Vectors into a mountain

That is correct. FAA MVAs in the Western U.S. are more complex than foreign MVA charts that Jeppesen charts. But, in order for Jeppesen to chart FAA MVA charts the FAA would have to have an orderly, systematic update process, such as they use for other IFR procedures. But, neither FAA ATC management nor the controllers union wants FAA MVA data to be on pilots' moving maps.

What's the management's and union's rationale for keeping MVA data secret from pilots?
 
Yeah. Don't forget to add 700 feet or 1700 in mountainous terrain if you want to use them as an ad hoc MEA. You get some interesting situations out west with those. There are airports with field elevations more than 10,000 feet below the MEF

Don't you mean 1,000 and 2,000? :confused2:
 
Heart attack shortly after reading back the new frequency?

Heart attack in the <~ 10-second span it takes to change frequencies and transmit? Would be one heck of a coincidence, seems unlikely, yet possible.
 
Heart attack in the <~ 10-second span it takes to change frequencies and transmit?

How long does it take for a heart attack to incapacitate someone?

Would be one heck of a coincidence, seems unlikely, yet possible.

Pilot incapacitation seems the most likely to me, given the information presented.
 
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Probably never know. One of the articles says the aircraft and pilot were mostly consumed by post-crash fire. Haven't seen any autopsy info.
 
Sad deal. If I don't hear chatter or get a controller acknowledgment within thirty seconds or so of a second call, I assume I screwed up the frequency and go back to the previous controller to confirm. And try to monitor 121.5 in number 2 radio as a backup if they're trying to reach me.
 
Sad deal. If I don't hear chatter or get a controller acknowledgment within thirty seconds or so of a second call, I assume I screwed up the frequency and go back to the previous controller to confirm. And try to monitor 121.5 in number 2 radio as a backup if they're trying to reach me.

That will work. Personally I use a 1 minute rule. Reflects the procedures used during a radar approach. No transmissions received after 1 minute in the pattern, assume lost commo.
 
Anyone check the NTSB report? Are we even sure it went down as posted in the video?
NTSB said:
Preliminary information provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) indicated that the pilot was being vectored for an instrument approach to SMO. The pilot established radio communication with the controller and subsequently acknowledged obtaining weather information at the destination airport. About 2 minutes, 26 seconds later, the controller issued the pilot a heading change to 290 degrees and a descent clearance to 3,000 feet for vectors to final approach. However, the controller received no response from the pilot despite multiple attempts over the course of about 2 minutes. The pilot then transmitted that he was on a 030 degree heading. The controller continued to issue vectors away from rising terrain and made several attempts to communicate with the pilot; however, no further radio communication from the pilot were heard.

Granted, there is the standard NTSB disclaimer, "This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors."
 
Somehow I miraculously managed to avoid terrain using only a sectional while flying night low level in a Cobra. I guess millennial age pilots would think that impossible.

I find it difficult to understand (careful choice of words) and, since I started flying when paper sectional charts were 25 cents, I am not in that age group.
 
What's the management's and union's rationale for keeping MVA data secret from pilots?

The MVAs are very complex in the mountainous areas and my presumption is they don't want pilots looking over their shoulder, so to speak, or second guessing then.
 
If you're following an MSA an MEF or an OROCA, you shouldn't need an MVA.
 
The MVAs are very complex in the mountainous areas and my presumption is they don't want pilots looking over their shoulder, so to speak, or second guessing then.

We all know that pilots are too dumb to fly/navigate on their own, so it makes sense. :)
 
If you're following an MSA an MEF or an OROCA, you shouldn't need an MVA.

Not sure I understand that when you are being radar vectored. Please explain. Also MSAs are not operational altitudes in the U.S.
 
Not sure I understand that when you are being radar vectored. Please explain. Also MSAs are not operational altitudes in the U.S.

Simple. If you're being radar vectored for an approach and you lose comms, check the MSA for the area. If the pilot in the thread example went to the MSA for KMSO, he'd be alive today.
 
