Robert McNamara Dead

[Tom-D]

THe XM1, as proposed and originally developed, was a disaster, comparable to the B1A bomber that Carter cancelled. The A1 and A2 mods fixed a lot of problems. It's still heavy and expensive. Fortunately, it never had to fulfill its designated mission - to block the Fulda Gap. The Abrams is a good example of our military movement to a bigger, more expensive, and fewer acquisition strategy. Lucky for us, our biggest, most-likely-to-produce-a-counterweight-to-the-M1-tank enemy, the USSR, went TU and we were left with armor supremacy. We kinda missed the boat on reactive armor though. The Russkies reallly snookered us there.

With regard to the F16, it was designed as a lightweight, inexpensive day fighter to counteract the scores of Russian jets that would be screaming over the West German battlefield. Compare it to the F14, a hulking beast. The fact that the design actually made it into service was an accomplishment of major proportions, although the victory was short lived. The F16 of today is not the F16 of yesteryear. In some ways that's good - it has a great deal of additional capability, and in these days of limited budgets, multipurpose airframes help stretch the almighty dollar.

That, of course, was a disagreement for another time. We've moved on to Gen V fighters. Darkening the skies with lightweight day fighters probably wouldn't get the job done any more, given the development of anti-air missiles.

At any rate, McNamara was a flawed man, pushing a flawed strategy, in a flawed military structure, for flawed presidents. If he had stuck to autos, he might have been considered a hero....

Freaking ground pounder,,,,,,,, you ain't Sh-- unless you can drop a nuke.

 

[ScottM]

Back to the topic. The obits are rolling in and are very interesting.

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/71328.html

 

[roncachamp]

As usual, you leap to the incorrect conclusion.

The USAF didn't put a gun in it until the E model.

In other words, it flew as a fighter long before it had a gun.

There is no need for you to deny the truth Steve.

You're still missing the point. The F-4 wasn't built for the USAF, it was built for the Navy. If the USAF had built it it would have had an internal gun from the start.

 

[Graueradler]

I think historically you will find the Kitty Hawks CV versus CVN were ordered at the same time Enterprise was. In 1960-1961 Nuclear powered ships were in the testing phase for viability.

I was refering to the America and the Kennedy. The Kitty Hawk was built at the same time as the enterprise.

USS Kitty Hawk(CV 63)29 Apr 1961 /12 May 2009--
USS Constellation (CV 64)27 Oct 1961 /7 Aug 2003Towed 12 September 2003, to be placed in inactive reserve in the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF), Bremerton, Wash.

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)25 Nov 1961 /--Active -- see Fact File

USS America (CV 66)23 Jan 1965 /9 Aug 1996Stricken from Navy List; In the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF), Philadelphia, Penn. planned for scrapping, instead sunk in the Atlantic Ocean off the Virginia coast on 14 May 2005, following a series of tests consisting of simulated attacks on the ship.

USS John F. Kennedy(CV 67)7 Sep 1968 /23 Mar 2007 --

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)3 May 1975 /--Active -- see Fact File

 

[Clark1961]

You're still missing the point. The F-4 wasn't built for the USAF, it was built for the Navy. If the USAF had built it it would have had an internal gun from the start.

You don't have a point. The F-4 had no gun when it was first procured and used by the USAF as a fighter. The USAF certainly had the option to specify a gun when the decision was made to purchase the first F-4s. Where the design originated is not important.

Or will you claim that all those F-4's that the Air Force used were originally built for the Navy?

What exactly prevents you from admitting your error, Steve?

 

[Capt. Geoffrey Thorpe]

There's no doubt McNamara tried to run Vietnam like Ford Motor Company. But he was a product of his time -- the Corporate Man Age. If it wasn't McNamara, it would have been some other engineer.

McNamara was a bean counter - not an engineer.

 

[Geico266]

The US built the nuclear powered USS Enterprise and then, under McNamara, went back to building conventional carriers. Some, if not all of these have already been scrapped while the Big "E" is still in service. I have no basis for this information but have been told that the return to conventional power was the result of cost effectiveness studies and that in these studies, the addiitional planes that could be carried by a nuclear carrier were considered to be a negative ( initail cost and operating cost) instead of a positive. May oar may not be true

There are / were several countries that will not allow a nuke powered ship to dock in their ports. This may have been a factor.

 

[Trapper John]

The F-4 had no gun when it was first procured and used by the USAF as a fighter.

