Airline pilots relying too much on automation?

No, it's answered right there. The system remains the same.



Newer Airbus are being equipped with BUSS (Back Up Speed Scale) systems and older ones are being converted.

So the system is still the same, shame they didn't change that bit. The stall warning going off because "It didn't believe that the stall could be so deep" and then coming back on is what fried them, that was the link they never broke and got past.
 
I'm not positive and I'm sure RotorandWing will correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think feeling the elevator is an option in an airbus due to the FBW.
 
So initial training was usually a long time ago, and since you never use more than 5 degrees of bank no one ever sees that those skills are deteriorating so you never do it in the recurrency training.
I guess you are telling the truth when you say you never ride on airlines...
 
Yes aerodynamics are the same. You still have to drop the nose when you stall, you still have asymmetric thrust when you loose an engine, you still can overspeed the same way, ect...
Your right swept wing makes things harder, you still have to be proficient at flying the airplane by hand.

The airline guys hand fly the airplane on every flight in one way or the other. :dunno:



That seems to be your favorite phrase. Every time your discussing something with someone on the forum no one has any idea what they are talking about besides you.

No, just people such as yourself when it's very obvious you're grasping at straws.



So initial training was usually a long time ago, and since you never use more than 5 degrees of bank no one ever sees that those skills are deteriorating so you never do it in the recurrency training.

See, there you go again. Where are you getting this "you never use more than 5 degrees of bank" stuff? Please show the reference here where airliners never exceed "5 degrees of bank".

From the top of my head...AF 447, AA 587, then there was another guy who iced up and got a overspeed and stall warning at the same time. I'm sure there are plenty more, if your really interested I'll find you some more numbers.

Please do, I'll be happy to discuss them with you, but please stick to facts.


Yes I keep going back to stick and rudder because it's important. Computers skills are to make things easier for you. Stick and rudder skills are so you can survive.

You're stuck on this fallacy that when someone occupies the cockpit of a large transport their "stick and rudder skills" deteriorate into nothing. I've cited example after example of how we use those skills everyday, but you cannot accept that.


You seem to really want to know about me and the 421 in a thread about airline pilot training. Fine, okay let's talks about it.
No we don't have those shinny new million dollar simulators like you guys use.

So your training is lacking? Nice. And why would I want to get into an airplane with you or put my family in there?

Unlike you though at least 30% of my flights are empty so I get to practice in the real airplane, not a simulator.

So tell us about your "practice". Do you shut down the engines and feather? Do you fail your alternators and go to battery power only, in IMC down to minimums? Do you go find a level 5 thunderstorm with microburst and practice windshear encounter and evasion? Do you shut down an engine and feather and fly a OEI departure routing, enter a hold then fly a NP approach to mins?

Simulators allow pilots to experience items that would be too risky to do in the real aircraft.

Now you what, I'm not completely satisfied with the amount of training the company provides, so in addition to all the company stuff I do a whole bunch of my own flying to be able to stay proficient not only on company's level, but on mine.

And who is there to make sure you are within standards? If you cannot fly to within standards does your company ground you and require more training?

My point is airline flying and training are far more regimented and standardized than a Part 91 guy out doing it on his own to his own standards.



Your asking if I practice upset recovery at each recurrent? Yeah, because it's important. Tell you what, I practice it at least once a week, not all of it is in the 421 but it's a lot more unusual than most pilots ever get to. I feel perfectly comfortable sitting in an aircraft that's in an inverted spin and just watching the ground get closer. You tell me how many airline pilots can say that?

I haven't taken a transport jet into an inverted spin because I've had the skills and training to avoid it in the first place.

Like I said earlier and you refuse to accept, flying a Part 91 GA small twin is a different skill set than operating a transport jet under Part 121. The accident statistics bear that out.
 
So the system is still the same, shame they didn't change that bit. The stall warning going off because "It didn't believe that the stall could be so deep" and then coming back on is what fried them, that was the link they never broke and got past.

When in doubt, fly the airplane. It's just that simple.

