Wrong engine shutdown

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Dave Taylor
This is a constantly recurring problem and often fatal.
I have a suggestion for panel designers that I think will help.
You know how, now, the engine instruments are immediately adjacent each other in most a/c?
I would put the instruments for the left engine on the left side of the panel, and the right engine far on the right side. If I was good at pshopping I would do a pic.
I think if they are widely separated it would be much more obvious to pilots which side is having the problem.

They could come up with a way to make them visible from both sides of the cockpit, I'm sure. Or to deal with any other problems such a change might cause.

I think this would be a simple improvement which would make a huge difference.
 
This is a constantly recurring problem and often fatal.
I have a suggestion for panel designers that I think will help.
You know how, now, the engine instruments are immediately adjacent each other in most a/c?
I would put the instruments for the left engine on the left side of the panel, and the right engine far on the right side. If I was good at pshopping I would do a pic.
I think if they are widely separated it would be much more obvious to pilots which side is having the problem.

They could come up with a way to make them visible from both sides of the cockpit, I'm sure. Or to deal with any other problems such a change might cause.

I think this would be a simple improvement which would make a huge difference.

It's not the engine instruments that tell you you have an engine failure.
 
This is a constantly recurring problem and often fatal.
I have a suggestion for panel designers that I think will help.
You know how, now, the engine instruments are immediately adjacent each other in most a/c?
I would put the instruments for the left engine on the left side of the panel, and the right engine far on the right side. If I was good at pshopping I would do a pic.
I think if they are widely separated it would be much more obvious to pilots which side is having the problem.

They could come up with a way to make them visible from both sides of the cockpit, I'm sure. Or to deal with any other problems such a change might cause.

I think this would be a simple improvement which would make a huge difference.

How about good training and meaningful recurrent training?
 
I'm going to guess that you have had no multiengine training.

Bob Gardner
 
Sounds awful. Not only from the standpoint of what others have said about it not being how you define the dead engine, but also sounds like something written by someone below the age of 40, when folks start needing bifocals.

Horrible UI to look one place close by and then all the way across the cockpit at something else. Especially with older eyeballs.
 
I think he was being facetious(already looked that word up earlier today, so I know it is spelled correctly).

Unfortunately there have been a Shirt-pot of wrong engine shutdowns, C-5 in Dover, that turboprop in Taiwan, etc. I realize that is only 2 but that is all I can remember. I have been in the sim and everybody gets fast hands and wants to do something and as FO I caught the PIC about to shut down wrong engine at least twice, which I would guess is about 5% of the time, which is still way too high.
 
I think he was being facetious(already looked that word up earlier today, so I know it is spelled correctly).

Unfortunately there have been a Shirt-pot of wrong engine shutdowns, C-5 in Dover, that turboprop in Taiwan, etc. I realize that is only 2 but that is all I can remember. I have been in the sim and everybody gets fast hands and wants to do something and as FO I caught the PIC about to shut down wrong engine at least twice, which I would guess is about 5% of the time, which is still way too high.

Quality training and recurrent training eliminate those errors.
 
You're all very wrong.

We may be 'wrong' but our point was very valid. Someone with actual multi training should know that you don't go diagnosing an engine failure by the engine instruments.
 
Unfortunately there have been a Shirt-pot of wrong engine shutdowns, C-5 in Dover.


The C-5 in Dover was not a case of shutting down the wrong engine.

They did shut down the correct engine, but later during the approach, the pilot confused throttles and ended up advancing the throttle for the dead engine.
 
We may be 'wrong' but our point was very valid. Someone with actual multi training should know that you don't go diagnosing an engine failure by the engine instruments.

I think you are all reading into things a bit too much. There are plenty of times when you need to refer to the engine gauges to figure out what the hell is going on. There are also times where you may decide to shut one down based on engine gauge indications as well.

I would argue that perhaps it's a good idea to give people the benefit of the doubt a little more often. So many assumptions that he doesn't have multi-engine training when he is actually a multi-engine ATP with a multi-engine type rating.
 