And the F-4 wasn't the only fighter in the inventory without a conventional gun. Everything my dad flew in the Air Defense Command from the mid-'50s on (F-86L, F-86D, F-102A, F-106A) didn't have a gun. I don't think the F-89D or the F-101B interceptors had guns, either. There was a later modification for the some of the F-106s that added a 20mm cannon in the missile bay, but that wasn't common.


Trapper John

 

[dmccormack]

McNamara was a bean counter - not an engineer.

Tomato, Tomahto

 

[dmccormack]

THe XM1, as proposed and originally developed, was a disaster, comparable to the B1A bomber that Carter cancelled. The A1 and A2 mods fixed a lot of problems. It's still heavy and expensive. Fortunately, it never had to fulfill its designated mission - to block the Fulda Gap. The Abrams is a good example of our military movement to a bigger, more expensive, and fewer acquisition strategy. Lucky for us, our biggest, most-likely-to-produce-a-counterweight-to-the-M1-tank enemy, the USSR, went TU and we were left with armor supremacy. We kinda missed the boat on reactive armor though. The Russkies reallly snookered us there.

Not exactly.

The M1IP was the up-armored, 105mm gun version that was deployed to Germany. It carried the TIS (Thermal Imaging Night Sight), had a stabilized main gun, employed Chobham armor (which was classified for many years), had separate ammunition storage (critical for crew survivability), a top speed in excess of 50 MPH (actual top speed is classified), an NBC air filtration system, and a reliable 1500hp turbine that could burn just about any combustible liquid (including peanut oil) and could be swapped out in about 35 minutes.

There was no deployed Soviet equivalent. The T-72 was strictly for export.

The Iraqis were equipped realized a bit late how poor those tanks were when they starting popping turrets under blast overpressure from 120mm rounds launched from M1A1s 3 miles away.

Captured Iraqi tank crewmen later told us: "We never even saw you...."

The Soviet's Main Battle tank -- the T-80 -- only carried a crew of 3, and employed an auto-loader which was notorious for ripping the arms off tank commanders. The 3 man crew meant reduced manpower for security duty, scouting, track replacement, etc. The stabilization was crude, the night vision absent, and the comms easily jammed.

I met with a Soviet Platoon Leader in an exchange program in 1991. We demonstrated our M1IPs for him and a few other exchange officers.

Afterwards, I asked him what he thought would have happened if the balloon had gone up.

"We would have lost..."

 

[RMCN172RG]

I was refering to the America and the Kennedy. The Kitty Hawk was built at the same time as the enterprise.

They are Kitty Hawks. Name of class goes to first ship in class. The class is ordered as a group and built separately. America and Kennedy, though originally named differently or not named just numbered were ordered as function replacements for the aging modified essex's of WWII fame.

Enterprise was the first experimental Nuke as a practical test of for using that to power ships in the future.

 

[dmccormack]

And the F-4 wasn't the only fighter in the inventory without a conventional gun. Everything my dad flew in the Air Defense Command from the mid-'50s on (F-86L, F-86D, F-102A, F-106A) didn't have a gun. I don't think the F-89D or the F-101B interceptors had guns, either. There was a later modification for the some of the F-106s that added a 20mm cannon in the missile bay, but that wasn't common.


Trapper John

How about the wonderful mission of the F-102: Carry one AIR2A rocket (not missle), fly directly towards Soviet Bomber formation, launch rocket, execute high-G reverse turn, hit afterburner and hope you escape the blast and EMP of resultant nuclear warhead...

Yeah, that was some good use of expensive assets, right there...

 

[dmccormack]

Freaking ground pounder,,,,,,,, you ain't Sh-- unless you can drop a nuke.

Ten years in the Air Force: Not one Nuke launched.

Eleven years in the Army: More rounds fired in one day than most gun people fire in a lifetime.

BTW: "Ground pounder" is an appellation exclusively for Infantry.
In Armor we referred to anyone on the ground as "crunchies."

 

[gprellwitz]

BTW: "Ground pounder" is an appellation exclusively for Infantry.
In Armor we referred to anyone on the ground as "crunchies."

And anyone in armor was referred to as a "cager"?

 

[dmccormack]

And anyone in armor was referred to as a "cager"?

Nah...

Infantry called tankers "treadheads," ............ but we couldn't hear them.