About a month ago I was flying a visual approach into a VFR airport. As I entered downwind I selected speed (160 knots). As I turned based I set managed speed (for the A/THR) to follow and the engines rolled down to idle. I just moved the thrust levers out of the detent and hand flew the thrust on in to landing. Point in this? Some people would have tried to re establish auto thrust. At 1500' is not the time when the simple solution is manual flying the thrust.

When in doubt, fly the airplane.:dunno:
 
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Originally Posted by MachFly
You seem to really want to know about me and the 421 in a thread about airline pilot training. Fine, okay let's talks about it.
No we don't have those shinny new million dollar simulators like you guys use

:confused::confused::confused: Flight Safety sure as hell has them, really good ones. Make yourself avail of them, you'll never get a chance to stretch the envelope in the plane like you can in the sim.
 
:confused::confused::confused: Flight Safety sure as hell has them, really good ones. Make yourself avail of them, you'll never get a chance to stretch the envelope in the plane like you can in the sim.

No I use sims. I just don't have a level D sim nearby.
 
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The airline guys hand fly the airplane on every flight in one way or the other. :dunno:





No, just people such as yourself when it's very obvious you're grasping at straws.





See, there you go again. Where are you getting this "you never use more than 5 degrees of bank" stuff? Please show the reference here where airliners never exceed "5 degrees of bank".



Please do, I'll be happy to discuss them with you, but please stick to facts.




You're stuck on this fallacy that when someone occupies the cockpit of a large transport their "stick and rudder skills" deteriorate into nothing. I've cited example after example of how we use those skills everyday, but you cannot accept that.




So your training is lacking? Nice. And why would I want to get into an airplane with you or put my family in there?



So tell us about your "practice". Do you shut down the engines and feather? Do you fail your alternators and go to battery power only, in IMC down to minimums? Do you go find a level 5 thunderstorm with microburst and practice windshear encounter and evasion? Do you shut down an engine and feather and fly a OEI departure routing, enter a hold then fly a NP approach to mins?

Simulators allow pilots to experience items that would be too risky to do in the real aircraft.



And who is there to make sure you are within standards? If you cannot fly to within standards does your company ground you and require more training?

My point is airline flying and training are far more regimented and standardized than a Part 91 guy out doing it on his own to his own standards.





I haven't taken a transport jet into an inverted spin because I've had the skills and training to avoid it in the first place.

Like I said earlier and you refuse to accept, flying a Part 91 GA small twin is a different skill set than operating a transport jet under Part 121. The accident statistics bear that out.


You know what man, what's the point of this? Your obviously not going to agree and nether am I. It's a waste of time, I'm done here.
 
Very cool! Is it all artificial? Meaning since it's FBW, the computer generates the forces you encounter in the stick, right?

Yes.

Example, in the landing mode:

FLARE MODE
Applicable to: ALL
The flight mode changes to flare mode when the aircraft passes 50 ft RA as it descends to land.
The system memorizes the attitude at 50 ft, and that attitude becomes the initial reference for pitch
attitude control.
As the aircraft descends through 30 ft, the system begins to reduce the pitch attitude, reducing it to
2 ° nose down over a period of 8 s. This means that it takes gentle nose-up action by the pilot to flare
the aircraft.



FLIGHT MODE
The normal-law flight mode is a load-factor-demand mode with automatic trim and protection
throughout the flight envelope.
Following normal law, the sidestick controllers set the elevator and THS to maintain load factor
proportional to stick deflection and independent of speed.
With the sidestick at neutral, wings level, the system maintains 1 g in pitch (corrected for pitch
attitude), and there is no need for the pilot to trim by changing speed or configuration.
Pitch trim is automatic both in manual mode and when the autopilot is engaged. In normal turns (up
to 33 ° of bank) the pilot does not have to make any pitch corrections once the turn is established.
The flight mode is active from takeoff to landing, and follows the logic shown schematically (Refer to
DSC-27-20-10-10 General).
Automatic pitch trim freezes in the following situations:
‐ The pilot enters a manual trim order.
‐ The radio altitude is below 50 ft (100 ft with autopilot engaged).
‐ The load factor goes below 0.5 g.
When angle-of-attack protection is active, the THS setting is limited between the setting at the aircraft’s
entry into this protection and 3.5 ° nose down. (Neither the pilot nor the system can apply
additional nose-up trim).
Similarly, when the load factor is higher than 1.25 g or when the aircraft exceeds 33 ° of bank, the
THS setting is limited to values between the actual setting and 3.5 ° nose down.
When High Speed or High Mach Protection is active, the THS Setting is limited between the setting
at the aircraft’s entry into this protection and 11 ° nose-up.
 
