Airline pilots relying too much on automation?

[MachFly]

So if I put you in front of a 757, 767 or an A320 you would ace it first time out? I don't think so, you're talking a different skill set.

If I know the mechanical systems I don't need a computer to do my job. So yes, I'll fly it, I might not ace it but you'll live and the plane will fly again.

Same reason I wouldn't sit in the back of your 421 while you flew through an area of convective weather or tried to fly an approach to minimums. There is no structure or standards to your "training" or your recurrency. There is no one there to say "sorry, you don't meet minimum requirements" and you are now grounded until you do.

There is a huge difference between 121 training and part 91 training.

Let's make one thing clear, you don't know S**t about my training. Don't make assumptions.

 

[LDJones]

All the airline pilots I know also actively got GA, how common are those guys?

I know a number of airline pilots who continue their passion for flying in GA aircraft on their days off. I recently flew with one who was completing his Sonex kitplane. Two other acquaintances are retired from the airlines and spend their days tinkering with and flying their two Navions. I've only flown with one of them, but always pick up a trick or two when flying with them.

That said, I know there exists those who aren't that passionate about flying, that it's really just a job to them. Coming home from a business trip a few years ago I sat next to an airline captain dead-heading home. Nice guy. We chatted about his career path. He said he stumbled into flying via college and ROTC. He had no real interest in aviation but it seemed like a good deal so he took it. Got trained, flew transports for a number of years in the military, then got out and joined the airlines. He'd been flying 20 or more years with the airlines at that point and still viewed it as just a job and couldn't wait til he could retire and do things he enjoyed.

So I know that type exists, although so far he's the only one I've encountered like that. I've personally known a least a couple of dozen who loved every minute in the air.

 

[RotorAndWing]

If I know the mechanical systems I don't need a computer to do my job. So yes, I'll fly it, I might not ace it but you'll live and the plane will fly again.

Right. Your "stick and rudder" skills would show severely lacking. Large aircraft fly different from small GA airplanes.

Let's make one thing clear, you don't know S**t about my training. Don't make assumptions.

Huh??? You don't know **** about airline training and all you are doing is making (wrong) assumptions.

So tell us about your last recurrent in the 421? Where did you go? Who conducted it? Was it a pass or fail type checkride?

 

[Everskyward]

Yeah but do all pilots think that way?

I'll bet they would have gotten the same answer from any of the other pilots who work here.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Since you seem to know everything why don't you tell us how often airline pilots work on their stick and rudder skills? And how well will they be able to fly their airplane without the computer doing their job?

Every recurrent, every initial and every upgrade training. I have to demonstrate dual FMGS failures, FCU failures plus a number of airports I fly into are no approach, VFR only airports with short narrow runways, all hand flown.

We also train for FAC failures, ELAC failures, SEC failures, hydraulic failures (which force hand flown scenarios)

You take a random airline pilot and tell him to fly from NY to LA without computers of any kind, will he be able to do it without spending the previous three weeks on preparation? Because when something fails in flight you ain't got time to study.

Not a problem. The FMS can be deferred. So can the autopilot.

 

[LDJones]

Who says it doesn't happen?

Every recurrent (I go twice a year) we simulate complete failures which drives the pilot into a hand flown no automation approaches (raw data).

My last recurrent covered wet runway with a 25 knot direct cross wind, a wet runway with a 20 knot crosswind single engine with a go around at 20 feet (balked landing), several ECAM events, V1 cuts, windshear on takeoff, TCAS and RA, emergency descent, emergency evacuation and a dual FMGS failure resulting in a raw data hand flown ILS to minimums, plus several non precision approaches (OEI and two engine). Also had to practice and demonstrate a rejected takeoff on a 25 knot crosswind wet runway with the engine failure below 60 knots, which if done incorrectly will leave you in the grass on the side of the runway.

I bet those rides work up a fair amount of sweat. I'll fly with you.

 

[Henning]

NO passenger hauling airline is EVER going to force a pilot to fly if the PIC deems it to be unsafe. For the simple reason that it puts ALL of the liability on them. You seem to have a pretty simplistic view of things - just compare the Part 91 safety record to that of the Part 121. You may continue to choose to be fearful of airline travel if you like but the numbers and simple LOGIC do not support your fears.