 

[flyersfan31]

Yeah, if I wasn't explicit in my comment about the Russkies, my point was that they never developed their next-gen tank to match/exceed the M1. They did, however, develop reactive armor which was more effective than the Chobham armor we went with. All the experts said the Russkies didn't have it. Then they did. Took us a while to catch up.

No matter now. We rule the roost.

Of course, we're wearing out the M1A1s and the lines are shut down IIRC. What do we do to replace them???

 

[Trapper John]

How about the wonderful mission of the F-102: Carry one AIR2A rocket (not missle), fly directly towards Soviet Bomber formation, launch rocket, execute high-G reverse turn, hit afterburner and hope you escape the blast and EMP of resultant nuclear warhead...

Yeah, that was some good use of expensive assets, right there...

Very few F-102 squadrons were ever equipped with the Genie as far as I know, but it was capable of carrying two, one in each missile bay. The standard armament load was six Falcons, usually three radar-guided and three heat-seekers, along with a set of 12 2.75" rockets attached to the front of the inboard door of each missile bay for a total of 24 rockets.


Trapper John

 

[dmccormack]

Very few F-102 squadrons were ever equipped with the Genie as far as I know, but it was capable of carrying two, one in each missile bay. The standard armament load was six Falcons, usually three radar-guided and three heat-seekers, along with a set of 12 2.75" rockets attached to the inside of the outboard door of each missile bay for a total of 24 rockets.


Trapper John

My mistake -- the F-106 was stationed at Griffiss AFB in the 49th (not the F-102, as I orginally posted).

AFAIK (though I can't find verification), the F-106 only carried a single AIR2A.

 

[dmccormack]

Yeah, if I wasn't explicit in my comment about the Russkies, my point was that they never developed their next-gen tank to match/exceed the M1. They did, however, develop reactive armor which was more effective than the Chobham armor we went with. All the experts said the Russkies didn't have it. Then they did. Took us a while to catch up.

No matter now. We rule the roost.

Of course, we're wearing out the M1A1s and the lines are shut down IIRC. What do we do to replace them???

Reactive Armor is only effective against explosive charge rounds (such as HEAT or HEP rounds), and only once.

US Tanks in Germany carried a majority of Sabot rounds (High Energy Penetrating rods that punched through, rather than exploding on, armor).

The Russians fielded reactive armor to counter Afghans with RPGs, not to counter NATO.

As far as "wearing out" -- the US has relied on depot-level maintenance since WW2 (when the inferior Sherman tanks simply overwhelmed the Germans by being repaired and returned to service in hours).

Not far from me is a United Technologies refurb center of M-2/3 Bradely Fighting Vehicles (by the way -- if you want to pick on an example of poor defense acquisition practice, the Bradley provides a stronger case than the M-1).

The show up as wrecks -- they leave as good as new -- or better.

 

[Trapper John]

My mistake -- the F-106 was stationed at Griffiss AFB in the 49th (not the F-102, as I orginally posted).

AFAIK (though I can't find verification), the F-106 only carried a single AIR2A.

The F-106 had the same missile bay as the F-102, but a better fire control system (and much better performance). Some F-106 squadrons were equipped with the AIR2A and some were equipped with the GAR-11/AIM26 Nuclear Falcon missile, but with either nuke, the capacity was one per bay, or two total. How the particular squadron at Griffiss deployed their weapons, I wouldn't know, but it's possible they carried a nuke in one bay and conventional Falcons in the other.


Trapper John

 

[dmccormack]

The F-106 had the same missile bay as the F-102, but a better fire control system (and much better performance). Some F-106 squadrons were equipped with the AIR2A and some were equipped with the GAR-11/AIM26 Nuclear Falcon missile, but with either nuke, the capacity was one per bay, or two total. How the particular squadron at Griffiss deployed their weapons, I wouldn't know, but it's possible they carried a nuke in one bay and conventional Falcons in the other.


Trapper John

I was assigned to the 416th (B-52G), but the 49th guys were right next door.

I'm fairly certain the 49th F-106 only carried a single AIR2A. They may have carried additional munitions, but I'm less certain about that.

 

[Trapper John]

I was assigned to the 416th (B-52G), but the 49th guys were right next door.

Buffs & Sixes - hope they issued you guys good earplugs!


Trapper John

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

There are some very interesting and informative posts in this thread. Thanks for sharing them.

Logistics, which have been touched on but not specifically discussed, are as important as (if not more important than) tactics and strategy. While the logistical side is overlooked by the general public in favor of things that go bang (and understandably so), the reality is that if you don't have food, gas, and ammunition, you're not going to have a very effective fighting force.

