CO1404 off runway at DIA

AdamZ said:
BTW here is a pax narrative of what they experienced.

http://www.newsweek.com/id/176611
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Newsweek said:
What I recall most is the incredible violence of it, like the roughest roller coaster you've ever ridden but with a desperate, roaring engine noise that seemed to get louder as we bounced more and more.


Things were flying around the cabin—books, newspapers, bags. After an especially hard bounce, the lights went out, and there was a sudden, terrible stillness.
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Sounds a lot like my truck accident. :yes:
 
Re: DIA 737 Accident

I don't know much about it either and the lack of credible news reports are annoying.

Greg's personal experience with that flight via his future daughter in law who was on board in interesting and harrowing. Not too mention it shows how interconnected we all are on this planet

See this thread for details

http://www.pilotsofamerica.com/forum/showthread.php?t=26264
 
gprellwitz said:
Yeah, this one doesn't show the runway. http://llnw.image.cbslocal.com/19/2008/12/21/320x240/crash2.jpg I saw an image in an earlier news report where an official had depicted the location with a push-pin on an overhead shot, and am looking for it.
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That building you see in the picture, on the right... it's the fire station. They missed it by 200 feet, I'm told.

By the way, "kudos" to the firefighters and response team. They deserve a cold one...
 
gprellwitz said:
The Denver Post has a better picture here:http://www.denverpost.com/portlet/article/html/imageDisplay.jsp?contentItemRelationshipId=2238707
imageDisplay.jsp
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Holy schmokes! Look at the embankments on the south and north side of taxiway WC that they went up and over... no wonder they lost the gear and split the fuselage. That had to have been a wild ride.
 
Re: DIA 737 Accident

In the interests of full disclosure, I am not the Greg mentioned. Seems there are two of us. :D Greg K is the one referenced.
 
Re: DIA 737 Accident

Yeah, yeah, whatever... all you Gregs look alike to me.
 
Re: DIA 737 Accident

Everskyward said:
And then there's Grant, the sometimes honorary Greg... :redface:
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Yup! :)

And I'll say that the extent of the "speculation" I've been involved in is where on the runway the flight departed the runway!
 
The tower called emergency crews immediately. The tower staff realized something was wrong immediately. Whether it was due to communication from the aircraft or visual, won't know until either the cockpit transcript is released or someone in the tower decides to say something publicly.
 
wsuffa said:
Greg,

There is a lesson here for other travelers. I long ago took to carrying an ID in my pocket at all times when in planes. On Int'l trips, my passport is always in a pocket (usually pants pocket), domestically my wallet with driver license is there. If you have to evacuate, ID in pocket is essential. On one of the foreign planes that went down in the last year there were immigration and customs issues for folks that lost their ID in the plane. NOT a good situation.
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Yup. I learned long ago to wear cargo pants when traveling (even in my little spam can). Passport, wallet, (used to carry a small swiss army knife, but no more) and chapstick is pretty much mandatory living in Colorado. And if I don't have the jacket on, it's always under the seat in front of me so I can grab it really fast. Anything else? Hey, that's why they invented shopping malls!
 
murphey said:
The tower called emergency crews immediately. The tower staff realized something was wrong immediately. Whether it was due to communication from the aircraft or visual, won't know until either the cockpit transcript is released or someone in the tower decides to say something publicly.
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FWIW... (not much, until verified). This is from a thread on a different forum.

What i saw last night scared the **** out of me! We were holding short of 34R as CO 1404 started its takeoff roll on it's ill fated attempt at flight. We were talking about the lear 31 that was in position in front of us when the lear reported that "a plane just went off the runway." When i looked down the runway towards the departure end i could see smoke and the glow of flames. Tower tried multiple times to reach the CO flight without response and then ceased all operations on the west side by cancelling a TO clearance for 34L and clearing the lear from 34R to exit on F2. When the tower finally declared a "code red," the fire trucks gradually started emerging from the fire stations. The fire station not more than 100 yards from the resting spot of the A/C had a truck come out first, and it slowly drove past the accident site on taxiway WC then turned right down 34R towards the end where we were. During this time two fire trucks pulled up next to the lear on F2 and seemed ready to douse him with eveything they had. Tower repeatedly told the crews exactly where the accident site was but none of them listened and continued to remain around the lear while the other truck continued towards us. Finally as the truck came close to the end of 34R they must of had an oh **** moment as they realized we were both not a "737-500 series" as to which tower told them was the accident a/c. They finally found the a/c right where they were told the whole time it was(and they ignored).

