Unfortunately the 'quote' feature defeats the 'ignore' feature.
Midair at FDK (Frederick, MD)
- Thread starter Pedals2Paddles
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Unfortunately the 'quote' feature defeats the 'ignore' feature.
FastEddieB
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Fast Eddie B
It takes discipline, but a glance can tell you who's being quoted, making it fairly easy to ignore the quoted text as well.
In any case, I know it's been good for my blood pressure.
In other words you can't directly fault him for being an inferior pilot. Seriously though, I have had close calls looking out the window and the closest call I had was ATC shouting at me for an immediate descent with me pushing fast and a King Air descending through the airspace I was just about to occupy.
Humans are fallible, we can accept that and try to reinforce our weaknesses, or we can deny it and lie to ourselves that it can't happen to us.
The fact that the cirrus pilot reported having two helos in sight proves that he was looking out of his window. He was also told that the helos were below him. If he was on a 45deg pattern entry, the hovering third helo was a green stationary speck at an a elevation he didnt expect him on a background of green and yellow fall foliage. Robinsons are one of the hardest aircraft to spot.
Jim Logajan
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.
In this specific case the Cirrus pilot did look outside since he was told about 3 helicopters and said he spotted 2. It doesn't matter what you may claim about the general case - in this specific case the Cirrus pilot did look and knew what to look for and reported what he saw. Other than momentary setting of some controls and checking speed and altitude, a pilot's eyes are outside when approaching the landing pattern in VMC. It is an oddball claim to say otherwise since past research found even outside the pattern:
"According to a U.S. study, private pilots on VFR flights spend about 50 per cent of their time in outside traffic scan (Suzler and Skelton 1976)."
Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Principle, Australian - Transport Safety Bureau
http://www.skybrary.aero/bookshelf/books/259.pdf
And in another study report:
The see-and-avoid concept has physical and behavioral limitations such that pilots cannot reliably see and avoid conflicting aircraft. Pilots can find it physically impossible to see converging aircraft, especially when climbing or descending in an airport traffic pattern. Also, because human information processing is biased toward detection of contrast and sudden change, the small, motionless, camouflaged target projected by a rapidly converging aircraft is difficult to detect within the random and narrow window of opportunity to see and avoid it.
...
These findings challenge the view that most midair collisions involve inadequate visual scanning (21,23).
...
Midair Collisions: Limitations of the See-and-Avoid Concept in Civil Aviation - C. Craig Morris
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/asma/asem/2005/00000076/00000004/art00007?crawler=true
That's a reasonable proposal. However according to the reports I linked to, researchers since the 1970's have criticized see-and-avoid as fundamentally flawed when applied to vehicles traveling at high speeds. From the Australian publication:
"See-and-avoid has been described as a maritime concept originally developed for slow moving ships which is now out of place in an era of high speed aviation (Marthinsen 1989)."
Part of its conclusion:
"The see-and-avoid principle in the absence of traffic alerts is subject to serious limitations. It is likely that the historically small number of mid-air collisions has been in a large part due to low traffic density and chance as much as the successful operation of see-and-avoid.
...
The most effective response to the many flaws of see-and-avoid is to minimise the reliance on see-and-avoid in Australian airspace."
Midair collisions are so rare that the 22nd Nall Report categorized them under "Unusual Accident Categories" and stated:
"Fourteen fatal accidents and another 17 that were not fatal arose from circumstances too rare to support tabulation as separate categories for statistical analysis. In part because they were so unusual, however, many received extensive coverage in the general media."
Any future steps should consume resources proportionate to the risk; no more, no less. People often get their priorities wrong when evaluating risk when presented with accidents like this.
I usually see "most" surrounding aircraft when I fly without a big problem... I have found that heli's do a good job of hiding into the background of the landscape.. Paint it green and you are asking for trouble, and in this case, that is clearly pointed out.. Altho I personally feel it was hidden in the blind spot below the Cirrus and with a couple of seconds notice the Cirrus didn't even have time to bank his wings and have a look under him..