While there are other sources of altitude info available there is no downside to making MVAs and MIAs available to pilots.

Oh, I agree but a properly trained instrument pilot should know the terrain (MSA, MEF, OROCA) in their area without the need of an MVA.

This isn't so much about knowing the terrain but how long to wait before executing lost commo. The pilot in question either waited too long or was incapacitated.
 
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Simple. If you're being radar vectored for an approach and you lose comms, check the MSA for the area. If the pilot in the thread example went to the MSA for KMSO, he'd be alive today.

If the pilot in the thread example had complied with ATC instructions he'd be alive today. I can't imagine whatever prevented him from doing that would have left him able to make use of the MSA for KMSO.
 
This isn't so much about knowing the terrain but how long to wait before executing lost commo. The pilot in question either waited too long or was incapacitated.

Well, if he wasn't incapacitated, how long do you suppose it would take him to determine he was lost comm and squawk radio failure?
 
Well, if he wasn't incapacitated, how long do you suppose it would take him to determine he was lost comm and squawk radio failure?

As I said above, I'd use about a minute. Same standard applied for a radar approach. If you haven't heard anything after 1 minute, especially after initial check in, initiate lost commo procedures.
 
As I said above, I'd use about a minute. Same standard applied for a radar approach. If you haven't heard anything after 1 minute, especially after initial check in, initiate lost commo procedures.

Agreed. He didn't do that and the only reason I can think of is incapacitation.
 
Somehow I miraculously managed to avoid terrain using only a sectional while flying night low level in a Cobra. I guess millennial age pilots would think that impossible.

The pilot involved was definitely no millennial. He was a white haired Doctor judging by the photos, and relatively skinny and in-shape looking, but that doesn't seem to mean much with incapacitation.

Didn't see any info on when he was first rated, however.
 
My question is why didn't the controller vector the mountain out of the way? All that attention on a 7600 and zero thought given to the other part of the equation.
 
I'm not sure it would make sense to provide MVA maps because they are solely designed for vectoring from a radar antenna located in a particular location. Should that antenna be taken offline for maintenance, or should a facility go into CENRAP (center radar presentation) the MVAs are no longer going to be used by ATC. They would remain valid for terrain and obstruction clearance; however, this type of information is already available using existing products: MEAs, OROCAs, and MEFs just to name a few. In this pilot's case, being vectored for an approach into Santa Monica (SMO), a look at the approach chart indicates areas of rising terrain in the direction he was heading.

The AIM guidance on lost comms does not provide enough guidance on matters such as the one in the case the OP posted about. If the pilot was conscious and capable of flying after communications were lost -- which may or may not have been the case -- joining a published route such as an airway and complying with its MEA would have been his safest bet.

I will be incorporating a discussion on this into the IPCs that I do.
 
My question is why didn't the controller vector the mountain out of the way? All that attention on a 7600 and zero thought given to the other part of the equation.
Mountains usually maneuver very slowly so giving them a vector is usually ineffective for traffic separation. Occasionally a mountain will move quickly but they tend to self-announce only a very short time ahead of the maneuver and they never seem to be on the correct frequency.
 
I'm not sure it would make sense to provide MVA maps because they are solely designed for vectoring from a radar antenna located in a particular location. Should that antenna be taken offline for maintenance, or should a facility go into CENRAP (center radar presentation) the MVAs are no longer going to be used by ATC. They would remain valid for terrain and obstruction clearance; however, this type of information is already available using existing products: MEAs, OROCAs, and MEFs just to name a few. In this pilot's case, being vectored for an approach into Santa Monica (SMO), a look at the approach chart indicates areas of rising terrain in the direction he was heading.

MVAs are based on terrain, obstructions, and controlled airspace. None of those things change if the radar goes down.
 
Mountains usually maneuver very slowly so giving them a vector is usually ineffective for traffic separation. Occasionally a mountain will move quickly but they tend to self-announce only a very short time ahead of the maneuver and they never seem to be on the correct frequency.

