Old news but good article by Wm Langewiesche on Air France 447

[AcroGimp]

Despite claims that it is the most important protection offered by the product line, Airbus eventually altered the Alpha Protection laws following the Iberia crash, where another Airbus simply refused to do what the crew told it to do, all the way to the ground, at over -1400fpm - resulting in loss of the aircraft and several significant injuries, fortunately no fatalities.

For AF296 they blamed the accident on pilot error before the fires were out - and there are longstanding claims that the FDR data used in the investigation was tampered with (of course objected to by Airbus).

'Gimp

 

[Bill Watson]

Despite all the p_ssing, I feel like I've learned a good bit here - right or wrong, I'm more informed.

I see two different discussions and both of them are enlightening.

1) The cause of this accident, probable cause if you will, was pilot error. The pilots completely screwed it up. They encountered a known problem but couldn't identify it. Outside of the known problem, the aircraft performed as designed. The crew then proceeded to demonstrate a great deal of incompentence in airmanship, systems understanding and CRM. Given that, the BEA concluded correctly I think that a number of things need to be done in training to address it. Pilot experience and selection too methinks. R&W seems dead right on this one. And he has hands-on experience that, while I can't share it I can appreciate that he has it.

2) There are a bunch of design and engineering issues that warrant analysis, particularly as they relate to human factors. This crash surely adds to this work and will influence it in the future. Is the design and engineering optimal? Of course not. Was it well executed? Seems like it. Can it be improved? Sure, but in what directions should it be improved? Matter of opinion. But in the end, the design and the engineering were well thought out, executed with excellence and functioned as designed with the exception in this case of those confounded freezing pitots.

R&W earlier said something about 'poor airmanship' on the part of the crew. I read that thinking that one might read that as 'stick and rudder skills' but I'm thinking it needs to include systems understanding skills and CRM.

The crew just didn't exhibit the right stuff during those long minutes before smacking into the ocean. Damn them, may they rest in peace.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Despite all the p_ssing, I feel like I've learned a good bit here - right or wrong, I'm more informed.

I see two different discussions and both of them are enlightening.

1) The cause of this accident, probable cause if you will, was pilot error. The pilots completely screwed it up. They encountered a known problem but couldn't identify it. Outside of the known problem, the aircraft performed as designed. The crew then proceeded to demonstrate a great deal of incompentence in airmanship, systems operation and CRM. Given that, the BEA concluded correctly I think that a number of things need to be done in training to address it. Pilot experience and selection too methinks. R&W seems dead right on this one. And he has hands-on experience that, while I can't share it I can appreciate that he has it.

2) There are a bunch of design and engineering issues that warrant analysis, particularly as they relate to human factors. This crash surely adds to this work and will influence it in the future. Is the design and engineering optimal? Of course not. Was it well executed? Seems like it. Can it be improved? Sure, but in what directions should it be improved? Matter of opinion. But in the end, the design and the engineering were well thought out, executed with excellence and functioned as designed with the exception in this case of those confounded freezing pitots.

R&W earlier said something about 'poor airmanship' on the part of the crew. I read that thinking that one might read that as 'stick and rudder skills' but I'm thinking it needs to include systems operation skills and CRM.

The crew just didn't exhibit the right stuff during those long minutes before smacking into the ocean. Damn them, may they rest in peace.

Good summary.

 

[Hello]

For AF296 they blamed the accident on pilot error before the fires were out - and there are longstanding claims that the FDR data used in the investigation was tampered with (of course objected to by Airbus).

'Gimp

Oh please...
And the man didn't go to the moon, the Earth is flat, and the government of the USA brought down the World Trade Center...

Those conspiracy theories' worth is exactly zero. Had Airbus and BEA done such a thing, it would have leaked a long time ago.

The problem with aviation ever has been the pilots can be never at fault, even when it's obvious they commit blatant mistakes, like the AF447 accident. There has to be always other factors.

What did you want? Airplanes to be perfect? If this were the case, pilots wouldn't be needed in the cockpit.
With all the automation of today, the pilots workload has been greatly diminished and safety greatly improved... In fact, they are nothing more than automation managers most of the time, and when something out of the ordinary happens, they have to manage the situation, that's why they're there.

Regards.

 

[genetk44]

Well both ignored it.Maybe it's a french thing...check this video out of a gear up landing...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5McECUtM8fw
BTW: if someone speaks french, can you translate?