With that said I would make the suggestion of adding a very key safety factor to all heli's.. Out here when we get forest fires, they bring in alot of rotor wing stuff to put them out.. If the blades are painted the same color they become a blur and invisible... On EVERY one where they paint one blade white, or red or any dissimilar color,, You can see those suckers 10 miles away......
IMHO.... ALL heli's need blades painted like that...
Ben.
timwinters
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He's not the one that needs to be banned.
MooneyDriver78
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I'm waiting for the report of the respective altitudes, if the Cirrus was below pattern altitude it's his fault, if the helicopter wasn't 300' below it's his, the Cirrus records it's flight data, so don't need radar data to determine where it was
Checkout_my_Six
Touchdown! Greaser!
fyi.....the main rotor mast (rotating part)....is bright orange and white. Take a look at the crash photos. It's there.
It's very hard to miss from above....It creates large circular orange and white set of concentric circles.
fyi.....the main rotor mast (rotating part)....is bright orange and white. Take a look at the crash photos. It's there.
It's very hard to miss from above....It creates large circular orange and white set of concentric circles.
He didnt approach the Robie from above, they were at the same altitude. The rotor head on the R helos looks like something from the RC model store, visual cross-section is that of a bird when viewed from the side. I share the pattern with Robinsons at one airport and a blue/white company EC145 at another. I can see the real helicopter miles out, not so the sperm shaped Robies.
timwinters
Ejection Handle Pulled
If they were at the same altitude then I doubt the damage to the Cirrus would have been the right main gear and the BACKSIDE of the right wing. The right main gear, right flap and right aileron were torn off by the impact:
That damage info from the NTSB report points to either the Cirrus descending into the chopper, or the chopper climbing into the Cirrus. Hopefully the Cirrus' black box along with other sources will have those answers.
I would imagine that if the Cirrus were a couple of feet above the Robbie that when he flew over the rotor disc he would have dropped into it bringing about exactly the damage seen. The only other way (besides descending onto the Robbie) was that the Robbie climbed into him.
Either way, the answer to 'fault' will lie with the altitude record of the SR-22. Did this happen at 1300' or 1100' and by what instruction were that at the altitude they were? Those are the primary issues in play. There is an altitude based differential scheme in place to avoid this accident, why was it violated?
Either way, the answer to 'fault' will lie with the altitude record of the SR-22. Did this happen at 1300' or 1100' and by what instruction were that at the altitude they were? Those are the primary issues in play. There is an altitude based differential scheme in place to avoid this accident, why was it violated?
timwinters
Ejection Handle Pulled
Exactly.
Absent an instruction from the tower to be at 1100, the helo may well have been where he was expected to be, yet the tower advised the cirrus that he had '3 helicopters in the pattern below him' (paraphrased).
To me the description suggests that he went horizontally through the rotor disc.
Lindberg
Final Approach
Why does fault depend on altitude in this case? I don't see anything in 91.113 regarding altitude in this situation, the transcript doesn't have the tower telling the helicopter to maintain a certain altitude, and there's not a separate published pattern for helicopters. The cirrus could have maintained his altitude and still been at fault, or not.
FormerRWPilot
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Some thoughts after having read this thread, in no particular order:
Did about 180 hours of training with AHC. Good people, safe people, responsible people. Was on my way to a career as a RW pilot until a couple kids arrived in my life and I moved to CO. PPL, IR, but not current.
I haven't trained with them since May of 2011, so things might have changed since the tower went into operation, but pattern altitude for us was 900MSL (about 600 ft AGL). It would be highly unusual to fly a pattern above 1000MSL (we'd venture that high to do 180* autorotations, but that was about it as I recall). That the controller mentioned heli traffic below the SR22 indicates to me that's the altitude where she expected them to be operating, 1000 and below.
AHC instructors I dealt with were to a man careful, precise, and engaged with the act of flying throughout. Odds that the instructee would be at the controls with the instructor not noticing he was 300ft higher than were he was supposed to be? In a high traffic situation? To my mind: nil.
