Crash at Reagan National Airport, DC. Small aircraft down in the Potomac.

Hopefully mode c, at least? What's TCAS supposed to do in a scenario like this?
Not very much. TCAS can't do much at such a low altitude as it depends on commanding altitude changes to resolve conflicts.

Resolution Advisories are inhibited below 1,000'. Traffic Advisories are displayed, but aural warnings are inhibited below 500'.

Very common to get a silent TA displayed from a helicopter operating near your arrival path on final. Visual separation is used. ATC audio seems to indicate that the helicopter reported the CRJ in sight and was instructed to pass behind it and to maintain visual separation.
 
It appears to me that the view is across the river, looking south east.

2 inbound aircraft, the first to the long runway 01, the second to runway 33. The helicopter was on an approximately 180 heading, parallel to the flight path of the first but opposite direction, and probably was keeping clear of that one. The 33 flight path is over the ridge east of the river, and relatively low to the terrain. From the video camera position, the 33 approach (AA) is near straight in, and the helicopter is traveling left to right.


The helicopter pilot was apparently fixated on the 01 aircraft, and failed to see the second, coming diagonally from his left. He may have lifted off from the War College, or may have been on the Anacostia river visual route south to Belvoir or Quantico.

At the time of impact, the 01 aircraft was about 30 degrees to the right, the 33 aircraft was about 30 degrees to the left. Not much scanning to miss the landing lights on the CRJ

Before 911, I often flew that path south bound out of College Park MD, KCGS.
 
It looks like AA was headed toward 01 and the controllers asked the AA flight to switch to the shorter runway 33. According to FlightAware track log, it looks like the AA flight was on a northerly course heading, and made a slight circle to land (more of a sidestep), turning right to 014, then back left to it's last datapoint heading 328. It is reported that ATC tried to verify with the helo whether they had approaching traffic in sight, with no response. This just seems inconceivable in the era of ADS-B. Horrible, God be with the victims and their families.

processed-AD3376A8-80E9-41D7-A6B1-2E2DFC6B5A78.jpeg
 
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Pat 25 did have ADS-B out.

Pretty sure that is MLAT not ADS-B

Flight radar24 reporting PAT25 not broadcasting ADS-B, only Mode S. They couldn’t provide a MLAT track but I think adsbexchange has access to more stations so it was able to

 
Yes, no ADSB, but ADSBexchange was able to multilaterate it using several receivers.

Hence the “jagged” flightpath depicted in the screenshot.
 
What I think you’re seeing is AAL1630 (B738) departing runway 1. It was the last departure prior to airport closure.

It doesn't look that big and that aircraft was in the air prior to the collision. Don't know the turnaround time for departures this time of year, bit I would likely take a few minutes to close the airport down. I have read on X that the AA aircraft was diverted to another runway for landing. But, why was there a helicopter flying at that altitude over an active runway in the first place?
 
I keep seeing this image. If the helicopter wasn’t broadcasting ADSB, where would this come from? Radar?

View attachment 137602
Given that picture, if the AA flight was diverted to different runway due to a flight on the main runway being delayed on TO, then the helo pilots may not have expected the AA aircraft to be where it was. Trying to spot another aircraft while flying at night over an urban area can be really difficult. My opinion is that ATC failed miserably this time.
 
Military and ATC do not depend on ADS-B. I'm a little shocked by the number of comments that suggest that ADS-B will save you or that planes can change course due to it when ATC has the airspace. That would be chaos. This was under ATC control and that is the final word. Why the helicopter was in the final approach path is the only question. I wonder about the ATC losing situational awareness of PAT-25 and the CRJ. Could the PAT-25 think that the airport was closed and so they dropped awareness? Even with a landing light shining in the windows? There is much to learn in the hours ahead.
 
Military and ATC do not depend on ADS-B. I'm a little shocked by the number of comments that suggest that ADS-B will save you or that planes can change course due to it when ATC has the airspace. That would be chaos. This was under ATC control and that is the final word.
Depend on? Of course not. But if they *have* it, it's another tool to help them be aware that they're on a collision course.

ATC may have the final word, but there is never only one cause of an accident.
 
I can’t help but notice that PAT25s altitude at the time of impact was 350 feet. The maximum altitude for the helicopter route from the memorial bridge to the Wilson Bridge is 200 feet.

Note: anyone who flies in the DC area at night knows that the PAT-xx helicopters are notoriously difficult to see. They typically operate with only a single red beacon on the tail.

Not much the regional crew could have done to avoid this…they may have gotten a TCAS alert but no RA due to altitude.
 
Listening to the audio, I disagree about the report of the Pat25 not responding to the report the RJ in sight request. I thought they acknowledged it insight, and the controller told them to maintain visual separation. Better analysis will validate if that is accurate. IMO, i think PAT 25 probably had another aircraft insight and didn’t realize they were looking at the wrong aircraft.

Brian
 
I’m in the ATC issue camp right now.

However, if the Blackhawk reported the wrong a/c in sight, that matters.

Pendulum swinging back, reporting the wrong a/c in sight, especially at night, isn’t even unusual.

This is an ATC issue.
 