I think you are all reading into things a bit too much. There are plenty of times when you need to refer to the engine gauges to figure out what the hell is going on. There are also times where you may decide to shut one down based on engine gauge indications as well.



I would argue that perhaps it's a good idea to give people the benefit of the doubt a little more often. So many assumptions that he doesn't have multi-engine training when he is actually a multi-engine ATP with a multi-engine type rating.

Again, the answer is quality training. Not trying to be smarter than the designer.

It seriously reminds me of a recent custom panel that some guy put in his Beech 18.....he put the feather switches on each side of the panel: left feather switch was on the far left, right feather switch was on far right of the copilots side so they wouldn't be confused.....except if you were flying single pilot and needed to feather the right......you'd have to seriously lean your body across the cockpit (while still trying to control the plane).

Sometimes the solution is already there....people need to use it.
 
I had a turbo charger explode on a Cessna 404 right after takeoff. IFR, loaded airplane, early morning before daylight.

Took my time, verified, and shut down the engine and landed. End of story.

Had a PT6 melt down on a Beech99 in cruise, IFR, at night. Took my time, verified, shut down and landed. End of story.

I had my #3 engine on a B727 shear the high pressure fuel pump 200' after takeoff. Night, cold and snowing, IFR. Took my time, verified and followed procedures, returned to land uneventfully. End of story.

I'll take training and recurrent training any day of the week and twice on Sunday.
 
Took my time, verified and followed procedures, returned to land uneventfully. End of story.

I'll take training and recurrent training any day of the week and twice on Sunday.

This right here. Do things slowly and correctly. Fly the plane too!
 
I would put the instruments for the left engine on the left side of the panel, and the right engine far on the right side. ... I think if they are widely separated it would be much more obvious to pilots which side is having the problem.
I keep trying to like this creative idea. Sorry, I just can't. Keep plugging away though.

dtuuri
 
You're all very wrong.

All I'm saying is if you're waiting for engine instruments to tell you there is a problem then you're behind the game and the plane.... JMHO!!!
 
How about good training and meaningful recurrent training?

No no no. There needs to be a mandate it install an annunciation system built into the engine controls. Just think, flashing knobs on the throttle, mixture and prop levels.

Also, a wheel on a stick that wags back and forth in the pilot's field of view for a landing gear warning system.
 
I think you are all reading into things a bit too much. There are plenty of times when you need to refer to the engine gauges to figure out what the hell is going on. There are also times where you may decide to shut one down based on engine gauge indications as well.

I would argue that perhaps it's a good idea to give people the benefit of the doubt a little more often. So many assumptions that he doesn't have multi-engine training when he is actually a multi-engine ATP with a multi-engine type rating.

I like "Make your levers like your feet," another version of "dead foot, dead engine."

Bob Gardner
 
I had a turbo charger explode on a Cessna 404 right after takeoff. IFR, loaded airplane, early morning before daylight.

Took my time, verified, and shut down the engine and landed. End of story.

Had a PT6 melt down on a Beech99 in cruise, IFR, at night. Took my time, verified, shut down and landed. End of story.

I had my #3 engine on a B727 shear the high pressure fuel pump 200' after takeoff. Night, cold and snowing, IFR. Took my time, verified and followed procedures, returned to land uneventfully. End of story.

I'll take training and recurrent training any day of the week and twice on Sunday.

Jeez. Maybe you should stay day VFR, then.

:D

Sorry, couldn't help it.
 
I like "Make your levers like your feet," another version of "dead foot, dead engine."



Bob Gardner


You can be fooled by your feet if you fly an airplane with rudder boost or even yaw damp. That's why they tell you to... look at the instruments.
 
No no no. There needs to be a mandate it install an annunciation system built into the engine controls. Just think, flashing knobs on the throttle, mixture and prop levels.

Also, a wheel on a stick that wags back and forth in the pilot's field of view for a landing gear warning system.

