I'm not trying to be gratuitously incendiary. I've never suggested they were suicidal. I'm merely suggesting their aggregate behavior was irresponsible, and not in an isolated fashion. I don't consider the lapse in basic airmanship that led to the loss of control, something that ought to be shelved into the "mistakes happen" pile. I think there was much more to the chronology of Colgan 3407 that shines a light into the irrational and irresponsible behavior that permeates the regional airline aggregate work dynamics. The CA's repeated failures, especially part 121 training events. The FO's negligent commuting itinerary and self-disclosure of viral illness AFTER signing-in for the flight (per CVR evidence). All of it indicative, in my opinion, of a petulant insistence in exercising vocational choices not in the interest of public safety.
It's clear to me you pointedly disagree with my meta-criticism of the dead's state of mind via the proxy of their economic behavior. We'll have to agree to disagree on that account. Do please understand I'm not trying to troll you. Shiny Jet Syndrome is not something I coined, it's a dynamic that has been described by people in the industry for decades. I do think the use of the term petulant is appropriate here, again my opinion. We talk a big game about IMSAFE and ADM, but the second people are told in America they can't do something because they are unapologetically priced out from doing it, holy hell here comes the pitchforks.
What kind of moral relativism must there exist where it's ok to threaten the lives of paying passengers just because regional pilots shall not be denied the right to pursue their vocational jollies with abandon and nobody can be critical about it? And furthermore, the idea that it's also ok because mainline pilots crash too? I don't agree with that relativism at all. They may not have had suicidal tendencies, but they killed those people nonetheless because they bit off more than they could chew and neither had the stones to know when to fold them. Now, the industry allowed them that discretion under monetary motivations of the airline's own (cheap scumbag regional operations), and innocent people died for it (apprenticeship with innocents in the back). So the culpability is shared. But I will continue to be critical of anyone who call themselves a professional pilot yet indulges in that behavior just because they insist on playing airline pilot everything else be damned.
This is where I think you're reaching. I don't think anyone involved in (either regional or mainline) accidents has any thoughts consciously at all of "playing airline pilot". As far as they're concerned they ARE airline pilots. The FAA says so, their company says so, and by every measure they've met every standard set for them.
Yeah, the captain had failures in the Colgan thing, but the industry still said he was Captain. That the training or evaluation process is weak -- or MAYBE allows too many chances -- really isn't his fault. He still woke up that morning thinking he had a job to go do and even though he might not be the best at it, he hadn't been tossed.
In mainline accidents like the AF (since we used it, I'll just contrast with it for convenience since both accidents were a fundamental flaw in understanding aircraft stall behavior), the pilots even moreso think they're prepared for most any eventuality.
But this idea that anyone will ever KNOW if they're "playing airline pilot" or actually are an airline pilot is an impossible to define and somewhat insulting concept you dump on them. They get up, put on a uniform, and go to work doing whatever they know how to do, and sometimes the circumstances are such that it finally exposes a huge missing chunk of critical information in their experience. Stuff even that we all may slap our heads and say, "OMG, how could they not KNOW that?!"
But as an instructor that's one of the biggest fears. Did I miss ANYTHING in training someone that'll be screwed up in their head for life via Primacy and will ANYONE catch it later and help them correct it before they kill themselves or others?
And then, of course, talking to instructors who HAVE watched former students die in airplanes, they confirm that yes, they DID teach those things -- somehow the human brain just didn't retain it at the moment it needed it the most to survive.
Example: The thread on the guy who flew into a thunderstorm with a VFR ticket. You really think nobody ever told him NOT to do that? of course they did. And he had no REAL pressure to get to Vegas. Nothing "Maslow" would say he needed to be there for.
Start tying paychecks to ANY human endeavor and some twisted things always happen. If you need the paycheck you might fly with a cold. If you need the paycheck you might not ask for more help when you're bombing checkrides and worried the next one might be your last. Etc.
But those influences are not tied to any sense of "I'm going to pretend to be an airline pilot."
It's a fine line when teaching to know when a student can do something and they need more confidence versus when they're overconfident and need to be taken down a notch. But we generally see in people a LOT more of the former than the latter as they step up their game.
And there's also the question of just how high do they need to step up their game? The people involved in those accidents met the standards set for them by a long list of people who created, reviewed, and changed those as needed for decades.
Even the crew rest "problems" that people feel Colgan started to "fix"? Pilots had flown hundreds and hundreds of millions of people under the old ones. Yeah, in hindsight, fatigue is bad. But increased automation in the decades that followed the original crew rest rules also plays a role. It played a big role in both accidents, too.
Trying to pin down the airline's problems to some weird perception that pilots want to "play pilot" is a much bigger reach than an awful lot of reasons that can actually be fixed.
Didn't everyone want to "play" whatever they grew up to be when they're kids in a great many roles? We don't say engineers that messed up and the bridge fell down, was caused because the engineer wanted to pretend they were an engineer. We look for actionable things that let the engineer make that big of a mistake.