As far as doing this in a simulator...the simulator doesn't simulate the pressure.

Some of the conversation is too muted or garbled to make out but
After the landing there is a "MERDE" = "****"
Then. " mumble mumble mumble, trop vite, trop vite" which translates as " mumble mumble mumble, too fast, too fast,".......anyways the only real thing I take away from that was that it would seem one of them felt they were coming in too fast too fast.....presumably on final due to lack of drag from the gear not being down?

 

[AcroGimp]

Oh please...
And the man didn't go to the moon, the Earth is flat, and the government of the USA brought down the World Trade Center...

Those conspiracy theories' worth is exactly zero. Had Airbus and BEA done such a thing, it would have leaked a long time ago.

The problem with aviation ever has been the pilots can be never at fault, even when it's obvious they commit blatant mistakes, like the AF447 accident. There has to be always other factors.

What did you want? Airplanes to be perfect? If this were the case, pilots wouldn't be needed in the cockpit.
With all the automation of today, the pilots workload has been greatly diminished and safety greatly improved... In fact, they are nothing more than automation managers most of the time, and when something out of the ordinary happens, they have to manage the situation, that's why they're there.

Regards.

Comparing claims of an apparent mismatch in data from the FDR on AF296, to nutjobs claiming Moon Landing Hoax or World Trade Center blather is nonsense.

Since I am a 20-yr safety professional in aerospace and defense, I am quite aware of the issue with pilots; humans are the least reliable element in any system we are a part of (1X10-1 in safety and reliability parlance), however, without human pilots there is no flight in GA, Commercial, BizAv, etc. so we have to design for that.

Simply put, Airbus has made choices that a substantial number of us who are in the actual community that design, build, certify and operate the aircraft find to be anywhere from strange to outright undesirable.

Pointing out real errors and faults in the hardware, software, man-machine interface or other certification issues does not diminish the issues with poor airmanship.

The objective is to learn from these accidents and then make adjustments to how we design, build, program and certify these systems so that they do not cause or accelerate helmet fires when the average (or even sub-par) flight crew is presented with a failure or unexpected situation.

For the Airbus family, there is a history of accidents where HAL simply ignores pilot inputs, sometimes even directly opposing pilot inputs and it has resulted in accidents, rather than preventing them as the brochure said.

Can some of that be explained as Boeing vs Airbus, USA vs Europe, etc.? Probably so but it is undeniable that there have been accidents, people have been killed, and the BEA has made specific suggestions to change the control laws, to add more readily digestible info for the flightcrew, etc.

'Gimp

 

[Bill Watson]

Helmet Fires.... I like that one.

 

[MooneyDriver78]

Some of the conversation is too muted or garbled to make out but

After the landing there is a "MERDE" = "****"

Then. " mumble mumble mumble, trop vite, trop vite" which translates as " mumble mumble mumble, too fast, too fast,".......anyways the only real thing I take away from that was that it would seem one of them felt they were coming in too fast too fast.....presumably on final due to lack of drag from the gear not being down?

Thx, watching this I'm amazed that 2 pilots could ignore a gear warning horn blaring for that long of time. There is something about the human mind that can ignore what's going around it when under stress.

 

[RotorAndWing]

Comparing claims of an apparent mismatch in data from the FDR on AF296, to nutjobs claiming Moon Landing Hoax or World Trade Center blather is nonsense.

Since I am a 20-yr safety professional in aerospace and defense, I am quite aware of the issue with pilots; humans are the least reliable element in any system we are a part of (1X10-1 in safety and reliability parlance), however, without human pilots there is no flight in GA, Commercial, BizAv, etc. so we have to design for that.

Simply put, Airbus has made choices that a substantial number of us who are in the actual community that design, build, certify and operate the aircraft find to be anywhere from strange to outright undesirable.

Pointing out real errors and faults in the hardware, software, man-machine interface or other certification issues does not diminish the issues with poor airmanship.

The objective is to learn from these accidents and then make adjustments to how we design, build, program and certify these systems so that they do not cause or accelerate helmet fires when the average (or even sub-par) flight crew is presented with a failure or unexpected situation.

For the Airbus family, there is a history of accidents where HAL simply ignores pilot inputs, sometimes even directly opposing pilot inputs and it has resulted in accidents, rather than preventing them as the brochure said.