Pitbull wearing googles in the cockpit. Pull the wrong lever and that's your sign! Oh and your forearm....sorry about that, ****e happens. :yesnod:
 
Nobody has pointed out yet that the idea, while novel, is solving a there decade old problem.

The tech exists, and is flying, to not only indicate very well which engine is dead, but to run half or more of the engine-out checklist, trim the aircraft, and then show the pilot a checklist of switches they need to throw to "true up" what the flight control system did to the state of the physical switches.

That's "state of the art". That those items haven't trickled down into a fleet that's 30-50 years old, isn't much of a surprise is it?

Making a PFD do a spectacular job of highlighting which engine is dead in a split power scenario or even showing the dolt pilot a picture of how to set the levers isn't exactly impossible these days. It's just not cost effective to retrofit into an old assed fleet of lighter twins built in the 70s or the "it's certified this way and way too expensive to retrofit it or certify new displays" copies made by the few manufacturers who are still making light twins.

The Transport Category stuff -- the ones made RECENTLY already do these things. Getting the price, size, and complexity down to shove it into a GA panel is the hard-ish part with mostly certification costs standing squarely in the way.

Maybe for good reason, maybe not. I'm not debating that here. I'm just saying this problem is already solved. It's just not in the majority of the aircraft fleet yet due to cost and complexity.

A programmer could very easily display a picture of the levers and a huge font sign that says, "The left engine is dead" on any LCD screen being used in a modern panel, anyone the power indications are split far enough to warrant such a message.

No need to scatter it over two sides of the cockpit. Just display it.

The trick is knowing what to take up screen real estate to display WHEN and what pre-empts what message. Which one will kill you first? Display that one. Or both.

It's doable now. Someone just has to cost justify the code writing and debugging and what not.

Heck the G1000 blinks at you like a Christmas tree in a 182 when an engine parameter is out of bounds already and highlights the trouble number.
 
You do sometimes need to refer to the instruments to see what's wrong, or at least to verify. The issue I see with engine instruments on either side is that it can make it harder to see that something's wrong during critical phases of flight (such as takeoff/landing) and also harder to make sure you're matching powers/torques/etc. correctly if you have to keep going left to right. Plus, if you have right engine gauges truly on the right side of the panel, that will make them very hard to see for the pilot in the left seat. And if you have left engine gauges truly on the left side of the panel, that will make them very hard to see for anyone (pilot, instructor, etc.) in the right seat.

As Jesse said, Dave very much has had multi engine training and knows how to fly them. The idea has some merit, just some consequences that I don't think make it workable.

What I see being a real issue with multi-engine crashes in light twins is that people set themselves up for failure, rather than success. They decide to land RIGHT NOW instead of taking the time to identify a good airport with emergency services, set themselves up on an ILS with a stabilized approach, put drag out too early (or don't get it up if they have it out), etc. Instead they Vmc roll the plane in when they get too slow and kill their friends and families.
 
Nobody has pointed out yet that the idea, while novel, is solving a there decade old problem.

The tech exists, and is flying, to not only indicate very well which engine is dead, but to run half or more of the engine-out checklist, trim the aircraft, and then show the pilot a checklist of switches they need to throw to "true up" what the flight control system did to the state of the physical switches.

That's "state of the art". That those items haven't trickled down into a fleet that's 30-50 years old, isn't much of a surprise is it?

Making a PFD do a spectacular job of highlighting which engine is dead in a split power scenario or even showing the dolt pilot a picture of how to set the levers isn't exactly impossible these days. It's just not cost effective to retrofit into an old assed fleet of lighter twins built in the 70s or the "it's certified this way and way too expensive to retrofit it or certify new displays" copies made by the few manufacturers who are still making light twins.

The Transport Category stuff -- the ones made RECENTLY already do these things. Getting the price, size, and complexity down to shove it into a GA panel is the hard-ish part with mostly certification costs standing squarely in the way.

Maybe for good reason, maybe not. I'm not debating that here. I'm just saying this problem is already solved. It's just not in the majority of the aircraft fleet yet due to cost and complexity.