In the non towered days, yes, we'd almost always fly opposite patterns to the FW traffic for this reason. 30 was a notable exception, and I gather that is not a change post-tower operation.
The farm just north of the field would complain daily about heli traffic doing autos in that area north of 12-30, and instruction had been given to avoid practicing those there, and I do remember flying many a left pattern to 30, but we'd usually break off short of 30 and fly to the "tires" (a series of old tire in the grass near where a taxiway intersects 5-23 that served as targets for approaches, a couple thousand feet south of 12-30).
Is it possible the accident heli was too high?
Logically yes. Pragmatically speaking? I'll be really surprised if that's the case.
The tailcone of the R44 has a very prominent and visible strobe light and anticollision light in operation when the power's on. If the SR22 didn't see him, it's because the heli was in his blind spot, plain and simple.
I reckon any more if you report not seeing all the traffic a controller calls out to you, you'll be told to divert/climb going forward.
I miss flying, a lot. I was very close to a commercial and was working on a CFI too when the kids showed up in my life, and I have no regrets, and while I tell myself that flying is safer than driving and that if I someday go back to it as a second career I won't be doing something irresponsible, this can't help but give me pause.
Did about 180 hours of training with AHC. Good people, safe people, responsible people. Was on my way to a career as a RW pilot until a couple kids arrived in my life and I moved to CO. PPL, IR, but not current.
I haven't trained with them since May of 2011, so things might have changed since the tower went into operation, but pattern altitude for us was 900MSL (about 600 ft AGL). It would be highly unusual to fly a pattern above 1000MSL (we'd venture that high to do 180* autorotations, but that was about it as I recall). That the controller mentioned heli traffic below the SR22 indicates to me that's the altitude where she expected them to be operating, 1000 and below.
AHC instructors I dealt with were to a man careful, precise, and engaged with the act of flying throughout. Odds that the instructee would be at the controls with the instructor not noticing he was 300ft higher than were he was supposed to be? In a high traffic situation? To my mind: nil.
In the non towered days, yes, we'd almost always fly opposite patterns to the FW traffic for this reason. 30 was a notable exception, and I gather that is not a change post-tower operation.
The farm just north of the field would complain daily about heli traffic doing autos in that area north of 12-30, and instruction had been given to avoid practicing those there, and I do remember flying many a left pattern to 30, but we'd usually break off short of 30 and fly to the "tires" (a series of old tire in the grass near where a taxiway intersects 5-23 that served as targets for approaches, a couple thousand feet south of 12-30).
Is it possible the accident heli was too high?
Logically yes. Pragmatically speaking? I'll be really surprised if that's the case.
The tailcone of the R44 has a very prominent and visible strobe light and anticollision light in operation when the power's on. If the SR22 didn't see him, it's because the heli was in his blind spot, plain and simple.
I reckon any more if you report not seeing all the traffic a controller calls out to you, you'll be told to divert/climb going forward.
I miss flying, a lot. I was very close to a commercial and was working on a CFI too when the kids showed up in my life, and I have no regrets, and while I tell myself that flying is safer than driving and that if I someday go back to it as a second career I won't be doing something irresponsible, this can't help but give me pause.
If he was at an altitude where his gear would intersect the rotor disc, he was at an altitude where it would have been most difficult to spot the helo. IIRC there is a published altitude separation procedure in place for rotor and fixed wing traffic. The question still lies in 'Why were they both at the same altitude and in the same pattern?
Lindberg
Final Approach
From the NTSB preliminary: "The published traffic pattern altitude for single-engine and light-twin airplanes was 1,300 feet mean sea level (msl), and 1,800 feet msl for heavy multiengine and jet airplanes. The traffic pattern was a standard left-hand pattern, and there was no published traffic pattern or altitude for helicopters."IIRC there is a published altitude separation procedure in place for rotor and fixed wing traffic. The question still lies in 'Why were they both at the same altitude and in the same pattern?
The data from the Cirrus's black box / glass cockpit will tell the details.. My guess it will not be disclosed till the factual report comes out though..