Can some of that be explained as Boeing vs Airbus, USA vs Europe, etc.? Probably so but it is undeniable that there have been accidents, people have been killed, and the BEA has made specific suggestions to change the control laws, to add more readily digestible info for the flightcrew, etc.

'Gimp

Just curious, how much actual, real time experience do you have in an Airbus? Where did you receive your training on Airbus systems? Have you actually sat in an Airbus cockpit and have had an opportunity to operate it in the various laws and redundancies?

In my operating experience with the airplane I have had a few instances where the airplane did not do as commanded. When that happened I simply took over and flew the airplane manually, much the same as I would do in a Boeing, Cessna, etc.

I will cite again that Airbus has had hundreds of thousands (millions) of hours operating, by crews all over the world that don't seem to have a problem with how the information is presented or how the aircraft operates. Yes, the airplane is a super complex system, very advanced, and it takes a highly trained disciplined crew to operate it.

Simply put, Airbus has made choices that a substantial number of us who are in the actual community that design, build, certify and operate the aircraft find to be anywhere from strange to outright undesirable.

What have you designed, built and certified on the Airbus? And again you say "operate", exactly how have you operated the aircraft? I'm just trying to understand where your gaining your conclusions from?

 

[MooneyDriver78]

I will cite again that Airbus has had hundreds of thousands (millions) of hours operating, by crews all over the world that don't seem to have a problem with how the information is presented or how the aircraft operates.

While true, but how many of those hours did the Airbus system have a problem, causing AP to disengage and the modes to change. Sitting comfortably in your chair while every works perfectly is not a good test of the aircraft systems. It's when things go to **** is the true test of the system and it's pilots.

 

[RotorAndWing]

While true, but how many of those hours did the Airbus system have a problem, causing AP to disengage and the modes to change. Sitting comfortably in your chair while every works perfectly is not a good test of the aircraft systems. It's when things go to **** is the true test of the system and it's pilots.

Not sure of the numbers fleet wide. My personally experience has been very seldom in the actual aircraft. We do simulate different scenarios during recurrent and work through the problem. The Airbus has many different layers of redundancy, so a failure of a system does not immediately downgrade into an emergency. We've simulated some of the worst case scenarios (dual ADR Failure, Dual RA failure, FCU failure, Dual FMS failure, Radio Panel failure, DMU failures, etc, etc). Systems knowledge is everything, basic airmanship is a must.

BTW, when the autopilot disengages it doesn't necessarily change the modes (laws).

What many here fail to grasp is this is not a GA light airplane. We don't get a "check out" and never see any meaningful training again. Initial training is quit long and indepth. The Airbus is a highly complex aircraft and does have a steep learning curve initially. I can see what bothers most here is it isn't familiar like their small airplanes, therefore it's "overly complex" and systems "that don't make sense".

We go to recurrent every 6 months and spend 8 to 10 hours in the sim. Those sim sessions include normal ops, engine out operations, Cat 2/3 approaches with various failures, hydraulic and electrical failures, pneumatic failures, and I guarantee at some point you will get a series of failures that essentially leave you with a very basic airplane, hand flying and raw data in crappy weather down to minimums.

Here's an interesting read on SOP's.

So tell me about the last time you received training in your airplane?


BTW, here's a little thing called "The Golden Rules of Airbus"

1-The aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft.
2-Fly,navigate,communicate in that order.
3-One head up at all times.
4-Cross check the accuracy of the FMS.
5-Know your FMA at all times.
6-When things don't go as expected-TAKE OVER.
7-Use the proper level of automation for the task.
8-Practice task sharing and back up each other.

 

[MooneyDriver78]

Not sure of the numbers fleet wide. My personally experience has been very seldom in the actual aircraft. We do simulate different scenarios during recurrent and work through the problem.
Did you simulate all 3 A/S indicators being frozen?? Do this scenarios have defined procedures, did the procedure include flying the plane level, verifying ground speed with GPS? IF it did, they didn't do it. Maybe it was too simple of a problem, and they were expected/looking for a more complicated one. Like AA587 with the turbulence training?
We go to recurrent every 6 months and spend 8 to 10 hours in the sim. Those sim sessions include normal ops, engine out operations, Cat 2/3 approaches with various failures, hydraulic and electrical failures, pneumatic failures, and I guarantee at some point you will get a series of failures that essentially leave you with a very basic airplane, hand flying and raw data in crappy weather down to minimums.
The problem with a sim is you are expecting failures, and you don't train with the same crew and obviously the crew dynamics were a problem here, neither pilot or the captain assumed control. Did they ever stick you with a copilot that purposely manipulates the plane incorrectly or otherwise gives confusing information in order to test how you handle it?
So tell me about the last time you received training in your airplane?