Yes, it was surreal, almost dream like. Knowing we just saw this a/c start its t/o roll and now it was on fire and in condition unknown down a 100' ravine off the side of the runway. Because of the time of year we knew it was most likely full, and the thought of what could have been made us anxious, nervous and really scared. I know my voice cracked a little when tower had us move to a different area. The poor Solutions guys were pretty bad off, you could hear it in their voice and their responses to towers instructions to clear the runway and the ensuing ground conversation for their t/o...which didn't happen, they returned to the FBO. I guarantee those two gentlemen saw the plane veer of the side and then saw the smoke and fire and were expecting the worst.
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Denver Post (and I'm sure elsewhere) has an article this morning with some initial CVR details, including speeds and timepoints in the takeoff roll where noise and vibrations started, takeoff abort called and runway departure (speculated).

My initial guess that they had rotated appears wrong - I stand corrected. However, there is speculation that the a/c did become airborne momentarily as it departed the runway - or perhaps more correctly, the ground departed below the a/c ...

Kudos to Continential - 2 employee volunteers arrived at our house yesterday as Escorts for Dani and spent the afternoon and evening with her gathering information on what they can do to help expedite replacing her identification papers and lost personal items. They took her shopping for some initial essentials and really did a GREAT job at helping her begin to ease back into "normalcy" again.
 
gkainz said:
Denver Post (and I'm sure elsewhere) has an article this morning with some initial CVR details, including speeds and timepoints in the takeoff roll where noise and vibrations started, takeoff abort called and runway departure (speculated).

My initial guess that they had rotated appears wrong - I stand corrected. However, there is speculation that the a/c did become airborne momentarily as it departed the runway - or perhaps more correctly, the ground departed below the a/c ...

Kudos to Continential - 2 employee volunteers arrived at our house yesterday as Escorts for Dani and spent the afternoon and evening with her gathering information on what they can do to help expedite replacing her identification papers and lost personal items. They took her shopping for some initial essentials and really did a GREAT job at helping her begin to ease back into "normalcy" again.
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This is what's known as being a good corporate citizen. Do the right thing, first and always, and allow consequences to occur independently. I know it makes me that much more likely to call on Continental when I need to travel in a mailing tube!
 
Missa said:
I challenge you to find a pocket that would fit that stuff in womens clothes.
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Our office admins are wearing such clothes today. One has blue jeans on (rare for us, but it IS the holiday), the other has dressy slacks. Both have pockets that will at least hold a DL, and I think passports, too (certainly the jeans). But I'm not about to walk over to them and try ;)
 
wsuffa said:
Missa said:
I challenge you to find a pocket that would fit that stuff in womens clothes.
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Our office admins are wearing such clothes today. One has blue jeans on (rare for us, but it IS the holiday), the other has dressy slacks. Both have pockets that will at least hold a DL, and I think passports, too (certainly the jeans). But I'm not about to walk over to them and try ;)
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Just stuff 'em in the bra. Done. :rolleyes:
 
murphey said:
Yup. I learned long ago to wear cargo pants when traveling (even in my little spam can). Passport, wallet, (used to carry a small swiss army knife, but no more) and chapstick is pretty much mandatory living in Colorado. And if I don't have the jacket on, it's always under the seat in front of me so I can grab it really fast. Anything else? Hey, that's why they invented shopping malls!
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I thought it was considered way uncool to have anything in the pockets of cargo pants. :p

When traveling I usally have the pockets on mine - even shorts - full of one gadget or another, (camera - PDA - cellphone) but I never try to be anything above geek.
 
This just in (to me at least):

Cockpit voice-recorder evidence shows one of the pilots of the Continental Airlines Boeing 737-500 involved in the runway excursion accident at Denver called for a rejected take-off.

The US National Transportation Safety Board says the call came just four seconds after the recorder picked up a "bumping and rattling sound" as the jet accelerated down runway 34R on 20 December.

During a briefing on the accident a spokesman for the NTSB stated that the CVR showed "nothing out of the ordinary" during pre-flight checks and taxi-out for the service to Houston. The NTSB has also reportedly said there is no evidence of any problems with the CFM International CFM56 engines, thrust reversers, brakes or flaps.

