Challenger go with throttle up.

[Ghery]

I was at work at Tandem Computers in Cupertino, CA when I got the news. Having worked on "stuff" that was launched on the shuttle when I worked for Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace prior to moving to Tandem I was familiar with the shuttle. This hurt.

Last year I had a management training class where we discussed the roles of the various players in the go / no-go decision: NASA, Morton Thiokol execs, and Roger Boisjoly, the Thiokol engineer who correctly predicted the failure of the O-rings in extreme cold. The amount of pressure put on the launch team to go forward was intense, especially with the addition of a civilian teacher to the astronaut crew and previous scrubs of the launch. Boisjoly wound up a pariah at his workplace after testifying in the Challenger hearings and left to become a lecturer on ethics.

I teach a seminar on engineering ethics to senior EE students at Washington State University every year. The first ethical challenge I give them revolves around Roger Boisjoly. Scary to think that none of those students were alive when this happened. We'll see how it goes again in March when I'm over there.

I thought every kid had space shuttle parts in their room and had met astronauts. I had lunch with Dick Scobee and my dad and later spent much of my training at the Dick Scobee field. (Auburn Municipal Airport)

The son of friends of ours in San Jose had been at the cape to watch the launch, but had to return home to get back to school the day before. Dick Scobee was a family friend of theirs. Matt had to be taken out of class when the news came through. He is now a Naval Aviator and a graduate of Annapolis.

30 years ago...

 

[murphey]

Working for a small aerospace company with FAA and NASA contracts. Three of us had the only large office with windows (conf room was internal) so both TVs and every box of kleenex got moved in as did the other 30-40 employees. Nothing got done that day.

 

[brentee]

7th grade. We were'nt watching the launch, but I remember the music teacher walk through the door and start crying.

My dad is gone but every time that you use a GPS or cell phone you are using something he worked on.

That is a realy nice thought.

 

[kyleb]

It was my first "senior" year at Georgia Tech. I walking back from class and overheard a conversation about the shuttle, but didn't hear any details. Went back to the dorm and turned on the TV. All of the networks were covering it <poorly>. Like in aviation accidents today, there was a tremendous amount of unfounded speculation and bogus commentary.

It was a very depressing day and week to be at an engineering school.

 

[flyingron]

Yeah, I had worked at Martin Denver as well. I feared the external tank was the problem (one of the big components Martin made down in Michoud).

 

[denverpilot]

I believe the SRBs were terminated after the orbiter broke up and the boosters 'ran free', but the orbiter itself broke up due to aerodynamic loads as the main fuel tank and orbiter mounts failed.

Nauga,
and his dogeared Rogers Report

Jr. High. Watched it live. Was already a huge Shuttle nerd so I knew all of the radio calls and what not by heart. Knew immediately it was an LOCV event.

Have read everything I could get my hands on about it (and later Columbia) and just can't believe the decision to go was ever made.

Also virtually unbelievable that the engineer who tried to stop it was shunned by peers who essentially didn't like it when he pointed out that flying manned spacecraft outside of tested bounds was paramount to murder.

Nothing I work on is life-safety in tech, but the Challenger destruction by willful decision to fly outside of parameters has colored my entire career, along with one boss who agreed. I will NOT sugar coat your disaster waiting to happen project just because it's popular with everyone, even execs.

I'll tell you that it's going to blow up. Want to fire me for it, go ahead. I haven't been wrong yet. What you do with that information is up to you. Got a lot of people who trust me for an honest opinion after living that way for two decades. No point in being a yes man in the tech biz. Too many things can still go wrong when everything goes right.

Can't imagine how ****ed I would be if nobody listened to a no-go item and decided to kill seven co-workers. Sounds like the engineer was reasonably diplomatic about his management putting a gun to their heads and pulling the trigger.

Columbia, slightly different story. They knew without a shadow of a doubt that they'd had foam hits and took significant damage but the famous air blast test really shocked many of the engineers when the giant hole appeared. Interesting backstory about how that test almost wasn't authorized.

 

[ettsn]

Sitting at home watching, same ice day in Atlanta. I was a big NASA nerd, so I would count down the stages. I knew instantly. My mother said "no honey, that's normal" and I turned and said it absolutely was not with tears in my eyes. I sat, dumbfounded, in front of the tv for 7-8 more hours, simply in shock.

 

[Rhark25]

Was in college, but heading off to my part-time job. I was in So-Cal and it was a bright blue clear sky that day. Was listening to KLOS on the radio when the DJ jumped on and said the shuttle had exploded. Got to work and we dug a TV out and watched the replays.

I remember the chute landing in the water, (Dan Rather pointed it out if I recall correctly) always wondered what that was.

I was getting ready for work and had the TV on when it happened. I punched the record button on my VCR and started watching. Several times the camera went to an item of some kind coming down by parachute but nobody ever discussed it. I always wondered what it was and then recently saw a documentary where they explained that the nose cones of the solid rocket boosters contained the parachutes that lowered them to the ocean where they would be recovered and used again. What we were seeing at the time was one of the nose cones which was apparently blasted away when the SRB was destroyed.

 

[kyleb]

I was getting ready for work and had the TV on when it happened. I punched the record button on my VCR and started watching. Several times the camera went to an item of some kind coming down by parachute but nobody ever discussed it. I always wondered what it was and then recently saw a documentary where they explained that the nose cones of the solid rocket boosters contained the parachutes that lowered them to the ocean where they would be recovered and used again. What we were seeing at the time was one of the nose cones which was apparently blasted away when the SRB was destroyed.