7 Months ago...10 hrs transition

 

[RotorAndWing]

7 Months ago...10 hrs transition

Aircraft type?

 

[MooneyDriver78]

Aircraft type?

Mooney M20J

 

[RotorAndWing]

. Did you simulate all 3 A/S indicators being frozen?? Do this scenarios have defined procedures, did the procedure include flying the plane level, verifying ground speed with GPS? IF it did, they didn't do it. Maybe it was too simple of a problem, and they were expected/looking for a more complicated one. Like AA587 with the turbulence training?

Yes, we have a situation where there is a loss of reliable airspeed. There are memory items as well as ECAM actions. And the Airbus has a BUSS ( back up speed system) in the event of ASI loss.

The problem with a sim is you are expecting failures, and you don't train with the same crew and obviously the crew dynamics were a problem here, neither pilot or the captain assumed control. Did they ever stick you with a copilot that purposely manipulates the plane incorrectly or otherwise gives confusing information in order to test how you handle it?

I take it you've got little if any experience in simulator training in a Air Carrier environment?

We train with a variety of crews, but the difference here is standardization and adherence to procedures. By having this you shouldn't have to worry about a fellow crew member do something out of the ordinary, everyone is on the same page. This is proved out time and time again ( and over hundreds of thousands of hours) of air carrier flying. Air France had a problem in that area not only with AAF 447 but a few other incidents.

The scenario of "stick you with a copilot that purposely manipulates the plane incorrectly or otherwise gives confusing information in order to test how you handle it" is rather silly for a carrier that adheres to standards, CRM and SOP's. Maybe we should train for "Snakes on the plane" or an alien intervention as well?

 

[RotorAndWing]

Mooney M20J

Ok, did you simulate a total electrical failure in IMC and perform an approach to minimums? How about a prop control failure? Landing gear failure to extend? Jammed fuel control lever? No flap landing? Trim failure? Loss of airspeed indication? Loss of a magneto in flight? How about an inflight fire? Did you have a complete systems oral exam detains aircraft limitations?

When will you go back for recurrent? Every 6 months? 8-10 hours of training?

I'm really not trying to be an ass here, but there is a world of difference in a check out part 91 in a Mooney and a Part 121 initial training program that last for 2-3 months and involves 40+ hours in the simulator and requires an indepth knowledge of the airplane and systems.

 

[MooneyDriver78]

The scenario of "stick you with a copilot that purposely manipulates the plane incorrectly or otherwise gives confusing information in order to test how you handle it" is rather silly for a carrier that adheres to standards, CRM and SOP's. Maybe we should train for "Snakes on the plane" or an alien intervention as well?

The difference is that's exactly what happen, if snakes on the plane ever happens in real life, then yes, I would add it.

 

[Hello]

While true, but how many of those hours did the Airbus system have a problem, causing AP to disengage and the modes to change. Sitting comfortably in your chair while every works perfectly is not a good test of the aircraft systems. It's when things go to **** is the true test of the system and it's pilots.

And yet, when things go to ****, the majority of the Airbus pilots do their job, like several pilots did with this specific issue with the pitot tubes.
I'm sure you realize it was not the first time this issue had appeared, other crews experienced the same issue and didn't crash the plane.

 

[MooneyDriver78]

Ok, did you simulate a total electrical failure in IMC and perform an approach to minimums? How about a prop control failure? Landing gear failure to extend? Jammed fuel control lever? No flap landing? Trim failure? Loss of airspeed indication? Loss of a magneto in flight? How about an inflight fire? Did you have a complete systems oral exam detains aircraft limitations?

When will you go back for recurrent? Every 6 months? 8-10 hours of training?

I'm really not trying to be an ass here, but there is a world of difference in a check out part 91 in a Mooney and a Part 121 initial training program that last for 2-3 months and involves 40+ hours in the simulator and requires an indepth knowledge of the airplane and systems.

