yakdriver
Cleared for Takeoff
- Joined
- Aug 29, 2011
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- 1,200
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- Twin Falls, Idaho
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yellow peril
Boy do I need to get new glasses or something. No wonder everybody scatters when I enter the pattern. Don
Bingo. Not busy for a bravoThis would be the Pittsburgh bravo, I assume. It's not covered by liveatc.net
The only thing that is a little troubling to me about the OP is he has said repeatedly that he assumed the 737 was climbing because it was departing. That's a reasonable assumption but assuming things in life never ends well. The more accurate conclusion is ATC has te situation under control. I'm not of the mind that ATC is not to be trusted. I explicitly do trust them but I will save myself first. A CFI once told me that if ATC makes a mistake they keep breathing, if a pilot makes a mistake, we stop breathing. I keep those words in mind every time I receive an order from ATC and I'll readily question them each time I'm inadvertently placed in a dangerous spot( this has happened only 1 time in 4 years of flying during a very similar situation to yours where I was flying near a air force cargo jet that was huge-- I just asked his altitude and then made sure to fly my altitude on the number. In this case though,ATC had this situation completely under control and a pilots assumption made it dangerous.
He's wrong. There are pilots breathing today who have experienced controller mistakes. There are pilots breathing today who have experienced pilot mistakes. Of the pilots not breathing today the reason is far more likely to have been due to a pilot mistake than to a controller mistake.
Point taken, but the real message is that regardless of who makes the error, the only one who may get killed is the pilot (the possibility of crashing into the ATC facility and that Swiss controller knifed to death by the angry father of one of the people killed by that controller's error notwithstanding), so at the end of the day, the pilot better make damn sure s/he's not getting hosed by a controller error.He's wrong. There are pilots breathing today who have experienced controller mistakes. There are pilots breathing today who have experienced pilot mistakes. Of the pilots not breathing today the reason is far more likely to have been due to a pilot mistake than to a controller mistake.
Of course- but the CFI's point is that if a controller issues a bad clearance or instruction they still go home that night. If the pilot blindly follows that bad clearance or instruction, they often do not.
Does ATC on rare occasions assign commands that end up losing appropriate separation? Yep, but they don't give you a traffic call first in Class B airspace. ATC had this situation under control. If they didn't the OP would've gotten a traffic alert (additional instructions) and not a normal traffic call.
I'm sure that's true almost all the time, but no one's infallible.
Point taken, but the real message is that regardless of who makes the error, the only one who may get killed is the pilot (the possibility of crashing into the ATC facility and that Swiss controller knifed to death by the angry father of one of the people killed by that controller's error notwithstanding), so at the end of the day, the pilot better make damn sure s/he's not getting hosed by a controller error.
True, but we can count on our fingers how many times ATC has directed people into an accident, while the the amount of pilot failures resulting in deaths requires a significant database to track.
Actually, though overstated, it didn't sound like a load of crap to me. And even the portion you bolded in your quote, Steven, I don't think said what you thought it did. It referred to the consequences of *pilot* error, not the consequences to the pilot of *controller* error.Another real message: When a CFI asserts something that sounds like a load of crap, challenge the assertion.
That's called constant bearing, decreasing range (CBDR).
If there's one thing I'll never forget from my Navy training it's CBDR. They beat that into our heads repeatedly. And then beat some more.
Actually, though overstated, it didn't sound like a load of crap to me. And even the portion you bolded in your quote, Steven, I don't think said what you thought it did. It referred to the consequences of *pilot* error, not the consequences to the pilot of *controller* error.
Nothing like throwing your belly up at lead to get his blood pumping.If there's one thing I'll never forget from my Navy training it's CBDR. They beat that into our heads repeatedly. And then beat some more.
If there's one thing I'll never forget from my Navy training it's CBDR. They beat that into our heads repeatedly. And then beat some more.
Now there is one thing that scares me here.
I've had a transponder anomaly in Class C before, right below a Class B floor. Approach thought I was in Class B and repeatedly asked me to "say altitude," which I did, and it was 100 feet below the floor. And had I really been in Class B, that would have almost certainly resulted in RAs. It's a real bad spot, pretty close to the FAF for SFO 28R.
The altimeter had been calibrated on the ground -- I do this routinely, every flight -- by comparing it to field altitude. It was less than 10 feet off.
So, we've established that the transponder is not reporting the correct altitude, and told Approach. But they still give traffic reports about me to other aircraft using the transponder-reported altitude. That's a 200 foot error in that particular case. If reported separation is only 500 feet vertically, there is a problem there.
Depends on your definition of a load of crap. According to mine, there would have to be no truth in it at all. If you read beyond the literal meaning of the words, there's a great deal of truth in it - as I said, it's just overstated.If it's not a load of crap you'd have to believe that all living pilots are mistake-free.
Depends on your definition of a load of crap. According to mine, there would have to be no truth in it at all. If you read beyond the literal meaning of the words, there's a great deal of truth in it - as I said, it's just overstated.
True, but in a boat, you're all at the same "altitude". CBDR doesn't mean as much in the air when you have the possibility of vertical separation.
And I'll state right now that it can be HARD to determine vertical separation of 500 feet when you're looking at a 737 a few miles away and closing.
Normally, whenever I've gotten a traffic call in class B, the controllers always state the relative bearing (3 O'Clock), the type (737), and the vertical information (level at XXXX, XXXX and climbing/descending), and tell me if they'll pass above or below me. That reassures me that staying at my assigned altitude is the right thing to do. One time I had a 747 pass 500 feet below me near Dulles while I was in a 172. That was really cool.
Often? What's the evidence of that? How does the total number of bad clearances or instructions compare to the number of bad clearances or instructions that prevented a pilot from going home that night?
I honestly believe you must just be looking to fight here.
I honestly believe you must just be looking to fight here. The point the CFI made and one I understand is that, if a controller issue an instruction or clearance that is a mistake, they are not the ones actually in the plane. So if a pilot blindly follows said instruction, it is the pilot who pays for that error. I'm not talking about small ATC errors, or small pilot errors. I'm talking about the importance of pilots knowing the situation they are in, and evaluating the safety of the situation at all times so as to avoid situations like what was described in the OP, where the pilot lost awareness and then took incorrect evasive action.
Yup, and even by that definition, I disagree that the statement was a load of crap.
I honestly believe you must just be looking to fight here.
That's just Steven. He likes to fight, hence his appropriate avatar.