Airlines operate under Strict Liability, that means no matter what, all the liability is on them; period, end of story. Strict Liability only applies to Airlines, Explosives Handling, and Dangerous Animal Handling.

 

[LDJones]

Airlines operate under Strict Liability, that means no matter what, all the liability is on them; period, end of story. Strict Liability only applies to Airlines, Explosives Handling, and Dangerous Animal Handling.

You forgot marriage.

 

[Threefingeredjack]

I think, based on my limited time on this forum, that a majority of GA pilots have no concept of operating an aircraft as a system, and of leading a crew in flight operations in marginal conditions near the edges of the aircraft's flight envelope. Given that assumption, and given the number of flights successfully completed worldwide each and every day by professional pilots, I have to conclude that the opinion expressed in the article is 100% BS, and the opinions offered here by anyone other than those who have danced the dance are meaningless.

That being said, are there sub-par 121 pilots? Surely. Can there be an intersection of the graph depicting them and the graph plotting the extremely rare systems failures? Absolutely. Are the results of that intersection catastrophic? Of course. It seems that it is easier to forget that humans and the machines they design are fallible and create sensationalism than it is to admit facts.

But let us not forget that a guy named Sully managed to deal with a seemingly insurmountable challenge, and there are many other examples of extraordinary skill minimizing or totally controlling a systems failure with a safe outcome. But safe results do not a headline make.

 

[RotorAndWing]

I think, based on my limited time on this forum, that a majority of GA pilots have no concept of operating an aircraft as a system, and of leading a crew in flight operations in marginal conditions near the edges of the aircraft's flight envelope. Given that assumption, and given the number of flights successfully completed worldwide each and every day by professional pilots, I have to conclude that the opinion expressed in the article is 100% BS, and the opinions offered by anyone other than those who have danced the dance are meaningless.

That being said, are there sub-par 121 pilots? Surely. Can there be an intersection of the graph depicting them and the graph plotting the extremely rare systems failures? Absolutely. Are the results of that intersection catastrophic? Of course. It seems that it is easier to forget that humans and the machines they design are fallible and create sensationalism than it is to admit facts.

But let us not forget that a guy named Sully managed to deal with a seemingly insurmountable challenge, and there are many other examples of extraordinary skill minimizing or totally controlling a systems failure with a safe outcome. But safe results do not a headline make.

 

[AmazonChitlin]

You forgot marriage.

 

[MrAviator180]

With this post you have clearly demonstrated you have zero concept or knowledge of a 121 operation.

Not surprising.

And? I thought it would be nice to share it and see what other people think about it. Take it how you want.

 

[Greg Bockelman]

And? I thought it would be nice to share it and see what other people think about it. Take it how you want.

Well he WAS talking to Machfly.

 

[Jimmy cooper]

Again, back to air France. If the pilots on board were subject to stringent examination and check rides, it seems strange that when the captain left the controls and the younger co pilot took over, he failed to realize, if he checked his instruments ,that he had stalled the aircraft! Then he kept at it, still pulling back. The report stated that only a highly qualified pilot could have saved it at this point. This info was gleaned from the black boxes recovered at great expense according to the article.

 

[stratobee]

In the case of the Air France accident I don't think anyone would have done any better on this board or anywhere else. They had unreliable speed information (and below a certain airspeed/AOA in Airbus automation Alternate Law the stall warner is disengaged so as to not make sound on the ground etc): the plane was below that speed. It's very easy to blame in hindsight, but being right in a violent thunderstorm, pitch black, fully iced up with multiple contradictory information is not an easy call. Sure, pilot error, but an error no skygod would have done much better at.

Now, if we all could start flying AOA's instead of airspeed, then it might not have happened. But we don't have those procedures in aviation and there is little routine. FAA are finally making it easier to install AOA meters, but it only took 50 years. Until we do learn how to use them, these errors and accidents will probably continue.

C Sullenberger quote:

"We have to infer angle of attack indirectly by referencing speed. That makes stall recognition and recovery that much more difficult. For more than half a century, we've had the capability to display AoA (in the cockpits of most jet transports), one of the most critical parameters, yet we choose not to do it."