I never said there wasn't, I don't have a simulator so obviously scenarios were limited, did some, talked about others.
I never said that part 121 training was inferior to 91, what I said was sim training can only go so far, and that training in a sim environment is not equivalent to the real thing.
IF we both agree it wasn't a mechanical failure, and it was pilot error, then we are left with choices as I see it:
Pilots were not properly trained to handle a relatively simple problem,
pilots never absorbed their training and put it to use,
pilots were bad pilots and never should have passed their training
So which of the above 3 is it?

 

[Jimmy cooper]

Someone mentioned that the entire crew was accomplished and well trained. Two did not have that many hours and training is unknown. I think it was these two that screwed the pooch. The captain arrived late to the Chinese fire drill didn't he? ( the author also had a very good article on 9-11 and the response that day by first responders. It was in the Atlantic magazine I think.) he's really a very good reporter. His father was a very well known aviation writer also.

 

[MooneyDriver78]

And yet, when things go to ****, the majority of the Airbus pilots do their job, like several pilots did with this specific issue with the pitot tubes.
I'm sure you realize it was not the first time this issue had appeared, other crews experienced the same issue and didn't crash the plane.

Probably true, certainly it was a know issue, were there cases when all 3 tubes iced up? Did any of these occur while the captain was out of the cockpit and the problem was left to be resolve a pilot with minimal recent experience and a inexperience copilot?

 

[RotorAndWing]

I never said there wasn't, I don't have a simulator so obviously scenarios were limited, did some, talked about others.
I never said that part 121 training was inferior to 91, what I said was sim training can only go so far, and that training in a sim environment is not equivalent to the real thing.
IF we both agree it wasn't a mechanical failure, and it was pilot error, then we are left with choices as I see it:
Pilots were not properly trained to handle a relatively simple problem,
pilots never absorbed their training and put it to use,
pilots were bad pilots and never should have passed their training
So which of the above 3 is it?

The sim environment is very mentally demanding, and often we get caught up in the heat of the battle where the lines between simulation and reality blur. You're presented with a problem to work out and your mind is not saying " hey, this is just a simulator, relax!"

I understand you cannot fathom what training in a level D sim under an air carrier is like, I've tried to give some insight here but you simply refuse to believe it. Can't help you there.

Another point. If I fail a sim session it's not a slap on the back and an "aw shucks boy, we'll just try again!" My job is on the line, I am demanded to adhere to standards and SOP, fail to do so and not only am I unemployed, but try going to another airline with a big failure on my record. Think the next company will hire me? How's that for " pressure"?

The AF447 was a pilot error event. The final reports on AAF 447 detail the problems and faults. Take the time to read it and try to understand what happened.

 

[Jim Logajan]

Probably true, certainly it was a know issue, were there cases when all 3 tubes iced up? Did any of these occur while the captain was out of the cockpit and the problem was left to be resolve a pilot with minimal recent experience and a inexperience copilot?

This article lists several such incidents though it doesn't give enough detail on all of them to determine if they exactly match your scenario, though I think that requirement is questionable at best:

http://www.aviationtoday.com/regions/usa/More-Pitot-Tube-Incidents-Revealed_72414.html#.VCcHLhZ0YUp

One thing I've wondered about: Since the pilots were clearly looking at the artificial horizon and trusting it enough in order to maintain wings level, I'm not sure I understand why they ignored the depiction of extreme pitch up attitude that I assume would have shown there.

 

[MooneyDriver78]

The sim environment is very mentally demanding, and often we get caught up in the heat of the battle where the lines between simulation and reality blur. You're presented with a problem to work out and your mind is not saying " hey, this is just a simulator, relax!"



I understand you cannot fathom what training in a level D sim under an air carrier is like, I've tried to give some insight here but you simply refuse to believe it. Can't help you there.



Another point. If I fail a sim session it's not a slap on the back and an "aw shucks boy, we'll just try again!" My job is on the line, I am demanded to adhere to standards and SOP, fail to do so and not only am I unemployed, but try going to another airline with a big failure on my record. Think the next company will hire me? How's that for " pressure"?



The AF447 was a pilot error event. The final reports on AAF 447 detail the problems and faults. Take the time to read it and try to understand what happened.

I'm sure if you mess up a sim scenario it won't cost you your job.
If you mess up in real life, it cost you a lot more than your job.
Back in. Post 67, you said "what pressure", now you say there is pressure in a simulator!?!

We'll have agree to disagree, cause you're right, I don't buy it.

 

[ClimbnSink]

Settle down folks because the problem is ATC didn't immediately clear af447for an immediate pitch change. Even though they never requested any such thing. ATC should have known.

