If this is another control command issue with the MCAS system, I have to ask why in the h#ll the crew didn't immediately switch off the autopilot.
The MCAS only functions when the autopilot is disengaged. Switching off the autopilot would have been the incorrect thing to do. In fact, with the autopilot engaged, you would never even have an MCAS problem.
I would hope the apparent cause of the Lion Air crash wlsh should be well known to MAX flight crews and that they would react immediately to any uncommanded pitch excursion.
I'm not even going to say that this latest accident was MCAS. Too early to speculate.
I know to all the armchair NTSB investigators on this site (and others, even the professional pilot boards), it's cut and dried. But, I think there are several issues at play here that unless you've flown large, complex aircraft may slip through the cracks.
Disclaimer: Although I'm typed in several Boeing airframes, I'm not typed nor do I fly any variant of the 737.
Like a lot of other problems that can creep up in any aircraft, this MCAS thing doesn't happen in a bubble. It's the result of another failure. Namely, an AOA/airspeed failure. So, this problem (probably) manifests itself first as Unreliable Airspeed. That's a pretty involved checklist to run. Possibly the stick shaker is going off because of the loss of the AOA probe. So now you're silencing alarms, hand flying the airplane, running checklists for Unreliable Airspeed, trying to figure out what airspeed indicator is giving you good information, trying to ignore the stickshaker, and now the MCAS is kicking in. There is a lot to process, and figure out. It's not just as simple as just "why didn't the crew just..."
And that brings me to my second point. Training. There are times that our training is just inadequate. The simulator can't replicate everything, and when it can, it may replicate it wrong.
Again, not a 737 guy, but I've trained for Runaway Trim in every airplane I've flown. It has ALWAYS been presented at the trim continuously runs away in one direction (nose up or down) with an associated aural/visual alert (either EICAS or a big trim wheel spinning near your knee). Most aircraft the first natural step to to move the yoke against the trimming force. There is a stab trim brake that engages when you push/pull against the trim and stops the trim from further travel. That doesn't happen with MCAS. Next, like I said before, the runaway has always been presented as the motor continuously running the trim towards the stop. The MCAS gives you an input of trim for 10 seconds, then stops for 5 seconds, then 10 more seconds, then a 5 second rest, and on and on. So, right when you think you may have a problem, it stops, then it starts again. That is unlike any other "runaway stab trim" I've even flown in the sim, and I bet these crews didn't either, because until Lion Air, they dodn't even know the MCAS existed.
The same thing happened in the KC-135 community. There was a crash back in 2013 which was attributed to an unscheduled rudder deflection. That was a Boldface (Memory Item) in the KC-135. RUDDER POWER-OFF. It was a red guarded switch on the center console. The briefing was always, if we have an Unscheduled Rudder Deflection, I'll race you for the switch and whoever gets there first, turn it off. We always trained for it in the sim. Always. It was a big deal. Well, why didn't this crew do the Boldface and turn the switch off? Because it presented itself in a way that we never trained for. Everytime in the sim, the rudder goes full-travel hard-over to one side. Violent yaw and roll. That's how we always thought a rudder hardover was going to go. Until Shell 77. Their rudder started hunting and through mis-diagnosis never were able to correct the problem and eventually overstressed the vertical fin and the airplane came apart midair.
I guess my point is, that it's really easy to sit here at 0 knots and 1 G and "I would'a..." these scenarios, but it's not that easy when you're in a midst of a problem that you've never seen before and don't really have a checklist for.
In the larger picture, it appears the airlines must address the over reliance on automated systems and focus on hand flying skills.
The issue seems to be concentrated on Asian and African operations.
True, and there's some of that here in the US, as well. I can say my airline has made it a priority to ensure that our hand-flying skills don't diminish (at least in the sim). We are certainly allowed to hand fly the jet as much as we'd like, except for the few cases where we absolutely must use the autoflight. In the sims, we have a block of time that we are required to handfly (autopilot/autothrottles/flight director off) takeoffs, visual approaches, and landings.