PA-32 /N8963N Down Feb 24,2024

GLMS_NC

Line Up and Wait
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Rick
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Kinda trending to be weather related. I think a few hours later the weather was fine.
 
METAR KJRO 241635Z AUTO 34009G17KT 1 3/4SM -SN OVC012 M01/M02 A2991 RMK AO2

Not exactly weather that a pilot without an instrument rating should be flying in...
 
The FlightAware ground track shows the pilot apparently decided to return to the airport, and that they were in the air for about eight minutes. The METAR speaks.

The track gives erroneous altitude and location information, but judging from the track and elapsed time, that may be what occurred.
 
The latest track on flight aware was on 2-13. I believe that was a different flight.
 
May be a case of let’s go up and take a look,then decided to return to the airport.
 
Not thinking so. They were headed to FL.
 
- NTSB issues the preliminary report into the fatal accident involving a Piper PA-32-300 Cherokee Six B, N8963N, that occurred on February 24, 2024, near James A Rhodes Airport (KJRO), Jackson, Ohio:

On February 24, 2024, around 1140 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-32-300, N8963N, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Jackson, Ohio. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The non-instrument rated private pilot and two passengers departed runway 01 at James A Rhodes Airport (JRO), Jackson, Ohio, at 1136 for a cross-country flight to Haines City, Florida, to pick up a vehicle. According to two witnesses who observed the flight, the airplane departed during a period of heavy snowfall. A witness on the airport property, who was also a flight instructor, reported that the takeoff appeared normal; however, due to the heavy snow fall and restricted visibility at the time, he told his wife to note the time as he did not feel that the flight would have a good outcome. He stated that the airplane was in the clouds when it reached the end of the 5,201 ft-long runway. He further stated he could barely see the windsock at the time due to heavy snowfall and estimated the visibility to be about 1/2 mile. Another witness who was outside of his residence about 1/2 mile west of the runway at JRO reported that the airplane turned left after takeoff and flew so low over his property that he could have read the registration number had the snow not been so heavy. The airplane continued in a left circle back toward the runway until he could no longer see it because of the snow. Shortly thereafter, he heard a “crunching sound.” He estimated that the airplane was in the air for a total of 3-5 minutes.

The airplane came to rest about 1/2 mile from the departure end of runway 01, oriented to an east heading at the end of a compact debris path oriented on a west heading. All flight control surfaces were present in the wreckage, which was largely consumed by fire.

Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that the fuselage and cockpit were mostly consumed by postimpact fire. All seats except for the front right seat, which remained attached, were impact separated from their mounts on the cabin floor due to impact forces. All non-metal seat material and lap belt and shoulder harness webbing were consumed by the fire. The instrument panel was fragmented and burned. No instrument readings were obtained. The throttle, propeller and mixture controls were reduced to their metal control cable components, and no position settings could be determined. The manual flap selector was found set to the full flap extended position, which was verified at the flap torque tube and control rod on the left side. Both wings displayed compression damage along the leading edges and were impact separated at the wing roots. Aileron control continuity was confirmed from the control surfaces through overload separations in the control cables to near the aileron drive chain at the control column, where it was separated in overload. The aileron drive chain was fully intact. The vertical stabilizer and stabilator remained attached to the empennage and displayed little deformation except for the right outboard portion of the stabilator which was bent upward. Rudder and stabilator continuity were confirmed from control surfaces to the forward cabin area.

Examination of the engine revealed “Normal Condition” spark plugs when compared to the Champion Aviation Check a Plug chart. Borescope examination of the cylinders revealed no anomalies to the cylinder walls, piston faces, or intake and exhaust valves. Crankshaft continuity was confirmed through multiple 360º rotations by rotating the vacuum pump drive and by rotating the crankshaft flange. Thumb compression and suction were achieved on all cylinders. All propeller blades exhibited chordwise scoring and leading-edge abrasion. One blade exhibited aft bending and a second blade exhibited torsional twisting.

Examination of the airframe and engine revealed no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

According to the pilot’s flight instructor, the accident pilot had accrued about 20 hours of “flying under the hood” and was working on his instrument rating.

The reported weather conditions at JRO at 1135 included overcast clouds at 1,200 ft, 1 3/4 miles visibility in light snow, and gusting wind.

The wreckage was retained for further investigation

- Report:
 
I keep thinking about this accident, and what I can learn from it.

I think we can all agree that the weather at the time of the accident was such that the flight should not have been attempted. When I check the weather along their route it seems that had they been able to make it the first 25 miles they would have been met with rapidly improving conditions. And would have had smooth flying the rest of the way to their destination.

I believe when planning long cross country flights we might tend to look at the weather as an average, which for this flight was great. But unfortunately the most important part of the weather is the worst 10 minutes.
 
I keep thinking about this accident, and what I can learn from it.

I think we can all agree that the weather at the time of the accident was such that the flight should not have been attempted. When I check the weather along their route it seems that had they been able to make it the first 25 miles they would have been met with rapidly improving conditions. And would have had smooth flying the rest of the way to their destination.

I believe when planning long cross country flights we might tend to look at the weather as an average, which for this flight was great. But unfortunately the most important part of the weather is the worst 10 minutes.
And maybe don't fly IMC if you aren't rated and/or proficient.
 