 

[RotorAndWing]

I'm sure if you mess up a sim scenario it won't cost you your job.

So please tell us how grading is done during a recurrent check ride (Proficiency Check) or how grading is done during Initial Upgrade. Please tell us the parameters for these checks and how they are applied. To say "I'm sure", please tell us how you are sure.

If you mess up in real life, it cost you a lot more than your job.

Hence, Standardization and constant training.

Back in. Post 67, you said "what pressure", now you say there is pressure in a simulator!?!.

I was seeking a clarification.

We'll have agree to disagree, cause you're right, I don't buy it.

You don't "buy it" because you don't understand it.

 

[WhiskeyPapa]

Great article. Article summarized in 2 sentences by the author:
"To put it briefly, automation has made it more and more unlikely that ordinary airline pilots will ever have to face a raw crisis in flight—but also more and more unlikely that they will be able to cope with such a crisis if one arises. Moreover, it is not clear that there is a way to resolve this paradox."

 

[AcroGimp]

While I normally would not reply to an attempt like this to dismiss all criticism based on a perceived lack of total qualification to speak on the subject, I do know a bit about the subject and am completely comfortable with my qualifications to speak on the subject - and since I can't stand logical fallacy arguments, in particular ad hominem/poisoning the well, I will reply to this.

Just curious, how much actual, real time experience do you have in an Airbus?

No experience as flightcrew.

Where did you receive your training on Airbus systems?

At UTC Aerospace Systems, via Airbus, while supporting the A320neo program which just had its first flight last week coincidentally. Because the A320neo is a new program, I had access to substantial legacy data for the A320, and had a tangential relationship to the new A350 as well.

Have you actually sat in an Airbus cockpit and have had an opportunity to operate it in the various laws and redundancies?

No, see above. However, I have worked closely with very experienced Boeing and Airbus pilots on various programs and have had extensive discussions with them about flight operations and for FBW aircraft in general and Airbus in particular I am always interested learning about their experience. Think check airmen level of experience.

I will cite again that Airbus has had hundreds of thousands (millions) of hours operating, by crews all over the world that don't seem to have a problem with how the information is presented or how the aircraft operates. Yes, the airplane is a super complex system, very advanced, and it takes a highly trained disciplined crew to operate it.

This statement is completely irrelevant from a Systems Safety Engineering standpoint and actually demonstrates a hazardous attitude. The same attitude that has failed throughout this argument to acknowledge there are issues with the Airbus man-machine interface, as evidenced not only by the crashes but by the changes to regulations, and design and programming, in addition to changes in training.

What have you designed, built and certified on the Airbus? And again you say "operate", exactly how have you operated the aircraft? I'm just trying to understand where your gaining your conclusions from?

If you have ever used an EFB in an Airbus, or any other commercial, business or general aviation aircraft, you are benefitting from my work on the FAA/Industry team that developed the regulatory framework.

Although limited in what I can divulge due to various NDAs I can say specific to Airbus I was involved in the Thrust Reverser installation/integration for the A320neo and A350. The work I was doing included needing an understanding of man-machine interface, as well as FADEC/AFCS and EFIS/EICAS integration to include pilot actions during all phases of flight.

Additional FBW programs I have been involved in are: Dassault FalconJet 7X, Spaceship Company SpaceShip 2, Mitsubishi MRJ70/MRJ90, Bombardier C-Series, Embraer KC-390, COMAC ARJ-21, and Aerion AS2 Supersonic Business Jet.

I have also served, by invitation, on 2 International Air Transport Association (ATA) Working Groups covering man-machine interface in the cockpit for digital displays, and the flight operations working group.

There is really a significant difference between how the operators use a system from how the OEM designs, builds, certifies and fields it. Before any pilot has an FCOM, the OEM wrote it. Before there are sim training scenarios, the OEM identified every likely failure mode, and addressed it by design or by operational mitigation, then passes that on to the training developer.

Everything any pilot thinks they know about an airplane was first imagined by, then developed and built and certified by the OEM.

As I have repeatedly said however, the issue is to learn from these accidents and while RotorAndWing has correctly picked up on the flightcrew element of the accident causes, he seems to have missed entirely the BEA report identified issues with the plane itself, in particular AOA presentation and the manner in which messages and failure warnings/cautions are decluttered (a recurring theme in Airbus accidents, as well as some Boeing accidents).