There are three modern wars we can look at, in which the US participated, where logistics played a tremendous role - the US Civil War, WWI, and WWII. The logistics in all three of those wars determined the strategies and tactics used. To go into details would be to write something of a term paper, but suffice it to say that superior production capacity, along with the ability to get the supplies to the front, is what allowed for victory in all three of those wars.

Illustrating how important logistics are was the effectiveness of submarine warfare in WWI and WWII. In WWI, the British were far worse off than in WWII from German submarine warfare which started in 1917. The British were literally on the verge of collapse from inability to get supplies from the United States and India. Very close to caving until the U.S. entered the war, ironically because of unrestricted submarine warfare.

And, in WWII, a lot of people far more knowledgeable than me will tell you that the single most effective tactic/strategy we used against the Japanese (the Germans did it to themselves by not having steady access to oil, hence Hitler's drive into Russia and the Caucuses) was use of the submarine force against the Japanese "colonies," from which Japan obtained virtually all of its supplies, particularly oil and rubber. In other words, we disrupted their logistical side, and they didn't have the materials to effectively counter things like our massive air/sea superiority by 1944. It was still a horribly bloody fight in the Pacific, but imagine if the IJN had managed to keep a pace with the USN.

You saw it in Europe, too - while German industrial production actually increased as the war went on (despite our bombing - Albert Speer was an absolute genius), they simply didn't have the gas to drive their machines. Tanks don't do much good if they don't move, trains can't take supplies anywhere if there's no coal/fuel or the tracks are damaged, etc.

The simple fact is that, in modern warfare (i.e., since mediaeval times, not that it wasn't important in times past), if you don't have the right equipment, you're not going to be too effective against others.

My point is this. McNamara was, as many of you have pointed out, a beancounter. But, in modern warfare, the supply of fighting forces is as important as how those forces fight. The simple fact - proven time and again since 1648 (generally accepted as the start of the "modern" period) - is that the better-supplied side wins in a war.

That's not to take anything away from anyone. My only point is that the supply side - which includes things such as standardization of equipment, development of new equipment/technology, etc. - is as important to military operations as the actual fighting is.

So, the relation to the thread is this: McNamara might have been a jerk, he might have been more concerned about the numbers than about the guys getting shot at on a daily basis. The M-16 issue was a pretty bad screwup (whether it was in good faith or not). But, like I said, it needs to be remembered that the numbers are just as important as the fighting.

Flame away.

 

[roncachamp]

And the F-4 wasn't the only fighter in the inventory without a conventional gun. Everything my dad flew in the Air Defense Command from the mid-'50s on (F-86L, F-86D, F-102A, F-106A) didn't have a gun. I don't think the F-89D or the F-101B interceptors had guns, either. There was a later modification for the some of the F-106s that added a 20mm cannon in the missile bay, but that wasn't common.

See mesage #32.

 

[Trapper John]

True only of dedicated interceptors.

Also true of variants of existing aircraft converted to interceptor duty, i.e., F-86D & L, where they took out the machine guns to make room for radar and fire control systems. Same with the F-89D & F-101B.


Trapper John

 

[dmccormack]

There are some very interesting and informative posts in this thread. Thanks for sharing them.

Logistics, which have been touched on but not specifically discussed, are as important as (if not more important than) tactics and strategy. While the logistical side is overlooked by the general public in favor of things that go bang (and understandably so), the reality is that if you don't have food, gas, and ammunition, you're not going to have a very effective fighting force.

"Battles are decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired." --Rommel

Yet Napoleon learned (the hard way) that defense of supply lines enables logistics.

 

[Tom-D]

I was refering to the America and the Kennedy. The Kitty Hawk was built at the same time as the enterprise.

USS Kitty Hawk(CV 63)29 Apr 1961 /12 May 2009--
USS Constellation (CV 64)27 Oct 1961 /7 Aug 2003Towed 12 September 2003, to be placed in inactive reserve in the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF), Bremerton, Wash.

USS Enterprise (CVN 65)25 Nov 1961 /--Active -- see Fact File

USS America (CV 66)23 Jan 1965 /9 Aug 1996Stricken from Navy List; In the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility (NISMF), Philadelphia, Penn. planned for scrapping, instead sunk in the Atlantic Ocean off the Virginia coast on 14 May 2005, following a series of tests consisting of simulated attacks on the ship.