I’m in the ATC issue camp right now.

However, if the Blackhawk reported the wrong a/c in sight, that matters.

Pendulum swinging back, reporting the wrong a/c in sight, especially at night, isn’t even unusual.

This is an ATC issue.
PAT’s responses aren’t recorded in the LiveATC but 2 minutes prior to the incident ATC gives a traffic callout to PAT25 about the CRJ. There is a silent gap of its response we can’t hear but then a “visual separation approved”, presumably indicating that PAT25 said it had the traffic. Strange phrasing but it seems PAT25 was responsible for separation at that point. To me this seems pretty squarely on the shoulders of PAT25.

Maybe we should start questioning the routine operation of military aircraft with minimal lighting in some of the busiest airspace in the world. The guy is squawking mode S, not like he is being stealthy.

Edit:

Someone found PAT25 on the Heli frequency. He called traffic in sight and requested visual separation which was approved. Hard to see how this is not on his shoulders.


Approx 7 minutes in
 
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It appears PAT25 didn't know the CRJ was going to turn to the runway? CRJ turns into the path of the Blackhawk because it's on a procedure to land. The Blackhawk, responsible for separation, misses that or..???

Blackhawk didn't know the CRJ was going to the airport?

View attachment DCA CA.mp4
 
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Listening to the audio, I disagree about the report of the Pat25 not responding to the report the RJ in sight request. I thought they acknowledged it insight, and the controller told them to maintain visual separation. Better analysis will validate if that is accurate. IMO, i think PAT 25 probably had another aircraft insight and didn’t realize they were looking at the wrong aircraft.

Brian

This^^^

I had it happen to me. Traffic displayed in the cockpit especially when integrated with a moving map and your route mapped on the display have heightened the awareness. However with a visual circling type manuever close to the ground, pilot attention outside is paramount. I'm not sure on the military side what, if any traffic information they may have. And the pilots attention is on the runway at this point.
 
Edit:

Someone found PAT25 on the Heli frequency. He called traffic in sight and requested visual separation which was approved.
If the helicopter is talking to DCA Tower on the helicopter frequency (134.35), would it have heard any of the tower instructions/conversation with the CRJ on 119.1 about the CRJ sidestepping to land on 33 instead of 01? (Not that this would absolve the helicopter of its see-and-avoid obligation, but it would lend insight as to what overall situational awareness the helicopter pilot had about what was going on with the CRJ. Nor would this necessarily absolve ATC if the runway assignment was changed for the CRJ and they did not advise the helicopter of that change (unless comms on 119.1 would also be heard on 134.35)).

(Edit: having just listened to the audio link that had the helicopter comms, given the rapid-fire radio calls it might have been difficult to paint a situational awareness picture from the radio even if all tower comms could be heard on 134.35. Very sad.)
 
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I keep seeing this image. If the helicopter wasn’t broadcasting ADSB, where would this come from? Radar?

View attachment 137602
Man, so close to landing, one second either way and it's merely filing a report.
I hope this wasn't another "flying with night vision" mission; I doubt it, DC is well lit up.
 
Do local controllers receive electronic conflict alerts?
(do they suppress them, once a pilot agrees to maintain visual separation?)
 
I don’t think Adsb would have made a difference.

I do think we should seriously evaluate the practice of using visual sep at night especially over heavy light pollution areas.

I’m also curious why we route all that traffic over the rivers. I have always assumed it was for noise abatement but don’t know for sure.

This looks like a clear example of the helo crew calling the wrong guy in sight and then lawn darting the jet. Could have also been they didn’t expect the impact aircraft to turn, as suggested above, but I doubt it. Jet traffic circling from 1 to 33 for landing is a normal procedure at DCA on a north traffic flow. If the PAT25 crew had at least a week on the job in that airspace the flight path of the rj would have been everyday normal.
 
If the helicopter is talking to DCA Tower on the helicopter frequency (134.35), would it have heard any of the tower instructions/conversation with the CRJ on 119.1 about the CRJ sidestepping to land on 33 instead of 01? (Not that this would absolve the helicopter of its see-and-avoid obligation, but it would lend insight as to what overall situational awareness the helicopter pilot had about what was going on with the CRJ. Nor would this necessarily absolve ATC if the runway assignment was changed for the CRJ and they did not advise the helicopter of that change (unless comms on 119.1 would also be heard on 134.35)).

(Edit: having just listened to the audio link that had the helicopter comms, given the rapid-fire radio calls it might have been difficult to paint a situational awareness picture from the radio even if all tower comms could be heard on 134.35. Very sad.)
Is ATC obligated to inform PAT25 of the runway change? Especially if there are more urgent calls to be made in such busy airspace?

Either way, I was taught visual separation means sufficient distance to avoid an aircraft, anticipating that they may change heading or altitude at any time. Not to assume that they are going to continue doing what they were last instructed to do or what I think they are going to do. Once ATC clears visual separation, I shouldn’t rely on them to tell me what I need to do or to relay information necessary for separation. That’s my job.
 