He has also failed to acknowledge that there have been, in fact, accidents caused by the Airbus FBW philosophy that yielded changes in the design, which has been my primary point all along.

The design of the plane must not create or add to the risk of helmet fires when the flight crews are dealing with unusual or emergency operations.

Put simply, if there was nothing wrong with the planes; design and regulatory changes would not have occurred - but there was, and they did.

'Gimp

 

[docmirror]

That's gonna leave a mark...

 

[RotorAndWing]

No experience as flightcrew.

Evident.

No, see above. However, I have worked closely with very experienced Boeing and Airbus pilots on various programs and have had extensive discussions with them about flight operations and for FBW aircraft in general and Airbus in particular I am always interested learning about their experience. Think check airmen level of experience.

Yes,, I understand check airman level of experience since I am both a TRI and a TRE. But non the less my background and actual operating experience on type is irrelevant on this forum.

There is really a significant difference between how the operators use a system from how the OEM designs, builds, certifies and fields it. Before any pilot has an FCOM, the OEM wrote it. Before there are sim training scenarios, the OEM identified every likely failure mode, and addressed it by design or by operational mitigation, then passes that on to the training developer.

Everything any pilot thinks they know about an airplane was first imagined by, then developed and built and certified by the OEM.

Gee, really?

As I have repeatedly said however, the issue is to learn from these accidents and while RotorAndWing has correctly picked up on the flightcrew element of the accident causes, he seems to have missed entirely the BEA report identified issues with the plane itself, in particular AOA presentation and the manner in which messages and failure warnings/cautions are decluttered (a recurring theme in Airbus accidents, as well as some Boeing accidents).

Yep! I read that and didn't dispute it. What I did state is when the same situation was presented to other crews (simulation) they didn't have problems with it as they followed procedures.

He has also failed to acknowledge that there have been, in fact, accidents caused by the Airbus FBW philosophy that yielded changes in the design, which has been my primary point all along.

Put simply, if there was nothing wrong with the planes; design and regulatory changes would not have occurred - but there was, and they did.

'Gimp

If you had actually read what I wrote I acknowledged there was changes in design as the aircraft evolves. It was a few others who had concluded the airplane was like a Cessna in that when it left the factory it never sees any more updates to the airframe.

 

[Silvaire]

...Put simply, if there was nothing wrong with the planes; design and regulatory changes would not have occurred - but there was, and they did...

I'll agree that is put "simply"

As a mechanic for a large airline I can tell you that we are constantly incorporating changes through AD's, Service Bulletins, engineering requests and other configuration alterations on both Airbus and Boeing aircraft. The controlled maintenance documentation itself is in such a state of constant flux that when printed it is only valid for the duration of that shift after which it must be discarded.

So, based on that, there is always something "wrong"

 

[Larry in TN]

One thing I've wondered about: Since the pilots were clearly looking at the artificial horizon and trusting it enough in order to maintain wings level, I'm not sure I understand why they ignored the depiction of extreme pitch up attitude that I assume would have shown there.

The aircraft pitch attitude was in the 10°-15° ANU range for the majority of the descent which is not an extreme nose-up attitude. In fact, it is very normal. What was needed was a sustained extreme nose-down attitude due to the very high AoA resulting from the steep descent angle.

 

[archerdriver]

This discussion has become about as productive as the discussion of MH 370's disappearance on PPRUNE. 11,500 useless posts and counting.

Fascinating discussion, and I will look up Wm L's article on 9/11 -

Have to comment....

<< PPRUNE.>> has GOT to be the most unfortunate acronym since the 1971-72 "CREEP" - "Committee to Re-Elect the President"!

 

[Art VanDelay]

I'm sure if you mess up a sim scenario it won't cost you your job.

Oh really ? And you know this how ? Tell me, what menial boring job do you have ? Let me know so I can spout off like I know something about it. Would you maybe find that irritating?

 

[Art VanDelay]

While I normally would not reply to an attempt like this to dismiss all criticism based on a perceived lack of total qualification to speak on the subject, I do know a bit about the subject and am completely comfortable with my qualifications to speak on the subject - and since I can't stand logical fallacy arguments, in particular ad hominem/poisoning the well, I will reply to this.

No experience as flightcrew.

At UTC Aerospace Systems, via Airbus, while supporting the A320neo program which just had its first flight last week coincidentally. Because the A320neo is a new program, I had access to substantial legacy data for the A320, and had a tangential relationship to the new A350 as well.

