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Then add on Vietnam. McNamara made a simple, fundamental, and ultimately catastrophic mistake -- and one that pretty much only he or the other Whiz Kids who subscribed to his dogma could have: He assumed that the pace and escalation of war in general could be "rationally" dictated through a series of carefully-executed stimuli, irrespective of the culture, political goals, and tactics of whatever enemy was being faced. The application of that theory in Vietnam was a tremendous failure, and by mid-1966 even he knew that. But rather than adapting or adjusting his approach and offering methods of continuing the campaign by means other than escalation and/or advocating ending it altogether, it seems to me he got almost paralyzed, hampered by the crippling realization that the entire intellectual foundation of his whole strategy had crumbled. Instead of reacting honestly and productively, he got defensive and angry (and probably began re-writing his history right then.) These things are not what you want in the face of a growing mess.
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