Look at the Aeroperu Flight 603 crash where a mechanic had accidentally left some tape over the static ports. Crashed into the sea at night because there was no reliable speed or altitude information and the flight computer kept giving contradicting information just like in the Air France accident. Had there been an AOA procedure implemented and the information available, that would not have happened. We're not talking rookie pilots here either - captain had over 22.000hrs. So it happens to the best of them.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aeroperú_Flight_603

 

[RotorAndWing]

Again, back to air France. If the pilots on board were subject to stringent examination and check rides, it seems strange that when the captain left the controls and the younger co pilot took over, he failed to realize, if he checked his instruments ,that he had stalled the aircraft! Then he kept at it, still pulling back. The report stated that only a highly qualified pilot could have saved it at this point. This info was gleaned from the black boxes recovered at great expense according to the article.

So then are we to assume with he Air France accident ALL airline pilot training is flawed? With the number of airline flights per year and the number of accidents/incidents related to automation dependency does that really point to a problem?

Airline training is an ongoing evolution and as problems are identified training is changed to meet the demands.

When one looks at the shear numbers of airline flights versus accidents those numbers are extremely low.

 

[MachFly]

Right. Your "stick and rudder" skills would show severely lacking. Large aircraft fly different from small GA airplanes.

No, large aircraft handle different, aerodynamics is the same. Stick and rudder skills are just as important if your flying it yourself.

Every recurrent, every initial and every upgrade training. I have to demonstrate dual FMGS failures, FCU failures plus a number of airports I fly into are no approach, VFR only airports with short narrow runways, all hand flown.

We also train for FAC failures, ELAC failures, SEC failures, hydraulic failures (which force hand flown scenarios)

Yes and you have a perfectly written out checklist for each one of those failures. Then your procedures is to positively identify a failure, then use the proper checklist to troubleshoot and secure if need be.
Given that you identify the right system to troubleshoot, you have to remember or find the right checklist with limited time, and sometimes you'd have to do that 6 month after your last recurrent training (I assume your recurrent training is twice a year).
In addition to all of the above the checklist has to have the procedures for the proper failure, given all systems on board it can not possible be the case. Don't ask me to give you details, I haven't read your checklist.

Back to the question regarding stick and rudder skills. How much time do you spend on things like unusual attitude training?
Most training is based on systems, not stick and rudder flying.

 

[RotorAndWing]

No, large aircraft handle different, aerodynamics is the same. Stick and rudder skills are just as important if your flying it yourself.

What large aircraft (above 12,500) have you flown?

Aerodynamics are the same? Really? A swept wing jet weighing 70 tonnes has the same aerodynamics as a small GA twin?

Yes and you have a perfectly written out checklist for each one of those failures. Then your procedures is to positively identify a failure, then use the proper checklist to troubleshoot and secure if need be.
Given that you identify the right system to troubleshoot, you have to remember or find the right checklist with limited time, and sometimes you'd have to do that 6 month after your last recurrent training (I assume your recurrent training is twice a year).
In addition to all of the above the checklist has to have the procedures for the proper failure, given all systems on board it can not possible be the case. Don't ask me to give you details, I haven't read your checklist.

Then you clearly don't understand what you are talking about? Why do you continue to go on about something you don't have a clue?

Back to the question regarding stick and rudder skills. How much time do you spend on things like unusual attitude training?
Most training is based on systems, not stick and rudder flying.

Initial training includes jet upset recovery. Occasionally it's added into recurrency training if a trend is denoted and skills are shown to be lacking. How many accidents are directly related to jet upset and recovery?

You keep going back to "stick and rudder" skills. I gave you several scenarios in our training where the aircraft must be hand flown without automation and into austere conditions (wet, icy runway, high crosswinds, windshear encounter and evasion, approach to minimums hand flown OEI with a go around (hand flown) OEI )

Now tell us about your initial training in the C 421 and your recurrent training? Is it a pass/fail consequence? are you grounded if you cannot meet minimum standards? Do you practice upset recovery techniques at each recurrent?

 

[MachFly]

So then are we to assume with he Air France accident ALL airline pilot training is flawed?