The crew on one of the networks noticed that and identified it as a rescue team being parachuted in to help. I remember thinking "No way."

 

[Ghery]

Yeah, I had worked at Martin Denver as well. I feared the external tank was the problem (one of the big components Martin made down in Michoud).

When were you there? October 1979 through the beginning of October 1983 for me. Started out on MX in the DSC and then moved down to the Waterton plant to work on "stuff" in Defense Systems. Worked in SSBN for that time.

 

[flyingron]

When were you there? October 1979 through the beginning of October 1983 for me. Started out on MX in the DSC and then moved down to the Waterton plant to work on "stuff" in Defense Systems. Worked in SSBN for that time.

1981-1982. Worked in ADM at Watertown on some projects I'm probably still not allowed to talk about. That was about the time they built SSB2. Decades later when they declassified some of the info on the spy satellites they showed the picture of that building. We always knew some spooky satellite stuff was going in there but obviously outside of our need to know.

 

[scottfromboston]

I was 5 or 6 and just remember my mother crying about it (and the ensuing Very Special Episode of ‘Punky Brewster’).

I actually worked with Roger Boisjoly's brother about ten years ago and the 20th anniversary was one of the few times my coworker talked about his brother and the impact it all had upon him and his wife. It ended his career and he and his wife spent a lot of time dealing with the personal aftermath.

 

[RevDMV]

The crew on one of the networks noticed that and identified it as a rescue team being parachuted in to help. I remember thinking "No way."

I thought the same thing, but still had no idea what it might be. Nosecone makes more sense.

Worst part is knowing that some of the aux air units where turned on and the co-pilot had manipulated switches. Not fun ride down. (Although good pilot trying to fly it to the end)

 

[Phoenix]

I thought the same thing, but still had no idea what it might be. Nosecone makes more sense.

Worst part is knowing that some of the aux air units where turned on and the co-pilot had manipulated switches. Not fun ride down. (Although good pilot trying to fly it to the end)

There must be a CVR tape. Not that I ever want to hear it.

 

[denverpilot]

There must be a CVR tape. Not that I ever want to hear it.

CVR Transcript: (Last words recorded, "Uh-oh")

http://history.nasa.gov/transcript.html

Decent summary of multiple sources by Snopes of all places, debunking the persisten rumor of existence of a longer version of the CVR, with decent short descriptions of the work done researching how the crew died:

http://www.snopes.com/horrors/gruesome/challenger.asp

If... they weren't losing consciousness in the two and a half minute free-fall, and there's evidence they were alive and doing things for at least a portion of the fall, but also evidence that they didn't finish the tasks at hand... it was definitely all over with quickly at the 207 MPH impact of the crew cabin into the Atlantic Ocean.

The bodies had been immersed in salt water far too long, for an autopsy to make definitive conclusions about cause of death.

 

[timwinters]

For posterity's sake, in case someone is doing a search a few years...or ten...in the future.

"Challenger, go at throttle up."

 

[Ghery]

1981-1982. Worked in ADM at Watertown on some projects I'm probably still not allowed to talk about. That was about the time they built SSB2. Decades later when they declassified some of the info on the spy satellites they showed the picture of that building. We always knew some spooky satellite stuff was going in there but obviously outside of our need to know.

I wonder what got declassified. I've never been told that I can speak about any of the projects I worked on while in SSBN. Well, I did do a magnetics analysis on the expected fields from the magnetic torquers on the Solar Max satellite so another engineer could analyze potential impact to the MMU with they went up to repair it. That wasn't classified. Even saw part of the Solar Max recovery mission on one of the IMAX films.

For posterity's sake, in case someone is doing a search a few years...or ten...in the future.

"Challenger, go at throttle up."

Thank you. That is correct.

 

[Jaybird180]

Columbia, slightly different story. They knew without a shadow of a doubt that they'd had foam hits and took significant damage but the famous air blast test really shocked many of the engineers when the giant hole appeared. Interesting backstory about how that test almost wasn't authorized.

I wonder if anyone ever considered sending supplies up to try an in-orbit repair? Or even abandon ship?

By attempting re-entry, they lost and ship and crew. It's a somber thought, but perhaps we could have saved this ship.

 

[denverpilot]

I wonder if anyone ever considered sending supplies up to try an in-orbit repair? Or even abandon ship?

By attempting re-entry, they lost and ship and crew. It's a somber thought, but perhaps we could have saved this ship.

From all I've read they didn't know the extent of the damage.

The big disconnect in thinking appears to be the reluctance to ask for an NRO resource to look at the Orbiter. An engineer wanted it and started the process to make the inter-Agency request and it made his bosses mad, who cancelled it.

They could have looked. They didn't.

 

[denverpilot]

By the way, the analysis of how fast the damage spread and known heating numbers, showed the hole in Columbia was way too big to fix on-orbit with techniques available at the time. Perhaps even now.

Best that could have been done if the damage level had been surveyed and known, would have been to launch a second Orbiter with two crewmembers and cram everyone into it for reentry, which would have been quite a press to do it safely with a reasonable flight plan. Folks have pointed out that another Orbiter was already on the other pad, but they don't quite get that NASA would never just launch and make it up as they went along. Time would have worked against them, and others have pointed out this as a possible reason why the NRO resources weren't requested. Not enough time.