Any chance this was a Special VFR flight? That would fit the profile of a below-VFR takeoff heading into nearby VMC conditions.
I would guess if they had called for SVFR they would have noted it in the prelim report.
 
KJRO is non towered, so probably not.
 
Class G no, nor would there be any point. KJRO is not a surface class E airport, so again, SVFR would be of little value.
 
Can't you get SVFR from FSS/ATC for Class E or G airspace?
The answer seems pretty clear from the regulation, no?

§ 91.157 Special VFR weather minimums.​
(a) Except as provided in appendix D, section 3, of this part, special VFR operations may be conducted under the weather minimums and requirements of this section, instead of those contained in § 91.155, below 10,000 feet MSL within the airspace contained by the upward extension of the lateral boundaries of the controlled airspace designated to the surface for an airport.​
 
I keep thinking about this accident, and what I can learn from it.

I think we can all agree that the weather at the time of the accident was such that the flight should not have been attempted. When I check the weather along their route it seems that had they been able to make it the first 25 miles they would have been met with rapidly improving conditions. And would have had smooth flying the rest of the way to their destination.

I believe when planning long cross country flights we might tend to look at the weather as an average, which for this flight was great. But unfortunately the most important part of the weather is the worst 10 minutes.
The weather 25 miles away should have no bearing on a takeoff decision. The pilot departed knowing what he was doing was illegal.
 
Apart from being reckless, what was illegal about this flight? I don’t know the area or the altitude he reached, so maybe he climbed into controlled airspace in less than 3 miles of flight visibility. But the takeoff appears to have been legal for day VFR: class G airspace, better than 1 mile visibility, clear of clouds.

I wouldn’t have had much temptation to make that takeoff under IFR, much less VFR. If I’m right about the conditions, this is one of those places where the regulations allow you to do profoundly foolish things, like trying to see the horizon and terrain through less than 2-mile visibility in blowing snow.
 
Sure looks like nothing more than an inexperienced pilot who got too big for his britches. “I’m almost halfway through IFR training - no problemo! Besides, we gotta get there today - if we don’t move that car back, I might have to pay an extra 10 or 20 bucks for parking.”
 
I don’t know the area or the altitude he reached, so maybe he climbed into controlled airspace in less than 3 miles of flight visibility. But the takeoff appears to have been legal for day VFR: class G airspace, better than 1 mile visibility, clear of clouds.
“A witness on the airport property, who was also a flight instructor, reported that the takeoff appeared normal; however, due to the heavy snow fall and restricted visibility at the time, he told his wife to note the time as he did not feel that the flight would have a good outcome. He stated that the airplane was in the clouds when it reached the end of the 5,201 ft-long runway. He further stated he could barely see the windsock at the time due to heavy snowfall and estimated the visibility to be about 1/2 mile.”
 
“A witness on the airport property, who was also a flight instructor, reported that the takeoff appeared normal; however, due to the heavy snow fall and restricted visibility at the time, he told his wife to note the time as he did not feel that the flight would have a good outcome. He stated that the airplane was in the clouds when it reached the end of the 5,201 ft-long runway. He further stated he could barely see the windsock at the time due to heavy snowfall and estimated the visibility to be about 1/2 mile.”
That’s a good lesson to take away from this mishap, then: METAR isn’t gospel. (Assuming that the report at takeoff time was more than 1 mile as posted above.)
 
That’s a good lesson to take away from this mishap, then: METAR isn’t gospel. (Assuming that the report at takeoff time was more than 1 mile as posted above.)
I was based at Watsonville, CA (KWVI) for many years. The ASOS there was notorious for reporting scattered or clear when it was OVC007 a quarter mile past the departure end. Twenty minutes after that observation the marine layer would reach the ASOS, but if you’re off site reading a METAR or listening to the ASOS, it can be deceptive.

On the other hand, KOBE (Okeechobee, FL), close to where I live now, has a pessimistic ASOS. It often is reporting 1/4SM BR OVC006 or thereabouts when it’s clear on the ground and SCT or FEW010. They finally fixed the wind readout, which used to often be off by 60 to 90 degrees and five to 10 knots.
 
Poor decision making in flying at all, then again in trying to return to the runway?
The second one is puzzling to me. Given the pilot had 20 hours eyes inside, when he apparently realized he'd made a big mistake once airborne and ended up in IMC when he shouldn't have been there- wouldn't it have been safer to continue climbing until above the weather, then divert to another airport with VFR conditions?
Trying to understand why he would have tried to return in conditions/visibility he knew were unsafe as opposed to the alternative- when he had a full load of fuel and plenty of time.
 
Poor decision making in flying at all, then again in trying to return to the runway?
The second one is puzzling to me. Given the pilot had 20 hours eyes inside, when he apparently realized he'd made a big mistake once airborne and ended up in IMC when he shouldn't have been there- wouldn't it have been safer to continue climbing until above the weather, then divert to another airport with VFR conditions?
Trying to understand why he would have tried to return in conditions/visibility he knew were unsafe as opposed to the alternative- when he had a full load of fuel and plenty of time.
Climbing above in icing conditions, precip, and unknown tops? The sounding at ILN from close to that time showed a temp-dewpoint depression of only a few degrees up to around 15,000’. Their best bet (other than no-go) may have been to have a better understanding of the big picture and head northwest, away from the precip.
 
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