No, absolutely not. I'm sure there are airlines pilots who are some of the best, and if you are one of them then way to go. Most airline pilots are people who do it as a job, not a hobby. They wake up in the morning and go to work, then they come back home tired and are happy that they can now relax. People with such approach to their work won't be as good as you need them to be.

 

[RotorAndWing]

No, absolutely not. I'm sure there are airlines pilots who are some of the best, and if you are one of them then way to go. Most airline pilots are people who do it as a job, not a hobby. They wake up in the morning and go to work, then they come back home tired and are happy that they can now relax. .

Again, please tell all of us reading what airlines you are associated with and what programs you have personally been involved with? You are making observations with no facts at all.

People with such approach to their work won't be as good as you need them to be.

Huh? Because they don't go out to the GA airport on their days off and fly an Extra or Pitts they are somehow inferior??

Most airline pilots are people who do it as a job, not a hobby. .

I take it you are a hobby pilot. So I'm to trust your skills over a highly trained professional?

 

[Jimmy cooper]

I'm not implying anything. I simply wonder that if the 22000 hour captain had remained at the controls, and the young pilot with the least hours had not gotten his hand in, would the captain have sensed , by looking at his entire panel, that they were indeed stalled and recovered it. I'm not calling anyone wrong in this case, just facinated by how this occurred. In the case of the aircraft that crashed near buffalo, it seems that if a sullenberg type pilot were flying that plane, it would have landed without mishap. Other aircraft landed just before and after without problems.

 

[Fearless Tower]

So while we are on the subject of stick and rudder skills, CNN just posted this video:

http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/wo...mepage=yes&video_referrer=http://www.cnn.com/

Emirates 777 attempting to land at Birmingham. What strikes me as odd is that he never appears to make any attempt to get the upwind wing down. It almost looks like he was hoping the airplane would straighten up out of the crab on its own.

 

[Henning]

Again, back to air France. If the pilots on board were subject to stringent examination and check rides, it seems strange that when the captain left the controls and the younger co pilot took over, he failed to realize, if he checked his instruments ,that he had stalled the aircraft! Then he kept at it, still pulling back. The report stated that only a highly qualified pilot could have saved it at this point. This info was gleaned from the black boxes recovered at great expense according to the article.

The Captain didn't come up with it either and he was in the cockpit for more than 2 minutes before they splatted. The straw that broke the camel's back in AF447 was that the stall warning only goes on within a limited range of AOA. If the AOA gets too steep, the system no longer believes the AOA is possible and shuts up, then when you decrease the AOA back towards flying, it comes back on. This is what confused the PF straight into brain lock. He then held the stick back all the way to 12,000' and stated, "this is really happening, isn't it?" That's when his hand trembled and the wing dropped (until then the plane had held a magnificent falling leaf stall). That's when the guy in the left seat took the stick and Picked The Wing Back Up!!! Holy cow, from an aerodynamic and control function aspect, what a magnificently crafted machine! What gets me is at this point the guy in the left seat could have still very likely saved it by putting the nose down and the power forward. Heck, try flaps, try anything, keep swinging at the freaking ball.

These guys gave up on flying the plane 3 minutes before it crashed. The captain didn't do ANYTHING when he came into the cockpit, not the first bit of leadership there. What happened is 3 professional pilots all with dissociative personalities crewed that flight, and it cost every one their lives.

It's the dissociative personality that is not tested for that really shouldn't be allowed to dutied as captain, you need at least one calm focuser on the flight deck that can keep think and doing until the plane stops moving. The trick is I'm not positive you can test for it without actually putting someone's life at risk, but I think there's a good chance. When the majority of pilots came from the military, this wasn't as big of an issue because many dissasciative types would have washed out either in training or through attrition in service. By the time they got out and into the airlines, they were for the most part proven calm focus types.

While lack of skill on the part of the PF in the right seat, his ham fisting the controls when the AP kicked out, was the a link in the accident chain, the inability to continue thinking and acting was what got them all killed. If he had ignored the stall warning coming back on when he put the nose down and the plane started accelerating again, they would have only lost a few thousand feet.

R&W, you're in the Airbus again right? Have they changed that feature on the stall system yet so it doesn't automatically shut up when the AOA is too steep?