RotorAndWing I must say you made some good points.
 
RotorAndWing I must say you made some good points.

I agree. Kinda like in 3 Finger's post, people who are outside of 121 or even 135 ops have no idea about their training requirements. Sure the aircraft have systems that make flying a hands off affair but as R&W pointed out, they do plenty of hands on flying as well.

Too often people paint a situation with a broad brush based on rumors or uneducated assumptions. Too often we post news stories about a reliance on technology and think it must be a trend because it made the news. In reality, for every Asiana or Air France you can find 5 times as many GA accidents where the pilot didn't react properly to what his instruments where telling him. It doesn't make the news unless it's an aircraft that's newsworthy. Just like when a C-17 or a Dreamlifter lands on the wrong runway it all gets blown out of proportion because of the type aircraft. In reality there are just as many GA aircraft doing it, you just won't see reports online about it.

While Stick and rudder skills are important, aeronautical knowledge and ADM are equally important. In all the evals I did in the military I never once failed anyone on their ability to control the aircraft. You can teach a monkey to make the aircraft go where you want. Although we'd like the non flying public to believe that flying an aircraft requires special hand-eye coordination, fact is the majority of the public can develop basic stick and rudder skills through muscle memory. I've seen plenty of pilots who I considered good "sticks" but they had no problem solving ability when things went wrong or outside of the norm. Plenty of pilots who can max perform their aircraft but have no clue about aerodynamics, regs, instruments, aircraft systems, etc.

Once again, with the safety record that Part 121 currently has, I think they probably have a good mix of technological savvy pilots along with a good stick and rudder skills set.
 
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Not saying this about you in particular but self-evaluation is sometimes not the greatest. I'll bet a majority of pilots would put themselves over on the right half of the bell curve but there is a left half too.


I don't. I can easily look at my puny logbook and know it's simply not possible for me to be on the right side of the pilot skills and experience curve. There's way too many folks who can count the number of *years* they've spent aloft out there to think my puny 500 hours means diddly squat.

Now if you're talking about charm and good looks...

Oh. Just checked the mirror. Might be in the center, but looks like slightly left of center is the most likely place unless a whole lot of pretty people died today. Heh heh. :)


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Oh... The topic. Had breakfast with an ex DC-10 guy this week (thanks for the invite, Troy!) who complained that he had a hell of a time getting folks to turn the autopilot off after lining up on the runway. It came up while discussing the Asiana screw up.

He said he watched some folks fight with the FMS for a last-minute ATC-requested runway sidestep too. That one was a particular pet peeve. He joked, "there's a reason they put knobs on the radios... they'd forget they could be manually tuned, I swear"... meaning his airline preferred even in VMC to have the ILS tuned in... But folks would go heads down messing with the FMS to do it, instead of just punching off the AP, flying the airplane, and asking the PNF to tune the stupid radio manually.

And he's been out of the game for a while now, so it's definitely not a new phenomenon.


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I don't think the problem is whether people are using the autopilot/automation or not. It seems like the problem comes when people get confused or way behind the automation. It's interesting to program the airplane and watch it fly itself around but you don't have as much feedback as when you actually are manipulating the controls so there is more of a lag in recognition when the automation does something you don't expect. I don't think the problem is that pilots can't hand-fly since they (at least we) are required to demonstrate it on every checkride. In most of these accidents I think the pilots were already in a pretty confused state when they took back the manual control from the automation.
 
I don't think the problem is whether people are using the autopilot/automation or not. It seems like the problem comes when people get confused or way behind the automation. It's interesting to program the airplane and watch it fly itself around but you don't have as much feedback as when you actually are manipulating the controls so there is more of a lag in recognition when the automation does something you don't expect. I don't think the problem is that pilots can't hand-fly since they (at least we) are required to demonstrate it on every checkride. In most of these accidents I think the pilots were already in a pretty confused state when they took back the manual control from the automation.