A programmer could very easily display a picture of the levers and a huge font sign that says, "The left engine is dead" on any LCD screen being used in a modern panel, anyone the power indications are split far enough to warrant such a message.

No need to scatter it over two sides of the cockpit. Just display it.

The trick is knowing what to take up screen real estate to display WHEN and what pre-empts what message. Which one will kill you first? Display that one. Or both.

It's doable now. Someone just has to cost justify the code writing and debugging and what not.

Heck the G1000 blinks at you like a Christmas tree in a 182 when an engine parameter is out of bounds already and highlights the trouble number.
I'm betting more often than not they identify the correct engine, but mange to pull the wrong lever.
Either way, pulling the power back first prior to shutdown to ensure "no change" is a prudent procedure.
 
It's true I have very little time diagnosing which engine has failed.
And most training I get regarding this, is on various maneuvers with an engine at idle, not caging the engine.

I just keep reading about these accidents, wondering what can be done different.
Plenty of these accidents have experienced crews in the cockpit, but still make the same mistake - so I was wondering what else could be done beyond the training and meaningful recurrent which apparently is not doing the trick.
 
so I was wondering what else could be done beyond the training and meaningful recurrent which apparently is not doing the trick.

I think the problem is more along the lines of the meaningful and recurrent not happening.
 
It's true I have very little time diagnosing which engine has failed.
And most training I get regarding this, is on various maneuvers with an engine at idle, not caging the engine.

I just keep reading about these accidents, wondering what can be done different.
Plenty of these accidents have experienced crews in the cockpit, but still make the same mistake - so I was wondering what else could be done beyond the training and meaningful recurrent which apparently is not doing the trick.

Show the ones that had well trained crews making this mistake.
 
I had a turbo charger explode on a Cessna 404 right after takeoff. IFR, loaded airplane, early morning before daylight.

Took my time, verified, and shut down the engine and landed. End of story.

Had a PT6 melt down on a Beech99 in cruise, IFR, at night. Took my time, verified, shut down and landed. End of story.

I had my #3 engine on a B727 shear the high pressure fuel pump 200' after takeoff. Night, cold and snowing, IFR. Took my time, verified and followed procedures, returned to land uneventfully. End of story.

I'll take training and recurrent training any day of the week and twice on Sunday.

WOWZA!!!!! That's some crazy stuff to go through!
 
The problem here is that none of you guys know how to think like a veterinarian. If you'd ever had your arm shoulder deep in a cow's butt then you'd fully understand the point that Dave's trying to make.

:goofy:
 
Quality training and recurrent training eliminate those errors.
Nothing short of eliminating humans will eliminate human errors. And you can't say that if one's still making errors then he needs more training; that's just circular.
 
Nothing short of eliminating humans will eliminate human errors. And you can't say that if one's still making errors then he needs more training; that's just circular.

So please show me where a well trained pilot or a well trained crew has made such errors.

It's been proven time and time again that proper training and recurrent training reduces if not eliminates accidents and incidents.

And while your at it, please explain why a portion of the GA pilots are so opposed to additional training that may keep them from doing something as suggested by the OP.
 
So please show me where a well trained pilot or a well trained crew has made such errors.
First define "well trained."
It's been proven time and time again that proper training and recurrent training reduces if not eliminates accidents and incidents.
Again, this presumes a particular definition of "proper training." Did the AF 447 crew not have "proper training"? Colgan 3407? The UPS crash in Birmingham? All of those pilots were "trained," and certainly had "a lot of training," and they still made mistakes.
And while your at it, please explain why a portion of the GA pilots are so opposed to additional training that may keep them from doing something as suggested by the OP.
I can't explain that. I've always advocated more training, and worry about folks spending money on "safety features" that they could be spending on "safety training."
 
First define "well trained."

Adheres to a established training program that focuses on procedures, CRM, ADM as well as Risk Management. Also adheres to a Standard which is reviewed by focusing on line oriented operations by identifying problem areas and applying corrective action via recurrent training and uses an SMS approach to Risk Management.