 

[Fearless Tower]

In the case of the aircraft that crashed near buffalo, it seems that if a sullenberg type pilot were flying that plane, it would have landed without mishap. Other aircraft landed just before and after without problems.

If MOST other pilots were flying that airplane that night, it would have landed without mishap.

 

[Jimmy cooper]

Another fascination for me was the airline captain some years back, who had engines out. Could have been caused by having to hold too long, but can't recall why engines quit, in any event he glided to an alternate field, landed, saving everyone. He claimed many years as a glider pilot saved the day. Anyone remember this?

 

[RotorAndWing]

I'm not implying anything. I simply wonder that if the 22000 hour captain had remained at the controls, and the young pilot with the least hours had not gotten his hand in, would the captain have sensed , by looking at his entire panel, that they were indeed stalled and recovered it. I'm not calling anyone wrong in this case, just facinated by how this occurred. In the case of the aircraft that crashed near buffalo, it seems that if a sullenberg type pilot were flying that plane, it would have landed without mishap. Other aircraft landed just before and after without problems.

Some training issues take years to manifest themselves. The Colgan accident prompted changes to stall training and recovery where previously airlines (under FAA guidance) were teaching stalls as a precision maneuver (don't loose altitude) rather than an escape method.

Also it heightened in the industry tighter scrutiny over repeated training failures.

Air France accident showed several issues with their training. Personally as a Captain if I know my aircraft is going through the ITCZ and there is inevitably going to be severe weather I'm not going to leave the cockpit even if there is a relief pilot.

 

[Henning]

If MOST other pilots were flying that airplane that night, it would have landed without mishap.

That's the unknown at this point, would they have? Civilian training is all about staying far away from anything dangerous. Hell, I see people doing Slow Flight demos in 172 at 65kts.

 

[Greg Bockelman]

Another fascination for me was the airline captain some years back, who had engines out. Could have been caused by having to hold too long, but can't recall why engines quit, in any event he glided to an alternate field, landed, saving everyone. He claimed many years as a glider pilot saved the day. Anyone remember this?

Gimli Glider. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gimli_Glider

 

[stratobee]

If you have a stall warner that comes on when you push the stick forward, but shuts up when you pull it back, then that's confusing. Technically he responded exactly correct to the information presented to him. Add erroneous/conflicting information and incorrect speed data in highly stressed environment and severe turbulence, and any pilot would have had a problem. I'm not so quick to feed these pilots to the dogs as everyone else is. They f**ked up, but so would most pilots in same scenario.

Fly the AOA is the solution. Forget airspeed. The quicker we get that implemented, the better.

 

[Threefingeredjack]

Another fascination for me was the airline captain some years back, who had engines out. Could have been caused by having to hold too long, but can't recall why engines quit, in any event he glided to an alternate field, landed, saving everyone. He claimed many years as a glider pilot saved the day. Anyone remember this?

That was an Air Canada flight where the incorrect amount of fuel was added due to a math error converting liters to pounds. (IIRC). By chance the pilot had served at the decommissioned base they eventually landed on and knew the runways. It was a masterful exhibition of CRM and energy management.

 

[Threefingeredjack]

No, absolutely not. I'm sure there are airlines pilots who are some of the best, and if you are one of them then way to go. Most airline pilots are people who do it as a job, not a hobby. They wake up in the morning and go to work, then they come back home tired and are happy that they can now relax. People with such approach to their work won't be as good as you need them to be.

"Most" airline pilots????? To make that a valid statement you need to demonstrate that you personally know most of the air carrier pilots in the world. On that point I throw the BS flag. Assuming my challenge is correct, the balance of your argument is invalid. Your argument is analogous to me saying that most military pilots only do it because the uniforms are cool and the retirement is great. Both arguments are equally absurd.

 

[Henning]

If you have a stall warner that comes on when you push the stick forward, but shuts up when you pull it back, then that's confusing. Add erroneous/conflicting information and incorrect speed data in highly stressed environment and severe turbulence, and any pilot would have had a problem. I'm not so quick to feed these pilots to the dogs as everyone else is. They f**ked up, but so would most pilots in same scenario.

Fly the AOA is the solution. Forget airspeed. The quicker we get that implemented, the better.