Yep, and multiple modes of automation, especially when selected by the plane, seem to add to the confusion greatly. I think if the automation were either 'on' or 'off' it would help; a red light that comes on indicating "All automation is now off, you need to manipulate everything manually".
 
"Fly the plane. Whoop whoop. Fly the plane. Whoop whoop. Fly the plane. Whoop whoop." ... was the last thing heard on the CVR recording. ;)
 
Yep, and multiple modes of automation, especially when selected by the plane, seem to add to the confusion greatly. .

Huh? "multiple modes of automation, especially when selected by the plane"

Now the airplane is selecting it's mode of operation? :rolleyes2:

I think if the automation were either 'on' or 'off' it would help; a red light that comes on indicating "All automation is now off, you need to manipulate everything manually".

Huh? Got news for you slick, that already exist, but not in that form.
 
Yep, and multiple modes of automation, especially when selected by the plane, seem to add to the confusion greatly. I think if the automation were either 'on' or 'off' it would help; a red light that comes on indicating "All automation is now off, you need to manipulate everything manually".
There already is a pretty obnoxious tone when the autopilot disconnects because years ago a crew didn't notice and flew into the Everglades (I think) while working on a gear problem which turned out to be the bulb.

Also I think we're taking about less than five accidents in millions of flights where someone actually gets far enough behind to crash. That's not excusing it but I'm not sure what else can be done about it, at least as far as extra technology is concerned.
 
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Huh? "multiple modes of automation, especially when selected by the plane"

Now the airplane is selecting it's mode of operation? :rolleyes2:



Huh? Got news for you slick, that already exist, but not in that form.

Yep, if I recall you correctly, the Airbus goes through three different modes depending on what faulted.
 
I was going to confess my sin: Tuning the ADF to an AM radio station and flying the needle.
The only thing that goes "Whoop, whoop, fly the plane." in my plane is my wife.
 
There already is a pretty obnoxious tone when the autopilot disconnects because years ago a crew didn't notice and flew into the Everglades (I think) while working on a gear problem which turned out to be the bulb.


Eastern 401. Exacerbated by differences in number of lbs of pressure required on the two yokes to trigger a disconnect, and the whole crew looking at only one half of the panel while fixated on the nose-gear lightbulb problem. (The AP disconnect indication could have been easily seen on the FO's side. He was leaning over fussing with the bulb with the Captain while the Engineer went to go look through a lighted telescope device to see if two red marks were lined up mechanically which was the backup system to the gear indicator light.)

Basically came down to no one was tasked with flying the airplane and everyone was troubleshooting in a three pilot cockpit.

I swear, one small but noticeable side benefit of two pilot cockpits is a higher awareness of when there's nobody flying the bus. With three or more up front it seems to happen far more often in accident reports that all of them fixate on the problem at hand and leave no one actually flying.
 
For what it is worth, my flight school claims the FAA has quietly pulled back on its recommendation of a few years back that everyone be trained on glass panel. They are now suggesting training on steam, and traditional pilotage first, and then progressing to the new technologies. That does suggest that somebody at the FAA feels that new pilots were being trained too much in the cockpit, and were possible getting too much information from the newest avionics, at the detriment to stick and rudder skills.
 
Eastern 401. Exacerbated by differences in number of lbs of pressure required on the two yokes to trigger a disconnect, and the whole crew looking at only one half of the panel while fixated on the nose-gear lightbulb problem. (The AP disconnect indication could have been easily seen on the FO's side.

Actually, that isn't entirely true. Because of the two AFCS computers and the mismatch in yoke pressure required to disconnect them, the Board determined that while the command mode of the A/P was disconnected (with aural alarm) and it was in CWS mode, the Altitude select light on the FOs panel would have remained illuminated giving the FO (and Captain who was attention was toward the right side) the impression that it was still engaged. Obviously everyone failed to notice the altimeter unwinding.

One of the things that came to light during the 401 investigation is that during the post accident interviews with other L-1011 pilots, it became apparent that most of them did not fully understand the various modes and features of the relatively new (at the time) AFCS.
 
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