No, see above. However, I have worked closely with very experienced Boeing and Airbus pilots on various programs and have had extensive discussions with them about flight operations and for FBW aircraft in general and Airbus in particular I am always interested learning about their experience. Think check airmen level of experience.

This statement is completely irrelevant from a Systems Safety Engineering standpoint and actually demonstrates a hazardous attitude. The same attitude that has failed throughout this argument to acknowledge there are issues with the Airbus man-machine interface, as evidenced not only by the crashes but by the changes to regulations, and design and programming, in addition to changes in training.

If you have ever used an EFB in an Airbus, or any other commercial, business or general aviation aircraft, you are benefitting from my work on the FAA/Industry team that developed the regulatory framework.

Although limited in what I can divulge due to various NDAs I can say specific to Airbus I was involved in the Thrust Reverser installation/integration for the A320neo and A350. The work I was doing included needing an understanding of man-machine interface, as well as FADEC/AFCS and EFIS/EICAS integration to include pilot actions during all phases of flight.

Additional FBW programs I have been involved in are: Dassault FalconJet 7X, Spaceship Company SpaceShip 2, Mitsubishi MRJ70/MRJ90, Bombardier C-Series, Embraer KC-390, COMAC ARJ-21, and Aerion AS2 Supersonic Business Jet.

I have also served, by invitation, on 2 International Air Transport Association (ATA) Working Groups covering man-machine interface in the cockpit for digital displays, and the flight operations working group.

There is really a significant difference between how the operators use a system from how the OEM designs, builds, certifies and fields it. Before any pilot has an FCOM, the OEM wrote it. Before there are sim training scenarios, the OEM identified every likely failure mode, and addressed it by design or by operational mitigation, then passes that on to the training developer.

Everything any pilot thinks they know about an airplane was first imagined by, then developed and built and certified by the OEM.

As I have repeatedly said however, the issue is to learn from these accidents and while RotorAndWing has correctly picked up on the flightcrew element of the accident causes, he seems to have missed entirely the BEA report identified issues with the plane itself, in particular AOA presentation and the manner in which messages and failure warnings/cautions are decluttered (a recurring theme in Airbus accidents, as well as some Boeing accidents).

He has also failed to acknowledge that there have been, in fact, accidents caused by the Airbus FBW philosophy that yielded changes in the design, which has been my primary point all along.

The design of the plane must not create or add to the risk of helmet fires when the flight crews are dealing with unusual or emergency operations.

Put simply, if there was nothing wrong with the planes; design and regulatory changes would not have occurred - but there was, and they did.

'Gimp

Acro flying is easy, anybody can do it. I know this because I once brushed up against a Pitts Special and I spoke with Acro pilots and did computer modeling bla, bla bla,bla ..... Are you familiar with the term "poser" ?

 

[AcroGimp]

Really funny the emotions this thread has brought out and the need for some to try and snipe and character assassinate rather than deal in facts.

'Gimp

 

[Greg Bockelman]

Oh really ? And you know this how ? Tell me, what menial boring job do you have ? Let me know so I can spout off like I know something about it. Would you maybe find that irritating?

So Art. Which company fires people if they bust a sim ride? I only have first hand knowledge of a couple and neither of them do.

Just curious. I know there has to be some.

 

[Sam D]

Question for those who get trained/tested in a sim regularly:

When you prepare for and begin a sim session are you at a higher alert level than during your regular flying?

I'd think you would be. Not to say that you'd normally be complacent but perhaps more relaxed. This thought struck me concerning when accident scenarios are repeated in the sim. Seems like there would be an element of 'ready for something to go wrong'.

 

[Jimmy cooper]

According to a friend who has worked at flight safety for years, a few that show up are really poorly trained and are not given the ok. They fail. I would imagine they don't fly for that company anymore. However......the pilot who crashed near buffalo apparently had , in the past, failed several check rides. When the chips were down, he turned an easily corrected situation into a disaster. How does this happen?

 

[nauga]

When the chips were down, he turned an easily corrected situation into a disaster. How does this happen?

Some would say it happens because of design flaws in the airplane. Others say it's because of pilot screening. Still others say it's training. Some claim conspiracy. The real answer is usually found in accident reports and is more along the lines of a combination of these and many more.

Nauga,
and his RAC 1A