USS John F. Kennedy(CV 67)7 Sep 1968 /23 Mar 2007 --

USS Nimitz (CVN 68)3 May 1975 /--Active -- see Fact File

See the pics below, sorry they are small, they are old.

 

[ScottM]

Logistics, which have been touched on but not specifically discussed, are as important as (if not more important than) tactics and strategy. While the logistical side is overlooked by the general public in favor of things that go bang (and understandably so), the reality is that if you don't have food, gas, and ammunition, you're not going to have a very effective fighting force.

In modern US time Sherman can be credited with rediscovering that fact of warfare.

But I am sure you know as a student of history that Rome often employed the strategy of attacking when the enemy would have a weak logistics support line and they would attack the logistics supply lines. This when also employed with their other tactic of siege made them the conquers of Europe and North Africa.

I am sure we can go back even further and see that the successful armies knew that as well. Probably even before Alexander it was a axiom of war.

You saw it in Europe, too - while German industrial production actually increased as the war went on (despite our bombing - Albert Speer was an absolute genius), they simply didn't have the gas to drive their machines. Tanks don't do much good if they don't move, trains can't take supplies anywhere if there's no coal/fuel or the tracks are damaged, etc.

I learned that a long time ago in USAF OTS. That was in the 1980's and was quite the eye opener. Basically the lesson was that main mission of the USAF was somewhat flawed and that doctrine in the 1960s onward was changing to reflect that.

 

[Dave Siciliano]

David: that's why I defer to what folks say about the big picture. That still doesn't make him popular with the fella that was on the front line with a defective weapon.

In WWII our Sherman Tank is looked back upon as a major blunder. Big picture folks can talk about how we out numbered the German tanks, fixed 'em and put 'em back right away, but ask the guy up front that shot at a German tank and had his round bounce off how he felt about that tank (the German round sliced right through the Sherman). Same with our torpedo at the beginning of WWII which circled off course or didn't explode on impact.

As much as anyone does, one major blunder that puts front line lives at risk can become the issue for which that person is remembered.

As for our M-1 program; yes, there were flaws. But, let's compare them to other R&D/acquisition programs. In Germany's case, look at how Hitler out ruled his experts many times and it saved our butts. The ME-109 is an excellent case in point, but there were many others. As flawed as our system may be, others can be more flawed.

In the end, things are run by humans and they all have different motivations and purposes.

Best,

Dave

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

"Battles are decided by the quartermasters before the first shot is fired." --Rommel

Yet Napoleon learned (the hard way) that defense of supply lines enables logistics.

Yup - I think every country that's had extended supply lines has had to learn that lesson the hard way. To bring the issue a little closer to home, if we're planning on relying on middle eastern oil in case of a major war with a country having a naval ability (there are really only two countries to which I could potentially be referring), we'll learn that lesson, too.

Like I said earlier, I don't mean to take anything away from anyone by pointing out the logistics side. At the end of the day, it's not the quartermasters doing the dying. I'm just trying to say that you can't neglect the logistical side; it's a numbers game, but without it, the war effort fails of necessity.

 

[Obi Heed Kenobi]

David: that's why I defer to what folks say about the big picture. That still doesn't make him popular with the fella that was on the front line with a defective weapon.

In WWII our Sherman Tank is looked back upon as a major blunder. Big picture folks can talk about how we out numbered the German tanks, fixed 'em and put 'em back right away, but ask the guy up front that shot at a German tank and had his round bounce off how he felt about that tank (the German round sliced right through the Sherman). Same with our torpedo at the beginning of WWII which circled off course or didn't explode on impact.

As much as anyone does, one major blunder that puts front line lives at risk can become the issue for which that person is remembered.

As for our M-1 program; yes, there were flaws. But, let's compare them to other R&D/acquisition programs. In Germany's case, look at how Hitler out ruled his experts many times and it saved our butts. The ME-109 is an excellent case in point, but there were many others. As flawed as our system may be, others can be more flawed.

In the end, things are run by humans and they all have different motivations and purposes.

Best,

Dave

Absolutely agreed.

 

[flyersfan31]

The show up as wrecks -- they leave as good as new -- or better.

Well, that's good news. The same can't be said for our airframes. The sad thing is for the acquisition price of every 20 that wear out, we can only afford to buy one super-deluxe new one.

Don't get me wrong, the M1 is one helluva beast! I wouldn't want to try to face one down.