Twenty-eight seconds after the brakes were released, says the spokesman, one of the pilots stated that take-off power was set. But 41s after release, a "bumping and rattling" began, and the call to reject take-off came at 45s.

There was no debris on the runway, which was bare and dry. Main landing-gear tyre marks started 1,900ft from the runway 34R threshold and nose-gear marks began 100ft further on.

The jet then began to veer off the centreline, says the spokesman, exiting the runway at 2,650ft from the threshold. It travelled into a grassy area before crossing taxiway WC and striking a berm.

As a result of the inertia from the impact, and the profile of the terrain, the aircraft "slightly became airborne". From the point at which it left the runway, the 737 travelled around 2,000ft before coming to rest.
The rattling sound continued to the end of the cockpit-voice recording, at 51s. The spokesman indicates that the recording was ended by the triggering of a deceleration 'g-switch', probably from the aircraft's impact with the ground after it struck the berm.

Information from the flight-data recorder information is "very good", he adds, and shows that the jet reached a maximum speed of 119kt. At the point where the flight-data recording ceased - again, possibly due to the ground impact - the aircraft was moving at 89kt.

Despite the aircraft's suffering severe structural damage and a fire around the right rear fuselage, none of the 115 occupants was killed, although dozens were taken to hospital with varying degrees of injury.
=============================================.
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So we have an abort, likely above 80 knots, and below V1. I have no criticism of the flight crew, just the observation that high-speed aborts are an awful decision to have to make.
 
TMetzinger said:
This just in (to me at least):



So we have an abort, likely above 80 knots, and below V1. I have no criticism of the flight crew, just the observation that high-speed aborts are an awful decision to have to make.
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They are, but I often wonder if the crew of the Concorde had known how bad they were on fire and opted for the abort, would some have survived?
 
smigaldi said:
They are, but I often wonder if the crew of the Concorde had known how bad they were on fire and opted for the abort, would some have survived?
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You don't want to go there. It is terribly easy to Monday Morning Quarterback that. I don't recall exactly when they knew they had a problem, but after V1 the decision HAS to be "GO" because the situation is safer to deal with in the air than an abort would be with the possibility of going off the end at high speed.
 
Greg,

I agree with you that going at V1 is the best bet to make, but it is a bet, not a guarantee. It's possible that if Concorde had aborted that somebody might have survived. Like any rule/guideline based on historical analysis and statistics, it's gonna be accurate for a large population over time, even though it may not be accurate for any specific individual.

Sort of the flip side of the "how risky is GA" discussion.
 
Rotor&Wing said:
A "bet"????? :frown2:
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Yeah, it's a bet. Lots and lots of our rules and guidelines are bets, or wagers, or "keeping the odds in your favor".

By going at V1 you're betting that your ability to survive whatever problem you have will be better in the air than on the ground. All the accident analysis done over history shows that your chances are better (often much better) taking it into the air. They do NOT show that to be true for your specific, unique, situation. Like anything else "past performance is no guarantee of future results".

There are people who smoke their entire life and die cancer free at a ripe old age. They beat the odds. That's no reason to smoke, or not quit smoking, because you're on the wrong side of the odds, and you're the sucker, not the house.

I am NOT advocating going against the rules/procedures/guidelines. I am saying that it's honest to recognize that they were derived from things we've learned in the past, not handed on tablets from a burning bush, and that "best practices" evolve over time due to the efforts of folks who remember that today's best practice is a bet, and there may be ways to improve the bet.

When I was a kid, emergency medicine "standard practice" was to pick up the victim, and go like hell to the hospital. Then the practice shifted to more advanced treatment in the field, and paramedics would "stay and play". Now, there's a set of guidelines that help you decide whether you need to load and go or stay and play. Heck, the guidelines for helicopters in EMS change due to differences in the perceived risk of EMS helicopter ops. The net result of all of this is that in general, more lives are saved, because you've better defined the odds.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
You don't want to go there. It is terribly easy to Monday Morning Quarterback that. I don't recall exactly when they knew they had a problem, but after V1 the decision HAS to be "GO" because the situation is safer to deal with in the air than an abort would be with the possibility of going off the end at high speed.
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Len Robinson of the Flying Pilot Podcast went through that accident in detail on one episode, and said the exact same thing.
 