That's just it, you need people in the cockpit who can focus through the confusion and parse the problem to the basics. At some point, I would have expected when the captain came in, someone should have parsed through all the BS and came up with "The nose is way high and we are falling out of the sky, we are stalled and need to get the nose down."

 

[RotorAndWing]

R&W, you're in the Airbus again right? Have they changed that feature on the stall system yet so it doesn't automatically shut up when the AOA is too steep?

This is the best explanation I found:

[FONT=ARIAL, Helvetica, Geneva]Has the issue of the Airbus stall warning finally been resolved and adapted by all airlines?[/FONT]
1. Airbus FBW does not stall when the aircraft is in Normal Law. The FBW protects it from a stall.
2. When the system cannot have adequate input (eg: Air Data problems), it degrades into:
- Alternate Law (with protection)
- Alternate Law (with minimum protection)
- Direct Law.

In the case of NAV ADR DISAGREE / loss of at least 2 Air Data computers, the system degrades to "alternate law with minimum protection"...

The overly simplified Airbus philosophy is: "I (FBW) fly the plane, you tell me what to do and I'll do it and keep you out of trouble at the same time. If I do not have the data input I need, then I'll tell you, since I do not have enough data to protect you, you fly the plane"

Both Airbus and Boeing have looked into stall recovery procedures in the light of AF447 and also the Colgan flight, to see if changes to stall recovery training/procedures are required.

There are two methods in stall recovery:
1. Minimize height loss
2. Get out of the stall in minimum time.

#1 = Full power and power yourself out of it while reducing pitch angle.
#2 = Focus on controllability with some height loss... once you get out of stall, then increase power.

During initial training, one is taught #2. But the legacy of older jets etc, made airline training focus on #1... However, #1 can cause further problems if you got underslung engines... Depends on how one looks at it, the difference between #1 and #2 can be as thin as one's hair's width... but the focus on increase power smoothly when one is on the very edges of the performance envelope, can make the difference between the two methods as wide as the Pacific Ocean.

 

[Jimmy cooper]

A good friend who has been a commercial pilot for many years, including demo pilot for major manuf. and has worked at flight safety for 15 years says it's amazing how bad some are that arrive to be tested. Including pilots from other country's. In the case of air France, they say they have implemented many more manual flying hours practice for their pilots.

 

[Henning]

This is the best explanation I found:

[FONT=ARIAL, Helvetica, Geneva]Has the issue of the Airbus stall warning finally been resolved and adapted by all airlines?[/FONT]
1. Airbus FBW does not stall when the aircraft is in Normal Law. The FBW protects it from a stall.
2. When the system cannot have adequate input (eg: Air Data problems), it degrades into:
- Alternate Law (with protection)
- Alternate Law (with minimum protection)
- Direct Law.

In the case of NAV ADR DISAGREE / loss of at least 2 Air Data computers, the system degrades to "alternate law with minimum protection"...

The overly simplified Airbus philosophy is: "I (FBW) fly the plane, you tell me what to do and I'll do it and keep you out of trouble at the same time. If I do not have the data input I need, then I'll tell you, since I do not have enough data to protect you, you fly the plane"

Both Airbus and Boeing have looked into stall recovery procedures in the light of AF447 and also the Colgan flight, to see if changes to stall recovery training/procedures are required.

There are two methods in stall recovery:
1. Minimize height loss
2. Get out of the stall in minimum time.

#1 = Full power and power yourself out of it while reducing pitch angle.
#2 = Focus on controllability with some height loss... once you get out of stall, then increase power.

During initial training, one is taught #2. But the legacy of older jets etc, made airline training focus on #1... However, #1 can cause further problems if you got underslung engines... Depends on how one looks at it, the difference between #1 and #2 can be as thin as one's hair's width... but the focus on increase power smoothly when one is on the very edges of the performance envelope, can make the difference between the two methods as wide as the Pacific Ocean.

Interesting, so they avoided answering the question.

 

[ClimbnSink]

That's just it, you need people in the cockpit who can focus through the confusion and parse the problem to the basics."

Most of the ice cool able to take it all in calmly under pressure guys that I've known likely have serious ADD. Focusing is great until you focus exclusively on the wrong thing.