 

[dmccormack]

In WWII our Sherman Tank is looked back upon as a major blunder. Big picture folks can talk about how we out numbered the German tanks, fixed 'em and put 'em back right away, but ask the guy up front that shot at a German tank and had his round bounce off how he felt about that tank (the German round sliced right through the Sherman).

If you survey nearly all of the equipment available to US Forces in 1940 -- we were a third-rate power.

I agree -- we can claim we "won the war" by overwhelming numbers. But the fact is poor equipment choices resulted in many unnecessary casualties.

For example -- the dirty little secret of Omaha beach was that the Army Air Corps failed to put bombs on the German beach defenses, resulting in landing Infantry being mowed down by defenders at 100% combat effectiveness.

One of the main design goals of the M-1 program was crew survivability. It's a very good thing we never had to fight the M-1s predecessor, the M-60, as it was a rolling death trap (spend 2 minutes in the turret and you'll see more exposed hydraulic lines than you can count).

Sure the M60A3 had a stabilized gun and the superior TTS (Tank Thermal Sight), but the armor was no match for modern ordnance, the vehicle was slow, gave a terrible (and thus fatiguing) ride, and the cupola was so high off the ground the tank might as well have had a "shoot me" sign as well.

So we did learn some lessons. But as I said earlier, Defense acquisition works on the principle "As long as it's not as terrible as the opponent's stuff, we'll be OK..."

 

[dmccormack]

Don't get me wrong, the M1 is one helluva beast! I wouldn't want to try to face one down.

I spent a week in a trench during OCS during "Static Defense week" (the next week was "Patrol week")

On the last night we were assaulted by a platoon (4) M-1 tanks.

At the conclusion of OCS I selected "Armor" as my branch of choice.

 

[Anthony]

Don't get me wrong, the M1 is one helluva beast! I wouldn't want to try to face one down.

Except in a Leopard II.

 

[ReverendSlappy]

My point is this. McNamara was, as many of you have pointed out, a beancounter. But, in modern warfare, the supply of fighting forces is as important as how those forces fight. The simple fact - proven time and again since 1648 (generally accepted as the start of the "modern" period) - is that the better-supplied side wins in a war.

That's not to take anything away from anyone. My only point is that the supply side - which includes things such as standardization of equipment, development of new equipment/technology, etc. - is as important to military operations as the actual fighting is.

So, the relation to the thread is this: McNamara might have been a jerk, he might have been more concerned about the numbers than about the guys getting shot at on a daily basis. The M-16 issue was a pretty bad screwup (whether it was in good faith or not). But, like I said, it needs to be remembered that the numbers are just as important as the fighting.

Flame away.

A great post, and I also want to thank those who have made some really interesting, informative posts here. Really good stuff, and I've only not chimed in because I've thought it'd get tossed into the SZ at some point anyway. But, since it's been a good convo so far, here's this one guy's opinion...

Overall, I'm almost conflicted about McNamara. There were positives: He did rein in what were clearly lax management and command and control practices surrounding the nuclear arsenal. He also eventually won the debate with LeMay and the Air Force and got SAC to be more flexible; before McNamara came along, their only real plan was to respond to basically any significant Soviet offensive -- nuclear or conventional -- with a full-scale launch of the entire nuclear arsenal, which had obvious, er, drawbacks. Also, he cleaned up the procurement process at the Pentagon, which had become rife with largess, corruption, costly redundancies and turf-protection, and just gross excess. In so doing, he saved untold billions of taxpayers' dollars, with no loss of military capability -- some might even argue that the net result of his focus on empirical analysis and quantitative case-building was a better Department of Defense and more apt military in general.

Then there was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Despite his "recollection" of his role in the events (the quality of which I'll discuss in a bit) being in lock step with Kennedy's mostly savvy and generally doveish gambits, McNamara was actually counseling the President to take the opposite tack; after just a few days into the crisis, he began advocating (along with LeMay) bombing the Russian sites, which would have escalated the crisis dramatically, and who knows how it might've played out.

Then add on Vietnam. McNamara made a simple, fundamental, and ultimately catastrophic mistake -- and one that pretty much only he or the other Whiz Kids who subscribed to his dogma could have: He assumed that the pace and escalation of war in general could be "rationally" dictated through a series of carefully-executed stimuli, irrespective of the culture, political goals, and tactics of whatever enemy was being faced. The application of that theory in Vietnam was a tremendous failure, and by mid-1966 even he knew that. But rather than adapting or adjusting his approach and offering methods of continuing the campaign by means other than escalation and/or advocating ending it altogether, it seems to me he got almost paralyzed, hampered by the crippling realization that the entire intellectual foundation of his whole strategy had crumbled. Instead of reacting honestly and productively, he got defensive and angry (and probably began re-writing his history right then.) These things are not what you want in the face of a growing mess.