And then there's the mountain wake turbulence to consider. Boy oh boy you think wake turbulence is wicked behind a heavy jet wait until you follow behind a mountain!
 
""""Mt. Constance Crash

http://www.windsox.us/VISITOR/HISTORY_BUILDINGS/PLANE_CRASHES.html


Here is something I got from Washington State Military Aviation Memorial.
The date was March 20th, 1975. The aircraft was U.S. Air Force C-141 transport # 64-0641 enroute from Japan to McChord Field. A traffic controller nearing the end of his shift mistook the C-141 for another aircraft in a different location, gave it orders to drop altitude for final approach and basically directed it into the west side of Mt. Constance. The accident happened at night in total darkness and claimed the lives of all 16 onboard. Hope this helps, Cye"""""

Seattle_PI_Frontpage_March_22_1975.jpg




 
My question is why didn't the controller vector the mountain out of the way? All that attention on a 7600 and zero thought given to the other part of the equation.


We're good but we haven't managed to move mountains yet.
 
By "man" of course, but most controllers lack the heavy equipment needed to do so. I have a little 22hp Kubota tractor that I use around the property but it would take me quite a while to move a mountain with it.
 
""""Mt. Constance Crash

http://www.windsox.us/VISITOR/HISTORY_BUILDINGS/PLANE_CRASHES.html


Here is something I got from Washington State Military Aviation Memorial.
The date was March 20th, 1975. The aircraft was U.S. Air Force C-141 transport # 64-0641 enroute from Japan to McChord Field. A traffic controller nearing the end of his shift mistook the C-141 for another aircraft in a different location, gave it orders to drop altitude for final approach and basically directed it into the west side of Mt. Constance. The accident happened at night in total darkness and claimed the lives of all 16 onboard. Hope this helps, Cye"""""

Seattle_PI_Frontpage_March_22_1975.jpg




Had a similar situation at Miramar when I worked there. Final controller took a handoff on an F-18 but was actually looking at a P-3. Since the P-3 was on a TACAN and high, he kept telling the F-18 he was well above glidepath. Fortunately, the weather wasn't too low and the F-18 punched beneath the clouds well below glidepath but just above the hills east of NKX.

Always know your position and if able, back up the controller's instructions with some sort of on board electronic means.
 
Had a similar situation at Miramar when I worked there. Final controller took a handoff on an F-18 but was actually looking at a P-3. Since the P-3 was on a TACAN and high, he kept telling the F-18 he was well above glidepath. Fortunately, the weather wasn't too low and the F-18 punched beneath the clouds well below glidepath but just above the hills east of NKX.

Always know your position and if able, back up the controller's instructions with some sort of on board electronic means.

Something got missed in the transfer of control. Wasn't there an exhange of "distance" in the procedures there? Did they layout of the room not have an ASR scope next to the PAR's?
 
Something got missed in the transfer of control. Wasn't there an exhange of "distance" in the procedures there? Did they layout of the room not have an ASR scope next to the PAR's?

Distance is always given. The student and monitor just simply identified the wrong aircraft. Think we had 2 or 3 ASRs but can't remember if they referenced any of them. Just one of those things where they saw a target and assumed it was there's without confirming it.

I was radar branch chief so I had to pull the tapes to investigate. Could've been ugly if the weather was worse. I'd like to believe the Hornet pilot had some sort of back up data to prevent a catastrophe.
 
Mountains usually maneuver very slowly so giving them a vector is usually ineffective for traffic separation. Occasionally a mountain will move quickly but they tend to self-announce only a very short time ahead of the maneuver and they never seem to be on the correct frequency.

Tectonic plates, baby. Slowly but surely!
 
This is a portion of the Los Angeles TAC with the Burbank ASR MVAs overlain. The crash site, Brown Mountain, is marked in blue text with a red obstacle symbol:
 

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