 

[Jimmy cooper]

I read the rundown on the air Canada pilot who glided into the former military base. Thanks so much for directing me to it. Fascinating story. Talk about fate is the hunter!

 

[RotorAndWing]

Interesting, so they avoided answering the question.

No, it's answered right there. The system remains the same.

[FONT=ARIAL, Helvetica, Geneva]Has the issue of the Airbus stall warning finally been resolved and adapted by all airlines?[/FONT]
1. Airbus FBW does not stall when the aircraft is in Normal Law. The FBW protects it from a stall.
2. When the system cannot have adequate input (eg: Air Data problems), it degrades into:
- Alternate Law (with protection)
- Alternate Law (with minimum protection)
- Direct Law.

In the case of NAV ADR DISAGREE / loss of at least 2 Air Data computers, the system degrades to "alternate law with minimum protection"...

The overly simplified Airbus philosophy is: "I (FBW) fly the plane, you tell me what to do and I'll do it and keep you out of trouble at the same time. If I do not have the data input I need, then I'll tell you, since I do not have enough data to protect you, you fly the plane"

Newer Airbus are being equipped with BUSS (Back Up Speed Scale) systems and older ones are being converted.

 

[MachFly]

What large aircraft (above 12,500) have you flown?

Aerodynamics are the same? Really? A swept wing jet weighing 70 tonnes has the same aerodynamics as a small GA twin?

Yes aerodynamics are the same. You still have to drop the nose when you stall, you still have asymmetric thrust when you loose an engine, you still can overspeed the same way, ect...
Your right swept wing makes things harder, you still have to be proficient at flying the airplane by hand.

Then you clearly don't understand what you are talking about? Why do you continue to go on about something you don't have a clue?

That seems to be your favorite phrase. Every time your discussing something with someone on the forum no one has any idea what they are talking about besides you.

Initial training includes jet upset recovery. Occasionally it's added into recurrency training if a trend is denoted and skills are shown to be lacking.

So initial training was usually a long time ago, and since you never use more than 5 degrees of bank no one ever sees that those skills are deteriorating so you never do it in the recurrency training.

How many accidents are directly related to jet upset and recovery

From the top of my head...AF 447, AA 587, then there was another guy who iced up and got a overspeed and stall warning at the same time. I'm sure there are plenty more, if your really interested I'll find you some more numbers.

You keep going back to "stick and rudder" skills. I gave you several scenarios in our training where the aircraft must be hand flown without automation and into austere conditions (wet, icy runway, high crosswinds, windshear encounter and evasion, approach to minimums hand flown OEI with a go around (hand flown) OEI )

Yes I keep going back to stick and rudder because it's important. Computers skills are to make things easier for you. Stick and rudder skills are so you can survive.

Now tell us about your initial training in the C 421 and your recurrent training? Is it a pass/fail consequence? are you grounded if you cannot meet minimum standards? Do you practice upset recovery techniques at each recurrent?

You seem to really want to know about me and the 421 in a thread about airline pilot training. Fine, okay let's talks about it.
No we don't have those shinny new million dollar simulators like you guys use. Unlike you though at least 30% of my flights are empty so I get to practice in the real airplane, not a simulator.
Now you what, I'm not completely satisfied with the amount of training the company provides, so in addition to all the company stuff I do a whole bunch of my own flying to be able to stay proficient not only on company's level, but on mine.

Your asking if I practice upset recovery at each recurrent? Yeah, because it's important. Tell you what, I practice it at least once a week, not all of it is in the 421 but it's a lot more unusual than most pilots ever get to. I feel perfectly comfortable sitting in an aircraft that's in an inverted spin and just watching the ground get closer. You tell me how many airline pilots can say that?

 

[nosehair]

Relying on technology. Back to basics. Way back, we were taught not to rely on the stall warning horn. We learned to feel the angle of attack. To feel the elevator,how it goes loose as it stalls, and tighten up as it regains recovery. You flew into and out of the sall to do it by feel.
When the AF pilot was pulling and pushing on the yoke with no regard for feel and control response, only doing what the faulty horn was telling him, he was doing what we trained him to do.

You know, PTS stall training and recovery