Add to that the apparent ease with which he has subsequently distorted his roles in matters... As I mentioned, he routinely tried to paint himself as being entirely with Kennedy in eschewing a military strike in Cuba in favor of a measured, more diplomatic response. Kennedy's tapes revealed that instead, from very early on in the crisis and all the way to the end he was in fact lobbying the President for more aggressive military action. He also routinely tried to characterize his position on Vietnam as one of anti-escalation, when in fact he had authored the entire strategy that was almost entirely based upon escalation from the start. Combine that with the stunning arrogance that he was known for, and it's not a pretty sight.

Big picture, I suppose it's somewhat possible to see McNamara as something of a tragic figure: A man who had his marriage to a very doctrinaire ideology cemented by more than a couple early successes, and who consequently became of victim of doing all he ever knew to do in the only way he ever knew to do it. But to do so is to absolve him of the cardinal sins that every ideologue like him is guilty of: Virtually unbounded arrogance; a strident refusal to accept simple realities that conflict with their narrow view; an absolute dearth of basic humility; a preference for base mendacity over the integrity required to admit one's own faults. These things -- particularly when they result in such a horrendous human toll -- are unforgivable.

Joseph Galloway (author of the excellent We Were Soldiers Once... And Young) began his obituary of McNamara with a great Clarence Darrow quote: "I have never killed a man, but I have read many obituaries with great pleasure."

 

[dmccormack]

Except in a Leopard II.

If today's German soliders are manning the Leopard?

Any day, any time, any where.

 

[Anthony]

If today's German soliders are manning the Leopard?

Any day, any time, any where.

I hear ya. Today's neutered, two year conscripts are no match for our professional armed forces. However, they still make some really good stuff.

Now if they were the former Wehrmacht or SS, you'd have your hands full.

 

[dmccormack]

A great post, and I also want to thank those who have made some really interesting, informative posts here. Really good stuff, and I've only not chimed in because I've thought it'd get tossed into the SZ at some point anyway. But, since it's been a good convo so far, here's this one guy's opinion...

Well said.

I'll stick to my position that McNamara was the epitome of his time. His contemporaries shared his hubris because they shared his worldview -- one where "management" trumped "leadership" -- and perhaps even "freedom."

Robert Moses is the most glaring example of a McNamara contemporary -- read this swell early essay about Moses from The Atlantic: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/39feb/0239rodgers.htm and then contrast with Robert Caro's magisterial work, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York.

Moses often said, "If the ends don't justify the means, what does?"

 

[Dave Siciliano]

Issues with the F-4

As the F-4 was initially intended as an interceptor, it was not equipped with a gun as planners believed that air-to-air combat at supersonic speeds would be fought exclusively with missiles. The fighting over Vietnam soon showed that engagements quickly became subsonic, turning battles which often precluded the use of air-to-air missiles. In 1967, USAF pilots began mounting external gunpods on their aircraft, however the lack of a leading gunsight in the cockpit made them highly inaccurate. This issue was addressed with the addition of an integrated 20 mm M61 Vulcan gun to the F-4E model in the late 1960s.
Another problem that frequently arose with the aircraft was the production of black smoke when the engines were run at military power. This smoke trail made the aircraft easy to spot. Many pilots found ways to avoid producing the smoke by running one engine on afterburner and the other at reduced power. This provided an equivalent amount of thrust, without the telltale smoke trail. This issue was addressed with the Block 53 group of the F-4E which included smokeless J79-GE-17C (or -17E) engines.


Here's some background. http://militaryhistory.about.com/od/militaryaircraft/p/f4phantomii.htm
=======================================


Planners didn't think there would be dog fights when the F-4 was designed; so, it had missiles and no guns. The missiles could not stay on target in the hard G, turning dog fights that came to be. Fighter pilots had fought not having guns and lost to planners. Once again, the pencil pushers out ruled the combat experienced fighter pilots. There are some great episodes on History channel documenting this where pilots of the time were interviewed. This problem wasn't exclusive to the F-4.



Best,


Dave