Again, this presumes a particular definition of "proper training." Did the AF 447 crew not have "proper training"? Colgan 3407? The UPS crash in Birmingham? All of those pilots were "trained," and certainly had "a lot of training," and they still made mistakes.

The AAF 447 crew did not have proper training. There were several areas where standards were not being followed. Colman 3407 again, by not adhering to standards and by lapses in Colgan's training program and lapses in evaluation.
UPS crash? Crew flying fatigued, not adhering to standards.


I can't explain that. I've always advocated more training, and worry about folks spending money on "safety features" that they could be spending on "safety training."

It's obvious you don't like airline pilots (what's new here? ) :rolleyes:

I've spent a great deal of my life in training and standards, worked in the AQP program when it first came out and have spent considerable time in Aviation Decision Making and Risk Management. Also have been involved with SMS since 2010 and have seen the inroads it's making towards safety.

I'm a firm believer in training and standards and have seen first hand how well it works. Right now the US Airline industry is at a record achievement of safety compared to 5,10 and 20 years ago and this advances are driven by training.

We live in an ever changing world, and some of those changes has us rethinking training environments. One issue that has arisen is the TAA cockpit and automation and thus the reliance on automation. That trend is now being addressed by more hands on flying. Another recent advance being taught is jet upset recovery in which high altitude and low altitude recovery technigues are taught and explored in training.

There are a few Instructors on this board that teach high performance and twin engine aircraft (GA). Ask them their thoughts on training and recurrence in light twin aircraft.
 
There are a few Instructors on this board that teach high performance and twin engine aircraft (GA). Ask them their thoughts on training and recurrence in light twin aircraft.

Most twin pilots don't do near enough, and many training centers half ass it. I specifically had one tell me (after complaining it was too easy) that they did it intentionally so folks would pass.

Your instructor should be nicknamed "Satan" and you should be wrung out at the end.

At least, that's how I train my light twin students, and I'm proud of how they handle emergencies.
 
Adheres to a established training program that focuses on procedures, CRM, ADM as well as Risk Management. Also adheres to a Standard which is reviewed by focusing on line oriented operations by identifying problem areas and applying corrective action via recurrent training and uses an SMS approach to Risk Management.



The AAF 447 crew did not have proper training. There were several areas where standards were not being followed. Colman 3407 again, by not adhering to standards and by lapses in Colgan's training program and lapses in evaluation.
UPS crash? Crew flying fatigued, not adhering to standards.
Not flying according to your training and not being trained are not the same. This is the "no true scotsman" argument. You can't seriously be claiming that all of those pilots weren't trained to handle the situations presented to them.
It's obvious you don't like airline pilots (what's new here? ) :rolleyes:
How is that obvious? I have plenty of friends who are airline pilots. What I don't like are know-it-all jerks, no matter what the fly. You're usually willing to actually contribute useful knowledge rather than preaching, but that is not true of everyone here.
I'm a firm believer in training and standards and have seen first hand how well it works. Right now the US Airline industry is at a record achievement of safety compared to 5,10 and 20 years ago and this advances are driven by training.

We live in an ever changing world, and some of those changes has us rethinking training environments. One issue that has arisen is the TAA cockpit and automation and thus the reliance on automation. That trend is now being addressed by more hands on flying. Another recent advance being taught is jet upset recovery in which high altitude and low altitude recovery technigues are taught and explored in training.
That's all great. But as you observe, what was considered proper training today, five, ten, and twenty years ago is different.
 
Not flying according to your training and not being trained are not the same. This is the "no true scotsman" argument. You can't seriously be claiming that all of those pilots weren't trained to handle the situations presented to them.How is that obvious? I have plenty of friends who are airline pilots. What I don't like are know-it-all jerks, no matter what the fly. You're usually willing to actually contribute useful knowledge rather than preaching, but that is not true of everyone here.
That's all great. But as you observe, what was considered proper training today, five, ten, and twenty years ago is different.

Apparently no matter what's presented, you will disagree.

So what is your solution? What would you recommend?
 
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