Either way, I was taught visual separation means sufficient distance to avoid an aircraft, anticipating that they may change heading or altitude at any time. Not to assume that they are going to continue doing what they were last instructed to do or what I think they are going to do. Once ATC clears visual separation, I shouldn’t rely on them to tell me what I need to do or to relay information necessary for separation. That’s my job.
I don't disagree with this at all. The helicopter was responsible for see-and-avoid, regardless of what ATC said or didn't say. And I also acknowledge that having landing craft sidestep from 01 to 33 is relatively common at DCA, so the helicopter should have been aware of that possibility under any circumstance. My question was less about fixing blame and more about how the Swiss cheese holes lined up here, and only whether (even if he should have anticipated it) the helicopter was aware the CRJ had switched from 01 to 33.

(BTW, in my limited Class B flying I can think of only one time where I was given free reign as to my direction of flight, and that only because I was well away from the approach paths and about to exit the airspace, but I suspect this lack of positive control is more common for helicopters than fixed-wing aircraft).
 
im not sure it mattered 01 or 33. It looks like the helicopter path was going to take it across both of those runways. that helicopter never should have been there on the altitude for final approacha for either of those runways. .. it was crossing and failed visual separation. Perhaps they identified the wrong plane, or the wrong lights, or just responded without actual seeing the traffic - who knows and we may never know. But that doiesnt change the fact that they were required to maintain visual separation and didnt. the end result is that we have a really bad situation for everyone.
 
Pretty sure that is MLAT not ADS-B

Flight radar24 reporting PAT25 not broadcasting ADS-B, only Mode S. They couldn’t provide a MLAT track but I think adsbexchange has access to more stations so it was able to

Point being they were squawking. Whether ADS-B or mode S, they were visible to both ATC and the CRJ.
 
I don't disagree with this at all. The helicopter was responsible for see-and-avoid, regardless of what ATC said or didn't say. And I also acknowledge that having landing craft sidestep from 01 to 33 is relatively common at DCA, so the helicopter should have been aware of that possibility under any circumstance. My question was less about fixing blame and more about how the Swiss cheese holes lined up here, and only whether (even if he should have anticipated it) the helicopter was aware the CRJ had switched from 01 to 33.

(BTW, in my limited Class B flying I can think of only one time where I was given free reign as to my direction of flight, and that only because I was well away from the approach paths and about to exit the airspace, but I suspect this lack of positive control is more common for helicopters than fixed-wing aircraft).
Part of the picture is PAT25 was on a route. So even though he was flying by own nav he was flying a prescribed route that includes altitudes.

So yeah he wasn’t being directly controlled but the QB had called the play for him.
 
Do local controllers receive electronic conflict alerts?
(do they suppress them, once a pilot agrees to maintain visual separation?)
Depends on the equipment. In this case I’m sure DCA uses STARS software. That provides CAs as depicted in the video linked above. That can be inhibited for “operational advantage” though.
 
Part of the picture is PAT25 was on a route. So even though he was flying by own nav he was flying a prescribed route that includes altitudes.

So yeah he wasn’t being directly controlled but the QB had called the play for him.
Looking at the DC Heli chart he was route 1 going into 4. It says at or below 200’ if I’m reading this correctly. Seems he was a bit high? The route 1 text explicitly says helos to the pentagon shall be at or below 200’
 
Part of the picture is PAT25 was on a route. So even though he was flying by own nav he was flying a prescribed route that includes altitudes.

So yeah he wasn’t being directly controlled but the QB had called the play for him.
absolutely. . . but did he adhere to the altitudes on said route ? I dont have the heli charts in front of me, but I do know they usually include altitudes in the route that preclude being at the same alttude as fixed wings on final. . . .

Looking at the DC Heli chart he was route 1 going into 4. It says at or below 200’ if I’m reading this correctly. Seems he was a bit high? The route 1 text explicitly says helos to the pentagon shall be at or below 200’

Exactly. . . you beat me to it. But the lack of adherence to that route altitude was a huge contributing factor. Never should have been at 400'
 
Point being they were squawking. Whether ADS-B or mode S, they were visible to both ATC and the CRJ.
Okay, I was just correcting your statement that it had “ADS-B out”. You didn’t say squawking you said ADS-B out. Considering there is considerable confusion as to the exact nature of the surveillance of that flight, I thought it prudent to be exact.
 
Kinda wonder if they had NVGs down or up. As bright as it is in that area, they’d be more of a hindrance down. Also wonder what seat the crew member, most likely crew chief, in the back was sitting in. Right side would be hard to see any traffic at the 10-11 o’clock position.
 
Looking at the DC Heli chart he was route 1 going into 4. It says at or below 200’ if I’m reading this correctly. Seems he was a bit high? The route 1 text explicitly says helos to the pentagon shall be at or below 200’
Yeah, that's what I see, too. Not a helicopter pilot and honestly I haven't looked at these charts before. But yeah, looks like they were on route 1 going to route 4 which pretty clearly states under 200' on both segments:1738245182929.png
 
Ughh absolutely tragic. Several from US figure skating development team were on the CRJ, mostly children and their coaches/families). I knew a few of the folks from that community on the CRJ, not very well but still hits close to home. First US passenger airliner crash since Colgan?
 
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