Air France A330 - Missing over Atantic

AdamZ said:
Spike while the voice recordings as the plane plummeted may not be anything but voyeuristic I would think that the voice recordings in the minutes before would in fact be helpful to learn about CRM and stress or perhaps lack there of and decision making before entering what was perhaps an avoidable situation.
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I believe the key word missing is the public release of transcripts. Investigators use the audio. CNN doesn't need the actual audio.
 
Bob Noel said:
I believe the key word missing is the public release of transcripts. Investigators use the audio. CNN doesn't need the actual audio.
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But the scum of the earth sure do try to. Freedom Of Information Act and all.
 
Greg Bockelman said:
But the scum of the earth sure do try to. Freedom Of Information Act and all.
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I got to hear the CVR of my buddy's last words shouting "Wrong Foot! Wrong Foot!" before the Jetsteam he was right seating plowed in upside down at RDU...:(:nonod:
 
Henning said:
I got to hear the CVR of my buddy's last words shouting "Wrong Foot! Wrong Foot!" before the Jetsteam he was right seating plowed in upside down at RDU...:(:nonod:
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My point made, in terms which are painfully real.
 
TangoWhiskey said:
ALL data was recovered and readable/usable! They have the last two hours of cockpit audio and all FDR data. This should help investigators tremendously.

http://www.flightglobal.com/article...-data-and-cockpit-voice-recorder-data-is.html
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Would be great if the NTSB were given the FDR and CVR data at the exact same time the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses got hold of it....... Personally I would not give much trust in what they disclose.. IMHO... French investigating a Air France flight crash. They will have just enough time to "massage" the facts till the summer release of findings.... :yikes::yikes::hairraise::mad2:
 
N801BH said:
Would be great if the NTSB were given the FDR and CVR data at the exact same time the Bureau d'Enquetes et d'Analyses got hold of it....... Personally I would not give much trust in what they disclose.. IMHO... French investigating a Air France flight crash. They will have just enough time to "massage" the facts till the summer release of findings.... :yikes::yikes::hairraise::mad2:
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No kidding. And I hope they do get it, considering there's potential airworthiness implications for A330's in the US, too.
 
bob_albertson said:
Interesting, CVR is supposed to record only 30 minutes and DFDR records 2.5 hours. I guess Airbus set up their systems a bit different. Interesting!
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Those are minimums. Overachieving recorders can do more.

Or perhaps they're following the Dr. Bruce "Don't Accept Minimum Standards" rule. ;)
 
denverpilot said:
Those are minimums. Overachieving recorders can do more.

Or perhaps they're following the Dr. Bruce "Don't Accept Minimum Standards" rule. ;)
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Haha, I don't think anyone/anything in the airline world would follow that rule.... it costs too much :lol::rolleyes:

It's definantly a good thing that they record more time. Not all accidents happen in 30 mins worth of chatting.

EDIT: Well, that should read: no management type or anyone in the purchasing department of any airline :redface:
 
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100...41631579541512.html?mod=WSJ_hp_LEFTTopStories

It's the WSJ, so you may have to have a sub to read.

excerpt from story said:
The pilots of an Air France jet that crashed into the Atlantic Ocean two years ago apparently became distracted with faulty airspeed indicators and failed to properly deal with other vital systems, including adjusting engine thrust, according to people familiar with preliminary findings from the plane's recorders.

The final moments inside the cockpit of the twin-engine Airbus A330, these people said, indicates the pilots seemingly were confused by alarms they received from various automated flight-control systems as the plane bucked through some turbulence expected on the route from Rio de Janeiro to Paris but also faced unexpectedly heavy icing at 35,000 feet. .....

Ultimately, the crew failed to follow standard procedures to maintain or increase thrust and keep the aircraft's nose level, while trouble-shooting and waiting for the airspeed sensors and related functions to return to normal, according to these people........
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These things always seem to start with pilot error; then, a more balanced report comes out. Sounds as if these folks were dealing with significant weather and equipment issues and myriad alarms were complicating how they reacted.

I wouldn't give Airbus a clean pass at this point.

Best,

Dave
 
Airbus Industries ?????

Ain't that the same con artists who built a plane that the verticle stab/rudder broke off of while being flown below VA ??? Oh Never mind... That was the pilots fault too... Sorry.:nono::nono::nono:

Now back to your regularly scheduled cover up..:yes::yes::wink2:

Ben.
 
So the summary is another Airbus completely overloaded the flight crew with unnecessary information...?

The amount of time to react to the problem was < 4 minutes, because in 4 minutes they were all dead.

The data recorder shows "the plane slowed dangerously" but the crew was supposedly getting faulty readings on airspeed.

(But the recorder wasn't?!?!)

My opinon: Something's totally jacked with their flight software, and they're covering their asses.
 
N801BH said:
Airbus Industries ?????

