the procedure for recovery.

What do you think or know about the lack of simulator training for this procedure? These issues?
Or the design issues that instead of redesign, they patched with software/hardware to minimize the issue, just in general? Even if it was not related to these flights, is that responsible?

Does it seem, and is there a history of taking shortcuts, instead of doing the job right? Even if no history, what about this case?
 
FlightRadar24.com or app - Filter by Aircraft - ICAO code A20N

Likewise, the 737 MAX ICAO codes are B38M, B39M, B3JM for MAX 8, 9, and 10 versions respectively.

tvK5adf.png
 
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LongRoadBob said:
I’ve read that this crew on the Ethiopian flight had been trained in the procedure for recovery.
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Every 737 crew has been trained on the runaway stabilizer procecure. It hasn't changed in the 50 years since the airplane was introduced. Same for every other transport jet. They all have runaway stabilizer procedures and all of their crews have been trained in them.

Or the design issues that instead of redesign, they patched with software/hardware to minimize the issue, just in general? Even if it was not related to these flights, is that responsible?
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There are no design issues. Transport jets operate over a very wide evenope of speed, weight, and altitude. They all have design elements to address a variety of issues like this one where the elevator feel is too light in certain situations. Stick pushers, vortex generators, rudder limiters, mach trim, speed trim, artificial feel devices, etc. These design elements are necessary. They aren't shortcuts.
 
LongRoadBob said:
is there a history of taking shortcuts,
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Define shortcuts. The FAA certification process is very laborious. This is the reason most OEMs have limited their clean sheet designs. The common method, which is used by all aircraft manufacturers, is to upgrade one model into another model or variant under the same Type Certificate. Just look at any FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet (TCDS) for the various models under one TC. Regardless, the new model must still pass the original TC certification points.

It's being discussed on other forums that the MCAS was a result of the certification process and not part of the design process. As stated, in order for the MAX to meet a certain stall limitation requirement per Part 25, they had to incorporate the MCAS. But keep in mind most aircraft design/certification review is done on computer then proven/disproven in subsequent test flights. In the the MAX's case, then found the rate of stab movement needed to be changed to meet certification requirements. Per these discussions, the MCAS was not needed to fly the aircraft in the normal flight envelop. And since there was an existing emergency procedure to stop the effect of the MCAS (runaway stabilizer) there was no not requirement for a separate emergency procedure.

Now whether the 2 accident crews had the experience, skill sets, and training to handle a problem with the MCAS will been explained in future reports. However, those pilot qualification are solely up to the country CAA and airline operator and not Boeing. And it has been documented that not all Lion Air pilots were prepared to handle it a MCAS issue as shown in the previous days flight of that same aircraft. And in the Ethiopia flight, the FO had a total flight experience of 350hrs which I'm sure you'll agree is a bit short for for such an advanced aircraft considering most emergency procedures require both pilot involvement to include the runaway stabilizer procedure.
 
jordane93 said:
Thread drift and quick question! I don’t remember if I already asked you this. My CFI renewal is coming up next month and a few people at company posted on our Facebook group that their local FSDOs are renewing their CFIs due to being a 121 captain. Is that dependent on the FSDO? Have you heard of people renewing their CFI based on being a 121 captain? I thought that was only for check airmen. The people that posted it on the Facebook group were not check airmen. They were just regular line captains. Really it’s not a big deal but if I can just drive to the local FSDO and renew my CFI that would save me a few hours clicking through slides on my computer.
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It highly depends on the FSDO. The correct 8900.1 answer is you have to be a company Check Airman or in a position of instructional oversight. So it depends on what your company has you classified under. As Greg said KC accepted his FOM definition of his CA position.

Mine will only do Check Airman but most requests get a polite “Please contact your airline POI”. Some like Miami won’t do any Airman Cert tasks due to staffing.
 
mryan75 said:
Sluggo63 said:
I had just over 200 hours when I was in the right seat of a heavy, 4-engine jet flying internationally.
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I think that's insane. Nothing personal. I honestly think that's insane.
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It's not like the Air Force had a bunch of Barons laying around that I could have flown checks in to build time. It is what it is.
 
overdrive148 said:
FlightRadar24.com or app - Filter by Aircraft - ICAO code A20N

Likewise, the 737 MAX ICAO codes are B38M, B39M, B3JM for MAX 8, 9, and 10 versions respectively.

tvK5adf.png
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Check in a few days, and you'll see a bunch of 737 Max 8s flying towards California. My buddy who is a Captain at an airline with a lot of those planes says that they are getting ferry permits to take them all to VCV for long term storage.
 