TMetzinger said:
but it is a bet, not a guarantee.
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I agree. But the odds are stacked in favor of a go decision.

I just didn't like the Concord accident getting dragged into this because I don't think it is a valid comparison. I don't remember at what point they knew they had a problem, but a high speed, especially above V1 abort in that airplane would more than likely have had about the same result, only closer to the airport.

According to the Concord CVR transcript, it was 8 or 9 seconds between the V1 call and the first indication they had problems. To abort at that time would have resulted in definite deaths. By continuing, they gave themselves a chance to sort the problem out and get back on the ground with all the runway in front of them as opposed to maybe 3 or 4,000 feet of runway, at best. They had no choice but to go.
 
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Greg Bockelman said:
I agree. But the odds are stacked in favor of a go decision.

I just didn't like the Concord accident getting dragged into this because I don't think it is a valid comparison. I don't remember at what point they knew they had a problem, but a high speed, especially above V1 abort in that airplane would more than likely have had about the same result, only closer to the airport.

According to the Concord CVR transcript, it was 8 or 9 seconds between the V1 call and the first indication they had problems. To abort at that time would have resulted in definite deaths. By continuing, they gave themselves a chance to sort the problem out and get back on the ground with all the runway in front of them as opposed to maybe 3 or 4,000 feet of runway, at best. They had no choice but to go.
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Agreed.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
I agree. But the odds are stacked in favor of a go decision.

I just didn't like the Concord accident getting dragged into this because I don't think it is a valid comparison. I don't remember at what point they knew they had a problem, but a high speed, especially above V1 abort in that airplane would more than likely have had about the same result, only closer to the airport.

According to the Concord CVR transcript, it was 8 or 9 seconds between the V1 call and the first indication they had problems. To abort at that time would have resulted in definite deaths. By continuing, they gave themselves a chance to sort the problem out and get back on the ground with all the runway in front of them as opposed to maybe 3 or 4,000 feet of runway, at best. They had no choice but to go.
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Their abort was to another airport almost straight in front of them BTW.

My question was HAD they known prior to the rotation would they have stayed on the ground. My understanding of the accident was that they were on fire well before rotation and just did not know. It was so far behind them that I am sure they could not see anything from the cockpit.

The reason I question is this is I had family and a friend's father on AA191 and we have always wondered had rotation and lift off not occurred would they have lived as well.
 
smigaldi said:
Their abort was to another airport almost straight in front of them BTW.
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Irrelevant.

My question was HAD they known prior to the rotation would they have stayed on the ground. My understanding of the accident was that they were on fire well before rotation and just did not know.
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I took a look at the CVR transcript on that and the first indication the cockpit had that there was something wrong was about 10 seconds after the V1 call. They never said anything about Vr. So I don't know how much time there was between V1 and Vr. But that is irrelevant too.

The reason I question is this is I had family and a friend's father on AA191 and we have always wondered had rotation and lift off not occurred would they have lived as well.
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Well according to everything I have ever seen, the engine separated after the airplane rotated. At that point, if they had aborted, they would have gone off the end of the runway at a very high speed. The end result would more than likely have been the same. Can I say no one would have survived? Obviously not. But the odds of survival would not be great.

Scott, what you propose goes against EVERYTHING we as pilots have been trained to do. There just isn't enough time at that point to analyze the situation and decide to go or not. That decision HAS to be made just before V1. Any later and the airplane goes off the end at a high speed. Not good. you can Monday Morning Quarterback that all you want, but the crews had no choice but to continue the takeoff.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
Scott, what you propose goes against EVERYTHING we as pilots have been trained to do. There just isn't enough time at that point to analyze the situation and decide to go or not. That decision HAS to be made just before V1. Any later and the airplane goes off the end at a high speed. Not good. you can Monday Morning Quarterback that all you want, but the crews had no choice but to continue the takeoff.
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Greg I am not proposing anything. I said I WONDER. GEEESH a guy cannot even think what are the other alternative without being beaten upon? I am sorry Greg being an automaton of thought is not a good idea either!
 
Gee, Scott, you say this:

smigaldi said:
Greg I am not proposing anything.
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and in the next breath you say this

I am sorry Greg being an automaton of thought is not a good idea either!
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Sounds sort of like a proposal to me. Maybe "propose" was the wrong word. What I am saying is that if we took time to analyze AT THAT POINT in the takeoff if something goes wrong, we would kill a LOT more people than we might save. Going off the end at a high speed is pretty much guaranteed to hurt or kill people. Taking it in the air gives them a much better chance at a better outcome.