Huh, okay, I saw referenced previously in this thread a 2or 300' differential for helicopters below the light aircraft altitude.
FormerRWPilot
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Indeed; it's not de jure, but it is de facto the standard for heli ops at FDK, I can assure you from experience.
Having spent 100 hour so hours in the pattern there keeping it pinned at 900MSL, unless something has really changed since my time there, that's where you'll find the helicopters.
timwinters
Ejection Handle Pulled
Correct. That came from someone's Garmin pilot airport page, IIRC. There are lots of "local protocols" out there that aren't posted in the AFD.
Official? No.
But well known to the locals? Yes.
We'd have to ask the local rotor wing pilots what they understand the protocol to be to know for sure...regardless of that the AFD says.
Lindberg
Final Approach
I have less experience than most at towered fields, and very little at busy towered fields. But I don't understand how one controller could be expected to handle this traffic on the ground and in the air. And I wonder how much having the tower lulls pilots into a false sense of security.
Kinda funny that a towed airfield would ignore the safety measures in place in AC 90-66A with regards to vertical (and horizontal) pattern separation for rotor craft operations and fixed wing that details operations under pilot control/non tower operations.
The Root Cause analysis will likely find the procedures in place at the airport to be a causal factor in this accident.
The Root Cause analysis will likely find the procedures in place at the airport to be a causal factor in this accident.
It is not published in the AFD or FAA master record remarks.
ClimbnSink
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Doesn't matter it seems to be longstanding SOP at that airport.
RotorDude
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GliderDude
In some cases there is an LoA between the FAA tower and the heli flight school specifying the special pattern rules (which is not in the AFD). But at least in my experience, the local controller reminds pilots of those rules before allowing them to use the "special heli pattern".
ElPaso Pilot
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Does matter for transients.
One thing that bugs me to no end are airport managers who will post "local SOP" tribal knowledge on the FBO bulletin board and on AOPA/Garmin unofficial private sites, but won't fill out the proper form to put it on the document of record.
No disagreement, however not pertinent to this particular accident since the helicopter would have that knowledge.
Garmin pilot seems to show a heli pattern at 1000. Dont know where they pulled that info.
The pilot was undergoing a rental checkout. Knowledge common to any local grown RW may not have been etched into his brain. The instructor should have caught a deviation.
ClimbnSink
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Airplane pilots know less about helicopters then nonpilots know about airplanes. And what airplane think they know is usually wrong. As I and FormerRWpilot explained you just don't keep climbing in a helicopter. The Cirrus was too low.
Correct, that is something that an instructor not only watches for, but specifically gives instruction on, during a rental checkout, so I would expect extra vigilance to the local rule would apply to their operation.
So do we have an answer as to what the accident altitude was yet?
RotorDude
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GliderDude
The instructee heli pilot (on the controls) being checked out for rental had twice the RW hours of the instructor, and was also a CFI, with both RW and FW experience. It is possible the instructor was giving the instructee too much deference, and missed the altitude deviation (which the instructee may not have been aware of, and the controller didn't mention). This is all assuming it was the heli that was too high, which may not be true.
Agree on all points.
Checkout_my_Six
Touchdown! Greaser!
that's the $64,000 question at the moment. Once we know that, we'll pretty much have an idea what happened.
Until then.....keep guessing.
bfergie10
Pre-Flight
I have to question the witness statement in the NTSB report about the helicopter appearing to be in a stationary hover.
I'm not familiar enough with RW operations, but why would a helicopter be in a hover, at the TPA, with multiple aircraft in the pattern?
I understand the NTSB is simply publishing a witness account and neither agrees with or disagrees with it's accuracy.
I'm not familiar enough with RW operations, but why would a helicopter be in a hover, at the TPA, with multiple aircraft in the pattern?
I understand the NTSB is simply publishing a witness account and neither agrees with or disagrees with it's accuracy.
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NoHeat
Final Approach
Local procedures must be a key link in this accident chain. Too little separation, too little margin for error.