Transitioning to HSI - Any good tutorial recomendations?

[olasek]

TAll that was required was one clue to snap them out of it and push the throttles back up once they fell below critical altitude. Had the throttles not been closed the plane would have recovered as it tried to do.

The throttles were NOT closed.
Flight Path Vector was available to them, this was all what was required to recognize they were "dropping out of the sky", no SVT would give the info.

So, glass cockpits are OK, but if you only have a moving map GPS, you had better have an HSI installed.

I said nothing about glass/no glass.
Clearly the fact the HSI is being installed as the primary instrument just below AI (moving map pushed to the right) in every modern transport aircraft means nothing to you, I guess people who design aircraft should learn from you ...

 

[Henning]

The throttles were NOT closed.
Flight Path Vector was available to them, this was all what was required to recognize they were "dropping out of the sky", no SVT would give the info.


I said nothing about glass/no glass.
Clearly the fact the HSI is being installed as the primary instrument just below AI (moving map pushed to the right) in every modern transport aircraft means nothing to you, I guess people who design aircraft should learn from you ...

Do some more reading, the power was at flight idle from the time the stall horn came back on and PF retarded them at the top, they were never advanced again. Regardless of what they were looking at it was insufficient for them to realize their circumstances.

 

[olasek]

Regardless of what they were looking at it was insufficient for them to realize their circumstances.

True. But perhaps they should have started with basics - they had unreliable air speed data which was clearly flagged to them in the beginning and they did not even bother to pull out checklist which was readily available for such occasion. Of their own free will they entered a labyrinth that they found difficult to extricate themselves from. Really it is all seriously off topic and SVT has nothing to do with it, if you look for examples of accidents where SVT could have helped - yes, for example AA flight 965 at Cali.

 

[Henning]

True. But perhaps they should have started with basics - they had unreliable air speed data which was clearly flagged to them in the beginning and they did not even bother to pull out checklist which was readily available for such occasion. Of their own free will they entered a labyrinth that they found difficult to extract themselves from. Really it is all seriously off topic and SVT has nothing to do with it, if you look for examples of accidents where SVT could have helped - yes, for example AA flight 965 at Cali.

They had 1 out of 3 airspeed indications lost for less than one minute. It just happened to be the airspeed that drove the #2 A/P.

What I have not had an Airbus driver answer me yet is this: "Had he simply switched to #1 A/P could this have been avoided?"

 

[olasek]

"Had he simply switched to #1 A/P could this have been avoided?"

Don't recall details what's on the pertinent checklist but clearly it could have easily been avoided if they did "nothing", or rather nothing stupid - only keeping the same pitch and maintaining adequate throttle position (in other words maintaining status quo as just before A/P disconnect) all flying manually. It was their abnormal pulling on the stick that caused this chain of events. As one Airbus pilot told me - they checked in a simulator and aircraft practically recovers by itself once you release the stick.

 

[Henning]

Don't recall details what's on the pertinent checklist but clearly it could have easily been avoided if they did "nothing", or rather nothing stupid - only keeping the same pitch and maintaining adequate throttle position (in other words maintaining status quo as just before A/P disconnect) all flying manually. It was their abnormal pulling on the stick that caused this chain of events. As one Airbus pilot told me - they checked in a simulator and aircraft practically recovers by itself once you release the stick.

From my understanding 'flying the limiter' is the normal way of pulling on the stick.

 

[olasek]

From my understanding 'flying the limiter' is the normal way of pulling on the stick.

Their actions were judged bizarre according to many Airbus pilots, so I defer to them what is normal or not. But clearly some training deficiencies and misconceptions what Airbus' fly-by-wire can and can't do could have played role.

 

[RotorAndWing]

What I have not had an Airbus driver answer me yet is this: "Had he simply switched to #1 A/P could this have been avoided?"

The simple answer is no.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Don't recall details what's on the pertinent checklist but clearly it could have easily been avoided if they did "nothing", or rather nothing stupid - only keeping the same pitch and maintaining adequate throttle position (in other words maintaining status quo as just before A/P disconnect) all flying manually. It was their abnormal pulling on the stick that caused this chain of events. As one Airbus pilot told me - they checked in a simulator and aircraft practically recovers by itself once you release the stick.

Letting go of the controls in an Airbus and it will return to a steady state if in normal law. There still are some protections if it's degraded to alternate law.

It's been awhile since I read the reports on this, but I believe they were in alternate law.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Their actions were judged bizarre according to many Airbus pilots, so I defer to them what is normal or not. But clearly some training deficiencies and misconceptions what Airbus' fly-by-wire can and can't do could have played role.

True.

 

[RotorAndWing]

From my understanding 'flying the limiter' is the normal way of pulling on the stick.

Not sure what you mean by that statement. In normal law the aircraft will maintain a positive g load when up or down pitch is applied.

The acronym for normal law functions is BYPALS. Bank Angle 33*, Yaw protection, Pitch 30 up/15 down, AoA protection (A. Floor/ A. Protection/ A. max) Load protection( 2.5 clean/ 2.0 flaps) Stability, high speed and low speed.

This is for the A320 but the A330 is almost identical in system structure and architecture.

 

[Henning]

Not sure what you mean by that statement. In normal law the aircraft will maintain a positive g load when up or down pitch is applied.

The acronym for normal law functions is BYPALS. Bank Angle 33*, Yaw protection, Pitch 30 up/15 down, AoA protection (A. Floor/ A. Protection/ A. max) Load protection( 2.5 clean/ 2.0 flaps) Stability, high speed and low speed.

This is for the A320 but the A330 is almost identical in system structure and architecture.

From watching some cockpit videos and talking with a couple 'bus drivers', using full range stick motion inputs and letting the FBW system limit the control surface deflection.

Another thing I find odd is that there is no major visual indication of change between law states.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Another thing I find odd is that there is no major visual indication of change between law states.

Sure there are. On the PFD there are indications for Normal Law, Alternate Law, Direct Law and Mechanical Law.

 

[denverpilot]

After a discussion with a friend who flies something equally big from "the other" manufacturer, his comment was "We have a failsafe attitude and power that we can go to in virtually any phase of flight that always works".

In his case, 2 degrees nose up, max continuous power. The aircraft will ALWAYS fly in that configuration.

It astounds me that whatever training these guys received, they didn't know a specific pitch and power setting that would give them a flying aircraft when all else goes to ****. Just set it and fly it.

All the computer "laws" in the world can't screw that up.

 

[RotorAndWing]

In the Airbus, as well as Boeing QRH there is a table for flying with unreliable airspeed indications.