You can wonder all you want. But the bottom line is that after V1, the crew is going to take it into the air unless the airplane is physically unable to fly.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
Gee, Scott, you say this:



and in the next breath you say this.
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Greg it was not a proposal to change the way you do things. IT was to say lets keep thinking about this to see if we are sure what was done was the right thing. Hard and fast rules without thought or review are never good nor are they permanent. Right now to not abort is a best practice that will give you the odds on favorite for survival. But it is no guarantee and that implies that other decision in other situations could give you a better or worse outcome. We do not have all of the data about he CO1404 flight so we cannot make the determination if staying on the ground was the right thing to do. But everyone lived and that says something.

With the Concorde I even mention "had they known", that is a critical piece of information that they did not have to make their decision. That means that they were forced into their decision by habit and training. The problem occurred prior to V1 but the extent to which they were damaged was not known, nor did they have time to troubleshoot as they passed V1. All I have said was IF they had a better picture prior to VW would they have continued to accelerate? Or with the indication they had would decelerating made a difference? I don't know and no knee jerk opinion is telling us that either.

While you have labeled the alternative airport, Le Borget, irrelevant in this discussion, I cannot help but wonder if it did play a role in their decision as they almost immediately started calling it out as they lifted off.

The more we look at all of the situations and apply critical thinking, questioning decision, the better we can become at making the right decision with the information we have and can get.
 
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Rotor&Wing said:
Sorry, never heard it being stated as a "bet". :rolleyes:
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Ah, that's because it's known that if you want your idea adopted, you either imply it's a certainty, or downplay/ridicule the alternatives.

Education is indoctrination. Doesn't matter if it's religion, politics, the public school curriculum, or "Daddy says..."

And the indoctrination is often done with the best intentions and for the benefit of the indoctrinee (? maybe that's a word ?). But as adults and freethinkers, if we ever want to move beyond the teachings of today, we have to remember that most of our teachings are only "mostly" or "usually" or "generally" right. We shouldn't discard them, but we should always strive to improve them.
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Here's a for-instance. Right now best practices are (generally) not to abort between 80 knots and V1 for anything other than fires or loss of directional control. "Bells or swerves" is the way I've heard it described. If you could increase the instrumentation on an airplane, so that a computer could monitor structural integrity, fire, tire/wheel/brake status, engine health, fuel system integrity, and all sorts of other stuff, you could have an airplane that would give the pilots a "GO" or "STOP" based on changing priorities over time and the real-time health of the airplane. Such a system might tell a pilot to "GO" even with a major issue because it knows the brakes have a problem and they won't be able to stop. Or it may give a "STOP" at high speed because it knows that ALL the engines are likely to fail due to fuel system failure in about 3 seconds, and running off the end of the runway is preferable to crashing on the town.

Basically, the more we know, the better our decisions can be, and we may end up with new concepts for abort decisions beyond V speeds.
 
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Scott, you are entitled to your thought process and opinions. Other than that, I have no idea how to even continue this, so I won't.

Have a good Christmas Day.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
Scott, you are entitled to your thought process and opinions. Other than that, I have no idea how to even continue this, so I won't.

Have a good Christmas Day.
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Ditto.

Read what Tim wrote above. I think he is saying the same thing I am.

Have a Merry day too! I just finished my special Christmas breakfast, coffee and bagel and lox!!!
 
Greg Bockelman said:
But the bottom line is that after V1, the crew is going to take it into the air unless the airplane is physically unable to fly.
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Yep, exactly. I guess what's hard for some people to wrap their mind around is this concept of taking a plane into the air when you realize there is a problem. But it's been proven your chances are much better airborne working the problem than the high speed abort.
 
Rotor&Wing said:
Yep, exactly. I guess what's hard for some people to wrap their mind around is this concept of taking a plane into the air when you realize there is a problem. But it's been proven your chances are much better airborne working the problem than the high speed abort.
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And that's statistically valid but not necessarily true for any specific takeoff problem. Of course without any reliable way to discern which category their particular situation falls into the only practical option is to place their "bet" with the odds on favorite.
 
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