Ain't that the same con artists who built a plane that the verticle stab/rudder broke off of while being flown below VA ??? Oh Never mind... That was the pilots fault too... Sorry.:nono::nono::nono:

Now back to your regularly scheduled cover up..:yes::yes::wink2:

Ben.
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I'm not sure if you're referring to an Airbus or a Boeing... Boeing lost a few 737s due to tail issues as well....

That said, I don't approve of repairing FRP type structures. Once damaged they should be disposed of.
 
denverpilot said:
So the summary is another Airbus completely overloaded the flight crew with unnecessary information...?

The amount of time to react to the problem was < 4 minutes, because in 4 minutes they were all dead.

The data recorder shows "the plane slowed dangerously" but the crew was supposedly getting faulty readings on airspeed.

(But the recorder wasn't?!?!)

My opinon: Something's totally jacked with their flight software, and they're covering their asses.
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Well, it doesn't necessarily have to be jacked. There may have been proper work arounds for the issue that the crew just didn't know. Is the software so complicated that the mere mortal pilot has no chance of managing it? Had either of the FOs occupying the crew seats ever had the complete training on the aircraft? IIRC, the Captain was in crew rest. Did either of the crew on deck have a full Command Type Rating? How did they respond to the challenges?

We don't really have the evidence to make a claim just yet.
 
Henning said:
Well, it doesn't necessarily have to be jacked. There may have been proper work arounds for the issue that the crew just didn't know.
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Training failure, but the aircraft with Airbus' design philosophy should be making the proper "fix" clear.
Henning said:
Is the software so complicated that the mere mortal pilot has no chance of managing it?
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There's a lot of evidence that it took FIVE qualified crew-members including two check airmen to handle the engine loss over India last year. The Captain flew ONLY, the FO started digging through the manual and reading responses to the things that the 3rd, 4th, and 5th pilots in the jumpseats were reading him off of the displays. That's bad user-interface design, and if the aircraft is going to pretend it's smart enough to fix anything, and change "modes" like Airbus' software does... that's WAY too much displayed info if it takes 3 to 4 people to manage the information spewing from it.

Henning said:
Had either of the FOs occupying the crew seats ever had the complete training on the aircraft?
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They better damn-well have, or they shouldn't have been PIC. If we find out there are airlines not fully training folks sitting in the seats, I won't be flying those airlines!

Henning said:
IIRC, the Captain was in crew rest. Did either of the crew on deck have a full Command Type Rating?
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Why have different type ratings? Either you can fly the bastard or you can't.

Henning said:
How did they respond to the challenges?
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Obviously not well enough to survive and not kill their passengers.

Henning said:
We don't really have the evidence to make a claim just yet.
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I contend that Airbus isn't the best entity to investigate their own software... but who else could/would? I mean down at the code level too... not just the resulting assumptions about what was on the displays (just because the FMS says it was so, doesn't mean it was) and the user-interface.

Totally agreed that there's a lot more work to be done here. Just pointing out the obvious trend of Airbus cockpits being way too much workload when unexpected sensor problems occur.
 
denverpilot said:
They better damn-well have, or they shouldn't have been PIC. If we find out there are airlines not fully training folks sitting in the seats, I won't be flying those airlines!

Why have different type ratings? Either you can fly the bastard or you can't.
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The SIC type ratings are an ICAO thing. The only difference I can tell between the SIC rating and the traditional full PIC ratings is that the SIC ratings are "train to standard" and the PIC ratings require a checkride.

The FAA now has SIC type ratings to conform to what everyone else was doing, but does not require them. The FAA only requires a type rating for the PIC.
 
denverpilot said:
The data recorder shows "the plane slowed dangerously" but the crew was supposedly getting faulty readings on airspeed.

(But the recorder wasn't?!?!)
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The recorder could be recording both groundspeed and airspeed. Fed by the GPS or INS for groundspeed and the air data system for airspeed/mach. I assume the pilots' PFD has airspeed/mach not groundspeed.
 
Wow - just watched the PBS NOVA episode that aired back in February and mentioned earlier in this thread (can be watched online here: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/space/crash-flight-447.html) and if these current reports are true, the hypothetical sequence of events proposed by NOVA may have been close to the truth - such as it will ever be determined.
 
Henning said:
<SNIP>Is the software so complicated that the mere mortal pilot has no chance of managing it? <SNIP>.
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Depending on what failed and how it failed, yes, it could be so complicated that even the code writers couldn't get it running in the limited time they had.

Henning said:
<We don't really have the evidence to make a claim just yet.
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I think we can agree on this- still early in the investigation.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
The SIC type ratings are an ICAO thing. The only difference I can tell between the SIC rating and the traditional full PIC ratings is that the SIC ratings are "train to standard" and the PIC ratings require a checkride.