Sluggo63 said:
It's not like the Air Force had a bunch of Barons laying around that I could have flown checks in to build time. It is what it is.
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I suspect your training at 200hr was a little more rigorous than than the average civilian-only 121 line pilot. ;)

Nauga,
drinking from a firehose
 
Sluggo63 said:
Check in a few days, and you'll see a bunch of 737 Max 8s flying towards California. My buddy who is a Captain at an airline with a lot of those planes says that they are getting ferry permits to take them all to VCV for long term storage.
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That sounds expensive. I had some Embry-Riddle classes at VCV and learned to fly at APV. I'll keep an eye out.
 
overdrive148 said:
That sounds expensive.
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Most 121/135 operators have some sort of aircraft storage program as part of their OpSpecs and it is usually tied to the operational availability of an aircraft. Since it currently looks like it may be some time before the grounding is lifted it is probably the most cost effective considering their current issues with mechanics and the available maintenance coverage. Long term storage is defined as 120+ days of availability, intermediate storage is between 120 and 60 days (I think), and short term is less than 60. Plus its better on the equipment to store them per the applicable procedures.
 
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ARFlyer said:
It highly depends on the FSDO. The correct 8900.1 answer is you have to be a company Check Airman or in a position of instructional oversight. So it depends on what your company has you classified under. As Greg said KC accepted his FOM definition of his CA position.

Mine will only do Check Airman but most requests get a polite “Please contact your airline POI”. Some like Miami won’t do any Airman Cert tasks due to staffing.
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Thanks! I figured it was dependent on the FSDO. I called my FSDO like 1.5 months ago and gave them my number to call back but they never did lol. I guess I’m pretty low on the priority.
 
LongRoadBob said:
Thanks, that is an excellent overview. It was interesting and a very good summary.
On the other matte here, you only have to read through this thread to see a number of people that seem to have prejudged, and blame te pilots, at the same time absolutely absolving Boeing. Tantalum quite often, but others also.

I’ve read that this crew on the Ethiopian flight had been trained in the procedure for recovery.

What do you think or know about the lack of simulator training for this procedure? These issues?
Or the design issues that instead of redesign, they patched with software/hardware to minimize the issue, just in general? Even if it was not related to these flights, is that responsible?

Does it seem, and is there a history of taking shortcuts, instead of doing the job right? Even if no history, what about this case?
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If it’s not Boeing I’m not going...

Thathad some basis of truth before the MD merger.

Now... not so much
 
Sluggo63 said:
It's not like the Air Force had a bunch of Barons laying around that I could have flown checks in to build time. It is what it is.
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I should've asked more about the background. Still, I'd be curious (not knowing what your experience level and flying situation is now), looking back how do you feel about it? Do you think you were safe? I was specifically talking about 200–hour pilots flying paying passengers in 737s, which I think is... insane.
 
“At that time [1909] the chief engineer was almost always the chief test pilot as well. That had the fortunate result of eliminating poor engineering early in aviation.”
Igor Sikorsky​

Perhaps we should return to that philosophy. Were the project manager, the project chief engineer, the airframer CEO, the FAA personnel who approved the safety assessment, and the engineering design IPT leads or department heads all required to be passengers on a new model's maiden flight, they might be more motivated to ensure the correctness of the work.

In some eastern European countries, it is customary for a bridge design engineer, along with his family, to be required to stand underneath his new bridge during proof testing. Nothing like having some skin in the game to get someone to approach his work with the seriousness and thoroughness required.
 
overdrive148 said:
FlightRadar24.com or app - Filter by Aircraft - ICAO code A20N

Likewise, the 737 MAX ICAO codes are B38M, B39M, B3JM for MAX 8, 9, and 10 versions respectively.

tvK5adf.png
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I can’t say I’m an A20N expert, but per your screenshot, things in Denver aren’t looking too hot for Airbus right now, either...

33bob5v.jpg
 
LongRoadBob said:
On the other matte here, you only have to read through this thread to see a number of people that seem to have prejudged, and blame te pilots, at the same time absolutely absolving Boeing.
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Ahem:

"On Saturday, pilots from the five airlines simulated flights with the software as it was originally written, as well as with the proposed updates."

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/24/...html?action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

Which should surprise absolutely nobody. The US crews had no problems recovering the aircraft.
 
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