The FAA now has SIC type ratings to conform to what everyone else was doing, but does not require them. The FAA only requires a type rating for the PIC.
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One small difference...SIC has to do it all from right seat.
 
flyingcheesehead said:
The FAA only requires a type rating for the PIC.
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Well, not so fast. There has to be an appropriately rated pilot at the controls at all times. For the long haul guys that have two Captains and two First officers, that isn't a problem. But for companies like United who use one Captain and two or three First Officers, that becomes an issue. To be appropriately rated, the First Officers need a PIC type rating.

I think the jury is still out, but I am pretty sure an SIC type rating will not suffice.
 
Lance F said:
One small difference...SIC has to do it all from right seat.
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Can't address that directly other than to point to Kent's post about Dan Gryder's operation.

But, by extension, does that mean the PIC type has to be done from the LEFT seat? Because I am here to tell you that I did my 777 PIC type from the right seat.
 
I have never seen anywhere that the FAA cares what seat you are sitting in to be either the PIC or the SIC. Companies may have different policies. I have seen someone take a Part 135 SIC checkride from the left seat. That was in the days before SIC type ratings but I'm sure you could still do it now. I'm sometimes the PIC in the right seat or the SIC in the left. People just need to remember what role they are playing that day.
 
So basically, the plane encountered unexpected icing, and the pilots failed to deal with it in time.
 
I have a difficult time believing that Air France would ever have placed an unqualified or ill-trained crew in the aircraft. What I do suspect, is that the design philosophy which insulates pilots from the core operation of the aircraft, has the ability to impede the pilots' ability to resolve a crisis which is not entirely clear.

The envelope protections Airbus designs into its aircraft are dependent upon accurate information to operate.
 
I always smirked at all the Airbus bashing by old kudgels who distrust ball pens, home thermostats, automatic transmissions, and FBW controls in airplanes. However, here's a funny blog post by an A330 pilot that raises some questions (I only need 2 lines, but quoting a length to preserve the context):
In the old days the go-around procedure was "TOGA, Flaps, Gear"... why the shift to:

* TOGA
* "Activate managed Nav"
* "Flaps Three"
* "Gear up"

This change is due to RNP procedures. In the Airbus when TOGA is activated, it puts the plane in a track mode. When performing RNP approaches, navigating through high terrain in the containment area, we need to make sure she is navigating in managed Nav. Thus it's essential to activate managed Nav after you've selected TOGA and get her navigating on course.

But what if we're on approach a RNP 20 mile approach--- still clean--- and they close the runway because Colossal Airlines blew tires.

What happens if you select TOGA in a clean configuration?

* Nothing but a whole lot of thrust and a great deal of aggravation.

She will not transition to go-around and she won't climb. A better choice is to select the missed approach altitude and select open climb. This will enable you to climb to the required altitude and disarm the final approach, enabling your princess to navigate the lateral track for your required missed approach.Yes, you'll have to re-insert the approach, but that's easy when you're safely away from the ground managing the mass.
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What this tells me is that airliner type rating includes a few things that spam can drivers may fail to appreciate, but more importantly, that thing just flies in a different, counter-intuitive way. This is not specific to Airbus, but I am confident that carpers will take the opposite lesson from it.

(from http://karlenepetitt.blogspot.com/2011/03/go-around-but-what-if-youre-clean.html)
 
Lance F said:
One small difference...SIC has to do it all from right seat.
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I know for sure that's not true. Have photos of an SIC sittin' in the left seat in a 777 after the PIC went to relieve himself complete with "secret squirrel" stuff to get out the cockpit door.

Main reason? The video camera monitor for the secret squirrel stuff is mounted on the left side. Can't see it from the right seat.
 
Zaitcev: From many discussions with Boeing drivers, I'm not sure your assertion that "this is not limited to Airbus" is 100% true.

Yes there are complex systems that require some babysitting on the Boeings too, but...

I bet you'd be hard pressed to find a Boeing that would do one thing when TOGA was pressed on a "regular" approach, and do something completely counter-intuitive like drive along at high-power and "forget" to navigate when flying an RNP approach.

When the pilot is there to "serve" the needs of the technology, and not the other way around... That's a back-ass-ward design philosophy.

Tech fails enough on its own, why build in odd-ball "failures" like that one Karlene points out? (Yeah, in my opinion if you hit TOGA and the aircraft does completely different things depending on the type of approach, that's broken).
 
I remember the flight that crashed into the ocean after being washed and having the static ports covered. Because there were multiple static systems and they disagreed, what the pilots got was totally conflicting and confusing information as to their airspeed, vertical sepeed, and altitude. The only thing they could have relied on was their attitude display and their engine gauges.

It's not too hard when one of your instruments is lying to you. It's no doubt VERY hard when many of your instruments may be lying, and you can't tell which ones.
 
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